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THE
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA

FROM 1859 TO 1868.

VOL. I.

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
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THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA



FROM 1859 TO 1868:

*THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF ADMINISTRATION UNDER
THE CROWN.*

BY
ILTUDUS THOMAS PRICHARD,

(GRAY'S INN,) BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

IN TWO VOLUMES.
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ERRATA.

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- Page 109, line 6 from bottom. *For* "Dr. Daltry," *read* "Dr. Dealtry."
 „ 111, in headline. *For* "Epitaphs on Lord and Lady Canning," *read* "Epitaph on Lady Canning."
 „ 172, in note. *For* "Sir John," *read* "Colonel John."
 „ 263, line 1. *For* "Dr. Kaye," *read* "Dr. Kay."
 „ 265 in headline. *For* "Dr. Cottons Untimely Fate," *read* "Dr. Cotton's Untimely Fate."



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THE
ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA

FROM 1859 TO 1868.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

THE period between 1859 and 1868 is in many respects the most important epoch in the history of British India which the present century has seen.

It has been essentially a period of progress—of progress rapid, decided, unprecedented. No doubt the next decade, from 1869 to 1879, will present to those who live to watch it, still greater changes and more striking improvements than those which stamp the period under review with the characteristics I have assigned to it. But they who are called on to assist in those reforms, and whose duty or privilege it is to aid in the advance of civilization in India and the development of her future, will do well to study the history of the last ten years.

The condition of India much resembles that of a patient whose whole system has been labouring for a long while under some chronic disease, so subtle in its influence and so deep-seated as to baffle the vigilance of the physician. All he could say was that the constitution was affected by some morbid condition of the principal organs, which



resulted in a general decay of the vital powers, lethargy, and weakness. Suddenly an unexpected crisis occurs. The patient is seized with symptoms no longer undecided and doubtful. Rapid fever supervenes, and for a short time life trembles in the balance. Then the sharpest and strongest remedies have to be applied; under which recovery is rapid, the fever abates, the crisis is passed, and the patient, no longer the invalid he was before the attack, finds himself free from the debility under which he had been previously suffering, and restored to health, activity, and vigour such as he had never hoped to enjoy. It was in the rebellion of 1857 that the diseased condition of the system under which India had so long been suffering came to a crisis. The impure state of the blood, the feeble circulation, the general want of tone which had impaired the vital organs came to a head, and the symptoms, dangerous and violent, at once suggested a remedy and forced its application. The treatment was sharp and decisive. Throughout the disturbed districts the ordinary laws made way for the arbitration of the sword and cannon; and wherever the contagion spread, the remedy speedily followed. India, exhausted by the rebellion and the civil war, sank into a short but refreshing sleep, and awoke with the bloom of returning health upon her cheek and vigour in her limbs.

It is at this period, when she is just returning to consciousness, that I propose to take up the thread of her history, and to trace briefly indeed, in comparison with the importance of the subject, the events which have since transpired, reviewing the policy of the later part of Lord Canning's administration, the short career of the lamented Lord Elgin, and the whole term of Sir John Lawrence's incumbency as viceroy.

It is the misfortune of India that her real condition has never been fairly represented to the English reader. Hitherto, writers who have dealt with the subject have been either servants of the Government, who view everything



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Through the medium of official life, or travellers, who after a short sojourn, or a rapid progress through the country, record their hastily formed impressions. But the experience of the latter has been far too short to allow of their speaking from their own knowledge. They are witnesses who depose to facts on hearsay only. Well provided with introductions that admit them within the somewhat jealously guarded limits of official society in India, their intention of writing probably being no secret, they lay themselves open to receive impressions and gather ideas communicated exclusively from official sources. And the consequence is, that their record is but a repetition at second hand of official views. They, too, describe what they have seen through a coloured medium.

It is almost impossible for the English reader to realize the extent to which the official element pervades and colours all social and political questions in India. The non-official class among the European community is as a rule so small, and so wanting in influence, that anywhere out of the Presidency towns it may be said scarcely to exist as a class at all. And a residence within the Presidency towns does not of itself lead to any practical acquaintance with the condition of the interior, any more than a residence in the metropolis of the United Kingdom leads to an acquaintance with the internal condition of Ireland and Scotland. The travellers who visit India, as the generality do, in a hurried manner, provided with introductions to judges, collectors, commissioners, and military officers, for the purpose of "getting up" India, as it is called, are as much to be depended on as if they were to write an account of Russia or France after a visit to those countries accredited to a few officers in the imperial services, from whom they derived their impressions of the people, the laws, and the general condition of the two empires. Even among those Englishmen who have resided in an independent position many years in India, there are very few indeed who have succeeded



in breaking through the armour of reserve in which native society and native opinion shrouds itself. To most officials, the native mind is a sealed book. They are allowed to see exactly as much as the people by whom they are surrounded, and by whom their every slightest action is closely watched, think fit to let them see, and no more. A glass is held before their eyes, coloured with the hues which it suits the showman to represent; nor is it ever for one moment withdrawn, from the day they enter the country till the day they leave it. A native the best informed and best educated would no more dream of disclosing to an officer of Government his real ideas and opinions than he would of introducing him into his zenana. The Asiatic is always on his guard—always wary. His answers are well weighed: his opinions, when expressed, are all qualified to suit the temper, to chime in with the view of the official interrogator. You will never catch him unawares, never surprise him into the declaration of sentiments of which he has not, before he gives his answer, well studied the shape it is politic they should assume. This may at first sight appear strange or incredible to the English reader, accustomed to freedom of thought and independence of opinion. But that it is a true representation of an actual fact, I appeal to those few who, like myself, have, after passing many years in the service of Government, thrown aside their official character, and continued to reside in India in a private capacity or in the pursuit of some profession which brings them necessarily into contact with native thought and feeling. To such as these, the change is sudden and marked. It is as if you had worn coloured spectacles half your life, and they had been suddenly withdrawn, and you look upon the face of nature for the first time with your own eyes, and without any intervening medium.

The task of recording the exciting events of the rebellion of 1857 and the campaigns of 1858, I leave to other and abler hands. The conflagration is over at the point where



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my story commences. The edifice has fallen down, the firemen have subdued the flames and cleared away the *débris*, and the work of reconstruction has commenced—a reconstruction upon a surer foundation and an improved plan.

In dealing with the subject, two courses appeared open to me: either to make the work a short history of the ten years, recording the events as they occurred in order of time, or to deal separately with the different subjects successively which the contemporaneous history of every country embraces. There were objections to both plans. In the first, the incessant breaking of the thread of the story, upon the termination of each year, would have precluded anything like a complete, however superficial, treatment of each particular branch of the subject; and in the second, the division of the whole into separate chapters or heads of discussion would have almost eliminated the historical character of the book, and made it rather a series of essays than what it attempts to be, a history of the last ten years. I have therefore determined to obviate the difficulty which presented itself, by first of all giving a rapid survey of the principal occurrences as they took place in the order of time, so as to preserve an unbroken thread all through the chronicle, and to reserve for future and special consideration certain parts of the subject which cannot be handled in the cursory manner with which it will be necessary to review, within the compass of a few pages, so eventful a period as the decade terminating in 1869. One chapter will thus be given to social characteristics, two chapters to the history of legislation, two to finance, one to education, one to the difficult and complex question of the army amalgamation. The progress of hygiene and sanitation presents so many interesting features in connexion with Indian history during the period under review, that a chapter may profitably be devoted to it. To deal, however, with a subject so essentially professional in a scientific manner, would be difficult for a writer who has not had the advantage of a



medical education, and I am indebted to the able assistance of a medical officer of considerable experience in India—a well-known author of several professional works of great value, and a contributor of a great number of interesting papers to the “Annals of Indian Medical Science,” and other philosophical journals—for the chapter on the history of hygiene and sanitation.

Military events should either be related in great detail, as in Kinglake’s “Crimea,” or Napier’s “Peninsular War,” or concisely, as in Gibbon, who in five lines disposes of a campaign that extended from Gaul to Constantinople. A bare recital of successive operations, wearying the reader with names of persons and places in which he can take no interest, because he knows nothing of them individually and separately, must always be dry and uninteresting. And this is the reason why, for the most part, Indian history is so unpalatable to the general reader. His eye runs over page after page of wars and battles, victories and defeats, and when he reaches the end, he finds that nothing he has read has left the least definite impression on his mind. All he derives is a cloudy recollection of a mass of names, in which no single feature is distinguishable from the rest. And Indian history is, for the most part, a chronicle of wars, and little else.

But with the exception of the concluding operations of the great campaign of 1857 and ’58, the Bhotan war, and one or two military expeditions on the North-west frontier, the record of events in India from 1859 to 1869 is, fortunately for the writer no less than the reader, free from the prevailing features that ordinarily characterise Indian history. A chapter will be devoted to a brief description of the military operations in Bhotan, and the circumstances that led to them; and another chapter to a sketch of the two principal campaigns called the Umbeyla and the Black Mountain campaigns, on the Peshawur frontier, in 1863 and 1868.

It remains to say a few words as to the sources of



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information to which I have resorted for materials. They are mainly the blue-books and official records, or reports published in some departments annually, in others triennially, in others quarterly, and supplied liberally to the press. The files of newspapers have been freely consulted, especially the *Calcutta Englishman* and the *Delhi Gazette*, the *Madras Times* and *Athenæum*, and in Bombay the *Times of India* and the *Bombay Gazette*, as well as the official *Gazette* and despatches, the Acts of Council, Harrington's "Analysis of the Bengal Regulations," the reports of the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Affairs of 1812 and 1832, Col. Adye's "Sitana Campaign," Dr. Rennie's "Bhotan War," Mr. Algernon West's "Administration of Sir Charles Wood," and several other works of a similar character. These, aided by information from private letters, and my own notes, are the main sources of information. In dealing with the Umbeyla campaign, I have drawn largely upon a lively and animated description communicated in a series of letters to the *Delhi Gazette* newspaper by Dr. Sylvester, of the Bombay medical service, who was an eye-witness of the scenes he so graphically paints; and similarly, in the case of the Black Mountain campaign, I have availed myself of the account transmitted to the same journal by another eye-witness of what he describes, Deputy-Inspector-General Morton, of the Bengal medical service. I must not omit to mention the very prompt attention with which every requisition of mine for access to official records has been met by the various heads of departments to whom I have applied. Nor can I close this notice of the sources whence my materials have been taken, without alluding to the great assistance I have derived from the files of the *Friend of India*. Unable to concur in the views expressed by that journal on most questions, I have found its comprehensive compendium of news, collected and arranged with most praiseworthy diligence, of the greatest use in directing attention to original sources of information, and



in preserving the order of time in the multitude of events that crowd upon the memory.

In bringing the narrative down to the end of Sir John Lawrence's administration, I have necessarily had to encounter a difficulty which always attends the writer of contemporaneous, or almost contemporaneous, history. It is absolutely impossible to describe passing events in such a way as to give an historical character to the outlines of the picture, particularly in dealing with India, where political, financial, and legislative changes are so rapid and frequent. The care and research requisite to collect and arrange the information contained in this volume has necessarily occupied all the spare hours that could be snatched from the intervals of professional labour over a considerable period of time, and recent or contemporaneous measures in the legislative and political departments have rendered a careful revision of the manuscript indispensable, involving alterations in the text. Thus, since I left India, in the beginning of 1869, the income-tax, in a modified form, has been re-introduced, and the commission of inquiry into the Bank of Bombay has completed its sittings, although the report has not yet been made public; and I have, therefore, been unable to deal with so important an episode in the history of the last decade, in the manner which the nature of the subject demands. A new line of foreign policy has been developed, and several legislative measures, the necessity of which I had pointed out, as indeed it was generally recognised, have been passed. I have done my best, however, to grapple with these difficulties, and have spared no pains to ensure accuracy. It is very possible that my views on Indian affairs may be unfavourably received in official circles; but hitherto, the outside world has heard little or nothing of India from any other quarter than the official, and wherever discussion arises, all I ask for is a fair and impartial hearing from all who are interested in the welfare of British India.



CHAPTER II.

1859.

Conclusion of the campaign—Desultory operations—Critical state of the country—Tantia Topee—Sir Hugh Rose—Operations on the Oude frontier—Civil re-organization in Oude—Lord Canning's policy—Talookdaree tenure—Summary settlement of 1856—Pacification of Oude.

THE opening of the year 1859 found us engaged in trampling out the dying embers of the rebellion.

On the 18th January, 1859, Lord Canning, who was then at Allahabad, published a despatch from Lord Clyde, prefacing it with a few weighty paragraphs of his own. In this important State paper it is announced "that the campaign in which the troops under his (Lord Clyde's) immediate command have been engaged, is closed, and rebellion no longer exists in Oude. The Governor-General seizes the earliest opportunity of tendering his warmest thanks to the Commander-in-Chief, and to the noble army which he leads, for the accomplishment of this good work."

The campaign, indeed, was at an end. The enemy had no organized army in the field in any part of India. But there were hordes of armed men, bent on mischief, men hardy and inured to war, desperate, fighting as they thought with halts round their necks, traversing the country in large bands, varying from a thousand to ten thousand strong, and taking up positions in inaccessible places, sometimes in mountains, sometimes in fortresses, sometimes in walled towns. And wherever they went they brought desolation in their track. Strong enough to levy contributions by force from



those who would not willingly afford supplies, and to take a bloody revenge whenever aid was refused, these bands, half soldiers, half dacoits, struck terror into every part of the country through which they marched. There was a danger of this mischievous state of things continuing—of a chronic condition of guerilla war supervening upon the now extinguished rebellion. The Government, therefore, put forth all its strength to crush this threatening evil in the bud, and numberless brigades and detachments were set in motion all over that vast tract of country which may be roughly described as lying between the north-east frontier of Oude and the Nerbudda river. To trace the operations of these columns in detail would fill volumes, and to the English reader not well acquainted with localities, the details would be profitless and uninteresting. Every commanding officer of a detachment—and the rank of the commander varied generally with the strength of the party he commanded, from the brigadier-general down to the subaltern of irregular cavalry or military police—engaged the enemy as often as he could, and recorded the affair and its result in a report or despatch which was duly published in the official *Gazette*. The consequence is, that the *Gazettes* of those times are filled with reports couched in official language, and in general purport so much resembling each other that the perusal of them leaves on the mind a confused idea of a mass of straggling unconnected military operations conducted on no definite plan, and illustrating no known principle of strategy. The work resembles that which a man performs, who, when a fire has scarcely burnt itself out, goes about trampling on burning embers wherever he can find them. The duty was a severe one. The courage and skill of the officers, and the endurance and bravery of the men, were perhaps more severely tested in this series of petty campaigns than in a great action. Frequently an officer with a handful of troops under him, men and horses jaded and worn, would come at the close of a long march upon the



track of a band of rebels perhaps ten times their strength in number. The prospect of an engagement stimulates the fatigued soldiers to fresh exertion, and the gallant little force earns its night's rest by a sharp skirmish and pursuit, and a capture of the enemy's guns.

When the extent of country liable to become the field of such operations is considered; the mischievous results of the maintenance of a perpetual political ferment among native states especially; the facilities which are at hand in India at all times, and particularly after such a crisis as the Mutiny, for keeping up a guerilla war; the enormous population that exists in that country born and bred in habits of rapine and violence, who are only too ready to take advantage of any opportunity for indulging their hereditary propensities; and the immense number of men, many of them leaders of influence, chiefs, daring robbers, dashing soldiers, who believed that their lives were already forfeited, and that nothing remained for them but to die, as their fathers perhaps died before them, sword in hand,—it may be conceived how harassing was the duty, yet how necessary to be performed, and how anxious the Government were to get it done before the hot weather should set in.

The prevailing tragic features of the story of the rebellion are relieved by many little episodes of a comic nature; and in the closing scenes of the great drama, the hunt after Tantia Topee, though it ended indeed tragically for him, has a good deal of the humorous about it, and at the time it took place excited considerable amusement in India.

Tantia Topee was one of the Nana's associates, and there is good reason to suppose, from what little authentic information we have been able to collect about the terrible tragedy at Cawnpore, that he had quite as great, if not a greater share than the Nana himself in the cruel slaughter of our unfortunate countrymen. At that time Tantia Topee had not risen into notice. He first appears



prominently as a leader in the rebel army during the siege of Jhansie by Sir Hugh Rose, now Lord Strathnairn, when he attacked the British force with the view of raising the siege.

It seldom happens that a great war, or a serious political crisis, fails in bringing forward the man of the time, whose genius lacked only the opportunity of development. The Crimean war was, indeed, an exception; the campaign in India, in 1857-58, was no exception to the rule. Far in advance of any of the other commanders in genius, in tact, judgment, energy, and that unflinching determination which has won for England so many victories by sea and land, the character of Sir Hugh Rose, to any one who studies the military history of those times, stands out prominently. If his services have been rewarded, they have never been appreciated, perhaps because not thoroughly understood, in England. In India, it is generally believed, some official jealousy threw into the shade what was undoubtedly one of the most brilliant achievements that the military history of any country in ancient or modern times has recorded. Important as were the operations under Lord Clyde in Oude and Rohilcund, they would have been profitless, so far as putting an end to the war is concerned, had it not been for the vigour, and determination, and skill of his lieutenant. And fortunate it was for us that the tremendous task of recovering Central India, from the borders of the Western Presidency up to the Ganges, had been entrusted to a commander of Sir Hugh Rose's stamp. Had it been made over to a less able man, the result would have been probably the transference of the seat of war from Oude and Rohilcund to Central India; when, in a most difficult country, surrounded by independent states only half inclined to side with us, at any rate fully prepared to take the chances of war in a general *mêlée*, the campaign, instead of being closed in 1859, would have probably gone on two years longer. Had all Sir Hugh Rose's previous service been passed in India, had he made



the country and the character of its inhabitants his study for years, he could not have shown greater knowledge of the most effective method of dealing with the rebellion. With a small but well-appointed force, a tithe of that with which Lord Clyde confronted an enemy scarcely less formidable, he marched in one career of conquest from the Western Presidency right up to Calpee on the Jumna, capturing fortresses and walled towns, driving the enemy before him, fighting battles against enormous odds with one hand, while with the other he kept open his communication, or, as at Jhansie, maintained a siege. He understood the immense importance in Asiatic warfare of keeping the ball rolling. He allowed the enemy no breathing time. The consequence was that, formidable though they were in numbers, in character, in desperation, in resources, in position, and in the sympathy of the population, they disappeared before the British troops as a row of houses built up with a pack of cards falls at the touch of the hand. Such an unchecked career of conquest resembles that of the Israelitish invaders of Palestine. It was an achievement scarcely less glorious than the retreat of the Ten Thousand. The manner in which it has been undervalued may, perhaps, be owing to the fact that no leading journal of the day had a correspondent in Sir Hugh Rose's camp.

What would have happened had this part of the campaign been entrusted to less able hands, is shown by the episode of the chase after Tantia Topee. Failing in his attack on the British troops at Jhansie, foiled again at Calpee, and again at Gwalior, at each of which places the small force under Sir Hugh Rose, contending against an enemy immensely superior in numbers, aided by the fierce heat of the Indian summer, had covered itself with glory, Tantia Topee, at the head of a large body of fugitive soldiers, mounted chiefly on small hardy ponies—"tattoos" as they are called in India—made his way to the Nerbudda. The Bombay troops were awaiting him, and he turned again,



and from that time (Gwalior fell before Sir Hugh Rose on the 18th June, 1858) till the 7th April, 1859, Tantia Topee and the British columns were playing a game of hunt the hare all over Central India. He never succeeded in crossing the Nerbudda. At one time, as many as fourteen brigades were on the move after him. He was like a "will of the wisp." It seemed impossible to overtake him. Mounted on these hardy tattoos, he and his followers marched thirty, forty, sometimes, when hard pressed, seventy miles a day. It was clear he was in a country whose inhabitants sympathised with him, for the excellence of his information enabled him to baffle all the efforts of his pursuers. So rapid were his movements, and so constantly were false reports of his whereabouts circulated to mislead, that it seemed as if he were endowed with the faculty of being in half-a-dozen places at once. At last, however, the cordon of hunters surrounded him; driven to the sterile tracts of Bekaneer, and unable to obtain supplies in that desert country for his followers, he was forced to double back towards Bundelcund. Here he fell at last, on the 7th April, into the hands of his pursuers, but not fairly caught after all. He was betrayed.

Major Meade's column was close upon his heels. It consisted of the 21st company of Royal Engineers, detachments of the 9th and 24th Native Infantry, and about a hundred and fifty troopers belonging to a regiment raised by Major Meade himself, and called "Meade's Horse," and now incorporated with the Central India Horse.

Raja Man Singh of Porona—a territory in the jungles to the west of Jhansie, not far from Seepree (who must not be confounded with the better-known chief of that name, one of the Oude talookdars)—was in the confidence of the fugitive Mahratta chieftain, and undertook to betray his friend, upon whose head a large reward was set. Tantia had been joined by Ajeet Singh of Gwalior, the uncle of this Man Singh who played the traitor, and was marching



TANTIA TOPEE CAPTURED.

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for a ford over the Chumbul river at the junction of that stream with the Benasse, with the intention of joining Feroze Shah. This chief was one of the Delhi princes, who appears to have more of the character of the dashing soldier in him than the rest of his family. He had recently crossed over from Oude with a large following, and made for Central India. Eventually he escaped the fate which overtook so many of the leaders in the rebellion, went to Mecca, whence he has recently returned, and is at this moment said to be on the frontier of Peshawur endeavouring to kindle the smouldering embers of animosity against the British Government among the Affghan tribes of those regions.

Tantia had an elephant with him, while his followers were mounted on their ponies, and was now in the Porona jungles in fancied security, in the domains of his friend Man Singh. On the afternoon of the 6th April this chief, having given Major Meade information of the actual position of the rebel camp, and having had a party of sepoy placed under his orders, started on his treacherous errand. The sepoy were ordered to follow at nightfall, and to await further instructions at a spot selected for the rendezvous. In the middle of the night Man Singh joined them, and took them cautiously and quietly up to the Mahratta camp, where the ill-fated Tantia was lying down sleeping off the fatigues of the day between two pundits. Man Singh seized him; the pundits took to their heels; and the Mahratta chief who had so long kept up the chase, and baffled all the efforts of the British Government to catch him, was bound securely with ropes and taken into Major Meade's camp, then at Goonah. He was tried by a court-martial and hanged, a fate which his complicity with the horrible atrocities committed at Cawnpore but too well deserved.

Meantime the more important military operations on the Oude frontier had resulted in driving the remnant of the rebel army of Oude, under the Begum and the Nana, across



the first range of the Himalayas, which form the boundary between the independent kingdom of Nepal and what was then, and is now, the British India territory.

These operations it will be necessary briefly to detail, but the plan of the campaign, which occupied six weeks, will hardly be understood without a tolerable acquaintance with the geographical features of the country. On the 16th November, Brigadier Taylor, C.B., of Her Majesty's 79th Highlanders, had been directed to proceed with a strong brigade to Fyzabad and to cross the river Gogra, while another brigade under Sir Hope Grant marched in a direct line to the Goomtee. Leaving a force under Brigadier Horsford, C.B., of the Rifle Brigade, to reduce the country between Sultanpore on the Goomtee and Fyzabad on the Gogra, Sir Hope Grant pressed on with the head-quarters of Hodson's Horse to Fyzabad, to take command of the force in the field on the right bank of the Gogra. On the west frontier of Oude, in the Goruckpore district, there was a force consisting of the *Pearl's* Naval Brigade, the Bengal Yeomanry, the 13th (Prince Albert's) regiment, and the head-quarters of the 27th Madras Native Infantry, the regiment of Ferozepore (Sikhs) with some guns, under the command of Brigadier Rowcroft of the Indian Army. This force, which had been acting successfully and vigorously in reducing the district to order, was put under the command of Sir Hope Grant, and directed to move up into the Trans-Gogra district from the south and west. Meanwhile an excellent bridge had been constructed at Fyzabad by Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholson of the Engineers; and on the 25th November, Sir Hope Grant's arrangements being completed, he crossed the Gogra and attacked the rebels in force under the Rajah of Gonda and a Mahommedan chief, Mehndee Hoosein. Having defeated them and captured six guns, Sir Hope Grant marched on to Gonda, a place about midway north by west between Fyzabad and Baraitch; while Brigadier Rowcroft crossing the Raptee,—a rapid stream that, flowing by Baraitch and Goruckpore,



unites its waters with those of the river Gogra some distance west of the latter city,—drove the enemy northward towards Toolseepore. This place holds a position answering to the apex of a triangle the base of which would be formed by a line drawn from Baraitch to Gonda. Here a further onward movement was delayed, to allow the Commander-in-Chief to develop his plans, having for their object the concentration of the rebel army on the north of the Raptee. The conclusion of the operations in the districts to the west and north-west of Lucknow having left Lord Clyde at liberty to move his columns up to the support of Sir Hope Grant, he halted for a few days at Lucknow to get over some arrears of official work, while the troops passed on to take up their respective positions which had been assigned them in the cordon now pretty well surrounding the enemy.

Sir Hope Grant's instructions had been most explicit upon the absolute necessity of preventing the enemy from escaping round his right flank, between it and Brigadier Rowcroft's column, or throwing himself upon Berar. It was a kind of campaigning which especially called forth Lord Clyde's peculiar genius. The marked characteristic of his strategy was extreme caution, which he has often been blamed for carrying to excess—no doubt sometimes with reason. But in this instance, at least, excess of caution was almost impossible. He was in the position of a chess-player who has reduced his adversary to a single king, and whose only game is to hedge him in, or drive him to a corner of the board and there checkmate him. With this view the plan of the whole campaign had been arranged as far back as the preceding July; the operations in Berar, Goruckpore, and Oude being regarded as one campaign, having for its design the reduction of the whole country and the sweeping of the enemy out of our own territory into the jungles at the foot of the Nepal hills. Hitherto it had been most successful. The different brigades, perambulating the whole district where the enemy had taken refuge, cleared the country, driving the rebels before them, and destroying the



forts successively as they fell into our hands, either captured by assault, or, as was more generally the case, having been abandoned on our approach.

When all was ready for the final move, the Commander-in-Chief pressed on by forced marches, and joined Sir Hope Grant at Secrora, whence troops had already been passed on to Bulrampore on the Raptee. Brigadier Rowcroft now received orders to bring his right forward, and invade the Toolseepore district from the north-west corner of Goruckpore. At the same time the Commander-in-Chief advanced to Baraitch with Brigadier Horsford, the Begum and the Nana retiring from that place on the approach of the British, whose rear and flank were watched by Brigadier Eveleigh, while Brigadier Purnell watched the Gogra, and Brigadier Colin Troup the Rohilcund frontier. The cordon was thus drawn closer; but to render it still more secure, another force, under Colonel Christie, was pushed up to a place called Dhurumpore, almost due north of Baraitch.

Active operations then again commenced, which speedily resulted in the enemy being driven across the Raptee, and pressed by the pursuing column till they took refuge beyond the first range of mountains within the Nepal frontier.

There is little further to record. One more expedition into the hills beyond the Raptee, conducted in February by the column under Brigadier Horsford, completed the efforts of the British Commander-in-Chief to effect the destruction of the rebels. The column remained there a week, captured several guns and a few prisoners, drove the enemy further into the interior of Nepal, and then returned. It was hoped that our ally Jung Bahadoor, of Nepal, would have at once surrounded and captured the fugitives who had, uninvited, sought an asylum in his territory. Whether it was from unwillingness on his own part, or inability to control the feelings of his chiefs and soldiers, or from superstition, or from sympathy, it is difficult to say; but it was



not till the close of the year that, having assembled a large body of troops on pretence of a hunting expedition, he surrounded the rebel camp, and called on them to surrender. About two thousand five hundred men and twenty officers and chiefs did so, and were passed on to British territory, where the sepoyes were released and the chiefs detained for trial. The Nana and the Begum, with a few followers, remained in Nepal.

While these military operations were going on in Oude and throughout Central India—where however they were, as regards the strength of the individual detachments, on a much smaller scale—the attempt to reintroduce civil organization into the province of Oude was producing rapid results. The policy adopted by Lord Canning on the question has not, after the lapse of ten years, ceased to form a subject for discussion. Nor is it ever likely to escape discussion whenever attention is directed to the existing condition of Oude or the past history of its administration. Lord Canning's famous proclamation of 1858 was at the time warmly discussed in Parliament, and a majority of the House of Commons condemned it as an act of unjustifiable rashness and severity. In India, when it first appeared, the public mind was too full of other things to pay that attention to it which its importance demanded. The insurrection had not yet been quite trampled down; troops were in the field, and engagements, though minor ones compared with the great battles that decided the fate of India, were being fought every day in one part of the country or another, and newspapers were full of accounts of skirmishes, lists of guns captured, and the reports of casualties. The public had not time to consider the probable effect upon the future condition of Oude, of a proclamation confiscating to its conquerors the proprietary right in the entire soil of the province. After that first discussion in Parliament little more was heard about it, but papers were called for. And although little was written or said out of doors, the subject was not laid aside



or forgotten, either by the Council of India or the officials on the spot. Correspondence passed at intervals between the Chief Commissioner of Oude and the Governor-General of India and the Secretary of State and his council in England, most of which has since been given to the public in the form of two bulky blue books, monuments of the indefatigable research of our revenue officers, and witnesses to the difficulty that surrounds a subject on which scarce two of them agree.

It has been said that at that time the full force of Lord Canning's policy had not been thoroughly recognised, though if ever a proclamation was couched in unmistakeable language the document of 1858 assuredly was. Yet it certainly appears, from the despatch of the Secretary of State of 1860 and 1861, that the proclamation was not suspected of bearing the interpretation which was afterwards attempted to be laid upon it. The first blue book was not printed till the 20th February, 1865, and did not reach India till some little time after. Meanwhile, the lamented death of Lord Elgin left the throne of the viceroy vacant, and Sir John Lawrence, with the laurels nobly earned in his past brilliant career fresh upon his brow, was selected to fill it. Then it was that the war of tenant right, which had hitherto slumbered, or at any rate been confined to the portfolios of ministers and councillors and chief commissioners, "now trebly thundering swelled the gale," and the controversy was carried on with a degree of acrimony and almost mutual recrimination to which the formal style and stereotyped phrases of Indian official records were altogether unaccustomed. The details of this controversy belong necessarily to a later page of this history, when Sir John Lawrence's administration comes under consideration. For the present it is necessary only to carry on the thread of our story, and to relate briefly the circumstances under which this famous proclamation was issued, and the mode in which it was carried out.

Upon the annexation of Oude in 1856, instructions were



LORD CANNING'S POLICY.

forwarded to the Chief Commissioner¹ "that the settlement should be made village by village with the parties actually in possession, but without any recognition, either formal or indirect, of their proprietary rights. It must be borne in mind, as a leading principle, that the desire and intention of the Government is to deal with the actual occupants of the soil, that is, with village zemindars, or with the proprietary coparcenaries which are believed to exist in Oude, and not to suffer the interposition of middlemen, as talookdars, farmers of the revenue, and such like; the claims of these, if they have any tenable claims, may be more conveniently considered at a future period, or brought judicially before the court competent to investigate and decide upon them."

Over-hasty legislation, inseparable from a Government like that of India, where there is no representative element, and consequently no means beyond official channels for arriving at a correct knowledge of the actual condition of the people, has ever been the bane of Indian administration. As Sir Erskine Perry, in his minute upon this very question of Oude tenures, at a much later period of the controversy, most forcibly remarked: "The history of British India is full of examples of the great mischief done by clothing imperfect theories in the rigid garb of law." The Government in 1856, when it took forcible possession of Oude under circumstances, and in a manner, which all special pleaders for the now obsolete policy of annexation have vainly striven to justify, did not appear even to know what the talookdars were. They seemed to consider them middlemen, mere interlopers between the reigning power and the owner of the soil. Whereas, as Mr. Strachey remarks in the address already quoted, the talookdars of Oude constituted an old landed aristocracy possessing undoubted rights of property in the soil.

¹ *Vide* Hon. John Strachey's Address to the Legislative Council on introducing the Bill to define the rights of talookdars and others in certain estates in Oude: Simla, 17th July, 1867.



It is not difficult for those who have gained an insight into the system under which the government of India is administered, to trace the origin of this mistake. There are many symptoms to be observed in India of the communication to the Anglo-Indian mind of some of the characteristic tendencies of the Asiatic. If a certain acclimatization is necessary to render the physical frame of the European capable of sustaining the effects of the Indian climate, it would seem as if a somewhat analogous process had to be gone through with the mental organization. Englishmen located for many years in India undergo, a vast deal more than they are mostly aware of, assimilation to the people that surround them. It is not meant that they acquire their habits of life, mode of dress, manners and customs, though even in this respect the assimilation goes on to a much greater extent than is generally suspected. But the English official in India, before he has been many years there, loses his English habits of thought and inquiry, and adopts as rules of political faith the traditional opinions current in the circle within which he moves, and whose official atmosphere he breathes. Almost without perceiving it he becomes as wedded to the traditions of his official predecessors, as the Hindoo is to those of his forefathers. To investigate for himself the truth and soundness of conclusions made ready to hand, and presented for acceptance with the office he takes up, much more to question their correctness, is rank heresy. To look beyond the narrow circle in which he lives and moves for information is to exhibit a tendency to political freethinking. If the archives of his office show the recorded opinions of his predecessors that a talookdar is a middleman, he does not dream of inquiring whether the character of the talookdar is truly described, nor does it ever occur to him to ask himself whether, his predecessors' experience being necessarily confined to one province, perhaps at the time the record was made the only portion of India under British rule, it may not be possible that a talookdar beyond the



limits of that province may or may not be something very different from what he is represented there.

The great authority on Indian land tenures, Sir John Shore, afterwards Lord Teignmouth, had stated in his minute on the Revenue Department, dated 2d April, 1788,¹ from experience derived in the province of Bengal Proper, that the talookdaree tenure was a tenure subordinate to that of the zemindaree, but possessed of certain special rights and privileges, such as that of paying his revenue direct to the *khalsa*, or Government exchequer. When we annexed Oude, as Mr. Strachey says, two-thirds of the province was in the hands of the talookdars. It seemed not to have been made a subject of inquiry whether in Oude, a new province just annexed, the talookdar was a different personage from that described by Sir John Shore in Bengal in 1788.

Another apt illustration of the results of the system may be found in the history of Punjab revenue administration. In the debate on the Punjab Tenancy Bill, on the 17th Jan. 1868, Mr. Brandreth, a Punjab official of great experience, and a member of the Legislative Council, in tracing the past history of tenant-right in that province, remarked that the "Directions for Settlement Officers in the North-Western Provinces" was the *only guide-book* which the settlement-officers in the Punjab possessed. The force of this remark will be better understood by the English reader, if I explain in a few words what a "settlement-officer" in India really is, and in what light he is regarded by the natives. Properly speaking, a "settlement" means a settlement of the amount of revenue to be paid to the Government on land. So far, the duties of such an official are clear and simple. But in a new province he is immediately confronted by the question, With whom is the settlement to be made? in other words, Who is the proprietor? In theory,

¹ *Vide* extracts from Harrington's "Analysis of the Bengal Regulations, Calcutta, 1866," and Sir John Shore's "Minutes on the Rights of Zemindars and Talookdars, recorded in the Proceedings of Government in the Revenue Department, 2d April, 1788."



the functions of the revenue and the judicial officer are well defined; and after a province has been for many years under our rule, the natives learn to understand the difference between them. But at first it is impossible for them to do so. Except, perhaps, in the case of a few who may gain access to the European official, and may be able to understand him, the bulk of the people will be dependent upon vague rumour, or the interpretation of probably not impartial subordinates for whatever knowledge they may acquire of the new system. It thus happens that the settlement-officer, whose duties are merely to record existing rights, and settle the revenue accordingly, comes to be looked upon as an officer empowered to decide, and actually does in numbers of instances in effect decide, rights to landed property.

The "Directions for Settlement Officers in the North-Western Provinces" was a work compiled by Mr. Thomason, formerly Lieut.-Governor of the North-Western Provinces, who was notoriously so wedded to one system that it has been called after him—erroneously, for he was by no means the founder of it—"The Thomasonian System." In that official guide-book, certain principles were laid down which many able revenue authorities have always held, and still hold, to be unsound, even in that part of India for which they were compiled. The mischief committed by a blind adherence to this policy in Oude, even if it did not of itself cause, certainly contributed to, the horrors and bloodshed of 1857-58. Yet, for the Punjab, a large province, inhabited by many different races, each with its own customs and modes of tenure, the same infallible guide-book was provided; a guide-book according to which rights in land were to be recorded, nominally—in reality, to be decided. Mr. Brandreth alludes to one result of this: "It was expressly laid down," he says, "in the Guide Book, that those cultivators who have for a course of years occupied the same field at the same or equitable rates, are held to possess the rights of continued occupancy; while those



whose tenure is not similarly sanctioned are considered tenants at will. In accordance with the spirit of these instructions, the Punjab settlement-officers appeared to have recorded all tenants who had cultivated their lands continuously for certain periods as possessing rights of occupancy, without at all regarding any other circumstances or conditions connected with their occupancy." And that these "directions for revenue officers" had a good deal of the force of law, would appear from what Mr. Brandreth adds in the next sentence: "The Civil Courts also had subsequently, for the most part, except with regard to a limited class of cases, acted on the same principles."¹

Oude was annexed, as has been shown, in 1856. In 1857 a settlement was made, in which the principle that the talookdars were interlopers, with no right of property, was acted on in the "extremest" manner.² And the extent to which it was acted on seems to be, now, almost incredible.

"At the first summary settlement," says Mr. Strachey, "made after the annexation of the province, for a single season the revenue paid by the talookdars to the Government amounted to about sixty-six lacs of rupees, and they were in possession of 23,500 villages. At the settlement of 1856-7, they were dispossessed of one-half this property. In many cases they lost much more than this." The Chief Commissioner then proceeds to give some instances. Raja Man Singh was in possession of 577 villages, paying more than two lacs a year revenue. The settlement of 1856-7 left him with six villages, paying 2,900 rupees. It was a sudden decrease of this nobleman's income from about 20,000*l.* to 300*l.* a year. "This, it is true," continues Mr. Strachey, "was not an old ancestral estate, but many of the oldest families in the province were treated in the same manner. In one ancient estate, out of 378 villages 266 were taken away. In another very ancient

¹ *Vide* Supplement to *Gazette of India* (official), 25th Jan. 1868.

² The Hon. Mr. Strachey's address.

estate, out of 204 villages 155 were taken away. In the estate of Raja Hanwant Singh, consisting of 322 villages, paying between seventy and eighty thousand rupees a year as Government revenue, 200 villages, which had been in the undisputed possession of his family for many generations, were taken from him. In the last case, the officers who had made the settlement took refuge on the outbreak of the rebellion in the Raja's fort, and while they were there, they saw the men with whom the settlement had been made, come in and tender their allegiance to the Raja."

This settlement, that swept away so many ancient rights and committed so much injustice, was in itself swept away by the flood of 1857.¹ Lucknow was recaptured in March 1858, and then it was that Lord Canning's famous proclamation was issued.

At that time in India, the Punjab fever ran high. Dazzled by the success which had attended the efforts of the Punjab Government to trample out the insurrection the moment it appeared in their province, so strong a contrast with what happened in other parts of India; dazzled, too, by the brilliance of the personal character of many of the officers who came from the Punjab to take part in the campaign—of such men, for instance, as Nicholson and Hodson—it seemed to the Anglo-Indian community that the sooner the whole of India was subjected to the process of Punjabization the better. No doubt the Government

¹ With facts like these before us, one would think there was no necessity for historians of the "mutiny," as it is generally called, to waste much time and thought in finding out a cause for rebellion. The movement, call it by what name we may, unquestionably emanated from the province of Oude. And Lord Dalhousie is commonly said to have indirectly caused it, in that he carried out the annexation. It would be much more correct to say that it was caused by the obstinate adherence of the Bengal civilian to the traditional prejudices of what is called the Thomasonian school, an obstinacy which has since 1857 on more than one occasion nearly driven the population of large provinces into rebellion again.



shared this feeling. It was a fact there was no disputing, that directly the insurrection came in contact with the Lahore administration it was checked and foiled. Everywhere else, where it appeared in any force, it prevailed. There might be many ways of accounting for this, still there was the fact; and what was more, not only had the Punjab strength to stamp out the rebellion, but it furnished from its own resources the men and material by which Delhi was captured and the neck of the rebellion broken, before the long-expected succours had begun to arrive from England. So it was that public feeling in India pointed to the Punjab system of government as that best adapted for the province so lately the seat of anarchy. With the fullest approbation of all who watched the course of public events, the frontier of the Punjab had been extended so as to take in the district of Delhi, up to that time attached to the North-West,—the only measure of Lord Canning which, perhaps, at the time was generally approved. And the same principle was acted on when Sir Robert Montgomery, who had been for several years associated with Sir John Lawrence, was summoned from Lahore to take the helm as Chief Commissioner of Oude. There he remained till Sir John Lawrence's retirement made a vacancy in the Punjab (but lately elevated to the dignity of a Lieutenant-Governorship), when he made over the Chief Commissionership of Oude to Mr. Wingfield and returned to Lahore.

Sir Robert Montgomery's administration of Oude belongs to a period anterior to that at which this history commences. But it was necessary to allude to it, because to him was committed the duty of promulgating Lord Canning's proclamation of March 1858. "This proclamation," remarks Mr. Strachey, "had altogether a strange history. When it was issued there is not a doubt that it was intended as a measure of coercion and punishment to the rebellious talookdars. It would have seemed incredible in March 1858 that the Proclamation should come to be looked upon



by the talookdars as the Magna Charta on which all their rights depend. During the rebellion, I believe that, as a matter of fact, hardly anybody to whom the Proclamation was addressed ever saw it; and it was supposed for some time to have been virtually a dead letter. This belief was entertained by the Secretary of State, Lord Stanley, nine months after the issue of the Proclamation, and after he had received the explanation of the Governor-General regarding it. 'I observe with satisfaction,' Lord Stanley writes, 'that the policy indicated in the document adverted to, as regards the claims of the talookdars and other proprietors in Oude, has not in practice been adopted by you, and is declared on your own authority never to have been intended to have been carried into effect.'

"However indiscriminate and unsparing may have been the sentence of confiscation which your proclamation pronounced, that sentence has not been put in force: and the issuing it would appear to have been merely a menace, designed to strike awe into the minds of those still arrayed in arms against the British Government."

Whether Lord Canning did or did not intend his proclamation to have the signification which it has since been attempted to make it bear, it is useless now to inquire. Sir Robert Montgomery—and it is to be presumed he acted in accordance with the views of the Viceroy, for he was assured that his measures should have the fullest support—made good use of it in carrying out the especial work for which he had been summoned from Lahore, viz. the pacification of Oude. He summoned the talookdars to Lucknow in June 1858 to make their submission, and they were told that on their arrival they would be informed of the terms upon which they would be secured in possession of the estates they had held under the native government. Thus far the Proclamation had had a good effect: it entirely uprooted the settlement made in 1856-7. That settlement may, indeed, be considered to have uprooted itself, or at any rate to have been cancelled by the



events which had transpired in the interval. But it was manifestly open to argument, whether it presented itself to Lord Canning's mind in this view or not, that on the re-establishment of British rule in Oude the iniquitous settlement of 1856-7 would *ipso facto* be taken as still in operation, or rather as reverting after the hiatus caused by the temporary suspension of law had ceased. Lord Canning had already adopted the conclusion that the old system of village settlement in vogue in the older provinces, and introduced into Oude in 1856-7 by the civilians who had been educated in the school of Bird and Thomason, was faulty. It would have been difficult in the face of the deeply-rooted prejudices of the civil officers, who were wedded to this system, to have remedied thoroughly the mischief caused by the measures of 1856-7. There was but one way of getting rid of it, and that was the plan he adopted. By his wholesale confiscation he annihilated all rights in the soil, and with them those that had been recognised or conferred by British officers in the previous settlement. Viewed in this light, the Proclamation appears as an act of the highest wisdom. Viewed in any other, it is almost inexplicable.

The famous Proclamation is as follows. It was issued in March 1858, but not published in the *Gazette* till the 30th of April, 1859.

“PROCLAMATION.

“The army of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief is in possession of Lucknow, and the city lies at the mercy of the British Government, whose authority it has for nine months rebelliously defied and resisted.

“This resistance, begun by a mutinous soldiery, has found support from the inhabitants of the city, and of the province of Oude at large. Many who owed their prosperity to the British Government, as well as those who believed themselves aggrieved by it, have joined in this bad cause, and have ranged themselves with the enemies of the State.

“They have been guilty of a great crime, and have subjected themselves to a just retribution.

“The capital of their country is now once more in the hands of the



British troops. From this day it will be held by a force which nothing can withstand, and the authority of the Government will be carried into every corner of the province.

"The time, then, has come at which the Right Honourable the Governor-General of India deems it right to make known the mode in which the British Government will deal with the talookdars, chiefs, and landholders of Oude, and their followers.

"The first care of the Governor-General will be to reward those who have been steadfast in their allegiance at a time when the authority of the Government was partially overborne, and who have proved this by the support and assistance which they have given to British officers.

"Therefore the Right Honourable the Governor-General declares that Drigbyjeye Singh, Raja of Bulrampore, Koolwunt Singh, Raja of Pudnaha, Rao Hurdeo Buksh Singh, of Kutiaree, Kashee Pershad, Thakoor of Sissaindee, Zubr Singh, Zemindar of Gopal Khair, and Chundee Lal, Zemindar of Moraon (Baiswarah), are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands which they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to such moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them; and that these loyal men will be further rewarded in such manner and to such extent as, upon consideration of their merits and their position, the Governor-General shall determine.

"A proportionate measure of reward and honour, according to their deserts, will be conferred upon others in whose favour like claims may be established to the satisfaction of the Government.

"The Governor-General further proclaims to the people of Oude that, with the above-mentioned exceptions, the proprietary right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British Government, which will dispose of that right in such manner as to it may seem fitting.

"To those talookdars, chiefs, and landholders, with their followers, who shall make immediate submission to the Chief Commissioner of Oude, surrendering their arms and obeying his orders, the Right Honourable the Governor-General promises that their lives and honour shall be safe, provided that their hands are not stained with English blood murderously shed. But as regards any further indulgence which may be extended to them, and the condition in which they may hereafter be placed, they must throw themselves upon the justice and mercy of the British Government.

"To those amongst them who shall promptly come forward and give to the Chief Commissioner their support in the restoration of peace and order, this indulgence will be large, and the Governor-General will be ready to view liberally the claims which they may thus acquire to a restitution of their former rights.

"As participation in the murder of Englishmen or Englishwomen will exclude those who are guilty of it from all mercy, so will those who have protected English lives be specially entitled to consideration and leniency."



HISTORY OF THE PROCLAMATION.

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As Mr. Strachey has remarked in his address already quoted, the history of this Proclamation was a singular one. Although not published till 1859, a copy of it had reached the Board of Control and the Court of Directors, whose critique appears in the following despatch from the Secret Committee, dated April 19, 1858 :—

“THE SECRET COMMITTEE OF THE COURT OF DIRECTORS OF THE EAST INDIA COMPANY TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA IN COUNCIL.

“April 19, 1858.

“Our letter of the 24th March, 1858, will have put you in possession of our general views with respect to the treatment of the people in the event of the evacuation of Lucknow by the enemy.

“2. On the 12th instant we received from you a copy of the letter, dated the 3d of March, addressed by your Secretary to the Secretary of the Chief Commissioner in Oude, which letter enclosed a copy of the Proclamation to be issued by the Chief Commissioner as soon as the British troops should have command of the city of Lucknow, and conveyed instructions as to the manner in which he was to act with respect to different classes of persons, in execution of the views of the Governor-General.

“3. The people of Oude will see only the Proclamation.

“4. That authoritative expression of the will of the Government informs the people that six persons, who are named as having been steadfast in their allegiance, are henceforward the sole hereditary proprietors of the lands they held when Oude came under British rule, subject only to such moderate assessment as may be imposed upon them ; that others in whose favour like claims may be established will have conferred upon them a proportionate measure of reward and honour ; and that with these exceptions the proprietary right in the soil of the province is confiscated to the British Government.

“5. We cannot but express to you our apprehension that this decree, pronouncing the disinherison of a people, will throw difficulties almost insurmountable in the way of the re-establishment of peace.

“6. We are under the impression that the war in Oude has derived much of its popular character from the rigorous manner in which, without regard to what the chief landholders had become accustomed to consider as their rights, the summary settlement had, in a large portion of the province, been carried out by your officers.

“7. The land-owners of India are as much attached to the soil occupied by their ancestors, and are as sensitive with respect to the rights in the soil they deem themselves to possess, as the occupiers of land in any country of which we have a knowledge.

" 8. Whatever may be your ultimate and undisclosed intentions, your Proclamation will appear to deprive the great body of the people of all hope upon the subject most dear to them as individuals, while the substitution of our rule for that of their native Sovereign has naturally excited against us whatever they may have of national feeling.

" 9. We cannot but in justice consider that those who resist our authority in Oude are under very different circumstances from those who have acted against us in provinces which have been long under our government.

" 10. We dethroned the King of Oude, and took possession of his kingdom by virtue of a treaty, which had been subsequently modified by another treaty, under which, had it been held to be in force, the course we adopted could not have been lawfully pursued; but we held that it was not in force, although the fact of its not having been ratified in England, as regarded the provision on which we rely for our justification, had not been previously made known to the King of Oude.

" 11. That Sovereign and his ancestors had been uniformly faithful to their treaty engagements with us, however ill they may have governed their subjects.

" 12. They had more than once assisted us in our difficulties, and not a suspicion had ever been entertained of any hostile disposition on their part towards our Government.

" 13. Suddenly the people saw their king taken from amongst them, and our administration substituted for his, which, however bad, was at least native; and this sudden change of government was immediately followed by a summary settlement of the revenue, which, in a very considerable portion of the province, deprived the most influential land-owners of what they deemed to be their property—of what certainly had long given wealth, and distinction, and power to their families.

" 14. We must admit that, under these circumstances, the hostilities which have been carried on in Oude have rather the character of a legitimate war than that of rebellion, and that the people of Oude should rather be regarded with indulgent consideration than made the objects of a penalty exceeding in extent and in severity almost any which has been recorded in history as inflicted upon a subdued nation.

" 15. Other conquerors when they have succeeded in overcoming resistance, have excepted a few persons as still deserving of punishment, but have, with a generous policy, extended their clemency to the great body of the people.

" 16. You have acted on a different principle. You have reserved a few as deserving of special favour, and you have struck, with what they will feel as the severest of punishment, the mass of the inhabitants of the country.



17. We cannot but think that the precedents from which you have departed, will appear to have been conceived in a spirit of wisdom superior to that which appears in the precedent you have made.

"18. We desire that you will mitigate in practice the stringent severity of the decree of confiscation you have issued against the landholders of Oude.

"19. We desire to see British authority in India rest upon the willing obedience of a contented people: there cannot be contentment where there is a general confiscation.

"20. Government cannot long be maintained by any force in a country where the people is rendered hostile by a sense of wrong; and if it were possible so to maintain it, it would not be a consummation to be desired."

We must return to the use made of this proclamation in the province to which it was applied.

The result of the negotiations with the talookdars in June 1858 was, that before Lord Clyde's army took the field at the close of that year, and commenced the operations the conclusion of which has been briefly described, two-thirds of the talookdars had tendered their allegiance, and estates paying to Government fifty-two lacs a year, or half the revenue of the province, had been settled with them.¹

The truth is that, as Sir Charles Wingfield and Mr. Strachey have remarked, the talookdars were treated as belligerents, not as rebels. They were invited to a conference when in arms against us, offered terms, and promised their estates on condition of their exerting themselves to restore peace and quiet in the country. It follows that the arrangement entered into with them assumes the character of a treaty made between belligerent parties, one of whom, having the upper hand and being the stronger of the two, offers peace on certain conditions, which are accepted and acted on. It has never been hinted that the talookdars did not carry out these stipulations.

Meantime, Sir Robert Montgomery had been recalled to Lahore to take up the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, and Mr. (now Sir Charles) Wingfield was Chief

¹ Mr. Strachey's Address.

Commissioner of Oude. When in October 1859 Lord Canning made a state entry into the capital of the province, in a large durbar, to which the talookdars had been summoned to meet him, he stood up, and, with his fine sonorous voice and truly majestic manner, delivered the following address:—

“ TALOOKDARS OF OUDE,

“ I am glad to find myself in your country and amongst you, and to have this opportunity of speaking to you in the name of the Queen your Sovereign.

“ A year has not passed away since this Province was the seat of anarchy and war. The conduct of its people had been such that the Government was compelled to lay a heavy hand upon it. But peace and order are now restored to every corner of Oude, and I am come to speak to you not of the past, but of the future.

“ You have, all of you who are here present, received yesterday the grants of those estates which the Government has restored to you.

“ You will have seen by the terms of those grants that the ancient Talookdaree system of Oude is revived and perpetuated.

“ Be assured that so long as each one of you is a loyal and faithful subject and a just master, his rights and dignity as a talookdar will be upheld by me, and by every representative of your Queen, and that no man shall disturb them.

“ You will also have seen by those grants that the same rights are secured on the same conditions to your heirs for ever.

“ Let this security be an encouragement to you to spend your care, and time, and money upon the improvement of your possessions.

“ As the Government has been generous to you, so do you be generous to those who hold under you, down to the humblest tiller of the soil. Aid them by advances of money and other indulgences to increase the productiveness of the land, and set them an example of order and obedience to your rulers.

“ Let the same security in your possessions encourage you to bring up your sons in a manner befitting the position which they will hereafter occupy as the Chiefs of Oude. Learn yourselves, and teach them, to look to the Government as a father.

“ Talookdars, I trust that there are none amongst you who are so infatuated as to believe that the Government has had designs against your religion. Even if there be any such, I will not condescend to repeat the assurances which they have already received on this head. I leave it to time, and experience, and their own sense, to dispel their perverse suspicions. But for their own sakes I warn them not to be led into acts of opposition or distrust towards the Government by the false tales of designing men.



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“Lastly, talookdars, whenever in any matter you have doubts to be resolved or wishes to make known, address yourselves to the Chief Commissioner. He will tell you the truth in all things. He is the high and trusted representative of the Government in Oude, and, depend upon it, he will be your best adviser and your truest friend.

“I wish that I could speak to you in your own language. That which I have said will now be interpreted to you, and I enjoin you to bear it in your memories.”

Meanwhile the work of disarming was being vigorously carried on throughout the province by the military police formed on the system introduced by Sir Charles Napier in Sind. Some idea of the military resources of Oude may be derived from the return of arms collected, and forts destroyed, up to the middle of August 1859. There were 684 cannon, 186,177 fire-arms, 565,321 swords, 50,311 spears, and 636,683 weapons of miscellaneous character given in. The number of forts destroyed and under course of demolition up to the same date was 1,569.



CSL

CHAPTER III.

1859 (*continued*).

The second Mutiny—Army re-organization—Peace proclamation—Lord Canning's tour—His views and policy—Lord Canning meets the chiefs in durbar—Right of adoption—Mr. Wilson—His death — Madras — Bombay — Operations on the North-West frontier.

ONE mutiny was over, and the country was just beginning to recover from the terrible effects of it, when Government were called upon to confront a second. In consequence of the great demand for European troops at the commencement of the disturbance, a large increase had been authorized to the Company's European army. There were at that period a good many men belonging to the Land Transport Corps raised at the time of the Crimean war, who were available for transfer to the Line, and from these and other sources men were shipped off to Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras—the majority of course to the first-named place—and draughted into regiments of infantry and cavalry. The men were mostly required for cavalry, and the idea was to raise regiments of light European horse, fitted especially for Indian service, where rapidity of movement and capability of making long marches are the most desirable characteristics of the cavalry soldier. In addition to this, the Indian horse is small, and not up to great weight; and as short recruits are always more readily procurable than tall ones, and it was an object to get the new regiments filled up as soon as possible, a much smaller class of men than are required by the usual enlisting standard for the

British army were taken. These new regiments, from the small stature of the men (the majority, indeed, of them were mere boys), got the nickname of "The Dumpies." They were never called, except of course in official parlance, by any other name; and when they mutinied, which they did, the event became known throughout India as "The Dumpy Mutiny."

The Dumpies were recruited from all classes, and so anxious were the military authorities to get them that no questions were asked about the antecedents of those who offered themselves to the recruiting-sergeant. An officer, writing of them from Barrackpore, remarked: "There are specimens of every shade of society among them, from the lazy boy who has left his reverend father's roof in a fit of *ennui*, to the London sharper whose last double the police nearly cut into; there are small white hands and large horny ones,—hands that can fashion saws from dinner-knives, to whom bolts and bars are a trifle; hands that still retain the deep furrows imprinted by the plough;" and the writer goes on to say, "but with all you have British hearts and sympathies." Had he stopped at the description of their physical appearance, it would have been correct. Of the hearts and sympathies the less said the better, for the whole of these men almost, seizing the opportunity when the Government were embarrassed, easily found a pretext, and demanded either their discharge or, what they really wanted and expected, a second bounty, although they had, many of them, not been in the country a year, and had scarcely passed their drill. The spirit of insubordination is most contagious; hence the necessity of speedily stamping it out directly it shows itself in an armed force. No matter whether the punishment be rather more severe than the offence requires: the latter must be weighed by its effects upon others, and not by its intrinsic turpitude. The mutiny of the native army, there is no question, might have been stamped out thus. The Dumpy mutiny, at the time it took a defined shape, viz. a demand for fresh bounty



or discharge, was the development of a spirit of insubordination that had unhappily been too long existing in the local European regiments, whose laxity of discipline used to be a matter of remark in every royal regiment that first found itself quartered in the same garrison, or encamped alongside of them. The system by which the new European regiments were officered was most faulty. Officers draughted into them from native corps, who had learnt what little they knew of discipline in sepoy regiments, where the system is totally distinct from that necessary to bring into and to keep a regiment of European soldiers in good order, were quite incapable of dealing with the unruly spirits the Indian recruiting-sergeant picked up from the population in our large towns. The Land Transport men, so many of whom came out among the Dumpies, were even in England sometimes a terror to the peaceable inhabitants of the towns in the neighbourhood of which they were quartered; and when removed to India, under the effects of a lax system of discipline and the example of older comrades, it is not to be wondered at that a spirit of insubordination showed itself. The pretence on which they put forward their claim to extra bounty was, that having engaged to serve the East India Company, and the East India Company having ceased to require their services, under the Proclamation of the 1st November, 1858, which transferred the government of India immediately to the Crown, they were entitled to their discharge, and to be sent home at the expense of the State, or to the offer of re-enlistment and a bounty, as if they had never engaged. It is hardly worth while to enter into a discussion of this question. A similar crisis is not likely to occur again, for it is scarcely possible to conceive circumstances under which an army can come into existence again under the British Crown, and yet owing primary allegiance to a body of men like the East India Company. History, it is said, repeats itself. But this chapter of English history is not at all likely ever to be repeated. Hence no practical good



would result from a reconsideration of the arguments adduced by the men to show they were entitled to claim their discharge. It was said at the time that some lawyers among them had put them up to asserting the right. But this is a very bad compliment to the profession, for there was very little law in the matter at all. The truth is, the men saw their opportunity; they knew the Government were embarrassed; the new recruits did not like the country sufficiently to care about staying in it, and the older men were tired of it, and anxious to get home.

The time and place selected for the demonstration were singular. The place was Meerut, and the time the month of May 1859, just two years all but nine days after the mutiny of the native army had commenced there. There was no open violence, nothing beyond a passive resistance to authority. A similar demonstration took place at Allahabad; the reply to the question, what was the men's grievance, being on each occasion the same, "that they had been made over like animals, or like goods and chattels, from the Company to the Crown," and they demanded their discharge and passage home, or bounty for re-enlisting.

At Berhampore — another coincidental connexion, as regards locality, between the mutiny of 1857 and that of 1859 — the men of the 5th European regiment proceeded to open violence, seized the barracks, and defied their officers, and a royal regiment and a couple of guns had to be sent up from Barrackpore to quell the mutinous spirit. Happily, there was no necessity for testing the much-debated point whether the royals would fire on their fellow-countrymen if ordered. I think there would have been little difficulty in quelling the mutiny had they proceeded to extremities, because the feeling in the royal regiments was sufficiently good to have justified the confidence reposed in them by their officers. Still it would have been a terrible thing if we had been forced, in the moment of victory over a common foe, to turn our arms against a section of our own countrymen; and rather than run the risk of a consum-



mation so terrible, the Government at once gave in to the demands of the mutineers. But to suppose that Government yielded to anything but brute force, that there was the least shadow of admission that the claim was a just one, is a mistake. It was said at the time by many who used to take the part of the discontented men, that they would have been well content to transfer their services without any fresh bounty, if they had only been asked in a proper manner; and that a paragraph in the Queen's Proclamation, complimenting the army for their past services, and announcing that they were transferred to the direct service of the Crown, would have been sufficient. But men, when they want money, and think they see the means of getting it, are not usually contented with fine words and soft speeches. It is quite true that there was rather a remarkable omission of any mention of the army's past services in the Proclamation; but to hold that this would afford the faintest shadow of justification for the inexcusable conduct of the men is absurd.

The most singular part of the story is the extraordinary bungling that went on at head-quarters. Much as the Dumpies wanted extra bounty, they did not want bloodshed. There were among them, however, a number of unprincipled villains who were not likely to be restrained by anything short of violence. So that it was a relief to all when active operations assumed the innocuous character of courts of inquiry and committees. The Government were beaten, but they were determined not to be thoroughly beaten, like a little boy who, when a big bully has seized him and demanded all his marbles, has enough spirit and enough liberty left to elect whether he shall give up his marbles or his top; and so, as the bully had demanded one thing, his victim resolved he should have another. The mutineers had grounded their demands on the plea, that having been enlisted to serve the Company they were not bound to serve the Crown; and accordingly, when the Government said, "Very well, then, we grant you your



passage home and a free discharge," they could not consistently refuse to take what was offered, though it was not what most of them wanted and expected. At the same time, they were distinctly assured that they should not be re-enlisted. This order was subsequently so far modified that, men being required for the China war, an offer was made to all who had not compromised themselves by insubordinate conduct, of a bounty of fifty rupees per man, on condition of their re-enlisting for ten years. Very few, however, availed themselves of this offer. It would have been a dangerous experiment for a few individuals to have enlisted into old regiments, where they would have been marked men. With the exception of a very few who accepted the terms, the whole body, some seven thousand, were sent home at the public expense.

In spite, however, of the determination of Government communicated to the men, that they should never be re-enlisted, the greater number—all who wished, at least—were re-engaged a short time after they reached England; so that in point of fact Government paid twice over to the demands of these men, sending them home first of all, and then giving them the very thing they had asserted their right to, and which Government had declared they should never have at any price,—bounty on re-engagement.

To complete this bungling, no sooner had the country been rid of the troublesome Dumpies, than our rulers bethought themselves how to reward the men of the old Indian army, who had remained staunch to their colours and set a good example to their younger comrades, and determined, strangely enough, upon rewarding them with the boon of two years' service. This, of course, made a number of old soldiers, who were just then particularly valuable to the State, entitled to their discharge, which they took, and had to be sent to England at the expense of the public purse.

The necessity of making some radical change in the constitution of the army in India had become apparent long



before these proceedings attracted public notice. And on the 15th July, 1858, a royal commission had been convened to take evidence and opinions of experienced officers, with a view to a re-organization of the whole military system. The members of this committee were the Duke of Cambridge, General Peel, Lord Stanley, the Marquis of Tweeddale, Viscount Malcolm, Sir Henry G. Smith, Sir G. Wetherall, Major-Generals Montgomerie and Hancock, and Colonels Burlton and Tait.

Nearly ten years have elapsed since the committee recorded its opinions, and every year's experience has strengthened the doubts of those who watched, from an impartial point of view, the policy pursued, in its soundness and expediency. Writing in 1869 of what commenced in 1859, and has been completed since, I may safely affirm that public opinion in India characterises the army amalgamation as a failure. Each step taken to fuse the two systems has resulted in developing some new difficulty and demonstrating the impossibility of uniting irreconcilable interests. The measures adopted to effect the union will be described in some detail further on. But the volume of orders and counter-orders, modifications, amendments, incessant interference with vested rights and subsequent concessions, inextricable confusion of local lists, staff corps, and regimental cadres, bears testimony in the shape of a matted mass of complications to the hopelessness of the task most imprudently attempted.

The Committee sent in their report on the 7th March, 1859, and the same year the first step towards the new system was taken in the notification that future appointments to the Indian army should be made subject to any alterations it might be found necessary to make on the basis of the report of the commission.¹

This report was not conclusive. The royal officers were in favour of an amalgamated army; the old Company's

¹ General Order, No. 1637 of 1859, quoting Secretary of State's letter, No. 343, 30 Sept. 1859.



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officers inclined to a separate local army. The matter was debated in the House of Commons, and the majority voted for a continuance of the separate force.

The question was in this unsettled condition when the news of the mutiny of the European troops on the bounty and discharge question reached home, and this had the effect of turning the balance. It was then decided not to retain the local army as a separate force, but to amalgamate the two.

The official announcement of the termination of the rebellion was made in a proclamation of the Viceroy dated 8th July of this year, on which occasion a day was appointed for public thanksgiving in the cathedral at Calcutta. The Proclamation runs thus :—

“The restoration of peace and tranquillity to the Queen’s dominions in India makes it the grateful duty of the Viceroy and Governor-General in Council to direct that a day be appointed for a solemn thanksgiving to Almighty God for His signal mercies and protection.

“War is at an end. Rebellion is put down. The noise of arms is no longer heard where the enemies of the State have persisted in their last struggle: the presence of large forces in the field has ceased to be necessary. Order is re-established, and peaceful pursuits have everywhere been resumed.

“The Viceroy and Governor-General in Council desires that Thursday the 28th July be observed as a day of general thanksgiving for those great blessings, and as a holiday throughout British India by all faithful subjects of the Queen.

“Especially his Excellency in Council invites all her Majesty’s Christian subjects to join in a humble offering of gratitude and praise to Almighty God for the many mercies vouchsafed to them.

“The Bishop of Calcutta will be requested to prepare a form of prayers to be used on the day above-mentioned by the congregations under his Lordship’s spiritual authority.”



As soon as the cessation of the monsoons would permit, the Viceroy left Calcutta for the Upper Provinces, then for the first time visited by him. His main object, no doubt, was to have an opportunity of meeting as many of the native chiefs and princes as could be assembled at the different places where he halted during his progress, and thanking those among them who had been conspicuous in their loyalty publicly, in *darbar*, for their services. It was also his object, doubtless, to make himself personally acquainted with the principal officers, civil and military, with whom he had been in official communication during the continuance of the war. He must have felt, too, an anxious desire to see with his own eyes the localities now famous to all time for deeds of heroism and valour and endurance. Nor was there wanting, probably, the idea of removing, by personal intercourse with as large a portion of the European community in Upper India as was practicable, some of that unpopularity with which he could not but be conscious he was regarded. A man in the position of Viceroy of India may, if he chooses, shut his ears to the voice of the people, and, confident in his own theory of administration—correct perhaps according to principles of political economy recognised as sound in European countries—silence with the iron hand of despotism the protests and remonstrances of a subject race, who feel that they are not understood. But few Englishmen are by nature tyrants or despots, unless they are men whose feelings have been blunted and views narrowed by a long career of official life passed among a people educated in the habits of abject submission and servile flattery, which in Oriental countries it is supposed the ruling class have a right to exact. A large-hearted and conscientious statesman like Lord Canning will ever consider it a proof of successful administration that he has the sympathy and attachment of the classes over whom he has been placed to rule. At the time Lord Canning left Calcutta for the Upper Provinces, he was probably the most unpopular man that ever





held office in that country. As far as public opinion in Upper India was concerned, much of this feeling had undergone a change when he returned to Calcutta. People were astonished to find in the courteous nobleman, whose every feature bore the stamp of deep thought and intellect and feeling, whose gentlemanly and dignified demeanour contrasted so favourably with the stiffness and *hauteur* of high Indian officials, the man who had been represented as vacillating in council, dilatory in action, unsympathising, cold and selfish in the midst of the terrible disaster that had swept over the country.

There is no doubt his views underwent a considerable change after his tour in the North-West. He then learnt, for the first time, what India really was, and how impossible it is for a Viceroy whose experience is confined to the limits of Calcutta, to realize the difficulty of governing so vast a country, containing so many different races, with so many varied and conflicting interests to be balanced. Lord Elgin is said to have felt the same, and to have expressed, after a journey of eight hundred miles in the interior, his astonishment at finding the real condition of the country so different from the idea of it he had gathered among his councillors at Government House.

Had Lord Canning, with the breadth of view that unquestionably characterised him, made in the beginning of 1857 the tour he accomplished in the end of 1859, he would have realized the nature of the danger that confronted him on the outbreak of the rebellion. He would have realized, what none can realize without seeing it, the risk to which small isolated communities of Europeans are exposed in settlements scattered a long distance apart throughout Upper India. He would have seen the enormous capacity for mischief a large organized body of men like the native army possess when infected with a rebellious spirit. In Calcutta, surrounded with a large European and American population, within sight of a forest of masts belonging to ships from every quarter of the world, where

every sight and sound indicates the activity of commerce, and an intimate connexion with foreign countries, a statesman straight from home, with all his English ideas of the force of law and order, could not, and never can, realize the defenceless position of small isolated European communities throughout the Mofussil. Lord Canning was new to the country, but he was surrounded with advisers who had the experience of thirty years' residence to lend weight to their counsels. In an evil moment he confided in them; yet he had no reason to doubt their prudence. The brilliant career of his predecessor had closed amid the congratulations of his fellow-countrymen. With the assistance and advice of similar counsellors, Lord Dalhousie had reached the pinnacle of a glorious and successful administration. He had never to complain of the want of experienced advisers, or of being misled by those whose duty it was to instruct him. It was not likely—was it possible?—that these officials, who had served through a long and honourable career in the country, would not be better able than a new-comer to discern the signs of approaching danger, if danger there were.

There is no training more prejudicial to the politician or statesman than departmental. Even in Europe or America, no politician whose whole career had been spent in the groove of official life, who had risen step by step from the position of a clerk to that of the head of a department, would ever be found fitted for the post of premier or president. Intimate acquaintance with details of office work is valuable in the head of a department. But real statesmanship—and an Indian viceroy, to be successful, should be a statesman of the first water—requires breadth of view and a capacity for generalizing, and the faculty of recognising the due weight to be given to conflicting interests and the double side of every question, which it is the whole tendency of official life to eliminate. A successful soldier is far more likely to turn out an able viceroy than a successful civilian. For although the former may have



had no experience of civil administration, and no knowledge of law, his career will necessarily have brought him into contact with men of all parties and classes, and have taught him to exercise unfettered judgment in great emergencies, under the guidance of general principles, while his broad experience of the world will have induced a habit of looking at questions on every side and from divers points of view. For the details of administration, he can, and ought to be, dependent upon others, but only for details. The evil Lord Canning was exposed to, was that he was forced by the nature of the emergency in which he found himself involved to depend on others for more than details. When the crisis came upon him, he dared not trust his own judgment, all ignorant as he was of the country and of the nature of the danger that beset him. And in depending on his councillors for advice on broad questions of policy, he had to work with tools but ill-adapted for the purpose for which he used them. In official details of departmental routine, his council might and probably would have directed him aright. As it was, they were incapable of dealing with anything beyond mere details, and the responsibility of action lay on him.

In November 1859 Lord Canning met the principal chiefs of Rajpootana at a grand durbar at Agra, on which occasion he addressed them collectively and individually, thanking them for services rendered, and conveying the assurance of Her Majesty's favour, and conferring on several of the most loyal and deserving gifts, remissions of debts, distinctions, &c. This durbar, however, is famous for the promulgation of a great principle in England's future policy towards India and her chiefs.

It is generally supposed, and indeed it has been of late so often stated in speeches and in books, that it is no wonder it has become an article of belief, that this durbar was the first occasion upon which the right of adoption by native chiefs was officially and publicly recognised. Yet Lord Amherst, in 1825, in an address to the chiefs of



Rajpootana, dated the 10th January, thus wrote: "The government of the several provinces and chiefs who now rule their own territories should be perpetuated, and the dignity of their houses continued. I hereby, in fulfilment of this desire, convey to you the assurance that, on failure of natural heirs, the British Government will recognise and confirm any adoption of a successor made by yourselves, or by any future chief of your state, that may be in accordance with Mahommedan law¹ and the customs of your race."

This right, however, had of late years been persistently denied to the independent chiefs till Lord Canning intimated its restitution in 1859, in the case of the Maharaja of Gwalior. This chief, not by virtue of his standing among the independent princes of Central India and Rajpootana, but by virtue of the extent of his territories, of his revenues, and of his resources generally—and partly, perhaps, because the Government more or less anxiously watched the nature of his policy—was honoured with a seat in the durbar equal in rank with that of the Maharaja of Jeypore, the representative of one of the first Rajpoot families.

I have annexed the short addresses delivered by Lord Canning to the Maharajas of Gwalior, Jeypore, and Alwar, three of the principal chiefs, as specimens of his style, and because in one of them, that to the Gwalior sovereign, the admission of the principle of the recognition of adopted heirs is prominently stated.

To the Maharaja of Gwalior he said :—

“ MAHARAJA OF GWALIOR :

“ It is with no ordinary pleasure that I receive your Highness in this assembly, in the presence of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, and of many distinguished officers of the armies of India, of many high officers of the Civil Service, and other English gentlemen, and before many loyal native subjects of the Queen.

¹ The Mahommedan law is here specified, but there appears no reason why it should not be extended to Hindoos.



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"I am glad to receive your Highness at Agra. It was from Agra that, a few days after the outbreak of rebellion, I received the news of your prompt and loyal tender to the Lieutenant-Governor, the lamented Mr. Colvin, of the services of the most trusty of your own personal guard.

"It was from Agra that, twelve months later, when the brunt of the rebellion had fallen at last upon Gwalior, a portion of that army marched which under Sir Hugh Rose drove back your enemies, and resealed you within twenty days in the palace of your capital.

"These were the opening and the closing scenes of the rebellion in the neighbourhood of this city. During the year which intervened, and since that time, you have earnestly supported the British Government with your whole strength, and in everything have shown yourself mindful of the ties which bind you to it.

"As the Head of that Government, I thank you heartily.

"I now make known to your Highness, that in remembrance of the good services which you have rendered, and to increase your authority and dignity, lands to the annual value of three lacs will be added to your territory, and the limitation which is imposed upon the number of your infantry troops will be extended; that the arrears due from your Government on account of the assigned districts are remitted; and that henceforward no payment will be claimed from your Highness' Government when the proceeds of those districts fall short of the sum stipulated by the Treaty of Gwalior.

"I have already told your Highness that if, unhappily, lineal heirs shall fail you, the Government will see with pleasure your adoption of a successor according to the rules and traditions of your family. Your Highness and all your Highness' subjects may be sure that it is the earnest desire of the Paramount Power that the loyal and princely house of Scindia shall be perpetuated and flourish.

"I expect, and I am sure that I shall not be disappointed, that your Highness will continue to apply all the energies of your Government, civil and military, to enforcing peace, and giving contentment to the country under your rule."

To the Maharaja of Jeypore:—

"MAHARAJA OF JEYPORE:

"The presence at this durbar of yourself, a prince sprung from the oldest and noblest families of Rajpootana, and a faithful and zealous feudatory of the British Crown, is very gratifying to me.

"The territory of Jeypore was less continually harassed by the rebellion than many others; but occasions were not wanting to you in which to show your signal loyalty.



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"When the rebel force approached your capital and called upon you to surrender the British officers in it, your answer was, 'Come and take them.' When the Political Agent was absent on distant duties, you gave a careful and considerate protection to his family.

"When opportunity offered, you sent in safety to this city of Agra, and under an escort of your own, fifty Christian lives.

"You have done all in your power to aid the British troops, by keeping open the communications through your country.

"In recognition of these services I desire your acceptance of the *pergunnah* of Kote Kasim as an addition to your territory. It was lately an appanage of the King of Delhi, by whose treason and rebellion against the British power it has been forfeited. In adding it to your possessions I feel certain that I place it for ever in loyal hands.

"I desire to take this opportunity of publicly thanking your Highness and the Jeypore Durbar for the faithful performance of its promises and of the wishes of the British Government, in steadily suppressing *suttee* within your territory, and in allowing no abuse of the right of sanctuary by murderers and robbers."

To the Maharaja of Alwar:—

"MAHA RAO RAJA OF ALWAR :

"You are welcome to this *darbar* for your father's sake.

"There was no better ruler in Rajpootana, and no more faithful feudatory of the Queen, than Bumree Singh.

"In his last illness he sent his best troops to the support of the British Government, and many of them were killed in the discharge of that duty at no great distance from this city.

"I regret to think that he did not live to see their death avenged.

"You are very young to be left alone as the inheritor of the rule of an ancient state.

"I know that you have had bad advisers, and that you have been misled by them. But these men have been removed from you, and now I enjoin you to use the time which must elapse before you can begin to govern, so as to show by your conduct that the Governor-General of India need not hesitate to recognise and support your authority when that time arrives.

"Walk in your father's footsteps, and you will be certain of that support. Guide yourself by the advice of the Governor-General's agent, Major Eden, and of the Political Agent, and receive the counsel which I have given to you in the friendly spirit in which it is spoken.

"The guns of your father's force which were lost shall be returned to the Alwar State if possible; if not, I will send others."



These addresses were delivered with all the majesty of expression and demeanour which Lord Canning knew so well how to throw into his public acts. Translations of them were subsequently read out by Mr. Beadon, then Foreign Secretary, in a low and inaudible tone, conspicuous for the absence of the qualities that distinguished Lord Canning's style. None of the chiefs could have heard or understood a word of what the Secretary read, though, of course, they were supplied with copies of the addresses, which they could study at their leisure.

There is no question that this measure—the recognition of the much-valued right of adoption—was a highly politic one. The independent princes of India had been watching too long the process of absorption. One after another they saw the territories of their fellow-chiefs lapse and fall into the apparently insatiable vortex of the British Indian Empire. The concession, if made during the war, would have been looked upon as made under the pressure of necessity, and liable to be cancelled on the restoration of British power. The privilege admitted now was a graceful concession made at a time when the British power was stronger than it had ever been before, and there could be no grounds for the most jealous to suspect that once granted it would ever be rescinded. It is a sort of "Magna Charta," a guarantee of independence and political life, to all the petty states that repose in peace and security like shrubs beneath the branches of the great tree which spreads the shelter of its foliage over the whole of Hindustan.

At the close of 1859, Mr. Wilson arrived in Calcutta to take charge of the department of Indian finance, and, with the view of acquiring some personal knowledge of the resources of the country, made a rapid tour from Calcutta to the Upper Provinces, passing a few hours at each of the larger stations ; where, in communication with the principal officials, he endeavoured to gather such ideas and information as might be imparted in a hurried visit or an after-dinner conversation. Thus primed, he returned to Calcutta



to take his seat at the Council Board, there to inaugurate those measures of reform which were so loudly called for in the most difficult department of political economy. Those measures will hereafter be alluded to more in detail when we come to the subject of finance. The early and lamented death of this eminent man prevented him from completing the work which he may be said scarcely to have begun, ere he sunk, under the influence of the climate of Bengal and the weight of anxious public cares, into an untimely grave. He died on the 9th August, 1860, of acute dysentery.

There is little of imperial interest to record in the progress of events in the minor presidencies during the year under review: except, indeed, in Madras, where Sir Charles Trevelyan—who assumed the governorship of that province early in the year, in succession to Lord Harris, whose tenure of office had expired—began early to exhibit that spirit of independence, or, as in a less important office it would be called, insubordination, which led to his early recall.

Unimpeded by the rebellion which had checked progress in the northern parts of India, the Madras Government was enabled throughout the year to proceed with their works of general improvement. Bombay, owing to its geographical position, and the comparative sympathy of a section of its native army with the movement which had disturbed all Upper India, was less unruffled than the sister presidency. But the political condition of the presidency, at that time under the administration of Lord Elphinstone, presented no feature of importance in an imperial point of view.

In the North-West Provinces, ever since the death of Mr. Colvin, the Lieutenant-Governor, who succumbed to anxiety and the pressure of work during the height of the rebellion in the Agra fort, until the commencement of this year, the office of Lieutenant-Governor had remained vacant. In January of this year it was filled by the appointment of Mr. Edmonstone, a civilian of standing and experience,



who had for many years served in the Punjab under the Lawrence administration, and subsequently as Foreign Secretary to Lord Canning. In February, Sir John Lawrence retired from the Lieutenant-Governorship of the Punjab, and his place was filled by Sir R. Montgomery.

Towards the close of the year, some military operations were undertaken on the frontier of the Derajat, the territory west of the Indus, in consequence of the cowardly murder of an officer (Captain Mecham), who, while travelling from Kohat, fell a victim to the bloodthirsty fanaticism of the tribes inhabiting the mountain ranges that border our north-west frontier. A force of about 4,000 men and 13 guns, besides police and levies, was placed under the command of Brigadier-General Neville Chamberlain. This force, which was called the "Koorum field force," entered the hills from Dera Ismail Khan in the month of December, and on the 22d engaged the enemy, defeating them with the loss of about fifty men, and driving them from their supposed impregnable position in the mountains. Captain Henderson, with a party of irregular cavalry, pursued them, capturing 5,000 sheep, besides bullocks and camels. The expedition was so far successful that the chief of the gang of murderers was delivered up, and the tribe who had concealed the criminals were punished by the destruction of their prestige among their own people, besides the loss of the best of their councillors and warriors, and property to the amount of 25,000 rupees.



CHAPTER IV.

1860.

Sir Charles Trevelyan at Madras—The income-tax—Sir C. Trevelyan's protest—His recall—Lord Clyde—His successor—Army reform—The indigo disturbances in Bengal—Famine in Upper India—Resuscitation of Secundra settlement—The Disarming Act—Right of adoption conceded generally—Military operations—Darjeeling.

SIR CHARLES TREVELYAN, who had been associated with Mr. Wilson in the Treasury Office in London before the latter was appointed to the post of Financial Member of Council, assumed the reins of government in the Madras Presidency at the close of the previous year. That the income-tax, with which Mr. Wilson's name is now historically associated, did not take Sir Charles Trevelyan by surprise is certain, for Mr. Wilson had stopped at Madras on his way to Calcutta, and in a conference with his late colleague had intimated the general outlines of the scheme which he would seem somewhat prematurely to have resolved upon adopting. I say prematurely, because at that period of his career it is certain Mr. Wilson lacked that personal experience of India which is so necessary to a successful administration of its affairs. Lord Canning had, previously to Mr. Wilson's arrival, proposed a licence-tax, which met with so much opposition both in council and out of doors, principally because it exempted officials, that it was abandoned—at least its character was changed to an income-tax. But the Council was not in accord, and eventually the matter was allowed to stand over till Mr. Wilson's arrival. Still something had been done to meet

the emergency. The first budget ever published in India was issued by Lord Canning in 1859, showing a deficit of five millions. To meet this he had recourse to a five and a half per cent. loan, the duty on Malwa opium was doubled, and the salt-tax was raised eight annas a maund (a shilling per eighty pounds) in Bengal and the North-West. The proposition to extend the measure on the same terms throughout India was vehemently and successfully opposed by the Governments of Madras and Bombay. Mr. Wilson, shortly after his arrival, published an amended budget, which showed a deficit at the close of 1859 of nine and a half millions, and of six and a half for 1859-60. This was exclusive of the reductions effected in the item of military charges, and of the increase in the inland revenue from the Custom and Excise.

But the most prominent feature in Mr. Wilson's policy was the income-tax, an impost up to that time unknown in India. It not unnaturally excited a good deal of opposition, and no small amount of apprehension among the natives, who would have submitted contentedly to a poll-tax, but saw, in an impost levied proportionately upon their incomes, the shadow of some great engine of oppression. Investigation into the worldly means and possessions of wealthy men had too often in former days, and in native states in more recent times, been followed by arbitrary exactions, for them to feel comfortable under the prospect. The poll-tax, which is a tax that falls equally upon rich and poor, and is consequently on all now recognised principles of political economy justly regarded as a remnant of barbarism, and a licence-tax exacted in some shape under former *régimes*, were the only forms of direct taxation with which the natives were familiar. With forced payments, levied by despotic rulers, they were by tradition familiar enough. And there is some reason to believe that they supposed this new tax upon incomes would assume the shape of those arbitrary exactions which were common under native rule. Experience has shown that the income-



tax is an impost unsuited to the country. It may be doubted if all direct taxation is not peculiarly unsuited to a population like that of India. If Mr. Wilson had learnt anything of the country and the people before forming any conclusions as to the measures to be adopted, it is probable that the income-tax would have been the last expedient to which he would have thought of resorting. But we are all apt to cling tenaciously to our preconceived ideas, and having once fixed in his own mind that an income-tax was calculated to meet the necessities of the case, it was not likely that the meagre information subsequently acquired during his rapid tour in Upper India, and communication with the officials in Calcutta and elsewhere, would lead to a change of purpose.

Sir C. Trevelyan and the Madras Council vigorously opposed the measure, and forwarded their protest to the Legislative Council in Calcutta. This protest was received on the 9th of April, and a reply drawn up by Mr. Wilson was forwarded on the 14th of the same month, and the income-tax bill was read a second time. Lord Elphinstone supported the Madras Government in remonstrating against the measure, but in vain. Had the Governor of Madras confined himself to protesting in council against the policy of the legislature, the matter would have ended probably with a reprimand from the Home Government, and an exhortation to the duty of obedience. It would seem, however, as if a spirit of insubordination had affected the whole political atmosphere about that time; or as if there were a sort of moral epidemic abroad, one symptom of which was a tendency to resist authority. During 1857 the disastrous news of the mutiny of a regiment, or the revolt of a district, had been so frequently repeated that the phrase that such and such a regiment, or station, or province "had gone," passed into a popular idiom. The natives had the same slang term in use, substituting for the English expression one signifying "has turned round." And when Sir C. Trevelyan took the unwonted course of



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publishing his protest against the income-tax in the newspapers of the Madras presidency, the journals in the other presidencies sounded the alarm in the well-known words that "Madras had gone." And so it had—in an Indian sense. In former days, under the Mogul empire, a similar exhibition of independence from a Soubahdar, or governor of a distant province, might be expected to be speedily followed by some overt act of rebellion. A protest against an imperial measure, such as the imposition of a tax, published in the newspaper, was an appeal to public opinion which was altogether strange and hideous to a Government so thoroughly opposed to the expression of any public feeling at all as that of India. It was as near an approach to a declaration of independence on the part of a satrap of a minor presidency as could well be made. If followed up to its natural conclusions, in the native mind, it would be regarded as little less than a declaration of contemplated resistance. And the most absurd and *bizarre* feature of the whole affair was, that such a course of action should be taken by Sir C. Trevelyan of all people in the world—a man noted for his haughty unswerving disregard of public opinion. There was no other single member of the government in the whole of India from whom such a policy might not have sooner been expected than from the conservative civilian governor of the Madras presidency. No motive has ever been assigned for this unwonted procedure, no explanation ever offered of the eccentric phenomenon. That the despatch was communicated to the press by Sir Charles himself has never been denied. It was only in the latter part of 1859 that Lord Canning had to combat a contumacious spirit of independence in his own Legislative Council, who, over-estimating their own powers, had assumed some of the functions of a House of Commons, and demanded, before passing a bill to raise duties and impose taxes, such a return as the House of Representatives would, under the British Constitution, be entitled to demand. The Council was speedily scolded into submission, and were taught that



their proper functions were to act merely as a machine to carry out the views of the Government itself. More recently, as will be seen below, the newly-constituted Council, after having every vestige of independence carefully eradicated, have been taught that even an independent expression of opinion is beyond their privilege. Still, whatever may be the powers of the Legislative Council, there can be no question that, constituted as the Indian Government is, Sir Charles Trevelyan's conduct in appealing to the public was in him wholly unjustifiable, and might, under other circumstances, have seriously embarrassed the Administration.

Lord Canning, who had lived through two outbreaks of insubordination, and was at the time snatching a little repose at Simla, must have beheld with dismay not altogether unmixed with amusement the appearance of the epidemic in the Madras Government. The crisis, however, was serious enough to force him at once to leave the cool breezes of the Himalayas and the rest he so much needed, and hurry to Calcutta, whence he forwarded a despatch to the Secretary of State, which was followed, as every one foresaw it would be, by Sir Charles Trevelyan's immediate recall. He was replaced by the Governor of Ceylon, Sir Henry Ward, who unhappily succumbed to cholera shortly after his arrival, and added another to the list of eminent men who about this time fell victims to the unhealthy influence of the Indian climate.

Another important office changed hands during the year. In June 1860 Lord Clyde, with his honours thick upon him, retired, and was succeeded by Sir Hugh Rose, now Lord Strathnairn. Lord Clyde had come to India for an especial purpose. He came to quell the rebellion, and he remained at his post till the last spark had been trampled out. That the genius of a general is to be measured by his success is an axiom in history; and in accomplishing the task which he undertook, with such prompt obedience to Her Majesty's wishes in declaring his readiness to start for



India the day following his acceptance of the post, he fully justified the confidence placed in him. But the tide had begun to turn before he took the field. Lord Clyde's *spécialité* was caution. And in one instance—the operations for the relief of Lucknow, and the rescue of the non-combatant portion of the garrison and the invalids—probably it would have been difficult to have selected an officer better qualified by the peculiar bent of his genius for the work in hand. In other and subsequent operations it cannot be denied, by an impartial writer, that although success attended Lord Clyde's efforts, that success was dearly purchased by the appalling loss of valuable lives, who fell not by the bullet and the cannon of the enemy, but by exposure to the climate, an exposure occasioned by the dilatoriness of the Commander-in-Chief in taking the field. When it is considered how much had been done to trample down the rebellion before Lord Clyde landed, how many successes had been gained by officers who had at their disposal not one tithe of the resources which Lord Clyde brought to bear against a foe already weakened by the loss of their prestige, already beaten in many an open field, driven out of Delhi, and held at bay at Lucknow, it is impossible not to find some justification for the impatience and discontent which three months of inaction at that critical period gave rise to in the army and among the public in India generally. In the difficult operations for the relief of Lucknow, and the rescue of the beleaguered garrison, Lord Clyde was surrounded by some of the best officers in the service, and no doubt he profited much by their counsel and advice. Still any attempt to rob him, upon whom would have fallen the blame of failure, of the credit of success is to be deprecated. The skill with which such a host of helpless people were extricated from the Residency in the presence of a numerous and desperate enemy cannot be too highly lauded. And had Lord Clyde after that object had been accomplished retired, and left to more active men the remaining conduct of the campaign, he



would have carried with him the grateful admiration of all classes. But from the end of 1857 to March 1858, when the hot sun began to tell upon the troops, he remained inactive. Both at the capture of Lucknow and in the Rohilcund campaign his over-cautious movements allowed the enemy to escape, and sacrificed our own soldiers, not to the genius of war, but to the rays of the sun. A future biographer of Lord Clyde or of Lord Canning may, perhaps, be in a position to produce some proofs that the policy of the war was directed, not as it usually is by the genius of the commander and the force of circumstances, but by some secret instructions, which among other things contained restrictions as to the loss which was to be inflicted on the enemy. When nations are engaged in a deadly struggle for mastery, it is usual to make the destruction of the enemy the main object of offensive operations. Compared with the exertions put forward by the British Government, with the expenditure, with the resources at Lord Clyde's disposal—and compared, too, with the provocation the English nation had received from the treacherous sepoy of the Bengal army—the loss inflicted upon them in the campaign of 1857-58 and 1859 was ludicrously small. At Lucknow and Bareilly, the two places where, in the latter part of the campaign, the rebellion chiefly concentrated itself, and where by an active commander really intent on the business of war the destruction of the mutineers might have been almost certainly accomplished, beyond the ordinary casualties of an action fought by an enemy that exposes itself as little as possible, the whole rebel army got off scot-free. If it was Lord Clyde's object to let them get off scot-free, if he had secret orders to conduct his movements on such a plan that the enemy should suffer as little as possible compatible with their defeat, then none can gainsay his right to the credit of success. But the public, who knew nothing of the existence of such secret orders, and who take for granted that a large and well-appointed army, placed in the field at an enormous



expense, is there for the purpose to which warlike operations are usually directed, who saw the reconquest of the disturbed districts postponed day after day, week after week, month after month, and then effected under circumstances when the sufferings and losses of our own troops were at the maximum, while those encountered by the enemy were at the minimum, will hesitate ere they join in according to Lord Clyde a rank among great English generals.

The same feature of Lord Clyde's character—caution—led him sometimes to treat his general officers who acted under him, to say the least, unfairly. In conducting military operations in concert with them he always had a preponderating force under his immediate control, while he expected his officers in independent command, though co-operating in the general plan of the campaign, to accomplish important results with very inadequate means. He was said to be very jealous of the reputation of his subordinate officers, and did not always award that meed of merit which was their due. He was too short a time at the head of the army to inaugurate any of the reforms in the military service that became necessary by the breaking up of the old system. And the bungling that took place on the bounty and discharge question, and the European mutiny, is not attributable to him so much as to the Supreme Government—although, of course, they were guided in some measure by the advice and opinions of the Commander-in-Chief. Some allusion has already been made to the ability evinced by his successor, Sir Hugh Rose, when referring to his achievements in the field. But Sir Hugh Rose's genius for command was not confined to the active operations of a campaign. No sooner had he taken charge, than he set his vigorous intellect to work to effect those internal reforms which the army at that time much needed. Endowed with marvellous physical powers, great activity, and unflagging energy, he soon made all classes feel that they had a commander over them of no ordinary calibre. To improve



the condition of the soldier, his quarters, his rations; to find occupation to relieve the tedious monotony of barrack life; to reward merit, and, by making it the stepping-stone to promotion, to kindle a healthy spirit of zeal and emulation; to revive discipline; to force officers to learn their duty,—were the ends to which he devoted the enormous energies of his mind and body. Nor did he do so in vain. At first he met with obstruction from dull apathy, and that spirit of conservatism that runs through every branch of the administration, and is seen in all the relations of life, in India. The much-needed reforms he tried to introduce were called crotchets. His insisting on discipline was the temper and spirit of a martinet. The old Indian school of military officers, long unused to interference so that their returns and muster-rolls were duly signed, opposed him in every way they could. But he forced obedience. Riding immense distances, accompanied by one or two of his staff and a flying camp, he personally inspected almost every body of troops in the presidency. From morning to night there was one thought uppermost in his mind, and that was the reform of the army, the infusion of a healthy spirit of zeal and emulation, and the improvement of the condition of the private soldier. For years accustomed to see patronage distributed in accordance with the system in vogue—a system at its height in the latter part of Lord Gough's and Sir W. Gomm's time, under which successful "simpering in Simla saloons," and petticoat influence, intrigue, and favouritism, had far more to say to the selection of officers for commands and appointments than gallant conduct in the field, or the display of genius and ability—the Indian military world received with a sneer of disbelief the declaration published by the new Commander-in-Chief, that with him patronage should go by merit, and by merit only. For the first two years he was most unpopular. But by degrees the tide turned in his favour, and before he laid down the cares and emoluments of office, those who had been foremost in abusing him acknowledged that he had worked



wonders, confessed that the reforms which were at first so unpalatable were needed, and the general opinion in military circles proclaimed him the best Commander-in-Chief India had seen at the head of the army within the memory of the present generation. He was succeeded in the command of the Bombay army by Sir William Mansfield. This officer held the responsible position of chief of the staff to Lord Clyde, a new appointment, up to that time unknown in India or the British army generally. Those who pretend to be behind the scenes are fond of declaring that it was to Sir William Mansfield's genius that Lord Clyde was indebted for the plan of his campaign. Without going so far as this, it may safely be assumed that Lord Clyde derived much assistance from the experience and administrative ability which Sir William Mansfield unquestionably possesses. It is to be regretted that on succeeding Lord Strathnairn, he evinced too little of his predecessor's energy in completing the beneficial measures which the expiration of that officer's period of command, in 1865, left unfinished.

The province of Bengal Proper, which had remained comparatively free from disturbances during the rebellion, was destined to be agitated by the violent rupture of the indigo system in 1859-60. That the province escaped the horrors of civil war in 1857, was mainly due to the energetic action of Mr. W. Tayler, the Commissioner of Patna, who, by his timely arrest of a dangerous conspiracy, struck such terror into the disaffected classes that they never ventured upon any overt act of rebellion. How this officer was rewarded by professional ruin for his services, as public men often are when they anticipate a crisis and strike too soon, or, deeming prevention to be better than cure, inundate the house with water before the fire has made head at all, is an episode of the mutiny that belongs to a period anterior to that which is the subject of these pages. But that the indigo disturbances were not accompanied by bloodshed, or by outrages on person and property, is due



to the character of the Bengalee rather than to the nature of the wrong complained of, and the extent to which feelings were affected. Sufficient time has elapsed since the occurrence to enable us to take a more unprejudiced and comprehensive view of the cause of quarrel than was possible at the time, or even for a year or two afterwards, when both parties were so much incensed against each other that it was most difficult to extract from the special pleading of partisans the real facts of the dispute. The custom had been for the planters to make advances to the cultivators, binding them down to deliver a certain quantity of indigo, and forcing them to bear the risk of failure. The obligation thus laid on the cultivator descended from father to son, for a failure of completion of the contract brought the cultivator again to the planter for fresh advances; and the result was that the former became hopelessly involved. As time went on, the yoke became so heavy that the people were unable to bear it, and several causes conspiring just at this time to awaken them to a sense of their position, and to a prospect of escape, if with a united effort they endeavoured to throw off the obligations, the attempt was made. They openly refused to fulfil their contracts, and defied the planters to force them. In a few cases violence was resorted to, and the lives and property of the planters were endangered. But the Bengalee is a harmless individual where physical force is concerned; and considering the excited state of feeling all over the province, the results in the shape of outrage on person and property were marvellously small. The loss entailed, however, in the aggregate was serious, for after the expiry of the Act which was passed to enforce fulfilments of existing contracts, by making a breach of them criminal, the cultivators refused to sow indigo in the Kishnagur, Jessore, Fureedpore, and Pubna districts, in which alone property valued at one and a quarter million was ruined.¹ The loss, of course, did not fall wholly on

¹ *The Friend of India.*



the planters. It was a strike without the clubs and associations to supply the labourers with means of livelihood during the cessation of their earnings. The miserable cultivators, in gratifying their grudge against the planters, had to forego half-a-million of money that would otherwise have circulated among them, and have afforded the means of support for them and their families. The planters, many of whom were landlords, naturally asserted their rights, and amid the wreck of their fortunes strove to save a few remnants, by a rigid collection of their rents; and the cultivators were sold up, or imprisoned and fined under the provisions of the special Act.

This Act was passed on the 9th April, and was intended to prevent the sudden and total destruction of almost all the indigo interests in the province. Under its provision a committee was assembled to inquire into the grievances of the ryots and the position of the planters, and to investigate the charges of oppression which the former brought against them. Of this committee Mr. Seton Karr was president, and Mr. (now Sir R.) Temple, the Government nominee. The planters were represented by Mr. W. Fergusson, and the missionaries by the Rev. J. Sale, while Baboo C. Chatterjee attended on the part of the British Indian Association to represent native interests. It commenced its sittings on the 10th May, and sat till the 4th August. It examined 134 witnesses, of whom 15 were officials, 21 planters, 8 missionaries, 13 native zemindars or talookdars, and 77 cultivators, tenant proprietors, or occupiers of land. The report drawn up by the committee is allowed by all parties to be most exhaustive. It deals with every point connected with indigo cultivation, with the relations between the planters and the ryots, with agricultural pursuits of all sorts, with the conduct of the police and the authorities, with the subject of land tenures, and the general condition of the country and the people.

The case on either side is thus briefly stated.

It is asserted, on the one hand, that the cultivation of



indigo is not voluntary on the part of the ryot; that he is compelled to plough, to sow, and weed his land, and to cut and cart the plant, at times when he would prefer being engaged in other agricultural work of superior profit; that the land allotted to indigo is selected by the servants of the planters, is the best land very often, and is sometimes forcibly ploughed up to be resown with indigo when it is already sown with other crops; that the cultivation is thus rendered irksome and harassing to the ryot; that he invariably becomes indebted to the factory, and is obliged to bequeath his debts to his posterity, which almost deprives them of personal freedom; that he is oppressed by the servants of the factory, kidnapped, imprisoned, and outraged, and that the planters use unjustifiable means to obtain estates in *putni*¹ from the zemindars, and that the system generally is vicious in theory, injurious in practice, and radically unsound.

On the other hand, it is maintained that the rule of the planters, as proprietors of lands, is milder and more temperate than that of the natives; that the object of the planter in securing zemindary right is to have that influence over his tenants without which, from interference on the part of others, he cannot carry on the cultivation properly; that the zemindars, aware of this, extort exorbitant terms from the planter; that the planter's difficulties are increased by the jealousy and suspicion of the executive authorities, the corruptness of the police, the distance of the courts, and the chances of legal procedure; and that his presence in the country is beneficial to the natives and the Government in diffusing civilization, protection, and progress.

The subjects of inquiry were thus classified :—

1. The truth or falsehood of the charges made against the system and the planters.

¹ *Putni* means a lease. The Committee found that the planters had gradually acquired certain proprietary rights in land, but that these rights might be acquired in a perfectly legitimate manner.



2. Changes required to be made in the system as between manufacturer and cultivator, such as can be made by the heads of "concerns," themselves.

3 Changes in the law or administration, such as can only originate and be carried out by the legislative and executive authorities.

With regard to the first of these inquiries, the Committee report that, although it was the custom of planters to make advances, instances of fresh advances of late years were not numerous. The cultivators complained that, in consequence of their liability under the contracts made with their fathers, they were oppressed to such an extent that neither their labour nor their time could be called their own. The planters urged, on the other hand, that the cultivators were in reality better off under the system than they were before ; that they were not subjected to the demands frequently made by the native zemindars on various pretexts on the occasion of births, marriages, &c.; and that the European planters did not put in force their powers to measure and assess the lands the cultivators rented from them to the full amount allowed by law. These advantages were obviously of a precarious character, dependent on the temper and disposition of individuals, while the evils under which the cultivators laboured were of a more durable and permanent nature. In point of fact, the Committee found that what are called the "collateral advantages" which the cultivators were said to enjoy, were limited to two dispensaries and a few vernacular schools. But all the defects of the system, the Report says, may be summed up in one short sentence, "the want of adequate remuneration." "It is this that mainly renders the possession of landed influence indispensable to extensive cultivation, and it is owing to this that the planter has to urge the cultivator to plough and to sow, by means little short of compulsion ; it is this that brings out in strong relief the well-known defect of the national character of the Bengali, that sharpens his cunning, aggravates his indolence, tempts him



to procrastination, and fosters his proneness to concealment ; it is this, in short, that renders the whole relations between the two parties one prolonged and unhappy struggle, in which Anglo-Saxon energy, promptitude, and pertinacity are often almost baffled by that subterfuge and evasion which are the proverbial resources of the weak." The obvious remedy for such a state of things, the increase of terms offered to cultivators, was impracticable, because most of the indigo "concerns" were being worked with borrowed capital at an average rate of interest of 10 per cent., which, with the cost of manufacturing, left too small a margin for the planter to satisfy the needs of the cultivator.

As to the charges of violence brought against the planters, the Committee find that they were on the whole but ill supported. Of the actual destruction of human life, there had been very few instances. Affrays were rare, and no distinct cases of the alleged burning of bazaars and houses, outrages on women, &c. were proved. Several instances of the seizure of cattle by the planters, and of kidnapping men, were supported by evidence ; but extortion on the part of the factory servants, which under such a system was highly probable, was not clearly proved. The whole system is, however, described as being such that violent men can only work it by oppression and ill-usage, and the best and most considerate could gain credit only by the fact of their having worked it, not merely without producing open discontent, but even with some show of contentment on the part of the cultivator.

The share which the missionaries had in the dispute was this. They were accused by the planters of having set the cultivators against them, by telling the ryots they were under no necessity to meet the obligations imposed on them ; in short, the charge amounted to having, by their advice, instigated the ryots to the attempt to rid themselves of a yoke which they were no longer able to bear. The missionaries who were examined stoutly denied the charge. They declared, on the contrary, that they had urged the



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people to obedience to the law, to avoid breaking it, to sow the indigo for the present year, and, if oppressed, to appeal to the authorities.

“The assertion,” the Report adds, “that the refusal of the ryots to sow indigo has been produced by the preaching of the missionaries, is one entirely without foundation in truth.” “In our opinion, it is extremely unreasonable to attribute the sudden failure of an unsound system, which had grown up silently for years, to the officials and missionaries who told the people that they were free agents.”

As regards the second head of inquiry, the Committee recommended first doing away with the system of advances; and if this were not feasible, that the manufacturer should purchase indigo from the contractor. And failing both these, that the planter should pay a certain sum for the crop on the ground. In default of all of these suggested remedies, they proposed improvement in the existing system: a simple bond for twelve months, with a strict annual adjustment of accounts, the stamp paper to be at the expense of the factory, the land to be selected by the planter and cultivator mutually, and the expense of delivery to be borne by the factory. In addition, care should be taken that there were fair measurements in change for seed, and the cultivator to be allowed to sow a cold weather crop after the indigo had been cut, or to grow seed from the stumps; and, finally, accounts for rent and indigo to be kept separate.

Under the third head, the recommendation of the Committee was confined to the reform of police and the establishment of more subordinate courts.

To this Report are annexed a minute of Mr. Temple and one by Mr. Fergusson. The former recommends judicious concessions on the part of the planter towards the cultivator; that Act XI. of 1860 should be made permanent, breaches of registered contracts to cultivate indigo being held punishable by the magistrate; and that a special commission should be appointed.

Mr. Fergusson dissented wholly from the Report. He avowed that "its language and tone tended to give a colouring and to lead to conclusions not proved."

At the time the discussion and the inquiry took place, party feeling ran high. Many had been ruined, and men smarting under the sense of wrongs were incapable of regarding the question with anything approaching to impartiality. It is clear enough to those who regard the matter at this distance of time, free from bias and interested considerations, that the breaking up of the system was the inevitable result of the increase of wealth and general progress of the country coming into contact with an order of things which had arisen under circumstances wholly different. The cultivators made the discovery (is it to be laid to the charge of the missionary or the official that the discovery came from them?) that they were not so miserably off as they thought, and that they were not bound to remain any longer in the condition of hereditary bondage, as it may be called, to which the system and their adherence to custom had brought them. It was impossible that such a system could be broken up without great loss on both sides, and corresponding public excitement. That the losses endured were not aggravated by a general disturbance of the public peace and outrages on person and property, is owing to the national character of the Bengali. In any other country in the world the reform would have been attended by a much greater social convulsion, though the contest between the parties, the many and the few, might have been as sharp as it would have been decisive.

The only measure of so-called reform which was actually carried out was the extension of subordinate courts; and as the condition of these courts was said to be one of the causes of the disturbances, this was hardly calculated to effect much improvement.

A vast pauper population, whose normal condition is but one step removed from penury—one might almost say from starvation—is ever liable to be plunged into the deepest



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distress by an unfavourable season. The wretched poverty-stricken classes of Upper India are year by year exposed to this danger. If the ordinary rain of heaven is withheld, the consequence is a famine. Unable to do more at the best of times than just to keep themselves and their families alive by the scanty pittance they earn by daily labour, a sudden rise in the price of the necessities of life is the death-warrant of thousands. And this is the condition of the bulk of the population throughout India after a century of British rule.

The consequences of poverty, as Macaulay has well represented, in tropical countries, are much less painful than in climates like our own, where the misery of the hunger-stricken poor is so much enhanced by the want of proper clothing and fuel. But it must be recollected that Macaulay was writing of Bengal, where the climate is equable, and, compared with the upper part of India, mild all the year round. In the North-West Provinces and the Punjab, for instance, the cold during three or four months of the year is so severe that even Europeans are glad to wear the warmest woollen clothing. Every house is provided with its fireplace, and fires are necessary for at least two months. Hoar-frost not unfrequently occurs even as far south as Delhi and Agra; in the upper part of the Punjab, ice may be seen on the roadside as late as the 18th March, at eight o'clock in the morning. At all large settlements it is usual to collect enough ice from earthen pans set out and filled with water for the purpose, to last the European community all through the summer months. In a climate cold enough to admit of an almost unlimited supply of ice being collected in a month or two, it is easy to understand that a population always underfed, and at the best of times not accustomed to the use of nutritive food, and most scantily clothed, must suffer much. When to their ordinary condition of existence is superadded the sudden rise of prices, owing to a scarcity of grain and cereals, it is impossible to overrate the amount of misery.



that ensues. The year 1860 was marked by one of these terrible visitations. The autumn rains of 1859 had almost entirely failed over a large tract of country. The ground became like iron or brass beneath the feet. The supply of grain was cut off, and before the cold weather was half over the famine, with all its horrors, had begun to make itself felt throughout the territory between the Jumna and the Ganges. It raged in the districts of Muttra, Agra, Meerut, in Rohilcund and Delhi, worse than elsewhere; but it was far from being confined to these limits, for it extended right up to Peshawur. The local newspapers sounded the alarm. As usual, the officials turned a deaf ear to any report that did not reach them through the "usual channels," and not till the people had begun to die in hundreds, and private liberality was solicited to meet the coming danger, would Government open its eyes to the necessity for action. Committees were then formed, a central committee being appointed at Agra to supervise the operations of local committees. Large subscriptions were made, supplemented by assistance from England. Public works were designed, and the starving wretches came in by thousands to receive a meal doled out to them every morning, and a small payment of two annas, or threepence—the ordinary day-labourer's wages in India—in return for a day's work.

The last severe famine which had visited that part of the country occurred in 1833. On that occasion, as on this, there were a large number of orphan children to be provided for. Parents, in many cases, died, leaving their helpless infants, perhaps on the roadside, to the mercy of some chance wayfarer. In other cases, unable to support their offspring, the parents would sell them to any purchaser they could find, or leave them in some conspicuous place where they were likely to attract the notice of Europeans. In 1833, most of the orphans thus situated were collected together, and located at a spot about three miles from Agra, just opposite the famous tomb of the Emperor Akbar. The place is called Secundra. Funds were raised,



church was erected, and buildings for the accommodation of the children, in addition to some old corridors and a mausoleum that were standing on the site, devoted to the charitable purpose. A missionary was put in charge of the settlement. Many of the children, of course, who were not far from death's door when first brought to the orphanage, sunk into an early grave. But the bulk survived. Schools were established, and means of instruction in useful trades provided. In course of time boys and girls grew up to maturity and were married. A village then rose in the settlement, a Christian village in the heart of a heathen population, where the church bell might be heard on Sundays, calling the congregation to morning and evening prayer. The settlement was in a flourishing condition when the rebellion of 1857 swept like a hurricane over the land. A Christian colony like that of Secundra was not likely to escape the notice of an army of fanatical Mahommedans and Hindoos, and when the mutineers advanced towards Agra, the Christian population of Secundra was scattered to the four winds of heaven, the buildings more or less destroyed, and the church dismantled. No sooner had the rebellion been quelled and political disturbances ceased, than a second famine wasted the land. Again parents died, leaving their infants to the care of the strangers. Again they were collected by the charitable efforts of the Christian community, and located at Secundra: the ruined buildings were re-erected, the church restored, another missionary took up his abode there, and at the present moment there is a settlement of three or four hundred children of both sexes growing up to maturity—a small Christian settlement and an oasis in the desert of heathendom, where the sound of the church bells on the Lord's-day again calls the congregation to Divine worship. Doubtless when the mutineers turned away from the smoking ruins of the village and the desecrated Christian church, they congratulated themselves on having swept from the face of the earth an institution so hateful to the fanatical heathen as a Christian colony

opposite the mausoleum of the great Mahommedan emperor. But why did "the heathen so furiously rage, and the people imagine a vain thing?" It needed but the withholding of the autumn rains for two successive years to bring the scourge of famine over the land ; and while the members of the first colony who remained true to their faith were dispersed by the violence of the mutineers to carry the seeds of truth elsewhere, their places in the original locality were filled by another body of orphans and destitute children, who are now fast growing up to maturity, and have formed the nucleus of another Christian settlement.

The Disarming Act, which was passed this year, might more properly be considered under the head of the history of legislation, in the chapter devoted to that subject ; but its importance in reality consists rather in its political than its legislative aspect. The native army had mutinied. The new local European regiments had followed suit. Madras had intimated a desire to assert its independence, and now, had the European community been in a position to do so, they would most assuredly have taken the same course, so far as to resist the operation of this law as it first came before Council. As it was, they were too weak and too insignificant in numbers to do aught but remonstrate most loudly against the measure. It may easily be believed that at that time the recollection of the events of 1857 was fresh in the mind of every one who had passed through that eventful year. Numbers of European tradesmen and others had been ruined by the rebellion so far as the destruction of their property was concerned. Many had lost brothers, wives, children ; wives had been left widows, and children orphans. Numbers had taken up arms and served as volunteers—some in self-defence, others from a patriotic desire to support the Government. Some instances there had been of planters remaining quietly in their homes ; nay, in one case, at least, of taking charge of an entire district whence the Government officials had fled. Every European in Upper India had shared more or less in the general



wreck of happiness and fortune. All had alike been exposed to the storm, and all by making common cause with the Government against a common enemy had drawn upon themselves the hostility of the rebels. During the rebellion there was a very general feeling that, after order had been restored, the Government would exact from the districts and cities which had been centres of disaffection a fine sufficient to compensate the owners of property for losses inflicted on them within those limits. This measure was partially adopted in the Punjab, but nowhere else. Compensation, as it was called—more correctly, a compassionate allowance sufficient to relieve immediate wants—was doled out in meagre proportion to the losses incurred, so far as they could be estimated. The native community certainly expected to be called on to meet this heavy charge; and were prepared, if not to pay the money, at any rate to submit to its being taken from them. The disappointment that ensued among those who had suffered, when it was found that Government had no intention of carrying out any measure of the kind, was very great. And just as people were in a bad humour about this, and indulging in the Briton's privilege of grumbling, the Legislature passed what was called the Disarming Act (Act XXXI. of 1860). This law put all Europeans and natives, loyal and disloyal, on the same footing exactly. Whether such an Act was called for, whether the European population had done anything to deserve such an insult, as it undoubtedly was, is now hardly worth inquiring. The Disarming Act passed by Lord Dalhousie in the Punjab had especially exempted Christians from its operation, and they had a right to expect the same principle should be observed here. It may be argued that a law should not be made to affect one class and not another; but apart from the fact that a great part of the Indian code does consist of enactments passed for special purposes and to affect special classes, the object of legislation is assuredly, not to produce a body of law perfect in the abstract, but to provide for the welfare of the com-



munity and the good of the country at large. In 1860, we had just passed through a bloody civil war—a war in which the instincts of humanity had been frequently outraged by the rebels, women and children having been massacred in cold blood with every accompanying circumstance that could heighten the horror of their fate. But three short years had passed since the whole European and Christian community of Upper India had been standing at bay fighting for their lives, defending themselves at fearful odds, whilst thousands and tens of thousands sought their blood. The non-official Europeans had drawn this upon themselves because they made common cause with the officials. What principle, what reason was there, in classing all in the same category now; in subjecting Christians, loyal and disloyal Mahommedans and Hindoos, the assailants and the assailed, to the same process of being disarmed? Every one, of course, admits the justice of the principle of equality in the eye of the law as regards the rights of property, the obligations of contract, the protection of the person. But a disarming Act is, from the nature of the case, an Act rendered necessary by some abnormal condition of society—by the existence of some political excitement peculiar to the state of the country at the time. It is special legislation to meet a special emergency. And whatever objection there may be to special legislation, the necessity which justifies it fully justifies the introduction of a qualifying principle. If the state of the country in 1860 required that the population should be disarmed by law, the very fact of such a law being necessary showed that the country was in an abnormal condition. There was danger, to meet which the Legislature had to step out of its way, and to interfere to an extent which necessity alone can justify, with the private rights and liberties of the inhabitants. The rebellion had been caused by misgovernment. In the excited state of feeling that ensued, the native population, who either took an active part in or sympathised with the movement, soon ceased to discriminate between European



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subjects and officials, when they saw the former take up arms in concert with the latter. The object for which they fought, then, was the destruction of the British government. The non-official residents would of themselves have excited no ill feeling. They suffered not because of their connexion by race and religion with the ruling powers, but because they allowed their sympathies with their fellow-countrymen and their patriotism to overcome every selfish consideration. When the rebellion was over, the European non-official population, who had been the innocent victims of the mal-administration of the officials, was classed in the same category as those who had fought against the Government; and while officials in general were exempt, the non-officials were brought under the operation of the Disarming Act. It was as if the Government, which had shown itself powerless to protect them, were now resolved to take from them the power to protect themselves.

The Act had the effect of producing an unwonted movement in Upper India. In all the large settlements public meetings of the non-official Europeans, Eurasians, and Christian inhabitants were held, and petitions drawn up against the measure, which were effectual so far that a clause was inserted in the Act rendering it a dead letter, except in provinces in which it should specially be put in force by the local Government. The dissatisfaction felt at the Act was far from being confined to the classes immediately affected. It was equally unpopular with the executive officers, who knew too well the value of unanimity and concord between the European and Christian population residing within their districts. Chief commissioners, commissioners, and magistrates were by no means pleased at seeing a measure passed which was so distasteful to these sections of the community that, had occasion required, as in 1857, their active co-operation and assistance in support of the Government, scarce one in a hundred would have come forward. When the Act reached the Punjab, Sir R. Montgomery by a notification



in the *Gazette* at once exempted all Christians from its operation.

Seeing how angry the European community were, Lord Canning adopted an expedient which, although it might have been well received before the Bill was brought forward, was now too late. He called—at least, permitted the call to be made—for a volunteer force, on the principle of that raised in England. The volunteers were, of course, to be exempted from the operation of the Act.

It was, however, too late. The class to whom the call was addressed were exasperated and sulky, and received it with silent derision. Here and there a few clerks and uncovenanted *employés*, anxious to win the favour of their superiors, enrolled themselves into companies and corps, and went to drill with praiseworthy perseverance. Parsees, and certain classes of natives, whose loyalty had never been doubted, offered their services, which were rejected, and the volunteer movement in India failed. For many years the non-official European and Christian population throughout India were so alienated from the Government in feeling, that had another outbreak occurred, the authorities would have had to trust to the military alone and to public servants to effect its suppression. The traders, the merchants, the planters, might indeed have taken up arms, for the protection of their own lives, their families, and their property. But they could hardly have been blamed if they hesitated again to risk the one, or sacrifice the other, in support of a Government that, as soon as the danger was over, deliberately attempted to leave its friends and supporters at the mercy of their antagonists, and overlooked the fact that an Englishman in India is as one to ten thousand, living in the midst of a population which, if it is goaded into hostility by the mal-administration of the ruling power, readily ceases to discriminate between the official and his non-official fellow-countrymen.¹

¹ It is gratifying to find that a different state of public feeling altogether seems to have set in with Lord Mayo's administration. For



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It is quite true that the excitement and ill-will caused by this Act was altogether out of proportion with the tenor and effect of the Act itself, as it ultimately passed Council. Whether or not it was owing to the general feeling of discontent, that the qualifying and modifying clauses were introduced, it is clear those clauses render it really innocuous. The law has been described as virtually arming natives already disarmed, and disarming by law Europeans unless exempted by the executive.¹ Under Clause 27, the local governments have power to exempt such persons as they think fit from its operation in their own provinces. It was probably taken for granted that the local authorities would exempt Christians, as Sir R. Montgomery did the moment the Act reached the Punjab. But the Legislature has no right to take anything for granted. And it may fairly be doubted whether or not it was worth while to give rise to so much ill-will among a class to whom the ruling powers certainly owed a good deal, and whom it was politic, at any rate, not to alienate for the sake of a principle sacrificed over and over again in Indian legislation.

While the Government were thus careless about the temper of their European subjects, they lost no opportunity of conciliating the natives. Rewards had been lavishly distributed, in the shape of confiscated estates, upon those who could make out a claim on the score of loyalty. But

once in the century the Governor-General of India bids fair to be popular with the European resident community. They are not hard to please, and although the Government of India can well afford to disregard their blame or their applause, the goodwill of our fellow-countrymen is of too great value to be needlessly thrown away; and should any political crisis occur in the present administration, Lord Mayo will find the advantage of being able to rally round him a class of men whose influence over the native population is much greater than is generally represented by official writers. The volunteer movement, which was languishing into an early grave, has revived under this impulse, and the formation of a corps of volunteers out of the railway *employés* will add considerably to the available defences of the empire.

¹ *The Friend of India.*



the measure which did, perhaps, more than anything else to gratify the aristocracy of India was the despatch dated the 26th July, by which her Majesty extended to every chief in India above the rank of "jageerdar," or grantee from the Crown, the right of adoption on condition of loyalty. It may be deemed politic to annex the condition of loyalty to the recognition of this right, but it is difficult to see any reason why such a condition should be annexed to this more than to any other right enjoyable under Hindoo law. As we have seen, it was clearly recognised in Lord Amherst's time,¹ but was repudiated by succeeding administrations that beheld in plunder and annexation nothing but an honourable method of aggrandizing the country. In the sense, however, of a declaration that Great Britain should rob no more, her Majesty's proclamation was not without its value, and it has been a source of confidence to many a chief troubled at the advance of old age, and the want of a natural heir.

On what grounds the right so fully recognised by the law of the Hindoos should have been denied to princes and chiefs by the East India Company, it is not easy to understand. A Hindoo who is without a natural heir, it is admitted, may adopt a son, who succeeds to all his property; but should he chance to wear a crown, he is not to exercise this privilege. A glance at the general principle of the law, one would think, must be sufficient to refute this doctrine. The etymology of the Sanscrit word "putra" shows at once the meaning of the right, and the hardship of excluding any one class from the exercise of it. "Putra" is one who delivers his father's soul from hell by performing the funeral rites. "Since the son," say the "Institutes of Menu," (chap. ix. sec. 138,²) "delivers his father from the hell named 'put,' he was therefore called 'putra' by Brahma himself." A Hindoo, who dies leaving no male

¹ *Vide supra*, Chap. III.

² *Vide* Macnaghten's "Hindoo Law," and other works on the same subject.



issue to perform the funeral rites, remains in hell. The prohibition, therefore, against the adoption of a son because the would-be adopter wears a crown, seems hard. Why should he not be allowed to adopt as well as another? And if he be allowed to adopt, why should not the adopted son succeed to all the rights of the natural son, whether those rights include a crown or a private estate? The rule that the right does not extend to a crowned head must have been devised with a view of consolidating under our dominion the various independent states. And it only shows how men, against reason and against right, will cling to a traditional policy, that there should be found in India even now those who contend that the principle universally recognised wherever the Hindoo system of law and religion prevailed, is yet not to be applied in cases where there is a chance of a territory lapsing to the power paramount.

It does not belong to this history to relate the progress of the China war which went on during the year 1860, although India supplied the greater part of the land forces employed in that country. Some military operations, however, of minor importance were carried on against various tribes in different parts of our extended frontier.

In the Derajat, the country to the west of the Indus, the Wazeeries, who had been punished for harbouring the murderers of Captain Meham, again proved troublesome, and a force was sent against them under Colonel Lumsden, which met with the success that usually attends such expeditions into the hills. The savages were indeed punished, but at the expense of an arduous, though not a prolonged campaign. On the Pegu frontier, in Guzerat, in the hill districts in Assam, in the neighbourhood of Darjeeling, similar operations were undertaken against savage tribes. In the latter case, indeed, the affair assumed more formidable proportions; and as it was connected intimately with previous political relations between the British Government



and the Sikkimese and neighbouring states, a brief notice of this episode in British Indian history will not be out of place.

The British territory of Darjeeling, the sanitarium resorted to by the European inhabitants of Bengal Proper, originally formed part of a territory called Sikkim, governed by a Raja. During a contest with Nepal in 1816, the portion of Sikkim now known as the Darjeeling district was conquered and annexed by that country; but when, at the close of the war between the East India Company and Nepal, in 1817, it was ceded to the former, the then Governor-General, the Marquis of Hastings, gave it back to the Sikkim Raja. Afterwards, when the desirable nature of the locality as a sanitarium came into notice, it was rented from the Sikkim Raja by the Company, in consideration of a regular annual payment to the Raja of 3,000 rupees. This, however, did not occur till 1835. The first officer who went to preside there was Captain Lloyd, who in 1839 was succeeded by Dr. Campbell as political agent. In 1849, Dr. Hooker, the celebrated botanist, visited the Himalayas, and Lord Dalhousie, then Governor-General, made a request through Dr. Campbell to the Sikkim Raja, that Dr. Hooker should be permitted to carry on his botanical researches in his territory unmolested. Dr. Hooker, however, was not allowed by the Sikkimese officials to carry out his innocent pursuits, and Dr. Campbell, with the permission of the Government, joined Dr. Hooker, and accompanied him to the capital of the Raja's territory, with the object of having an interview with the sovereign. He, however, refused to see them, and left the capital shortly after their arrival. Drs. Campbell and Hooker then set out to return, but were attacked on the road by about fifty armed Sikkimese, headed by an official. They knocked down Dr. Campbell, bound him hand and foot, kicked and otherwise ill-treated him. It appeared on inquiry that this outrage on the political agent was committed at the instigation of the Deewan or



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minister of the Raja, who had a grudge against Dr. Campbell for having some time previously interfered to procure the release of a Nepalese girl who had been kidnapped.

The two doctors were carried off to the capital, where they were detained upwards of a month in confinement till the 25th December, under circumstances of great hardship. They were released in consequence of a military force having been ordered to march to their rescue. The British Government then annexed the tract of land it had previously rented from the Sikkim Raja, and nothing further occurred till the present year, 1860, when Dr. Campbell having represented to Government that the Sikkimese had been giving trouble on the frontier, kidnapping British subjects and interfering with traffic, he was directed to proceed with a detachment of the Sebundy Sappers (a corps raised originally by that officer for service in the district), and occupy a portion of Sikkim. He had besides the Sappers a three-pounder gun and four Europeans, with which very slender force he proceeded on his career of invasion, and on the 30th November marched to a village forty miles from Darjeeling, and seized it. After remaining in undisturbed possession of this conquest for about a month, an attack was one day suddenly made on the little garrison, which eventually had to spike their three-pounder gun, and retire on Darjeeling. As usual, the retreat, before the asylum was reached, became a rout, and the detachment lost a fifth of its numbers.

The Sikkimese having exhibited signs of being so inflated with their success over Dr. Campbell's party as to contemplate following up their success and attacking the sanitarium of Darjeeling, a force was ordered to proceed under the command of Col. Gawler, of the 73d regiment, consisting of two mountain howitzers and a detachment of Artillery, 300 of the 6th regiment, 200 of Rattray's Sikhs and the Sebundy Sappers, to attack the capital of the Sikkim Raja. After meeting and overcoming a little opposition on the road in the shape of a stockade, the force



reached the capital on the 9th March, 1861, when a treaty was concluded by the Hon. Ashley Eden, the diplomatic officer with the force, with the Raja, the principal items in which were that a representative of the British Government should for the future reside at the capital. The first representative was Cheboo Lama, of whom more will be heard in the chapter on the Bhootan war; and ever since that time the Sikkim Raja has lived on terms of amity with his powerful neighbours.



CHAPTER V.

1861.

Constitutional changes—The famine and its results—Outbreak of cholera—Floods in Bengal—Cotton—The Hon. Mr. Laing—Contract Bill—Effect of extension of cotton cultivation—Sir Charles Trevelyan's views—Lord Canning's waste lands order—Currency Bill—The order of the Star of India—Honorary magistracies—Commission of Inquiry in Bengal—The minor presidencies—Bishop of Calcutta's schools—English education as opposed to Indian—Death of the Bishop of Madras—Lady Canning.

THE year 1861 was remarkable for the introduction of several very important changes in the constitution of the Indian Government; which, however, did not until after the close of the year come into actual operation, and therefore belong to another chapter. Thus, for instance, in this year was passed the Indian Councils Act, which made important modifications in the constitution of the Legislative Council. In this year, also, was passed the Act amalgamating the courts of law, and constituting the high courts at the Presidency towns; but neither of these changes was actually carried out till after the commencement of 1862. Scarcely less important was the Act which threw open the Civil Service to public competition. The introduction of currency notes, and the establishment of the banks of Bengal, Bombay, and Madras as Government treasuries and bankers, were all measures of vast public benefit, which, like the opening of the Civil Service, were conceived in this year but not born till later. Although, however, these constitutional reforms did not begin to



make themselves felt till they were actually introduced, the year 1861 is far from having been an uneventful one in the history of Indian progress.

The famine which commenced in the previous year continued its ravages through all the early part of 1861, with slight abatement. It was not till the month of August, when the periodical rains had set in with more than usual force, that the Agra Central Committee could issue a notice that, the symptoms of distress having decreased considerably, further assistance was not required. Liberally indeed had all classes, both in India and in England, come forward with that assistance. And when the relief operations finally closed, there was a considerable surplus in the hands of the committee. After a good deal of discussion, and a careful consideration of the various claims put forward for a share of the amount, it was eventually decided to invest the bulk of the money in Government securities for the support of the Secundra Orphanage alluded to in the previous chapter, and to distribute the rest in various proportions, among the different religious and charitable institutions that had during the prevalence of the distress burdened themselves with the charge of orphans.

The returns given in Colonel Baird Smith's report, which deals only with a portion of the district affected, that is, the North-West Provinces—and the famine extended with greater or less severity almost over the whole of the Punjab—show that thirteen millions of people were affected by it, and five and a half millions suffered most severely. Upwards of one-third out of an area of twelve and a half millions of acres, was thrown out of cultivation. Half a million of people emigrated to other districts or to foreign states, and four per cent., at least, of the population died. Eighty thousand poor received food daily at various relief-stations, and a hundred and forty-three thousand four hundred able-bodied paupers were employed in daily labour in public works of various kinds, at a cost of



250,000/. In addition to this, about fifty thousand men were employed in railway and irrigation works. The remission of revenue cost the State 400,000/. But these figures, indicating as they do but a portion of the sufferings and losses caused by this terrible visitation, convey to the mind no real idea of the extent of those sufferings. No pen can describe the scenes that daily met the view of those who were engaged in the duty of superintending the distribution of food. It was impossible for a casual traveller along the high road, or even for the ordinary resident engaged in his daily avocations, to avoid witnessing constant indications of the distress. But to see it in its true character, and to gain any adequate idea of its extent and nature, it was necessary to visit the relief asylums.

The applicants for charity were divided usually into three classes: the first included those who were in the last stage of want and emaciation; the second, those who from age, or debility induced by starvation, were unfit for present work; and the third, those who were fit for labour. Wooden barriers, or pens, were erected to keep the crowd of starving wretches, whose sufferings were aggravated by the sight of food, from pressing within the area and overpowering the slender staff of volunteers who superintended the relief operations. Within the area allotted to the class unfit for work the sight that presented itself was most deplorable; a crowd of destitute creatures in every attitude of apathy, disease, and prostration—a mass of squalor, nakedness, and misery such as it seldom falls to the lot of an Englishman to see. Out of the number assembled in this spot, perhaps a few would be selected as fit for a day's nominal labour. In the face of so much accumulated misery then happily within reach of relief, it was impossible to avoid the conviction that a much larger number of persons must at the time have been perishing from want in the highways and byways, in the fields and villages.

One of the best of these asylums was established at Delhi, where hundreds of starving wretches owed their



lives to the humane exertions of one who had a few short years before, in the rebellion of 1857, been forced to fly from an infuriated mob, and for weeks suffered every possible privation and misery with his family in the jungles.

Such was this terrible visitation—a visitation that no one can the least estimate without witnessing its results. And such are the visitations that appear under some mysterious law of nature to visit India periodically, and that might in most cases be much mitigated, if not really warded off, by an extensive system of irrigation.

Travancore, a district of Madras, in the south of India, was also visited by a famine this year; but, though the distress for the time was severe, it was not attended with results anything at all to be compared with those which appeared in Upper India.

The famine was followed, as is generally the case in India, by an outbreak of cholera, which spread its devastations with remarkable exactness over the area where the scarcity of food had been prevalent. The first of these visitations had confined its ravages to the native population almost entirely. The cholera smote the European community, especially the soldiers, with terrible force. As usual, almost all remedies were vain, and the epidemic, baffling medical skill, and defying all the efforts of science to combat it, ran its course, gradually dying out, as after marking down its victims it travelled from town to town, from garrison to garrison, from Benares to beyond the Indus, and from Rajpootana in the South-West to the foot of the Himalayas in the North-West. This is remarked as being the fifth visitation of cholera in India during the last twenty years.

Hitherto Bengal had enjoyed immunity from the disasters which swept over the Upper Provinces; but, as if Nature had determined that this part of India should not escape scot-free the vials of her wrath, Bengal was visited by a terrible flood, which carried away villages, destroyed roads, washed down bridges, and did an incalculable



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amount of injury to the crops. The waters subsided to give birth to a malarious fever, that raged over the recently inundated area, and swept away thousands of victims.

While Nature was dealing thus mercilessly with this portion of the Eastern hemisphere, the fairest regions of the West were being devastated by civil war. In the one, famine, pestilence, and floods; in the other, the hand of man himself was the agent of destruction. But the American War was destined to affect India in a very marked and beneficial manner. The impetus given to the production of cotton by the absence of the supply from Southern America began first to be felt in the early part of this year. There was a splendid opportunity for India to monopolize a large share of a trade which it could not be doubted would prove the means of pouring into the country untold wealth, and of giving such a stimulus to agricultural industry as would raise the value of land, introduce English capital and enterprise, and improve the condition of the people. And although the sanguine hopes of those who watched the first efforts of India to supply the Manchester market have not by any means been realized to their full extent, still the movement has been of incalculable advantage to India in many ways.

It must not be supposed that the export trade of Indian cotton arose solely from the American War. The consumption of cotton during the sixty years between 1785 and 1845 trebled itself every fifteen years, being three times as great in 1800 as it was in 1785, three times as great in 1815 as in 1800, and so on. Between 1845 and 1860 the consumption also increased largely, though not so fast as in previous years; but the price of the raw cotton increased at the same time. The deduction is obvious, viz. that although the supply of raw cotton had immensely increased, still the demand was ahead of it, and thus the prices rose. In other words, between 1845 and 1860, Southern America, in spite of her slave labour, had failed to meet the demands of Manchester to the fullest extent, and



was beginning to lose her monopoly of the trade. The fact is also confirmed by the export of Bombay cotton to Liverpool, which had attained large dimensions before the civil war began in America. That event, by raising the price of cotton to an exorbitant amount, gave a great stimulus to the cultivation, but it also caused a contraction of the trade which it will take many years to recover.

During the year 1861 the price of "surats" rose from fourpence to ninepence, and it was said a million bales would be required. But before the year was out, speculators received a warning of the instability of the cotton market, for a rumour gained ground of impending war between England and the Northern States of America. Indeed at one time it was telegraphed from England that war had been declared. The depression consequent upon this rumour of war, which it was supposed would have the effect of re-opening and re-invigorating the South American cotton trade, was but temporary; and during this, and the few succeeding years, enormous fortunes were realized by cotton speculators. Money poured into the country, particularly Bombay, and the agricultural population of the cotton-producing districts amassed so much wealth, that the zemindars, it was said, not knowing how to employ their surplus silver, used it for tires for their cart-wheels.

The Government were fully alive to the opportunity thus offered to India of enriching herself. But it was obvious, Government could only aid the extension of cotton cultivation in an indirect way. The great drawback was the want of communication, for it so happened that the richest cotton districts were situated just where the communications with the sea-board were the worst and the least developed. Great improvements, it was obvious, could be made in the mode of packing and transport, while hopes were entertained that by attention to cultivation, and importing the best seed, Indian cotton might be produced equal in quality to that of Egypt, or even of Louisiana. The Agricultural and Horticultural Society of Bengal



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gathered and published all the information it could collect upon the subject, and offered 100% reward for the best essay on cotton cultivation. New Orleans seed, they said, was the best adapted for Upper Bengal, Behar, and the North-West Provinces, while the Sea Island was best suited for the Sunderbunds and both sides of the Bay of Bengal. The New Orleans is a short staple, adhering closely to the seed; the Sea Island a long staple, with the cotton hanging loosely, and easily removed. There is a tendency, however, in the long staple when introduced into India to degenerate into short staple. Everything degenerates in India. The Anglo-Saxon degenerates; cattle, horses, sheep, dogs, and cats degenerate. The vegetable world follows the same inexorable law, and cotton forms no exception.

The legitimate field for Government operations, however, lay in the extension of railways, and the construction and repair of roads. For this purpose the Hon. Mr. Laing, in his budget for 1861-2, laid before the Legislative Council on the 27th April, 1861, proposed to set aside half a million sterling nominally for public works; the bulk of it, however, was to be expended in making roads. He says: "We shall especially urge on the construction of good roads in the principal cotton districts, so as to be prepared to bring the resources of India into play to supply the threatened deficiency of cotton from America. Immense interests are at stake in this question. Not only material—for who can measure the extension of commerce, and the material benefit to England and to India which would result from a transfer of the chief supply of cotton from America to the East?—but moral also, for the issue for which Wilberforce contended, and for which England has sacrificed her West Indian colonies, and poured forth her millions like water—the issue of slavery or freedom—is staked mainly on the question whether America's danger is to be India's opportunity. If cotton produced by free labour can under-sell cotton the produce of slavery, then, and not till then, the cause of freedom is finally gained."



And he adds, further on: "To press on the construction of roads and communications; to pass just laws for the enforcement of contracts; to provide ready tribunals for dispensing justice, to impress on all connected with them the importance of encouraging independent English enterprise by every means consistent with justice, and with the equal rights of our native subjects: these are within the legitimate functions of Government."

This second paragraph has been here quoted because there is a clause in it which touches upon a subject requiring a passing notice. It was urged by the party who advocated the introduction of European capital and enterprise into India, that after the break-up of the indigo interests in Bengal in 1859-60 it was vain to expect Englishmen to invest their capital in India unless they were protected by a law making breach of contract a criminal offence. We have seen that a bill to this effect, which passed the Legislative Council, was vetoed by the Secretary of State, a temporary enactment only being allowed to remain in operation for six months, to prevent the absolute ruin of the planters under a combination of the ryots. Mr. Laing and Mr. Beadon during the course of the year had occasion to visit England for the recovery of their health, and they availed themselves of the opportunity afforded them to put before the public the views held by almost all the most experienced legislators and officials in India. It is noteworthy that men of the most opposite characters, and who had been educated in totally different schools, belonging to different parties in politics, different services, and with diverse associations, all concurred in recommending a departure from the generally accepted principle of legislation, and were in favour of making breach of contract in India a criminal offence. Even Lord Canning, who cannot be supposed to have had any unfriendly feeling against the natives, civilians brought up in all the traditional prejudices of their service like Sir Cecil Beadon and Sir Bartle Frere, all concurred; but the



opposition at home was steady and unswerving, and the bill was never passed. It is curious that Mr. Laing, in his remarks just quoted, represents the extension of the Indian cotton trade as the destruction of the system of slavery in America. The name by which the Contract Bill went among the natives was the "Slavery Bill," so that while with one hand he aimed at the extinguishment of slavery in America, he with the other endeavoured to introduce it (according to native views) into India. But the fact of the bill being vetoed in England, increased enormously the respect the natives had begun to feel for the unknown power in the West which could thus control the mighty Government of India or annul its measures. It made them feel, at any rate they persuaded themselves they could feel, now sure of justice. There was a something that could control the despotism of a Government which, under the guise of quasi-constitutional forms and with many protestations of liberality, is nevertheless many times more despotic and more iron-handed in its rule than the so-called despotism of the Moghul emperors.

Without entering into a discussion on the much-debated question as to whether there is anything in the character of the native of India, or any peculiarity in the climate, or the soil, or the country, which can justify a departure from a principle so generally recognised as that a breach of contract not necessarily a fraudulent breach should be held liable only to damages in a civil court, it may be sufficient to remark that oppression in the long run generally—may we not say always?—turns out ill for the oppressor. A departure from certain general principles of equity and justice that commend themselves to the instincts of all mankind, is oppression. And that such a law would be considered oppressive by all the natives in India is certain. It might be enforced, no doubt, for a time, perhaps for all time, but it might also prove the proverbial straw on the camel's back. But in fact the law is wholly unnecessary; and great as is the weight of authority in its favour in India itself, it



is to be recollected that, with the exception perhaps of Sir R. Napier, now Lord Napier of Magdala, whose military duties may in early years have brought him into contact with the natives, there were none of the Council who by any possibility could have had the means of making themselves acquainted with the actual merits of the case, or the real feelings of the people.

The proposed Contract Bill was by no means, however, a result of the indigo difficulties of 1859-60. The project was merely revived on that occasion, and not started for the first time. Thirty years before, a similar measure had been proposed by the Indian Government, and disallowed by the Court of Directors; who would not hear of a law which they stigmatised as "one-sided," inasmuch as it made a breach of contract by one out of two consenting parties a criminal offence.

Upon Sir Charles Wood's intimating in a despatch dated 18th April, 1861, that if a Contract Bill on this principle was framed by Council he would veto it, the matter was of course dropped, much fault being found with the Secretary of State for going so far as to veto a bill before it was passed. But in truth there is much in what was urged in defence of such a line of policy, inasmuch as it was more courteous and respectful to the Indian Government to warn them beforehand, that if they passed a certain bill he should veto it, than to wait till it was passed into law and then annul it.

While upon the subject of the extension of the cotton trade and its effects on the country, at the risk of anticipating a little the order of the narrative, it will be as well to quote in this place some remarks of Sir Charles Trevelyan in his budget issued for 1863-64, delivered on the 7th April, 1864. From the returns attached to that budget, we find an enormous increase in the export of merchandise from British India in the period between 1860 and 1863, and that of a similar period ten or twenty years earlier. Thus, from 1840 to 1843 the average value of the exports was

13,610,842*l.*; from 1850 to 1853 they averaged 19,502,645*l.*; but from 1860 to 1863 they were as high as 38,750,577*l.* "To account for this rapid stride we must recollect the great progress India has made during the last twenty years under the more liberal views adopted by the Government. The Russian war gave an enormous impetus to the export of fibres and oil-seeds, but the value of cotton exported rose from 16,799,317*l.* in 1862-63 to 31,432,818*l.* in 1863-64. This was exported from the three presidency towns in the following proportions :—

	Cwt.	Value.
Calcutta	401,663	£2,152,128
Madras	597,995	4,103,000
Bombay	3,325,463	25,177,690."

In his budget statement for 1863 he remarks as follows :—

"Our proceedings must also have reference to a state of things which has begun to show itself in an unmistakeable manner.

"India was already rich in indigo, opium, saltpetre, and other staples of her export trade, when the demand arising from the Russian war gave a great stimulus to fibres and oil-seeds, and the American war has since raised the inducement to cultivate cotton to an unprecedented height. But India has a great population to feed, and as the breaking up of land is a gradual process, the increased demand for exported produce could only be met by diverting to its production a large proportion of the land which had been previously employed in raising grain.

"Simultaneously with this, railways and public works have been prosecuted at the rate of ten millions a year, whereby the industry of the people has been largely diverted from immediate production to increasing future productions.

"Consumption has also been greatly stimulated by the abundant means placed at the disposal of the cultivators by high prices, and of the labourers on railways and other public works by high wages.

"The result of these combined causes is that there is a serious strain upon the springs of society in some parts of India, like that which took place in Ireland in 1846 and in England in 1847, when such a large number of labourers were employed upon public works and railways. The price of every description of produce, whether for exportation or home consumption, has gone up. Exporters complain that prices are often as high here as they are in England. Consumers

complain of the greatly enhanced cost of every necessary of life, and as they have so much more to pay for the means of subsistence, they are obliged to stint themselves in everything else. This is the true explanation of the continued stagnation in the demand for Manchester goods, notwithstanding that the native manufacture is still falling off. A man must feed himself and his family before he can buy clothes, and at the present high prices of food the body of the people in several parts of India are barely able to subsist. A fall in the price of Manchester goods would not have much influence in promoting their sale under such circumstances.

"The effects upon the labour market are very striking. Although population is congested in some parts of India, there is in others a scarcity of labour. For a long time complaints have been received from several extensive provinces that the progress of public works and industrial undertakings is seriously impeded for want of labour. New roads, or tea and cotton plantations, are chiefly in thinly inhabited and unimproved parts of the country. Even if the population of India could be equally spread over the whole surface of the continent, it may be doubted whether the supply of labour would, under present circumstances, meet all the calls that would be made upon it; but as it is, the obstruction in several important districts is positive and decisive.

"Owing to the suitability of the greater part of the Bombay presidency for growing cotton, this state of things is at its height there. An artificial famine has been created. The prices of material and of labour have been doubled and trebled; works are constructed at a greatly enhanced cost. The most serious symptom of all, however, is that the Government of India has been called upon to sanction a general increase in the pay of the public establishments of the Bombay presidency, with the certainty that if the same causes continue, a similar necessity must soon arise for a further augmentation. On the one hand, we are urged to supply funds without limit for the prosecution of public works, and, on the other, we are told that the dearness of every necessary of life, which arises in a great degree from this large expenditure, must be compensated by a corresponding increase of pay to the public establishments."

And he goes on to point out that the condition of the country was rapidly approaching that of Ireland in 1847, when 734,000 able-bodied men, representing a population of 3,000,000, had to be struck off the labour lists on account of the forced neglect of the tillage of the soil.

This state of things, so vividly depicted by Sir Charles Trevelyan in 1863, was brought about by causes that



commenced to act in 1861. There was a universal cry for Indian cotton. It arose in England, it was taken up in India, and the cotton-growers answered, "Give us roads." All eyes were turned towards India to see how she would behave in this new crisis. As usual, the Government was called upon to aid. The responsibility was theirs that India should not lose the opportunity of making her fortune. They responded to a call to which they dared not turn a deaf ear, and vigorous efforts were made to push on railway works, then languishing, and to complete roads that had been commenced, and to construct new ones. And the consequence was the withdrawal of the agricultural population from the tillage of the soil, and an alarming diminution in the amount of grain produced. The distress to which Sir Charles Trevelyan alludes arose to such a pitch, that officials in the receipt of stated salaries, and those not very large ones, were seriously inconvenienced. It was said there were several military officers' families at Poona and elsewhere, who could not afford meat on their table more than twice a week.

Another result of the sudden extension of the cotton trade was a measure introduced by Lord Canning towards the close of the present year. It is probable he had had it in contemplation ever since his first visit to the Upper Provinces, from which period we date that change in his views and policy which did so much to obliterate his former unpopularity among his Anglo-Indian fellow-countrymen, and raised him even in the estimation of his former detractors to a rank among the ablest of the statesmen who had filled the office of Governor-General. With the view of attracting English capital and enterprise to India he offered for sale culturable waste lands at the rate of five shillings an acre for uncleared, and ten shillings for cleared, limiting the grant to each individual to 3,000 acres. All the under-tenants' rights were respected, and by another ordinance the revenue of settled lands was allowed to be commuted at the rate of twenty years' purchase. The



minor presidencies and governorships were to issue their own rules as to details in accordance with the general principles enunciated in what was called "the waste lands order." We shall see further on the fate of this measure.

Mr. Laing landed in Calcutta the 18th January. He remained long enough to bring out the budget, and left again in May—to return, however, at the close of the year to his post. His budget and financial policy will be reviewed in another place. It is only necessary to notice here one important measure, originally devised by Mr. Wilson, and introduced, with certain indispensable modifications, by his successor. Up to that time the only paper currency that India possessed was a limited amount of notes issued by the three Presidency banks, upon which anywhere out of the immediate neighbourhood of the Presidency towns a discount had always to be paid, varying in amount with the distance from the original source of issue. Thus, eight hundred miles from Calcutta, at Delhi or Agra, for such bills you had to pay one rupee per cent., and of course there was no obligation upon any one to take them at all. The native bankers had their own "hoondees," or bills of exchange; which, however, were not in circulation like bank-notes, but might be endorsed from one person to another, just as any other bills of exchange. Except for the purpose of remittances, they were not in extensive use among European residents. The whole machinery of the finance and currency system had been conducted up to the era of reform in a most primeval and clumsy manner. There were the different Government treasuries all over the country at every Sudder station, as it was called, where the collector and deputy-collector resided, and in those treasuries the cash paid in on account of Government was allowed to accumulate. One collector might draw on another by bills of exchange for public purposes, the distribution of pay of Government servants, soldiers, and the like; and when one treasury ran short of cash, it had to be supplemented by the transfer of bullion



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from a neighbouring treasury, where there happened to be a surplus. Thus, in time of peace, the old native army used to be employed in little else but conveying this treasure from one part of the country to another. At the most unfavourable seasons of the year, European officers would be liable to be called out into camp, in command of a detachment, and ordered, with so many thousand rupees, to a neighbouring collectorate. The duty was irksome to a degree, and the exposure to weather worse than often befel officers throughout a campaign; while the practice of keeping detachments of soldiers incessantly wandering about the country, away from head-quarters, and under command of a native officer, perhaps of a young European subaltern, was most injurious to discipline.

The whirlwind which passed over India in 1857 was violent and destructive, but it swept away a vast number of abuses, and many systems rotten to the core, and this among the rest. India was at last to have a paper currency, and if possible a gold currency. The banks of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay were substituted for the old treasuries, and they became in effect the Government treasuries, and were to act as agents in the issue of notes. The Act provides for the issue of notes in exchange for current silver coin, or standard silver bullion, at the rate of 975 rupees for every thousand "tolas" of silver fit for coinage, of which an assay may be required, at the expense of the person tendering; but issue for bullion may be refused at places where there is no mint—that is, of course, anywhere out of the Presidency cities; and the Governor-General in Council is empowered to direct that, to a specified extent, not exceeding one-fourth of notes, the issue may be in exchange for gold coin and gold bullion, at rates fixed by the order. The bullion and coin received in exchange for notes is to be retained, except so much (not exceeding four crores¹) as the Secretary of State for India shall fix to be invested in Government securities.

¹ A crore is ten millions.



The banks immediately began to set about establishing branches at other places, which should act as centres of the different circles within which the notes issued should constitute a legal tender at par. At first there was every appearance of success. The notes were a great accommodation to the European community, who were, of course, used to them, but the natives were not, and it takes a long time to introduce any sort of reform among so conservative a body; and even at the close of the sixth year from the passing of the Act, they prefer their own "hoondées."

The year 1861 is memorable for the creation of a new order of knighthood, the order of the Most Exalted Star of India. Honorary titles and distinctions are understood and appreciated at Oriental courts. The Mahommedan emperors bestowed them freely, and the Persian order of the "Lion and the Sun," and the Turkish order of the "Medjidieh," are familiar to us all. The idea of the Indian order of knighthood was a very happy one, for it served as a bond of union between men who distinguished themselves in arts or arms, in politics or literature, whether of Asiatic or European origin, and, emanating from the Crown, it formed a connecting link between it and the native princes, the distinguished soldiers and statesmen of India, who were deemed worthy of the knighthood. The insignia consists of a star and a badge and collar. The star is of five points in diamonds, resting on a blue enamelled ground, with the motto of the order, "Heaven's Light our Guide," circumscribed in brilliants, the whole surrounded with rays of gold. It is worn on the left breast. The badge is a cameo portrait of the Queen, on a ruby ground, surrounded with a circle, in which the motto is inscribed in rubies. This is surmounted by the star of five points in brilliants, and the whole is attached to a blue ribbon with white edge, to be worn over the right and under the left shoulder. The collar consists of the lotus-flower, alternating with crossed palm-branches set between two chains of gold, from the centre of which hangs a badge as above, ornamented by a



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cross. The whole costs 900*l*. The robe or cloak, which is of ample dimensions, is of sky-blue satin.

With the view of lending as much *éclat* as possible to the ceremony, the same date was chosen for the investiture of the new knights at Windsor by her Majesty, and at Allahabad by her Majesty's representative. At Windsor, accompanied by the Prince Consort and the Prince of Wales, her Majesty conferred the honour on Sir John Lawrence, Sir George Pollock, Lord Clyde, Viscount Gough, and Lord Harris. Sir James Outram and Lord Combermere, who were not, however, able to be present owing to failing health, were also among the recipients. So also was the Maharaja Dhuleep Singh. At Allahabad, on the same day, Lord Canning, as Grand Master of the Order, conferred the investiture on Sir Hugh Rose, the Maharajas of Gwalior and Puttiala, the Nawab of Rampore, and the Begum of Bhopal. The Nizam of Hyderabad, the Raja of Cashmere, and the Guicowar of Baroda, were at the same time nominated knights of the Order, but the insignia were delivered to them subsequently by the political agent at their respective courts.

Much amusement was caused by the scant courtesy with which the honour was received by one of these potentates, the Nizam of Hyderabad. It was said, that for a long time he could not be prevailed on to take it at all; and when it was presented by the Resident, who is described as crawling to the foot of the throne, and delivering the insignia containing the cameo likeness of the Queen, the Nizam took it in his left hand (itself an insult), and then put it under him and sat upon it. Such is the story as it was told in all the Indian papers, and the affair has never been satisfactorily explained. That the Nizam contemplated any slight or insult is not to be supposed, for Orientals far surpass Europeans, and above all, Englishmen, in their studied observance of the courtesies and refinements of life. The Nizam might not have known exactly what to do with the insignia, and not being instructed how



to wear it, there being no superior there to put it on for him, as is generally the case when it is presented, he may have placed it down beside him on the "gaddee," or cushion which constitutes the throne, and there it might have been partially concealed by the loose drapery of an Oriental costume, and hence the report that he took the insignia and sat upon it. The Resident's crawling posture is intelligible, because, from an absurd custom in vogue, and even settled by treaty, it is the practice at most courts for the residents and political agents to conform to Oriental etiquette. And on state occasions, the Resident, with his staff, enters the hall of audience with bare feet—that is, divested of boots—and they squat down, in Oriental fashion, on their haunches, with their feet tucked under their legs. From this position, if you want to approach a neighbour who is seated at a little distance, and etiquette forbids you to rise, there is no help for it, you must support yourself on your hands and knees. If after this you are compelled to progress ever so little, the motion must take the form of an advance on all fours, and if in that posture it is necessary for you to use one of your hands in presenting a person with something, no matter what, the action necessarily places you in a still more absurd posture. So that it may be allowed that the Resident had difficulties to contend with; the fault really lying with the absurd custom which the Government have carried on since the days when the representatives of the East India Company at native courts were the representatives of a body of merchants, seeking for favours, and soliciting protection and privileges from the native sovereigns. Circumstances are changed now, and although it is right that every respect should be paid to a native sovereign, especially in his own court, yet the political agent, or resident, or whoever may be for the time the representative of the Queen, should not be required to adopt forms or an etiquette suitable only to subjects and inferiors.

The Star of India could only reach a few among the



heads of native society, and it was desirable to invent some method of conferring distinction and social position among the upper classes which could be more extensively distributed. With this view, the rank of honorary magistrates was created. While presiding at the distribution of degrees at the Calcutta University, Lord Canning took occasion to assure the natives that the object Government had in establishing its extensive and costly system of education was to teach them to govern themselves. The distribution of honorary magistracies looked like the first fulfilment of the promise. They were appointed first in Bengal, and subsequently in the North-West, in Oude, the Punjab, and the other provinces. The system has been found, on the whole, to work well ; but is liable to a good deal of abuse in the hands of narrow-minded men, who are apt to forget the principle on which these honorary magistracies should be conferred. The post is much coveted by the natives, more for the honour than the power it brings with it ; but in too many instances it has been indiscriminately bestowed on those who had little in their social position, or their attainments, or their local influence, to recommend them. By a little judicious distribution of money among the native subordinates of the courts, or about the persons of influential officials, or else by an affectation and display of liberality in sentiment or purse, men may succeed in wheedling local governors into conferring the distinction upon them and their relations. It is right, of course, that public spirit and liberality should be encouraged and rewarded ; but there should be some other method found for honouring men for donations to dispensaries, exhibitions, and the like, besides investing them with magisterial powers, which, in many such cases, they are not capable of wielding with credit to themselves or the Government that appoints them.

In addition to this, municipal institutions in the Presidency towns, afterwards extended to other places in the Mofussil, afforded a means of placing natives in a position where they might co-operate with English officials.



Meantime, the deplorable state of affairs throughout Bengal, the seat of the indigo disturbances, had resulted in the appointment of a commission of inquiry consisting of Mr. Morris and Mr. Montessoro. The inquiry was instituted in consequence chiefly of complaints urged on the notice of the Government, that the ryots had combined against the landlords, Europeans as well as natives, in a refusal to pay their rents, and that the spirit of resistance went so far as to inflict the punishment of social excommunication on all who took service with Europeans. The inquiry was not so satisfactory as might have been wished, for the Commissioners, instead of conducting it together, took separate parts of the district, each under his own investigation, and arrived at pretty nearly opposite conclusions. One was astonished at the orderly behaviour of the ryots, and their good feeling towards the planters; the other finds them guilty of fraud and forgery, and acts of violence and of combination. It is obvious that such a report could have very little weight. But the indigo districts of Bengal were suffering now from the consequences of the strike of the past year. The planters, who were landholders, naturally made use of the means within their reach to raise their rents. The ryots had refused to sow any more indigo as far back as 1859. The planters, then taking them at their word that they would not grow any more indigo because it was not remunerative, doubled the price they paid for it, and told the ryots that those who refused to grow it should have their rents raised. This, of course, was a remedy that only those could resort to who were zemindars as well as planters. Those who were not landholders mostly betook themselves to tea-planting. The tenants, at least in the district that fell to Mr. Morris's lot, resisted in every possible way the attempts of the landlord to exact his rent, and the feud at length reached the point where the law was forced to interfere. The ryots then found themselves deserted by their own leaders, who fleeced them, and then left them to fight their own battles;



the money they had received in former years was no longer there to relieve their daily wants; the inundation had swept off their rice crops; and finally, the epidemic fever, which followed on the subsidence of the waters, added the climax to their miseries. The unhappy struggle had ruined both parties; but, if the ryots contended for a principle, they may claim the victory, dear as it was purchased; and the indigo interests in Lower Bengal never recovered the blow.

The Small Cause Courts, introduced by Mr. Harrington's Act as one of the proposed remedies for the state of affairs in Bengal, were set up this year in sixteen districts; and, as affording a method of realizing small claims by a procedure more summary than the ordinary civil courts, they were calculated to do good. The new system of police, however, was not introduced into Bengal this year, although it was organized in other provinces where it was perhaps less urgently required—in Pegu, Tenasserim, Arracan, and the North-West, as also in Bombay.

Very little of any general interest transpired in the two minor presidencies, Madras and Bombay, during the year. Sir William Denison, who came from Australia with a good character as a popular governor, was by no means popular in Madras. The complaint urged against him was that he did nothing, not that he did wrong. The same fault was found with him that was at first found with Lord Canning—dilatatoriness, and an apparent *insouciance* and disregard of his duties and of the country generally. In both instances it might have arisen, certainly in the case of Lord Canning it did so, from a desire to master the difficulties of the situation, and to learn his duty before committing himself to any particular line of policy. It was scarcely to be expected that, having been so short a time in a country which was entirely a novel and a strange field to him, he should have inaugurated any new or important measures. When memorialized about the land tenures in a portion of his charge, he postponed the question for "further consideration," which was the wisest thing he could do. Mean-



time railways were pushed forward, and a stimulus given to the introduction and cultivation of the Cinchona plant in the Neilgherrie hills. Sir W. Denison also promptly acted upon the order known as "Lord Canning's waste lands order" in a part of the presidency favourable to coffee-growing, called Wynaad, where very sanguine hopes were at one time entertained of unprecedented success in coffee-planting, and Ceylon feared a rival. But the even tenor of the Governor's way was not interrupted by any of those exciting movements that disturbed the northern Presidency, while Madras and Bombay shared in the general measures of reform that were being pushed forward with all practicable speed by the Imperial Government at Calcutta, and especially they benefited in a much greater degree than Bengal by the impetus given to the cotton trade. The wild speculations and subsequent crisis in the money market which involved Bombay in so much distress will come before us in another chapter.

Some important changes were made during the year in a vast tract of territory which, in one sense, may be called the cotton field of India. The rich and fertile valley of Berar had been under our care and management ever since 1853, when it was assigned to us by the Nizam in lieu of a sum of money he was bound by treaty to pay towards the maintenance of the Hyderabad contingent; but a new treaty was this year concluded with the Nizam, by which a portion of it, the Raichori Dooab and the Dharaseo district, was restored, together with another district called Shorapore, which was thrown in as a sort of present or reward to the Nizam for keeping quiet during 1857. Berar is divided into two great districts, West and East Berar, recognised principally by the now well-known name of the chief cities Oomrawuttee in the west and Akola in the east. The population of the two districts is about the same, numbering, it is said, between five and six millions.

It was in the year 1861 that the Bishop of Calcutta, Dr. Cotton, put forward a scheme, with which his name will



ever be associated in India, for establishing schools for the education of that large class of European children whose parents are unable to afford the expense of sending them to England. The scheme met with the hearty approval of the Secretary of State, and efforts were made to collect funds for the institution. The design was to collect money for a fund wherewith schools might be established all over the diocese of Bengal wherever they appeared to the committee to be the most urgently required. The sum necessary for carrying out on anything like an efficient scale so grand a design is immense, but the object is well worthy of the support of all who have at heart the interests of India. Year by year the European population of that vast country increases, but the increase, rapid though it be, has no visible effect, in consequence of the immense extent of territory over which the population is spread. There are no trustworthy returns extant giving any accurate estimate of the number of English residents in India, but it must be very large. It was remarked, at the time of the mutiny in 1857, how little the general public knew, of the existence even, of European families residing in the suburbs of native cities in Upper India, and of whose existence they only became aware, alas! when it had been terminated by the mutineers. And people were startled at long lists of names of men, women, and children who had been murdered in places where no one seemed to be aware before there were any Europeans to be found at all. As a rule, but few military officers settle in India after they are entitled to a pension; of civilians doing so, instances are very rare. But there are a vast number of clerks and *employés* in the service of Government and the railway, merchants, planters, tradespeople, besides retired pensioners from the ranks, and a few officers, for whose children the means of education were very scanty. The bulk of them could not afford to send their children to England, and they were thrown back on such resources as the country provided. In Upper India, almost the only institution for the education of boys and



girls was the Martinière, which had two branches, in Calcutta and Lucknow. The founder of this noble institution was a General Martin, who started in life as a drummer-boy in an English infantry regiment, went into the King of Oude's service, where he made himself generally useful, and being a shrewd man amassed enormous wealth, the bulk of which, at his death, he devoted to this praiseworthy object. But the existing schools at the Presidency towns, excellent as they were, could not meet the wants of families scattered over the length and breadth of the land.

One great part of the Bishop's scheme was to utilize the Himalayas, and to provide schools in healthy places like Mussoorie and Simla. There can be no question as to the advantage that is to be derived from these hill-schools. There is only one fear, and that is, lest they should tempt parents who with a little care and self-denial could afford to send their children to England, to forego that advantage, and rest content with a second-class education in the country; for, with all the advantages of climate and scenery, with the best efforts of the most experienced masters, education in India is not, and can never be, the same thing as education in England. The deterioration of the Anglo-Saxon constitution in India is an inexorable law of nature, from which there is no escape. The theory of climatization is a fallacy long ago exploded. Every day that an Englishman remains in the East, he becomes less able to withstand the effects of climate. Nor does the intellectual part of our nature escape this influence. We miss every day in India a thousand associations, incidents, sights and sounds, by which our ideas, our thoughts, and feelings might be invigorated, quickened, and purified. As the polyp and sea-anemone kept in vivaria pine for what is to them life, we yearn for that contact of mind with mind, that elevating, freshening influence of civilization which can only be found in the great centres of human life in Europe and America. And as the fresh sea-water pumped into the vivarium once every six hours serves but to delude the occupants with a



counterfeit tide, and is but a sorry substitute, though it does enable them to maintain a languid existence which would otherwise totally decay, so the resources of literature and society which we have in India are but a makeshift after all, by which we do our best to repair the decay of mental vigour inseparable from a life of exile. The effect of this upon children is very striking. Here and there you meet exceptional instances, but as a rule an English boy or girl educated in the country, even under the happiest and most favourable circumstances, with all the advantages of hill climate and home influence, bears the same resemblance to a child educated in England as the indigenous horse of India does to the English thoroughbred. It is right that parents who cannot afford to send their children to England should have the means of giving them a good education in their adopted country, but it is to be feared that one result of the Bishop's schools will be that many a child who would have been brought up amid healthy influences in Great Britain, will be left to grow up to maturity amid the comparatively sickly and enervating moral atmosphere of an Indian school. Nowhere is the character of boys to be studied better than in a playground. Let anyone sit in the corner of a playground in a large Indian school, and listen to the conversation of the boys, their language, pronunciation, and general development of ideas and character. He will probably hear less actually bad language than in a similar place in England: but he cannot fail to be struck with the prevailing tone, the listlessness and want of energy in the boys' actions and gestures, their behaviour to each other, and a general want of the manliness and vigour which are observable in an English school.

Dr. Daltry, the Bishop of Madras, died early this year. He was a contemporary and friend of Simeon at Cambridge in early days, and was appointed Archdeacon of Calcutta in 1831. In 1840 he left India, and succeeded Baptist Noel at St. John's, Bedford Row, whence he was taken for the Madras bishopric. He was a good, guileless man, but



not gifted with those abilities, the best test perhaps of true greatness, which enable men to influence others.

Cast in a different mould from Bishop Daltry, but gifted with many sterling qualities, though they were destined to be exercised in another field altogether, and were combined with the utmost refinement to which the highest cultivation of mind and manner can attain, the Countess Canning, at the close of the year, preceded her husband, by but a short period, in her flight to a world where political animosities and social distinctions are forgotten. Lady Canning left Calcutta in the autumn for a short sojourn at Darjeeling, and on her way back caught a jungle fever, which developed itself about ten days after her return to Barrackpore. Perhaps there were never two people in the position Lord and Lady Canning held, who realized better in the mere outward observances of life the ideal of true nobility and gentle breeding. Courteous and affable, and at the same time dignified, Lord Canning had the faculty of making his guests feel at home, while at the same time as long as he was in the room they never lost the perception that they were in the presence of her Majesty's viceroy. And the Countess Canning, in her own sphere, exerted a similar influence. There was a shade of great sadness at times upon her features, which would have been painful to witness but for the spirit of sweetness and resignation that accompanied it. On terms of intimacy with the Queen, the childless Countess may have felt sadly at times in India the want of female sympathy and friendship. It is seldom the part of the historian to intrude into the private life of great people or public characters. But in India the tongue of scandal is never silent, and I may not in thought follow Lady Canning's mortal remains to the tomb her sorrowing husband had prepared for her at Barrackpore, without recalling, in open contradiction to the reports about the terms on which she was said to live with her husband, the impression I have received from one who was frequently in their society, when relieved for a time of the pressing



EPITAPHS ON LORD AND LADY CANNING.

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cares of state Lord Canning sought and found, in the companionship of one of the most refined and elegant women of her age, the solace of domestic happiness. His feelings at her loss found expression in the following words, which were subsequently inscribed as an epitaph over her tomb :—

“Honours and praises written on a tomb are at best a vain glory ; but that her charity, humility, meekness, and watchful faith in her Saviour, will, for that Saviour's sake, be accepted of God, and be to her a glory everlasting, is the firm trust of those who knew her best and most dearly loved her in life, and who cherish the memory of the departed.”

Below this are the following lines :—

“The above words were written Nov. 22d, 1861, by Earl Canning, who survived his wife but seven months. He left India on the 18th March, died in London on the 17th June, and was buried in Westminster Abbey on the 21st June, 1862.”



CHAPTER VI.

1862.

The Legislative Council—The Mysore grant—Lord Canning's protest—Bombay and Madras Councils—The High Courts—Sale of waste lands—Sir Charles Wood's unpopularity—Redemption of land tax and permanent settlement—Physical changes in operation—Climate and irrigation—Railways—Increased cultivation—Ganges Canal—Extension of cotton cultivation—Tea—Causes of failure—Rising in the Hills—Treaty with Burmah—Official changes—Lord Canning's death—Sir John Peter Grant—Sir George Clerk—Police and Finance Commission.

THE new Legislative Council met on Saturday the 18th January. The visitor to the Council Chamber might have seen seated, at the centre of a long table covered with green baize, facing the door, the noble figure of Lord Canning. On his right sat a native prince, calm and impassive, but showily and richly dressed. This was the Raja of Puttiala, a Sikh chieftain from Upper India, who had behaved with marked fidelity to the British Government in 1857. He was the first native member appointed to the Council under the new Act, and perhaps was better fitted to aid Her Majesty's Government in the field than in the council chamber. After attending several sittings, the Raja asked leave to bring in a bill. The permission could not be refused, and the object of the contemplated enactment was to prohibit the use of beef as an article of food. Next to the Raja of Puttiala sat Sir Bartle Frere; then another native member, Raja Deo Narain Singh, Raja of Benares; and next to him the strikingly tall figure of

Sir Cecil Beadon. On the left of Lord Canning sat Mr. Grey, the Secretary; then Mr. Harrington; then the Raja Dinker Rao, the astute Mahratta minister who kept Scindia, the Raja of Gwalior, straight during the troublous times of 1857, although others say that it was Scindia who kept his minister straight. But it only needed a glance at Scindia and his minister to see with which of the two the moral influence lay. Next to Dinker Rao came Mr. Erskine, and after him Messrs. Cowie, Fitzwilliam, and Forbes, the non-official element in the Council, for the independent influence of the native members was so small that they hardly deserve to be reckoned in that category. Mr. Wyllie, the deputy secretary, sat next to Mr. Forbes; the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir J. P. Grant, was placed immediately opposite Lord Canning; and after him Mr. Ritchie and Sir Robert (now Lord) Napier of Magdala.

The constitution of the new Council was given to it by the "Indian Councils Act" of 1861, alluded to in the last chapter.

With the exception of the presence of a small body of non-official members, that constitution was eminently despotic. It was never intended, indeed, that the power of the Viceroy and his Executive Council should be in any way interfered with by the legislative body. Ever since the free expression of opinions, and the attitude assumed by the popular party headed by the Chief Justice Sir Barnes Peacock, in the discussion that ensued upon the question of the Mysore Grant and the budget, the Government at home, as well as in India, seemed to have resolved to trample down the sickly little shoot of liberal principles that had thrust its head above the ground during the reaction of public feeling at the time of Mr. Wilson's appointment.

Even Mr. Wilson's English ideas in favour of representative government speedily gave way before the conviction forced upon him after his rapid tour through the country up to Lahore, that what India required was a firm govern-

ment. After the blow which had well-nigh staggered us in 1857, there was indeed need of firmness. And when, in the angry and excited state of feeling consequent upon Sir Charles Wood's policy in the matter of the Mysore Grant, the Council assumed something of the functions of a House of Commons, and called for papers, the fate of the sickly little shoot was sealed. It must be trampled down, and trampled down it was.

That India is not yet ripe for representative government is patent to every one. The native population have to go through many decades of education before they are fitted to exercise the right of suffrage, and before they find candidates suited for the Indian Parliament. Here and there might be found some of sufficient breadth of view and general intelligence to take part in a debate, to criticise a bill, to recommend a measure. But to entrust a house of native representatives with the power of a House of Parliament would be to surrender the country.

That the Legislative Council, however, should be improved by being deprived of the experience of a man like Sir Barnes Peacock, or that it would not be improved by a much larger admixture of the non-official element, both European and native, is indeed difficult to understand.

No one felt or resented the interference of Sir Charles Wood in the matter of the Mysore Grant more strongly than Lord Canning himself. The Mysore princes were the descendants of the sons of the notorious Tippoo Sultan, who after the death of their father at the capture of Seringapatam in 1799 had been brought over to Calcutta, where they had lived, and their children after them, ever since, in the receipt of a pension from the British Government. As the family increased in numbers in course of years, and bid fair to go on increasing, and as they refused to exert themselves, or do aught but live the lives of Eastern princes in luxurious indolence, Lord Dalhousie recommended that after the fourth generation the pension should cease. But the Directors, probably afraid of agitation in



England, declared that they could not turn the princes out into the world to share Adam's curse and earn their bread by the sweat of their brow. The numbers of these claimants to eleemosynary support had arisen in 1850 to the alarming figure of twenty-two grandsons and thirteen great-grandsons, with their families and servants and pensioners, and the host of nondescript hangers-on that are a part and parcel of every Eastern court. What was to be done with them? Were we to go on pensioning the ever-increasing host of princelings and their satellites for all time; or were they to be told to go to seek their own bread? Lord Dalhousie, as has been stated, suggested stopping their pensions altogether after the fourth generation. Lord Canning was not averse to making an arrangement by which a permanent provision should be secured on a reasonable and moderate scale, but the family determined to try the experiment of an appeal to England.

Fully alive to the objectionable course of maintaining a large colony of princelings in mischievous idleness, Sir Charles Wood was desirous of making some arrangement by which they might become absorbed into the body of the people, and learn to be independent. So he proposed to allow the different members of the families to remove from Calcutta, and settle where they pleased; and in order to enable them to do this, he proposed to create a fund in India stock, the interest of which would be sufficient to maintain them. Accordingly a sum of 17,000*l.* per annum was allotted for their maintenance, an equal amount given to the existing heads of families for their lives, and a further sum for the purchase of residences. Altogether it amounted to 520,000*l.* But Sir Charles Wood justified the expenditure on the ground that the whole sum did not equal that originally set apart for their maintenance, or the interest of the sum which had accrued to the Government by withholding part of it for so many years.¹

¹ *Vide* "Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs." By Algernon West, late Private Secretary. P. 140.

Sir Charles Wood thus expressed himself upon these points, in his despatch dated February 4, 1861 :—

“When I review all the circumstances of British relations with the families of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan from the time of the conquest of Mysore ; when I advert to the terms of the treaty of 1799, to the revenue of the territory assigned for the maintenance of the country ; when I consider the intentions of the framers of the treaty, the recorded opinion of Lord Wellesley, and especially of the Duke of Wellington, who remonstrated against the illiberal manner in which effect was given to a treaty he helped to negotiate ; when I refer to the accounts of the appropriated Mysore Deposit Fund, and know that in the year 1806, when neither of the contingencies contemplated in the treaty as grounds for a reduction of the payment to the family had occurred, there were accumulations to the credit of the fund greater than the amount which I have ordered to be distributed amongst existing members of the family ; when I consider that since that time the sums actually paid to the descendants of Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan fell short of those specified in the treaty by a larger amount than that which I have ordered to be capitalized as a permanent provision for the family ; that the annual amount now paid to existing incumbents is below that stated in the treaty ; and that on the death of these incumbents, many of whom are of advanced age, the territories assigned for the maintenance of the family will revert to the British Government in perpetuity, free from all charge or incumbrance ; and when I bear in mind the claims of a body of men descended from a sovereign prince to generous sympathy and beneficent treatment, and the benefit which they will derive from being placed in a position of honourable independence, I cannot think that the demands of justice and humanity would have been satisfied by any less liberal arrangement than that which has been directed by Her Majesty’s Government.”

This drain upon the Indian revenue certainly came at an inauspicious moment, when the finances were in such a state that it was deemed necessary to send Mr. Wilson out to see after them, when there was an enormous deficit, and the only hope of balancing our receipts and expenditure lay in a stern and ruthless exercise of the shears in cutting down departments, abolishing offices, reducing salaries, and in taxing the people. The announcement was received in India with a yell of indignation, which found an echo within the walls of the Council, and put back for a half century, probably, the progress of India towards a representative Government.



Lord Canning had entered a dignified and a firm protest against this unheard-of interference with the administration of Indian affairs. He said in a minute, dated 20th August, 1860, to which the portion of the despatch from the Secretary of State just quoted is a reply :—

“The circumstances of the time must be my excuse if I say that this is a grievous weight to put upon the State, when every nerve is being strained to reduce and keep down expenditure, and when risk and odium are being incurred by the raising of new taxes.

“The Home Government cannot be fully aware of the refusals and postponements with which the most urgent requests for increased expenditure in various departments of civil administration are almost daily met by the Governor-General in Council, even when based on the clearest justice and expediency. But the general necessity under which we lie of avoiding for the present every increase of expense that can by possibility be avoided, must surely be understood in England.

“Here it certainly is not by the Government alone this new infliction is felt. The arrangement has been paraded in the newspapers (not by the authority of Government), and is known to the public at large ; and I have reason to believe that it is viewed as a very unreasonable burden by many who are now being called upon for the first time to pay a direct tax to the State, and who are therefore more inclined than they have hitherto been to criticise the disposal of the State's money.

“Usually the Government of India has been consulted by the Home Government when measures affecting the position of the chiefs or great families of India have been in question, and especially when any considerable expenditure, hitherto unlooked for, has been involved. In the present instance, the Governor-General in Council was not apprised of such measures being contemplated.

“Had he been so apprised, it would have been his duty to suggest for consideration some points which seem to have been entirely overlooked in England.

“Admitting that it is desirable and just that there should be some permanent future provision made for the Mysore family, it would have been his duty to submit that the present and general increase of their stipend is not called for.”

And again, in alluding to the blow which was dealt to the prestige of the Viceroy of India by such an ignoring of his authority, he adds :—

“Now it is very probable that, the result of Prince Golam Mahomed's voyage to England being known, other natives of high rank who may have favours to ask will follow his example. It will be for the Secretary



of State to judge whether their claims too shall be decided in England without reference to the Governor-General in Council.

"I venture to think that, apart from the burden which may be put upon the revenue unnecessarily and unseasonably by such a course, there are strong reasons for adhering to the former practice of receiving the representations of all such claimants through, or of referring them to, the Government of India.

"With the increasing facility and habit of visiting England, and with the tendency which the assumption of the government of India by the Crown has naturally had to direct all eyes to England, it has become more than ever desirable that, with the view of upholding the authority of the Governor-General in Council, natives should not, whatever their rank, be encouraged to address their claims direct to the Home Government.

"It cannot be a good thing that a native prince, however high in rank or loyal in disposition, should go about vaunting the influence which he has been able to exercise in England in the acquisition of his desires, as Prince Golam Mahomed has done.

"I have before had occasion to remark (I believe with the approval of Her Majesty's Government) that 'it is not a proper or a wise policy to lead the native chiefs to look beyond the Queen's representative in matters affecting their rights and titles, and the engagements made with them,' and that 'it is a mistake to suppose that by so doing their loyal and orderly subordination to the Queen's Government would be promoted.'

"These remarks had not reference to the rights or claims of stipendiary chiefs, but they are not the less applicable to such chiefs. I refer to them now, not from any jealousy for the authority of an office which I shall soon lay down, but because I am convinced that to hold India well in hand, the influence of the Governor-General in Council ought to be increased and not diminished in the eyes of the natives, and that weakness will result to the Government of India by attracting their attention and their hopes from India to England. It appears to me that the tendency of some recent proceedings has been in this last-named direction; but however this may be, the fact that a pensioned prince, leaving Calcutta without any avowal of his purpose (indeed with a studious concealment of it, as regards myself), has been able to obtain from Her Majesty's Government an augmentation of the stipends and grants to his family by the vast amounts ordered in the despatch of the 11th of June, and that he has claimed payment with only a few days' foreknowledge on the part of the Government, and at a time of notorious financial pressure, is a significant one. All this is as well known in the bazars and streets of Calcutta as in the Council Chamber of Government House, or at the India Office in London; and it will not tend to elevate the Government of India in the estimation of the public, native or European."

Such was the history of the Mysore Grant, which was loudly condemned by the Legislative Council; Sir Barnes Peacock heading the malcontents by questioning the extent to which the treaty as originally construed was binding on us at all. Care was taken that in the new Council there should be no opportunity for a similar expression of public opinion to find vent. The president is the Viceroy, or some one nominated by him; he may adjourn any discussion or vote, any meeting or business—whether a quorum be present or no—to any future time. A member may call for papers, as “spirits from the vasty deep,” but the President shall determine whether he shall have them or no. And, thirdly, the President may suspend the constitution of the Council—for sufficient reasons. After a bill has passed it must receive the assent of the Governor-General in Council as Viceroy, besides the assent he gives as President of Council; and after an unhappy bill has struggled into existence against all these odds, it may be vetoed by the Secretary of State.

Such is the constitution of the Indian Legislative Council, the non-official members of which are nominated by the Governor-General. But, indeed, it matters little by whom they are nominated, as it is clear that they are but a cypher, a “sham and a wind-bag,” as Dr. Johnson would have called them. Even the public, or reporters for the press, were only admitted on Mr. Laing’s urgent representation. It is a great misfortune that the term “Legislative Council” was retained, because the phrase conveys to the mind the idea of a real council met together for free debate and to frame laws; and we shall see in the sequel of the history how, even in such an assembly, the non-official members have met with scant courtesy, and been desired in other words “to hold their tongues.” But in England, people who hear of the Calcutta Legislative Council are apt to get the idea that it is really a legislative council in the same sense as the phrase is used in the colonies and other dependencies of Great Britain, where

there is a real freedom of debate and interchange of opinion; and so they come to give much greater weight to the proceedings of the Council than they deserve, supposing them to be in some sense a reflection of the popular voice supported by the weight of public opinion, instead of being the acts of a small clique of officials which may be annulled by the simple fiat of the Viceroy or the Secretary of State.

From 1833 to 1861 the minor presidencies had had no legislative council of their own, but their laws were all manufactured for them by the legislators who sat in Calcutta. In 1833 a legal member nominated by the Crown was added, and in 1853 a member of the Civil Service from each presidency and lieutenant-governorship was nominated as a sort of representative from his own province, and at the same time two judges of the Supreme Court were privileged to sit in council. By the new Act the minor presidencies received again the privilege of having legislative bodies of their own, but they were not to interfere with the army, customs, public debt, or any question of Imperial interest. The Bombay Council met on the 22d January, and that of Madras on the 4th February. In Madras Sir W. Denison appointed three officials and an equal number of non-officials, of the latter of whom one was a native. In Bombay Sir George Clerk appointed seven, out of whom four were non-official, three being natives and one an English gentleman, for which he was belauded by the natives exactly in proportion to the extent to which he was cried down by the Europeans.

As to the comparative value of a European or a native in council, it is mere dogmatism to assert, as is so often done, that the superiority lies wholly with the Anglo-Saxon. As a general rule, applicable in principle only—for in each instance the question of comparative efficiency must rest upon the selection made and the individual merits of the nominee—the Englishman will of course have the advantage in breadth of view, independence of thought and



feeling, and political education: on the other hand, the native has the advantage of acquaintance with the country and the feelings of the people, and it is India after all, and not England, that is being legislated for. But what is of much more importance than the comparative qualifications of the Englishman and the native, is the fact, generally overlooked, that experience gained in Calcutta, Bombay, or Madras, is of very little more use in legislating for all India than that gained in London or Melbourne. Nor is there much less want of sympathy between the European and the native than there is between the natives of Upper India and the class known as Young Bengal and Young Bombay.

One would have thought the Council as thus constituted was sufficiently secured from all tendency to freedom of debate or procedure; but, to take away even the slight shadow of resemblance to a House of Commons which some member might at a future time have been so infatuated as to imagine he beheld, Sir Charles Wood subsequently sent out instructions to Lord Elgin, who had meantime succeeded Lord Canning, that such terms as "sessions" and "prorogation" were not to be used, and that the right was reserved to the Viceroy of publishing a bill when the Council was not sitting without asking leave to bring it in.

Another important measure of this year was the amalgamation of the courts. The old Supreme Court and the old Sudder Court at the three Presidency towns were abolished, and an amalgamated court called the High Court substituted in their room by charter. One-third of the judges by the Act must be barristers of five years' standing, and two-thirds members of the Civil Service who have been judges of zillahs or district courts for at least three years. The High Court at Agra, now Allahabad, was not created till a year or two subsequently. At the same time, the Civil Procedure Code in vogue in India in every court not established by royal charter was intro-



duced into the High Courts of the Presidencies, much to the disgust of the bar, but very much to the advantage of the client, for one uniform procedure thus became generally adopted throughout India.

The opening of the new Council and of the new Courts were the only constitutional measures carried out this year. But Sir Charles Wood, the *bête noir* of the Indian Government, continued to deal his blows against the prerogative of the Viceroy with unabated vigour. Lord Canning, there is no doubt, felt bitterly the humiliation to which he was subjected, and Lord Elgin is said to have remarked shortly after he came into power that his predecessors were Governor-Generals, but that he had not authority to confer a pension of two pounds a month on a retired clerk. Of course so long as the constitution of the Government provides a machinery whereby all the Viceroy's public acts are liable to be cancelled, and it is required that they should receive confirmation by the higher authority of the Secretary of State before being effective, neither the Viceroy nor the public have any reason to complain of that machinery being set in motion. Whether the Viceroys of India, and Lord Canning was the first, have fully realized the fact of their subordination to the Secretary of State, there are no means of knowing; but certainly the incessant, and, as it appeared to the outside world, the occasionally abrupt, interference of Sir Charles Wood with many of the measures of the Indian Government, had the effect of lowering very much the prestige of the local Government among the natives, and to a certain extent no doubt weakened the power of the executive. I am not depreciating the principle of that interference. When the Viceroy, as is the case in India, is necessarily so much under the influence of a small clique of officials, and the Government is practically an oligarchy, the check that is capable of being applied to tyrannical, or oppressive, or unjust measures, by a higher authority in England, situated at a distance from the vortex of petty prejudice and



SIR CHARLES WOOD'S UNPOPULARITY.

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passion that too often sway the councils of the Government in a place like India, is most wholesome and salutary. The outcry against Sir Charles Wood among all the European community in India was very loud. The unpopularity with which Lord Canning was at one time regarded was all transferred to the Secretary of State. And during the latter part of Sir C. Wood's tenure of office, there was literally nothing too bad to be said of him. Every unpopular measure, every distasteful order affecting either of the three services, was invariably ascribed to him. In private circles or in public, to say a word in his defence was to draw down on yourself a portion of the odium with which that official was viewed. In the army especially, while the ill-conceived and ill-ordered amalgamation was being carried out, every order, every measure, every act of government which injuriously affected the interests of any class, was attributed to some hostile feeling which Sir Charles Wood was supposed to entertain towards the officers of the old Indian army, whose ruin, according to popular representations, he was for ever plotting. It was utterly vain to combat this notion, and so deeply was it engraven in the minds of all classes, that if such a mode of expressing political feeling had been common among Anglo-Indians, the Secretary of State would have been burnt in effigy every night in every garrison, and in every place where more than two Englishmen were to be found together. He occupied the place which the Pope fills in the Protestant mind of England every fifth of November. The natives, on the other hand, regarded him in quite a different light; and I am quite sure that the fact of there being an appeal from the decision of the local Government to a higher authority in England, however distasteful it may be to officials on the spot, is a source of untold satisfaction and confidence to the whole native population.

So would the European community regard it, if they knew their own interests. But in 1862, to borrow a meta-

phor from Hindoo mythology, Lord Canning had become the Avatar of Anglo-Indian worship, and Sir Charles Wood the antagonistic demon ever seeking its destruction.

The next interference by the Secretary of State with the measures of the local government, which gave great umbrage, was the practical annulment of Lord Canning's resolution for the sale of the waste lands. This measure was no new design hastily conceived, for as far back as 1858, Lord Stanley, when Secretary of State, had desired Lord Canning to collect information and prepare a scheme for selling the waste cultivable land, as well as parting with the fee simple of lands owned by Government, by means of the redemption of the land-tax. Why the measure had lain so long in abeyance is not known. Perhaps Lord Canning's attention was too much occupied with other matters, or perhaps it was not till the cotton crisis and the famine that the probable advantages of the scheme forced themselves upon his notice. At any rate it was not till October 1861 that the resolution appeared offering waste lands for sale in fee simple. The date is not unimportant, and so anxious was the author of the scheme to see it carried out, that he took the somewhat unprecedented course of officially desiring those who wanted to avail themselves of the opportunity to take up land, not to wait for legislation on the subject.

He retired in March 1862, and almost his last act was to introduce into council his bill giving the authority of a legal enactment to his proceedings. Now all this time the measure was before Sir Charles Wood. He had from October to March to express his dissent from the scheme, if he did dissent. He knew its importance. He knew that the moment the resolution had been published, it was received with acclamation by all parties. He knew that applications for grants of land were pouring in from all sides. He knew that in England companies were being formed to purchase estates in India, yet it is strange he took no steps to express disapproval; on the contrary, he



allowed things to take their course. But after Lord Canning was dead—for he died very shortly after his return to England—the Secretary of State issued orders superseding the late Viceroy's resolution, and practically annulling it. All India stood aghast. Those who had bought lands, but whose purchase was not complete, complained loudly that they had been deceived. The enthusiasm with which the resolution had been received, and with which English planters and capitalists were preparing to settle down in India, suddenly cooled. Companies suspended their operations, and intending speculators shut up their purses, and betook themselves to Australia or some other colony where the government was a little less arbitrary and capricious, and where there was a restraining power in the shape of public opinion, or a hope of satisfaction from an appeal to Parliament. Meantime, officials under some local governments, taking the cue from their superiors, adopted every shuffling and quibbling artifice they could to put an end to bargains already half made, and get rid of the *bête noir* of Indian officialism—the European settler.

By the new resolution, dated 9th June, 1862, waste lands, instead of being sold as had been directed, at so much an acre, were to be sold in plots or blocks by auction at an upset price which the local government might fix. Now if the object was to get European settlers to come to India—and Lord Canning made no secret that such was the end he contemplated in issuing the resolution, and Sir Charles Wood professed to concur with him—it was about the last thing likely to forward such an object, allowing the local governments to fix an upset price on land; for it obviously left it in the power of a small clique of officials to put a prohibitory price on it if it were likely to be purchased by any one who was obnoxious to them.

Acquaintance with the site of valuable blocks of jungle land in India is not to be acquired very easily, and Lord Canning's resolution plainly aimed at both rewarding



energy and encouraging a wholesome spirit of enterprise. For unless a plot selected was in the proximity of a town, or there was any cause for making it specially valuable, in which case it was to be put up to auction, the person who discovered the site—a discovery which perhaps was not made without toil and risk—derived some advantage for his trouble, for he had but to apply for the land and it was his on compliance with the necessary conditions. But Sir C. Wood totally forgot that waste land in India does not lie by the road-side, where you can inspect it during a morning ride, and he offered but little inducement to a man to spear out desirable localities whereon to settle. For, first of all, the local authorities must make themselves acquainted with the site, so as to fix the price; then the applicant must deposit the cost of the survey, and then it has to be surveyed. Each one of these regulations is in itself calculated to act as a prohibition; and certainly the clause regarding the survey is; for in many parts of the country, unless the jackals and bears could have been prevailed upon to occupy some of their spare time in surveying the block, there would be but little prospect of getting the work done. Sir Charles Wingfield stated that this work could be done by qualified natives, of whom he said there was any number who had been turned out professional surveyors from the Government colleges. Now the Government colleges do not, as a rule, teach surveying at all, with the exception of the Roorkee institution; and the students from that mostly enter Government service, so that it would have been extremely difficult to find this host of ready-made surveyors, except on paper. But under such a system, who in the world would take the trouble to go and find out a valuable block of land for the sake of seeing it bought over his head by some one with a long purse? An intending settler might after severe toil and exposure discover a site, and after depositing his money and getting it surveyed, have the satisfaction of seeing it purchased at auction by a native banker acting on a hint from the



collector. Had it been designed to hedge round the purchase of waste lands with prohibitory injunctions, without the appearance of actually cancelling Lord Canning's resolution, it could hardly have been accomplished more effectually than by Sir Charles Wood's regulations.

But, in truth, there was a great deal of misunderstanding on both sides of this question. Waste land, in the sense of land having no owner, and waste land in the sense of uncultivated land, are two different things. Of the latter there is no lack in India. Thousands and thousands of acres in every part of the country meet the eye, even of the traveller who pursues his unadventurous way by train. Any one who traverses the continent either in pursuit of science or at the call of duty, may pass, if he go so far, over thousands of miles of uncultivated land covered with stunted vegetation, the abode of the jackal and the deer. But if he imagines the land has no owner, he will be much mistaken. Let him set up a claim, or begin to plough up a portion of it, and valueless as it is he will very soon discover the landlord. Even in jungle districts or virgin forests it will often happen that the zemindar of the neighbouring village—whether that village be one or twenty miles off—will put in a claim for the whole tract. Of course such claims are not easily substantiated. But Sir C. Wood had the then recent events in New Zealand fresh in his recollection. He made no distinction in his own mind between the New Zealander and the native of India, and he dreaded a repetition of what had occurred in the South Pacific. Those who know India perceive how groundless are such fears. Hardy as are some of the natives of the Upper and Central Provinces, there are none that can be compared for a moment with the Maori: and tenacious as the Indians are of their rights in land, the settler is not likely to be called on to compete with them in any field more fatal than the civil courts. The different parties, however, who contested so hotly the policy of Lord Canning and Sir Charles Wood, might have saved themselves the trouble. English capitalists and



colonists will never settle in India as long as there is land to be had in Canada, New Zealand, America, Vancouver's Island, or the Cape. Indeed, as to colonists, the idea of Englishmen "colonizing" the plains of India in the same sense as they do Australia or Canada, and other countries similarly situated, is a mere chimera.

No doubt Lord Canning's resolution was faulty in one respect. He allowed thirty days for a claimant to come forward and establish or set up his right to a plot of land selected for purchase, and within one year from date of sale an owner might recover compensation. The first clause was defective, because thirty days were not long enough; the second conveys a privilege which ought not to have been granted.

Heretofore we have been considering waste lands in the sense of jungle lands. There is another kind of waste land in India, viz. common land, or uncultivated tracts lying contiguous to cultivated, but without an owner. With regard to land of this kind, Lord Canning's resolution was fair enough. He laid down that the owner of the cultivated land to which such tracts were contiguous should have the right of pre-emption. If he did not choose to exercise that right, then in that case, after an interval of five years, and if the land was still waste, it might be sold. Sir C. Wood, however, ruled that in such a case the purchaser should not get a title till the twelve years—the period allowed by the limitation clause of Act X. of 1859—had elapsed. Added to all which, when the different provinces published their detailed rules under the new resolution, many of them added a proviso that the purchaser should hold his grant subject to any future legislation as to the claims of third parties.¹ So it is hardly to be wondered at that applications for waste land in India were not numerous.

There were two other important questions which received the attention of Sir Charles Wood and the Council at the same time as the waste lands resolution, viz. the proposed

¹ *Friend of India.*



redemption of the land-tax and the Permanent Settlement. The latter measure met with the approval of the Council and the Secretary of State, as it has met with that of a large party in India. The operation of the former was practically restricted to the land purchased by settlers under the new resolution.

But, in point of fact, the proposed redemption of the land-tax is a subject scarcely worth discussing, for the simple reason that natives will not avail themselves of the privilege. They have not sufficient confidence in the permanence of British rule, or in British good faith, to run the risk of paying down twenty years' purchase in commutation. Let the offer be made ever so widely, it will not be accepted save in a few exceptional cases, and, in fact, there was not a single application from all the North-West Provinces and Oude during the six months that the experiment was tried. The project, it may be added, would never have been entertained by any one who had any actual knowledge of the feelings and prejudices of the people.

As to the Permanent Settlement so strongly recommended by a large school of politicians, the Government might be advised to act on the principle illustrated by Shekh Sadi in the Gulistan. A certain king had sentenced a man to death. The criminal advised the king not to carry out the sentence. He was asked why. "Because," he said, "if you kill me now the chances are you will hereafter change your mind and believe me innocent, and then it will be impossible for you to undo what you have done." The introduction of the Permanent Settlement is, it is true, recommended by a large class of writers, but it is with equal vehemence opposed by others who have as many claims to attention on the score of practical knowledge and experience as the first. It must be at the best a doubtful experiment; and the fact that the measure, once carried out, cannot be undone, but will be binding on us for all time, ought to make the Government very cautious



how they introduce it. Until it has been carried into effect, we are free to try experimental measures, and, as a last resource, after all we can fall back on it.

In his minute upon the revenue administration of India, submitted to the Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1832, the Right Hon. Holt McKenzie, alluding to the Settlement, says: "Fully admitting the propriety of creating a private property in land where it may not have existed, and of giving considerable value to it where it may have possessed little or no value, I confess I cannot altogether applaud the policy which limited for ever the reserved rent of the Indian exchequer, and that in a condition of things so little advanced towards the state of improvement which we may reasonably anticipate, and to which a perpetual limitation of the public rent seems to be in no degree necessary. I do not refer to the glaring inequalities which disfigured the Settlement actually made; these were incidental, though sufficiently discreditable to the authorities that permitted them to occur in an arrangement irrevocably sanctioned. They do not affect the principle of the measure. Independently of any such defects, it seems to me that the Perpetual Settlement must be held to have been a very improvident proceeding."¹ But, indeed, it would be easy to fill many pages with the opinions of very high authorities against this measure, as also with many good authorities in favour of it. There is reason to believe that many of the glaring inequalities and defects to which Mr. Holt McKenzie alludes, have been lost sight of, and overlaid with statements and opinions in favour of the measure during the time that has elapsed since it was first carried out. But it is clear, from a perusal of the official and parliamentary papers of 1817 and 1832, that on both these occasions, when the question was thoroughly sifted and discussed, the weight of authority was against a further extension of the system; and,

¹ Report of Select Committee of the House of Commons on Indian Affairs, 1832, vol. iii. p. 308.



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although that ought not to be any guide for Indian politicians in the present day, if they can discover fallacies in the arguments formerly adduced, or if the condition of the country has undergone such changes as to make that desirable in 1868 which was deemed undesirable in 1832, yet the opinions recorded in the voluminous proceedings of the Select Committee, and the numerous minutes and despatches that have been written on the subject, may not lightly be disregarded. There are, of course, some tracts of country where such an arrangement might be made with due regard to the general interests of the whole empire. But India is now passing through a transition state. It is impossible for the most far-seeing politician to estimate the probable value of land ten years hence. During the last thirty years India has so much changed that, except for the colour of the people, and perhaps the climate, you would hardly recognise it as the same. It is all very well to assert that the Permanent Settlement has been a success in Bengal. Even allowing, for the sake of argument, that it has as regards Bengal itself, it must be remembered that Bengal is an integral part of the empire, and must not be regarded as if it stood alone, an isolated province, and was not called on to bear its share of Imperial burdens.

The following figures exhibit the proportions in which Bengal Proper and the Presidencies of Bombay and Madras contribute to the Indian revenue :¹—

	Population.	Square Miles.	Taxes. £	Average per head. Rs. As.
Bengal . .	40,852,397	277,000	8,189,067	2 0
Madras . .	23,127,855	128,551	6,141,126	3 12
Bombay . .	10,021,305	80,000	41,654,295	4 0

So that while Bengal, with its 277,000 square miles of the most fertile land in the world, pays but eight millions to the State, Madras with its 128,000 square miles, and its population only a little more than half of that of Bengal, pays six millions.

¹ *Vide* returns in the *Times of India*, Dec. 21, 1861.



There are many reasons for believing that, compared to what it was in very early days, the climate of India has undergone a total change. One strong indication of this are the traces and remains of buildings and enormous cities which meet us everywhere, erected by the former inhabitants on a scale of magnificence and grandeur which the present race of natives could not be conceived under any circumstances capable of compassing.

Such a deterioration in physical development as would account for the difference between the present race and the inhabitants of India before Alexander's time, making allowance for the admixture of Northern blood consequent on the various invasions of India by races from Upper and Central Asia, can be explained only by supposing that changes have occurred in the climate similar to those which have taken place in Italy and other countries. There was, in all probability, as much difference between the ancient and modern Indians as between the ancient and modern Greeks and Romans ; and without searching for the causes of deterioration in the latter instances, the phenomenon in India may be fully accounted for by a change of climate. Certainly there is no country in the world where at different seasons Nature wears so different an aspect. In Bengal, and the southern part of India, especially near the coast, it is pretty much the same all the year round ; but all over Central and Upper India, the rich verdure, the brilliant foliage, tinted with every possible shade of brightest green, the luxuriant crops, the rivers, brooks, and small lakes, that form the characteristic features of the country during the periodical rains, is as utterly different to the parched-up appearance of the same land a month before as it is possible to conceive. Then the earth is like iron under your feet, and the sky white with heat ; the trees, shrubs, dry river-beds, and the whole surface of the soil and everything on it the same brown colour, like burnt clay. An extensive system of artificial irrigation, and the growth of forest-trees on a large scale, would even now so totally alter the



character of a great part of Upper India, as to transform it, in climate at least, into another country.

Another cause of future change, the result of which no one can at present foresee, is at work in the development of railways. We are only just commencing to sketch out the nucleus of that network of iron roads which will one day overspread India and alter the channels of commerce, and most materially affect the value of land. While we were constructing a thousand miles of railway in India, there were twenty thousand constructed in America, and mostly with English capital. But our progress, though slow, is sure, and will become more rapid, doubtless, as time goes on. In no country in the world, perhaps, are railways better appreciated than they are in India. Wherever they appear they stimulate commerce and agricultural industry, and diffuse among the masses a spirit more approaching that of Western civilization than anything that we before have witnessed. Traversing vast tracts, as railways do in India and America—in the former case affording practically the only communication between rich agricultural districts and the sea-board, or the great centres of population and the markets—land in their neighbourhood increases in value in an untold ratio.

In the ten years between 1850 and 1860, the cultivation increased in five collectorates in the Bombay Presidency from below six millions to upwards of ten millions of acres. This was under a low assessment, which was fixed at a time when the value of land was much depressed. But in course of years the value increased enormously, on account chiefly of the rise of the export trade, and general growth of prosperity. Throughout one collectorate, that of Nuggur, the average rate of assessment was eight annas, or a shilling an acre; but in consequence of the change in the value of money, and other causes, it was practically reduced to half that, or sixpence an acre, and that under a thirty years' lease!¹

¹ *Times of India.*

During the famine of 1860-1 in the North of India, an estimate was made by Colonel Turnbull, of the Engineers, of the probable results of the Ganges Canal. This estimate should not be taken as being very accurate. Accuracy in such a calculation was impossible; but as an estimate it may illustrate the subject. The canal was calculated to produce 339,243,840 lbs. of grain, sufficient for 464,718 men, and the same number of women and children, per diem for a year, and fodder sufficient to support the cattle of the whole district through which the canal flows, besides causing a circulation of 120 lacs of rupees, or 12,000,000/.

Without pursuing further this subject, which would easily occupy a volume in itself, let us ask whether a country where art and nature are working such modifications is ripe for a perpetual settlement? Bengal, with its fertile soil and thriving population, pays three annas and a half an acre; while Madras pays seven, and Bombay the same; an inequality of taxation which it would be assuredly unjust, even if it could be shown to be politic, to stereotype.

The effort to promote the extension of cotton cultivation was this year carried out with unabated vigour. Sir Charles Wood even sanctioned an expenditure of 3,000,000/ from the cash balances for reproductive public works, but it was found impossible to procure labour to that extent. Prices of cotton continued to rise, and "Surats" went up to sixteen pence. This was a year of great distress in Lancashire, and India was of some service in remitting 70,000/ towards the fund for the relief of the operatives; but her best aid, perhaps, was the million and a quarter of bales of cotton she shipped to Liverpool. Meantime, 30,000/ were voted for temporary works on the Godavery in the Madras Presidency, with the view of tapping the cotton districts in the Central Provinces. The navigation of the Godavery is seriously impeded by three great barriers, or bars of rock,



which cross the river in three different spots, and it is the removal of these barriers which has for so long occupied the attention of the Madras Government. This grant of 30,000*l.* for temporary works was not intended to supersede the operations for opening out the navigation of the river permanently. In the Bombay Presidency roads were sanctioned from Poona to the frontiers of Mysore, at a cost of 27,000*l.* Other grants for similar purposes were made in other provinces at the rate of 15,000*l.* in the North-West Provinces, 7,000*l.* in Nagpore, and 2,500*l.* in Berar; sums that appear ludicrously inadequate for the objects to which they were devoted, but they were granted from the Imperial revenue for local improvements at a time of great financial pressure, and were necessarily cut up into small fragmentary portions, owing to the vast extent of country over which the money had to be spread, and proportionate also to the amount of labour likely to be profitably employed.

The attention of private speculators had for many years been directed to the cultivation of tea in Assam, and more recently in the North-West of India and the Punjab. In Assam the plant is indigenous. In Upper India it is not so, the seed having been imported in the first instance from China. With the view of encouraging as much as possible the growth of tea, and at the same time of improving the quality, the Government established experimental gardens in Upper India, under the supervision of Dr. Jamieson, the superintendent of the botanical gardens at Saharunpore, in the North-West Provinces. Dr. Jamieson's reports speak most favourably of the prospects of tea cultivation; and small gardens in the hands of one or two private speculators having turned out eminently successful, the rage for tea planting spread rapidly among the European community. The natives never seem to have taken to it with any zest. But a vast number of English, principally retired officers and others, living in the Himalayas and the adjacent valleys, engaged in it. The tea-plant is hardy,



and survived wonderfully the series of experiments made by hands altogether unskilled in that branch of horticulture. The mania spread like an epidemic. Companies were started by officers in the service, who invested all their hard-earned savings in estates which were to yield a fortune in a few years' time. Patience was the only thing required; capital and skill—above all, experience in tea planting and manufacture—were quite secondary matters. Elaborate prospectuses set forth the yield per bush, the number of bushes in an acre, the expense of cultivation, and the market price. The statements were a little overdrawn, perhaps, but the scheme appeared so plausible that numbers were eager to invest. Assam shares, which had been bought some years back for five or ten rupees, were selling for five hundred. By the present year, 1862, almost every available plot of ground suitable for tea had been taken up in the Kangra district, in the Punjab, in Kumaon, in Darjeeling, in the Dera Doon. In Assam, planters might be reckoned by hundreds; upwards of a hundred had settled in the valley of Cachar, which a few years ago was an uninhabited jungle. In Central India, on the high lands, in the Deccan, in the Neilgherries, the same state of things prevailed; while in Coorg, and the Wynaad, and other districts in the Madras Presidency, similar energy was being bestowed on coffee planting. India was suddenly represented in the character of an agricultural El Dorado; where gold and silver were to be plucked off the tea, coffee, and cotton bushes, instead of dug out of the ground. The tea fever did not reach its height in this year, but it may be as well to anticipate a little, and relate in this place the results of the epidemic. In 1860-1-2, and in 1863, with the exception of a few long-headed men who were vastly in the minority, tea-planting was considered as a certain road to a moderate fortune. Banks advanced large sums on the security of plantations—a sure sign that confidence was placed in the speculation at that time. Of course the inevitable reaction came. The



elaborate prospectuses, that set forth the most unexceptionable tabular statements, showing the amount of profits to be derived, might have been correct, but they took no account of one thing which in all prospective views of human affairs should be allotted its proper place. If it is ignored and put out of court altogether, it invariably revenges itself for the contumely by asserting its right to be considered, and that is CIRCUMSTANCE. The tea companies failed, failed altogether, failed everywhere. One or two of the very best are in existence in 1868, but they are mostly, paying little interest on their capital. All the rest have perished, and untold sums of money have been buried in the soil—sacrificed to the bubble Tea. These failures are especially painful to contemplate. Usually in a great commercial crisis, when some very favourite speculation has proved unsound, and a general smash has involved in ruin all who were unwary enough to trust the bubble, the disaster has chiefly been confined to the commercial world, where, though it would be unjust to say men are used to such things, yet, compared to bodies of men like the officers of the civil and military services, the ruin is less complete, and the losses are more easily recovered. But the speculators in tea were principally officers in the service, or retired officers who invested the savings, perhaps, of a lifetime, upon which they depended for the means of educating their children or starting them in the world, or providing for their old age, in some company or private partnership. The ruin that overtook them was complete. There was no recovery. There was no going through the insolvent court and starting again in another line of business. Their savings were gone, and except for their bare pay and pensions they were penniless. It is lamentable to think how many lacs of rupees, representing the hope of comfort in old age, of a provision in retirement, of a liberal education for children, have been squandered in India within the last five or six years in tea.



The question naturally occurs to the reader, Why this failure? The causes are several; and may be briefly stated as follows. It must be premised that, as a rule, small gardens of from fifty to a hundred or two hundred acres, managed by the owners themselves, have succeeded so far as to afford a very fair profit on the outlay, and the labour expended on them. A planter—a retired officer, for instance—purchases a small estate, say a couple of hundred acres in extent. He plants out fifty acres of tea the first year, tends it himself with the assistance of a few gardeners at eight shillings a month. Next year he plants out fifty acres more, and in the fourth year the first fifty acres will begin to be fit for plucking, and in full bearing in the fifth year. He constructs a rude factory, sets up his furnace, which costs him next to nothing, and manufactures his tea, for which, being a small quantity, he finds a ready sale in the neighbouring settlement. The story of his success gets abroad. People hear that Captain Smith, with a very small outlay, is realizing such and such a profit from so many acres of tea. If it pays him twenty-five per cent. on an outlay of a thousand rupees, they multiply it by tens, and think they can realize twenty-five per cent. on ten thousand rupees, forgetting altogether that it is to Captain Smith's own supervision that the success is attributable; and that, moreover, Captain Smith, on his own account, has not reckoned anything for his own services during the five years he was waiting for the plants to mature. As Captain Smith could not possibly have existed on less than two thousand rupees a year during those five years, to make the calculation correct, ten thousand rupees ought to be added to the capital invested, and then the profits dwindle down from twenty-five per cent. to about two per cent.

But there is another thing not taken into consideration. Captain Smith's five or six hundred pounds of tea found a ready sale in the neighbouring settlement, at perhaps five shillings a pound, but the supply was just equal to the demand; and had that five hundred pounds been five thou-



sand pounds, there would have been no call for it, but it would have had to be packed up in boxes, and sent all the way to Calcutta, where brokerage, agency commission, freight, loss by the way, and half a dozen etceteras would have very speedily reduced the two per cent. to a deficit.

The main cause of failure, then, may be said to be the erroneous conclusion that success in a concern conducted on a large scale would be proportionate to that which attended efforts on a small scale. Another cause of failure was the ignorance of managers of plantations. In the small gardens the owners looked after the cultivation and manufacture themselves; they had to teach themselves by experience, when all was new, but by care and attention and diligent acquisition of information from every available quarter they picked up knowledge enough to guide them clear of any very great error. But tea-planting is by no means an instinct or a science which is born with us. During the time that the tea mania prevailed there seemed to be a notion abroad that any man in the world could plant and manufacture tea. A sailor by profession who had been all his life at sea; a soldier who for years had pursued the unvarying round of regimental duty; clerks who had never left their desks for two days together; younger brothers of directors who had never had any opportunity of acquiring the requisite knowledge; members of every class, of every profession, with all kinds of antecedents, and one common feature, viz. utter ignorance of tea culture and manufacture, were entrusted with the management of estates, generally the property of joint-stock companies, on salaries of five or six hundred a year. Some of them never learnt at all; others did, but the experience was dearly paid for by the shareholders.

Another fruitful source of disaster was—in Assam, the want of labour; and in Upper India, the drought. It is doubtful if these difficulties can ever be entirely got over. Assam seems a country singularly situated, having no indigenous population. Coolies, of course, can be im-



ported, but the expense of importing them is so heavy, and they die off so rapidly, that it is extremely doubtful if the produce of the estates will ever pay for the labour. In Upper India small gardens may be watered artificially, almost by the hand, and in seasons of drought extra efforts may save the crops, but large plantations require an extensive system of irrigation.

The seasons are very variable, at least they have been so lately, though they were not so formerly; but, judging by the experience of the last few years, the drought is so great that the spring crops will generally be very poor. In Upper India the first flush is in the spring. Plucking commences about April, and is supposed to go on till June; but in point of fact the great dryness of the spring weather prevents the young leaf from sprouting, and in that case little or no tea is made till the autumn. When the periodical rains fail, as they do occasionally, the planter's prospects are poor indeed. Tea-planting in Upper India will become a certain success when a good system of artificial irrigation has made the planter independent of the seasons, and when the principle is recognised there as fully as it is elsewhere, that special training or skill, acquired either by study or experience, is necessary in every pursuit in life. In Assam and Lower Bengal, where the air is much less dry, and there is always more rain, the spring crop may always be relied upon. There is no doubt, too, that the indigenous Assam plant yields much more leaf than the China plant, which is not indigenous; although the flavour of the tea grown in Upper India is very far superior to that produced in Assam, which is chiefly valued in the market for its colour. In fact, the higher the elevation at which tea is grown the finer will be its flavour; and this is the reason why the Russian China tea is so much finer in its flavour than that imported into England. It is often supposed that the difference is to be accounted for by the fact that the inferior qualities only are shipped to England,



or that the tea deteriorates from contact with the sea air. Neither of these explanations is correct; the latter, indeed, is so absurd that it is extraordinary it could ever have been entertained. The tea imported into Russia, overland, is grown upon the high lands of China, and has the same rich aromatic flavour as the tea grown in Kangra and Kumaon and other hill districts in India.

It would be an error to suppose that the losses by tea failures were all confined to the services. A very large number of firms in Calcutta suffered materially. Estates which had been bought for large sums of money—generally speaking, having fetched far more than their value owing to the excitement that prevailed—were thrown into the market by decrees of court, the foreclosure of mortgages, or a general inability to meet engagements. Plantations on which lacs of rupees had been expended were sold for ten or twenty thousand, in some cases abandoned to weeds and wild beasts; and one estate, which was valued at upwards of a lac, and on which the whole resources of the proprietor had been expended, was sold for seven rupees, or fourteen shillings.

The tea fever may be said to have reached its height in 1863. In the autumn of that year the *Friend of India* wrote: "A glance at the *Calcutta Gazette* will show the enormous extent of tea-land advertised as applied for by capitalists in Assam. Our share-list, which does not represent private owners, almost every week contains the name of a new tea company. There are several young plantations which annually double their produce." The same authority, quoting Dr. Jamieson's official report, gives the following figures, showing the extent to which tea cultivation had then spread. In Assam, in May 1863, there were 246 tea estates, of which seventy-six belonged to companies, the rest to private owners. The area of the whole was 122,770 acres, of which 20,144 were under cultivation. These acres yielded 2,150,068 lbs., valued at the rate of one and ninepence per lb. at 190,000%. In



Cachar, in the six years since 1856, no less than 177 grants of land, covering 558,078 acres, had been applied for. The tea manufactured, with seed sold, was estimated at 47,614*l*.; and in the current year the value, it was expected, would be doubled. In six years planters in this territory, a tract previously uninhabited, drew from the treasury a sum no less than 173,058*l*. Where there was hardly a human being before there were in 1863 150 English planters, employing 15,317 coolies, and the number was increasing every month. At Darjeeling there were, in 1862, 12,366 acres cleared, of which 9,102 were cultivated by 7,447 coolies.

In the North-West and Punjab tea districts, covering 35,000 square miles, Dr. Jamieson estimated the produce, when in full bearing, at the rate of 100 lbs. an acre—by no means a high estimate—at ninety-three millions of pounds, equal to the whole quantity exported by China. In Kumaon there were eleven plantations, two of which belonged to Government. In the North-West Provinces there were 38,556 acres of tea grants, of which 4,596 only were under cultivation, producing 33,960 lbs. in 1862. In the Punjab there were 9,518 acres planted out, employing about thirty-seven planters and 4,000 coolies.

Such was the smiling aspect of affairs in 1863. Alas that such pleasing anticipations were destined never to be realized! There is still, however, vitality in the Indian tea cultivation; and wherever the planter is so situated that the seasons can be depended upon, or is rendered by artificial irrigation independent of them, and can procure as much labour as he requires, there is no doubt of success. But in India these are very onerous conditions, and it is to the fact of their being overlooked, amid the sanguine expectations at first entertained, that we must attribute much of the failure and ruin that have overtaken so many speculators.

The year 1862 was not marked by any military event of importance. There was a rising among the tribes in the



TREATY WITH BURMAH.

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Jyntea hills in Assam, who were driven into rebellion by misgovernment and the oppression of petty officials in levying a house-tax. This occasioned a little trouble, on account of the inaccessibility of the place. Brigadier-General Showers, commanding the Presidency division, took the field against the rebels, and Mr. Beadon, who had succeeded Sir P. Grant as Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, also visited the disturbed district. The malcontents were, as it was supposed, pacified, and the General and the Lieutenant-Governor returned to their respective charges, but the rebellion broke out again, and was not quelled at the close of the year.

An important treaty was procured this year, after a vast deal of coaxing and trouble, from the King of Burmah. This potentate, when deprived of a large part of his dominions in the last Burmese war by Lord Dalhousie, declined, with an excess of caution which we should have expected to find exercised by an attorney rather than a semi-barbarian chief, to sign a treaty, lest he should be held to have acquiesced in the annexation of his territory to British India. What difference the king supposed it would make, whether he was held to have acquiesced in it or not, it is difficult to see. But he refused to execute a treaty till the close of the present year, when Colonel Phayre (who had succeeded Colonel Yule as Chief Commissioner of the new province of British Burmah, which was in this year formed by the amalgamation of Arracan, Pegu, and the Tenasserim provinces into one charge) proceeded to Mandalay, the capital, and persuaded the king to grant one. By its terms Englishmen are allowed to trade in the dominions of the king, and to pass through them unmolested; and a British consular agent is to reside at the capital. He refused to surrender his custom duties, but an impost of one per cent. only was levied on goods conveyed by the Irawaddy from China to the Bay of Bengal.

Several changes of officials in high positions occurred during this year. On March 12 Lord Canning made over to

Lord Elgin his responsible post, which he had held during a period more thickly beset with political difficulties than any which it had ever fallen to the lot of a Governor-General to encounter. The historians who attempt to describe Lord Canning's career in India, will be struck with the remarkable difference in his public character and policy, before and subsequent to the suppression of the rebellion. To the probable causes of that difference I have already alluded. And the period that elapsed before the change took place does not come under review in these pages. In the later years of his administration, Lord Canning earned a title to be ranked among the greatest statesmen who have ever held the office of Governor-General. Whether a more vigorous policy at the outset of the disturbance might not have trampled down the spirit of disaffection, it is fruitless now to inquire. Eminently unfortunate in his advisers, he had no sooner shaken himself free from their influence and turned the full force of his own judgment and discretion upon the management of affairs, than he found himself beginning to rise in the estimation of all independent thinkers, supported by public sympathy, and hailed as the pioneer of a more liberal and enlightened policy than India had up to that time ever seen. The wounds, however, that society in India had suffered during the mutiny were too fresh to allow men to form a calm or unprejudiced judgment. The shortcomings of the first part of his administration were still attributed to him rather than to the ill advice of the counsellors by whom he was surrounded, and it was not till time had been allowed for the passions which a period of unprecedented excitement had aroused, to cool down, that men could bring themselves to regard Lord Canning's character in a true light.

With his great experience of India, and the liberal views he adopted in the later part of his career, it was fondly hoped that on his return to England he would continue to watch over the destinies of his recent charge in the capacity of Secretary of State, if indeed his services could have been



spared for the office. He died at the zenith of his fame, having been preceded but a few months by his wife, the Countess Canning, by whom he left no child to perpetuate his line and title. His death has been popularly ascribed to the effects of the Indian climate and to over-work. The Indian climate, however, though it had robbed us about that time of many great men, was not the cause of Lord Canning's death. He landed at Marseilles in good health, and must have caught cold on his journey across France. Not long permitted to enjoy the first instalment of rewards conferred on him for his services, the rangiership of Greenwich Park and an official residence at Blackheath, he was, on the 21st June, 1862, followed to his last resting-place in Westminster Abbey by a train of distinguished mourners, among whom were Lord Palmerston and Lord Clyde, and Sir James Outram.

It has been remarked of Lord Canning that one indication of greatness was wanting in his career. Really great men are always served by great men; but of all Lord Canning's subordinates who owed their elevation to him, few exhibited any peculiar capacity or genius with the exception of Sir R. Temple, under whose vigorous administration the Central Provinces took a sudden leap towards civilization, the more striking from the contrast with the state of stagnation in which that territory had lain so long.

The great fault in Lord Canning's character—the key to all his failures and unpopularity—was the utter absence of all enthusiasm. Cold, phlegmatic, and reserved, his icy nature seemed incapable of being warmed into life, either by zeal for public service or private friendship. There is no real greatness without enthusiasm; for he who is without it cannot influence his fellow-men, and the man who has not a spark of it in his nature will neither kindle it himself in others, nor sympathise with it when it has been kindled. There are some who confound enthusiasm with impulse; and in the estimation of such men, the calmness of judgment and careful thought necessary for a ruler are wanting



in an enthusiastic nature. But this is a mistake. Calm, impartial, just, Lord Canning allowed important questions to remain undecided day after day, week after week, till the public grew weary and impatient, and called that indolence which was in reality over-caution. An impulsive man is ever incautious; and impulsiveness is incompatible with justice and impartiality. But enthusiasm is a higher order of emotion altogether—it is the sympathetic chord that links great minds together: in this attribute Lord Canning's character was totally wanting, and this is why he made choice of few but men of mediocrity to serve him.

True justice can only be done to his memory by a publication of his papers, and these may throw much light upon the career of a statesman who served his country in a most eventful period, and upon a character that is after all an enigma.

In Bengal, Sir John Peter Grant was succeeded in the Lieutenant-Governorship by Sir Cecil (then Mr.) Beadon, on the 25th April, and early in the same month Sir Bartle Frere succeeded Sir George Clerk in the Governorship of Bombay.

Sir John Peter Grant, one of the ablest of the Bengal civilians of the old school, was called to the helm at a critical time. His position, to compare the small with the greater, was very like that of Lord Canning. His whole official career having been spent in running the ball backwards and forwards in the same groove, he was well adapted to continue the process with the additional impetus communicated by the authority of his new position. No sooner had he taken charge than the ball glided out of its groove, ran off the board, and began to describe unwonted circles and gyrations on the floor. But that Sir John Peter Grant should have been unpopular among the planters and the non-official community is hardly to be wondered at. The part he was forced to take set them necessarily against him. How serious was the crisis in 1860 may be judged by Lord Canning's remark, who declared that it caused him more



anxiety than he had felt since the fall of Delhi. Sir John Grant had been to Dacca to inspect some railway works in progress there. On his way back, his course lay up the river Jamoonah, and crowds of ryots thronged the banks, praying and beseeching him to deliver them from the indigo planters. For days afterwards, in the same journey, both banks of the river, for a distance of seventy or eighty miles, were lined by thousands of people who were running along to keep up with the steamer, the women sitting by the water's edge, the inhabitants of the different villages pouring out and taking up the race from village to village, all the time vociferously beseeching him to grant them justice. The Lieutenant-Governor's remark upon the subject does not certainly indicate any great depth of feeling: "The organization and capacity for continued and simultaneous action in the cause, which this remarkable demonstration over so large an extent of country proved, are subjects worthy of much consideration." Lord Canning looked at the matter in a much more serious light, but Sir John Grant probably knew the Bengalee character too well to feel alarmed. "From that day," said the Viceroy, "I felt that a shot fired in anger or fear by one foolish planter might put every factory in Lower Bengal in flames."

It might have occurred possibly to Sir John Grant that the demonstration which he thought "worthy of serious consideration," and which so much alarmed Lord Canning, may have been very easily got up by working some of those secret springs that are never wanting in the politics of Bengal when a little intrigue may serve the purpose of a party.

That the high opinion which Sir John Peter Grant's fellow-civilians had formed of his abilities was shared by the Government at home, is evidenced by his selection to succeed the late Governor of Jamaica, a dependency where reform in the administration seems to be more loudly called for than it was in Bengal in 1860. Nothing, of course, can justify the outrages committed by the natives



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in Jamaica during the recent outbreak ; but if the accounts which have been published of the wrongs and grievances of the black population are true, Sir John Peter Grant, as the friend of an oppressed race, will find no unfavourable field for the exercise of that benevolence and large-hearted sympathy which caused him to be regarded in Bengal as the friend of the native, and the enemy of European progress.

Sir George Clerk commenced his Indian career in 1816, and for his eminent services, principally in diplomacy, was in 1848 created a K.C.B. After this he was called to serve his country in another field altogether—a rare distinction for an Indian officer—having been appointed to assist in adjusting the affairs of South Africa, and in a special commission to the Orange River Settlement. Upon his retirement from Bombay the Secretary of State availed himself of his great Indian experience by appointing him a member of Council. One claim he undeniably has on the gratitude of posterity, in the fact that it was he who first brought the Lawrences into notice. When political agent in the Punjab, in the days of Runjeet Singh, he first took Sir Henry Lawrence by the hand, and set him on the lowest step of the ladder on which he soon rose to eminence. He did not accomplish much in Bombay, but quarrelled with Sir Charles Wood for what the one called interference, and the other a due exercise of authority, and tendered his resignation. Through the mediation of Lord Stanley the resignation was withdrawn. This was at the close of 1861, but in April 1862 he laid down the cares of office, and closed a long and honourable Indian career. The Home Government recognised his services by the unusual grant of a pension of 1,000*l.* a year, and by a seat at the Board of the Council of India.

The services rendered to the State by the Military Finance Commission have been alluded to elsewhere. It was convened first in 1859, under the presidentship of Col. Balfour, of the Madras Army, a son-in-law of the famous



economist Joseph Hume. Colonel Balfour was succeeded in 1862 by Colonel Browne, the author of the unfinished but valued work on the "History of the Bengal Army."

The Police Commission closed its proceedings, and sent in its report in this year, for which they received the thanks of Government. When their labours commenced, they found the local government was spending no less than three millions sterling upon their police. At the committee's recommendation this was reduced to two millions. Assuming the population of British India to be 132,750,168, spread over an area of 835,837 square miles, they allotted one constable, costing 130 rupees a year, to every square mile, or every thousand inhabitants. This would give 150,000 policemen for all India, at a cost of 1,949,532*l*. The new system was first carried out in the Madras Presidency, with every indication of success, but the committee had a stout battle to fight in Bengal and the North-West Provinces before they obtained a recognition of the principle that the magistrate who tries the criminal shall not be the detective to catch him; and that while the police are trained to act together in an *émeute*, they may not render themselves dangerous by combination. These were the principles upon which Sir Charles Napier formed his police in Sind in 1843, and which were subsequently introduced into Bombay, Burmah, Oude, the Punjab, and the North-West Provinces.¹ The system, however, has since been much modified, and in fact, as far as power of combination goes, and influence in the country, and the capacity for mischief, should they be disposed to act mischievously and follow the example of the old Bengal Army, the present police force possesses nearly all the faults, with none of the few good points, which distinguished the native army. The moral effect of the present system upon the country at large has been further considered in the chapter on Legislation.

¹ *Friend of India.*



CHAPTER VII.

1863.

Sir Charles Trevelyan—Lord Elgin—The Honourable G. Edmondstone—Official life in India as compared with England—Secret disaffection—Wahabeeism—Mr. William Tayler—The Patna plot—Lord Elgin's last journey—His death—Sir John Lawrence appointed Viceroy—Sir William Denison acts as Viceroy—Agricultural improvements—The commercial crisis—Absorption of silver.

EARLY in this year Sir Charles Trevelyan returned to India in the capacity of Finance Minister. After his recall from the Governorship of Madras—a measure necessary for the maintenance of the prestige and authority of the Viceroy—his appointment to India was the best testimony that could possibly be given to the estimation in which he was held by Sir Charles Wood and the other members of her Majesty's Government. It can readily be believed that the duty of recalling the insubordinate Governor of Madras was a painful one to the Secretary of State, for he was well known to be a personal friend of Sir Charles Trevelyan, with whom he had been associated many years in the Treasury. That the mode in which he had carried out his duties as Governor had met with the fullest approbation of his superior is clear from the eulogistic terms in which Sir C. Wood alludes to them. He said that "no servant of the Crown had more earnestly endeavoured to carry out the great principles of government which were promulgated to the provinces and people of India in Her Majesty's proclamation."

On the other hand, Sir Charles Trevelyan's acceptance of an appointment so much less valuable in point of position

and emolument than that of which he had been deprived, shows that he was too high-minded to allow a recollection of what he must have regarded in the light of an injury, to rankle in his breast. And no one can read his able and masterly exposition of the financial condition of the country, in his budget statements from 1863 to 1866, without the conviction that had the Home Government lost the benefit of his ability and experience, owing to the unhappy publication of the minute on the income-tax of 1860-1, it would have paid dearly for the satisfaction or the duty of punishing an insubordinate official.

To the public in India, especially in the Madras Presidency, and that large portion of the official community which ever regarded the income-tax with disfavour, Sir Charles Trevelyan's return as Finance Member of Council was looked on as a triumph. It was indeed a tacit though very unmistakeable acknowledgment, that however much the course he took in condemnation of Mr. Wilson's policy was open to censure, the opinions he then held were recognised as sound. Viewing as a whole the financial measures adopted from 1859 to 1863, it is clear that the equilibrium between revenue and expenditure which Mr. Wilson and Mr. Laing laboured so hard to attain was mainly due to reductions in public establishments; and it was to this, rather than to the imposition of new taxes, or the increase of former duties, the finance minister should have looked. The mischievous results, however, that were anticipated from the income-tax never occurred. It was highly unpopular, and unfair in its operation, as it fell much more heavily, in proportion to their numbers and their incomes, on the European than on the native community. The proceeds realized were much below the estimates, and the best authorities concur in regarding it as an impost to which in India nothing but extreme necessity could justify resort.¹

¹ Since the above was written, Sir R. Temple has introduced his budget, and procured the re-imposition of the income-tax to the extent

Sir Charles Trevelyan landed at Madras on his way up the Bay of Bengal, to receive the congratulations of his friends.

The calm and somewhat torpid existence of Madras society was stirred into unwonted activity by the appearance of an official who seemed really popular; addresses were delivered and speeches made, and after a vast quantity of powder had been expended in fireworks, the ex-Governor re-embarked on board the steamer that was to convey him to the new field of his exertions.

Sir Charles Trevelyan landed on the 13th January. On the 5th February, Lord Elgin left Calcutta for a tour in the Upper Provinces, little dreaming that he was destined never again to visit the seat of government. He held durbars at Patna—at that very time, though it was not discovered till afterwards, the seat of a dangerous conspiracy—at Agra, and other places. At the latter city he met the principal chiefs and independent rulers of the different states in Rajpootana and Central India, on the same site which had witnessed the interview between Lord Canning and the native potentates. The grandeur and magnificence of the

of one per cent. But the soundness of the views expressed in the text will, I think, be shown by the statement of Sir R. Temple in proposing his Bill, to the effect that out of the whole population of India the number of persons who would pay the tax upon an income over 50*l.* a year was only 150,000. These figures speak for themselves. The inference to be drawn from this is rendered still more clear by a table published by the *Friend of India*, March 16, 1869, showing the number of persons who paid the income-tax of 1861-2 on incomes above 50*l.* per annum. In the cities of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras respectively, there were for incomes between 50*l.* and 100*l.* a year, 10,000, 5,000, and 1,500; for incomes above 100*l.*, 7,000, 5,000, 1,000. That it should be represented that in Bombay there were not more than 5,000 persons drawing an income of above 100*l.* a year is in itself a *reductio ad absurdum* which needs no further comment. The result of the returns from the Presidencies, apart from the Presidency towns, is even more striking. In Bengal, Bombay, the North-West Provinces, and Madras, the returns show 50,000, 30,000, 30,000, and 15,000 persons respectively in the receipt of incomes between 50*l.* and 100*l.* a year; above 100*l.* a year, they are 14,000, 10,000, 11,000, and 5,000.



viceregal durbar of 1859 was here repeated, if possible on a larger scale, and with a greater display of barbaric wealth and pomp. From Agra the Viceroy passed on by easy stages to Simla, repeating the somewhat monotonous ceremonial of the *durbar* in one or two other places. At Simla he remained till the autumn, when he set out on the fatal tour that ended in a grave on the lonely summit of the Himalayas.

Early in the year, the Hon. Mr. Edmondstone's term as Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces came to a close. He had succeeded to the post after the interregnum which ensued subsequent to the death of Mr. Colvin, who succumbed to care and over-work in the early period of the rebellion. He died soon after his return to England, having survived but a short period to enjoy the honour of a family baronetcy that descended to him almost immediately after his retirement. It must have been constantly remarked by those who have friends in India, how frequently death cuts off the retired official or man of business a short time after his return to his native land. The usual platitudes are uttered on the occasion, and each hale, robust old man, as he sinks into the grave, prematurely, even at the age he has reached, is looked upon as another instance of the ravages of an Oriental climate. The truth is, that in many cases men who leave India at the usual age for retiring on a pension or from business, are in just as good health as their compeers who have been struggling on in some profession or career at home all the time, and mean to struggle on and to be busy, thriving, rising men for many years yet; while the Anglo-Indian, with his pension and his Five per Cents., need not trouble himself to keep in harness any longer. Men in official or business life in India work, as a rule, much harder and more continuously than their compeers in England. There are several inducements to this: one is the hope of a more speedy return, and another is the absence of any temptation to idleness. Work is often the only refuge from the



inconveniences of a residence in a tropical climate, or the depression which a life often of lonely exile and separation from family intercourse is calculated to produce. And so the Anglo-Indian toils on for the best part of his life, buoyed with the hope of retirement, with his nervous system often strung up to the highest pitch, his physical and mental powers strained to the point—sometimes beyond the point—where the intellectual faculties can be maintained in the most efficient working order, till the moment of retirement, when all work suddenly ceases. Occasionally, of course, men do overstrain themselves, but as a rule it is not the overstraining, but the abrupt relaxation of the mind and the sudden unstringing of the nervous system consequent on the change from hard work to complete idleness, that lands the majority of retired Indians in the grave shortly after their return to England.

Mr. Edmondstone was probably the best selection Lord Canning could have made for the post of Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces. It was no easy post, for these provinces had been the principal seat of the rebellion. It was here the storm had raged with its greatest fury, and the shattered fragments of wrecked institutions were strewn far and wide. In no part of India—except, of course, Oude—had the ruin and devastation been anything like so severe as in the North-West. When Lord Canning made over his charge to Mr. Edmondstone in 1858, it was as if he had put him in command of a wrecked ship, with fragments of broken spars and tangled rigging strewn over the deck, while the vessel was moving slowly under patchwork sails and jury-masts. It required a firm hand to take the helm under such circumstances. Mr. Edmondstone had served during the latter part of his career in the Punjab, and he brought to the duties of his new charge more liberal views and independence of mind than would have been found in a civilian like Sir John Peter Grant, for instance, or Mr. Beadon. At the same time, Mr. Edmondstone as Lieutenant-Governor displayed none of the peculiar charac-



teristics of the Punjab school. He became merged in the regulations, and worked as a wheel—a very efficient wheel, no doubt—in the machinery by which the executive government went on. Had a Lawrence or a Montgomery been in his place, he would have put himself at the head of every movement instead of being carried along with it; he would have directed and controlled, superintended and stimulated the work of resuscitation and renewal, instead of remaining content with being himself one of the parts of the machine that effected those results. Mr. Edmondstone's career was marked by no failures, nor was it characterised by any successes. The fragments of the wrecked institutions were picked up and put together, and made as efficient as possible under the circumstances. He went steadily to Nynce Tal every summer; and though you heard of the government of the North-West Provinces, you seldom heard of Mr. Edmondstone's government.

He was succeeded by the Hon. E. Drummond, a Bengal civilian taken from the Financial Department to fill the post of pro-consul over a province he had up to that time never even seen. The history of his five years' tenure of office, which expired in 1868, may be briefly dismissed with the remark that, while carefully watching over the interests of his own service, he originated little or nothing for the benefit of the thirty millions of population committed to his care. Strongly imbued with all the traditional prejudices of the old Bengal school, he showed himself the determined enemy of European progress in the country; and beyond one or two feeble efforts to follow the example of the Punjab in the matter of public exhibitions, his career was marked by no features of general interest.

While to all external appearances the political condition of India was at this time one of profound repose, there were symptoms, which were observed only by those who had the means of getting a glimpse occasionally below the surface of native society, indicating that the restless spirit of Asiatic intrigue was still actively at work.

It was not till long afterwards that a full revelation was made of a conspiracy, whose most remarkable characteristic, perhaps, was the extent to which its ramifications had spread without attracting notice, rather than the capacity of the conspirators for carrying out their designs. Vague rumours had been flying about the country for some time previously, of an agitation among the Mahommedans, consequent on the approach of a period foretold by sundry prophecies, when a prince and a deliverer, the Imam Mehndi, was to appear, whose advent should herald a tremendous conflict between Mahommedanism and Christianity, great political revolutions, and a series of events terminating with the destruction of the world. Why this new prophet, or reviver of Islam, was to appear from the North-West, is not so easy to determine. But, with the exception of the British conquest, all the great revolutions and political movements that have affected India have invariably come from the North-West. To the modern Indian, among all the uneducated and even with some of the better-educated classes, the regions of Central Asia are a *terra incognita*, surrounded with a cloud of awe and mystery, with which the imagination of a superstitious people is always too prone to invest a neighbouring country that is shut in by ranges of lofty mountains, inhabited by strange races, and which has been in past times the cradle of heroes and warriors. Vague reminiscences and traditions, the fragments of an imperfect history, keep alive the memory of Timour, Mahmoud, and Nadir Shah, and the other conquerors who, issuing from the North, poured their hordes like a devastating flood upon the defenceless plains of Hindostan; while in more modern times, and within the recollection of the present generation, the tragic story of the Affghan war has added an element of reality to the cloud of myth and romance that hangs over the regions where the half-dreaded, half-expected, but all uncertain power of the Roos¹ is supposed in every bazar and

¹ Russia is so called in the East.



every homestead in India to be making its way slowly but surely to the frontier. Whatever may be the reason, there is no doubt of the fact that, among Mahommedans generally, there is a belief and expectation that the hand yet destined to revolutionize India is to come from beyond the Indus.

Wahabeeism, which may be described generally as a revival of pure Mahommedanism, has been preached with great activity in many parts of India for many years, especially during 1862 and 1863. Wahabeeism, in itself, has no direct bearing against the British power. It is a religious rather than a political movement. But, inasmuch as its object is to restore the pure worship of Islam throughout India, the destruction of all opposing principles and systems is a necessary means to the end. Religious enthusiasm is always formidable; and the principles of the Wahabee preacher are those which, while they allow no quarter to an enemy, promise Paradise to the true believer who falls sword in hand fighting for the faith. For years Patna has been known to be the head-quarters of Wahabeeism in India; and it was Mr. William Tayler's great foresight in seizing the heads of the movement in 1857 that saved Behar, and probably Bengal, from the horrors of the rebellion. Mr. William Tayler was then Commissioner of Patna. But the men he seized were powerful and wealthy; their friends had the ear of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. It was at the time of Lord Canning's thralldom to the clique of narrow-minded councillors, to whom India owes so many of the disasters of 1857; and Mr. W. Tayler was disgraced and driven from the service, and for a time professionally ruined. But the crisis was past; the blow had intimidated the conspirators, and Behar and Bengal were saved. Time has shown the wisdom of his policy; one by one the malefactors he seized have been marked down by the slower operation of the ordinary laws; and the last remnant—the last that has as yet come to light—of the conspiracy was broken up in 1863 and 1864.



The story is worth the study of Indian politicians, for it shows even more forcibly than does the history of 1857, how our dominion in India is ever liable to be threatened by the operations of secret organization. So totally separated are the English community from the native, so slender and superficial are the links that connect the two, and so little is the sympathy between them, that the English official world is absolutely in the dark as to everything that goes on beneath the surface of native society. It is as in the physical world, where the inhabitants of cities, situated in a volcanic country, are ever liable to be overwhelmed by the sudden outbreak of forces that are at work unseen beneath the soil.

The note of warning was first given by the press, the editor of one of the journals of Upper India having, through a native correspondent, obtained one of the inflammatory Wahabee pamphlets then in circulation. Valuable information was also afforded by an old Sikh priest, who had behaved with remarkable fidelity to the British Government during the rebellion.¹

¹ This man's history illustrates the fate of too many of those who were loyal to us in 1857, to be passed over. He was the owner of considerable property, the head Gooroo, or Sikh priest, of the city of Agra. His conduct in 1857 had made him a marked man, and after order had been restored a criminal charge was brought against him, as was the case with so many of those who aroused the enmity of their fellow-countrymen by taking part with the British Government. If investigation could be made, it would be found that an astonishing number of those who were loyal have since either been reduced to beggary by legal processes, or have died in jail under some criminal charge, which is very easily got up in India. The Sikh Gooroo was tried by the judge, assisted by assessors who were Europeans. These assessors have not the power and functions of a jury, for their award may be set aside. The assessors in this case found the man not guilty, the evidence being clearly fabricated, but the judge overruled them, and the Gooroo was sent to jail in irons. The case was referred to the Lieutenant-Governor, and eventually the Sudder Court directed the man's release. Yet the order for his release was out a fortnight before the victim could be got out of jail. On one pretext or another the officials about the judge's court and the jail contrived to get his liberation postponed.



The information thus acquired was privately communicated to Government, as well as the names of several of the most active Wahabee preachers in the Punjab, some of whom were themselves Government *employés*. The next link connecting the conspiracy with Patna was discovered in a curious manner by Captain Parsons.

The story of the plot is closely interwoven with that of the Umbeyla campaign, which originated in military operations directed against a colony of Hindostanee fanatics, at a place called Sittana, on the right bank of the Indus. The campaign occupied all the latter part of 1863 and the beginning of 1864, and is of sufficient importance to claim a chapter to itself. Accordingly, it has been related somewhat with more detail than would be practicable here, in a future portion of the work.

There was a sergeant of mounted police, under Captain Parsons' command, who was a native of Eusofzye, a tract in the Peshawur valley, and who had been at Sittana. One day in May 1863, when at Kurnaul near Delhi, he saw four travellers, whom he recognised as Sittana men. He entered into conversation with them, and soon managed to worm out their secret. They were emissaries from the Sittana people, bound for Bengal, to collect men and money for the war which they were then preparing to wage against the British power. The men were arrested and taken before the magistrate, who treated the story as mythical, and released the travellers. Nothing daunted at the rebuff, the sergeant sent his son all the way to Mulka, one of the principal head-quarters of the fanatics near Sittana, to find out the parties with whom these four emissaries had put up on their way through Thanesur,

When he did get out, his property had been most of it plundered, none of his relatives having sufficient power to protect it. Had it not been for the accidental circumstance of this man's having some friends among the non-official European community on the spot, he must have died in jail. The few natives who stood by us in 1857 did so at a greater sacrifice than most Englishmen are aware of.



a large city near Umballa. By this means the discovery was made that one named Jaffir Ally, at Thanesur, was the medium through which the conspirators were assisted with men and money. The clue thus found was put into the hands of Captain Parsons, who was told to follow it up.

Captain Parsons at once searched the house of Jaffir Ally, who was a petty civil officer and a licensed vendor of stamps, and among other letters found one addressed to one Mahomed Shuffee, a rich man, who held a large contract under the Commissariat for the supply of butcher's meat to the European troops. Subsequent information was received which induced the authorities to arrest Jaffir Ally, and Captain Parsons was sent to seize him, but he had fled; after a pursuit, however, of about two hundred miles, the energetic officer overtook and captured him at Allyghur.

As the evidence which had been collected clearly pointed to Patna as the head-quarters of the conspiracy, Captain Parsons was deputed to that place to conduct the investigation, and various arrests were made. Indeed, this nest of Wahabeeism was for a time pretty well broken up. The conspirators were all tried at Umballa, and some very curious and significant revelations came out during the inquiry. This Mahomed Shuffee, or Shaffayut Ally, had a contract to supply the troops with meat in every garrison and camp from Delhi to beyond the Indus. It may therefore be easily conceived what a valuable ally he was. A man of great wealth, and consequently of some importance, he could obtain access to any European officer of any rank. His agents, servants, *employés*, swarmed at every station where there was a European regiment. Recruits for the enemy at Sittana actually marched up with the very detachments, regiments, and brigades that were on their way to operate against them, in disguise as Mahomed Shuffee's servants or Commissariat subordinates: while, by means of his agencies at all the different stations, he



transmitted money collected for the cause by emissaries who went about preaching in all the large cities, even down as far as Dacca : while recruits were sent up from places equally distant, all through the heart of India, travelling along the Grand Trunk road, putting up at serais, confronted every day, and many times in the day, by our police. The usual Oriental system of metaphor was adopted in all the correspondence between the agents and the leaders of the movement. In their phraseology Patna was called the "bara godown," or the great warehouse ; and Sittana the "little warehouse," or the wholesale and retail store. How long this had been going on was uncertain. The evidence adduced went to show it had been in progress for at least two years. Some of the witnesses describe, in the most *naïve* manner, their disappointment on arriving at Sittana, after a long journey from some place in Bengal, perhaps a distance of two thousand miles, at not finding the Prophet, who, to do them justice, appears to have been the first person they asked for. They were ordered to drill instead of to prayer ; and, sorely against their will, sent to fight, which some of them refusing, they were at once put in confinement.

The story shows how slow our Government are to take warning even after the lesson of 1857, and how easily a plot of this kind can be carried on, these operations having proceeded uninterruptedly and unsuspected for at least two years, the head centre of the movement being the army meat contractor.

The most extraordinary feature of the case is the disproportionate result produced by all this secret preaching and canvassing, plotting and contriving. The Sittana fanatics certainly gave our troops some trouble, and fought with desperate energy. Unable to realize the importance of the movement, Lord Elgin, like Lord Canning before him at the beginning of 1857, took wholly inefficient measures to meet the emergency. Before leaving Simla on his tour through the mountains to Lahore, he had



directed a brigade to be sent against Sittana, under the command of Sir Neville Chamberlain. It is only necessary to remark here that the mistake of underrating the enemy was found out too late—too late, at least, to ward off very unhappy consequences.

Mahomed Shuffee, and the other conspirators, were mostly found guilty of treason; the leading men were condemned to death, but the sentence was remitted by the court of appeal, and eventually none of them suffered capitally.

Lord Elgin's route led him through the Kangra hills, whence he was to descend to the plains, and join his camp, which was pitched at a place called Pathankote, at the foot of the mountains. The valley of the Kangra district is considered by some to be the most beautiful in all India excepting Cashmere, which has never been deprived of the crown given her by the pen and poetry of Moore. How much of the position which Cashmere holds is owing to the fancy of the popular poet, they can judge who have had the opportunity of seeing the valley and comparing it with the grand panoramas of majestic beauty in which the Himalaya mountains are so rich. Lord Canning especially admired the scenery of Kangra, a lovely valley surrounded by lofty mountains lying between two rivers—the Ravee and Sutlege—and bounded on one side by the territories of Cashmere and Chumba, and on the other by Koolloo, Spiti and Ladak. "Various races of men, belonging to distinct types of the human family and speaking different languages, are distributed over its surface. Here are hills just raised above the level of the plains, and mountain crests higher than any peaks of the Andes. Every tone of climate and variety of vegetation is here to be met with, from the scorching heat and exuberant growth of the tropics, to barren heights, destitute of verdure, and capped with perpetual snow. Hills dissolve into gentle slopes, and platforms of tableland and valleys become convulsed and upheaved, so as no longer to be



distinguished from the ridges which environ them. I know no spot in the Himalayas which for beauty can compete with the Kangra valley and the overshadowing hills. No scenery, in my opinion, presents such sublime and delightful contrasts. Below lies the plain, a picture of rural loveliness and repose. The surface is covered with the richest cultivation, irrigated by streams which descend from perennial snows, and interspersed with homesteads buried in the midst of groves and fruit trees. Turning from this scene of peaceful beauty, the stern and majestic hills above Dhurmsalla confront you. Their sides are furrowed with precipitous watercourses. Forests of oak clothe their flank, and higher up give place to gloomy and funereal pines. Above all, are wastes of snow or pyramidal masses of granite, too perpendicular for the snow to rest upon."¹

It is upon scenery such as this that the pretty little village of Dhurmsalla, the last resting-place of Lord Elgin, looks down. It is approached from the Simla direction by the Rotung Pass, at an elevation of 16,000 feet above the level of the sea. Thoroughly enjoying the magnificent scenery of the mountain ranges, Lord Elgin sat for a whole hour on the summit of the pass exposed to a keen cutting wind. After this, he resolved rashly to cross a famous bridge near the same spot, constructed of twigs and branches of trees, a feat which at any time requires considerable nerve, besides great physical exertion. The terrors of the passage were heightened at the time by the swollen condition of the torrent that thundered below. It is not every man that can safely travel in the interior of the Himalayas, for you are always liable to a sudden and unexpected strain on the nerves. Nor can the venturesome traveller who scales the dizzy height by a pathway a foot wide, or crosses foaming torrents by bridges made of a single rope, or twigs, always calculate beforehand the extent to which his nervous system will be tested, or the amount of physical exertion it will be necessary to put

¹ Settlement Report of the late Mr. George Barnes, Commissioner.



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forth. With youth, health, good spirits, and presence of mind, a man may pass through many dangers which, if they encountered him at an advanced age, with failing powers and weakened nerves, might prove fatal. Had Lord Elgin been a younger man, he would have had resources to draw upon. As it was, he overtasked himself. He was at the time suffering from an affection of the heart, which might have been aggravated by the rarity of the atmosphere at that great elevation, and was certainly aggravated by the unwonted exertion. His sitting on the summit of the pass so long was a most imprudent act for a man not in robust health and over-fatigued. The attempt to cross the bridge was worse. The nervous system could not sustain the shock, or the physical exertion required to bring him safely on to *terra firma* was too much.

Fear is hardly the emotion you undergo when you suddenly find yourself on the edge of some tremendous precipice, or on a narrow plank, or a loose rope bridge with a roaring torrent and an abyss below. It occasionally happens to a traveller in the Himalayas, not accustomed to mountain paths and crags or precipices, to find himself suddenly in some such position, and then all depends on the extent to which his nervous system answers the sudden and unexpected call made upon it. To judge by the expression of Lord Elgin's features when he reached the bank, that call had been answered, but at the expense of life. It showed how tremendous the struggle had been. But he had conquered, and had unassisted reached the bank in safety, when he endeavoured to persuade himself and those about him that he was suffering merely from excess of fatigue. After this, the camp moved slowly along the narrow hill roads over the summit of the mountains, down their rugged sides, across the valleys, over the watercourses, and on from stage to stage till they reached the lovely spot called Dhurmsalla. Here there is a small British settlement, a



regiment of Goorkhas, and a few civil officers with their families, completing the little circle of English society, which is augmented every summer by visitors from the neighbouring towns in the Punjab.

Too ill to ride, the Viceroy had been carried in a litter, and his physician, Dr. Macrae, telegraphed for from Calcutta. It was deemed unadvisable to move the patient beyond Dhurmsalla. Then came grave consultations, and the anxious inquiry, alas! too familiar to those whose lot is cast in India, often asked many times in a day, if the patient can bear the journey to the sea. Here it was out of the question. The short story of Lord Elgin's last illness and death is full of melancholy pathos, yet the picture is so softened with the tints of peacefulness and repose which cheer the last hours of the dying Christian, that the contemplation of it gives rise to many feelings besides mere grief and sorrow. Here, amid the glories and grandeur of that mountain scenery, where every crag and rock,—the snow-capped peaks tossing their summits into the sky so far as to seem as if they belonged to some other world, and not to this; bleak, barren, lifeless regions of eternal snow; the bold, steep precipices whose face the bird alone can scale; mountain torrents roaring down their rocky beds, and tumbling in wild revelry a hundred feet at a time over some cascade,—where every feature of external nature speaks to the mind of the power and majesty of the Creator; within view of the smiling valleys which, lying as they do close up to the foot of the hills, seem as full of lessons of love and mercy as their giant guardians are of terror and majesty and awe: amid such scenery as this, far from his native land, but tended in his last moments by his wife, Lord Elgin awaited the message of death.

For lessons of patience and faith in the last hour, we are generally sent to the death-bed of the poor and humble. But in that distant though lovely spot in the Himalayas, there was one calmly and peacefully contemplating the approach of dissolution, who had a large share of the world's honours

and wealth to leave this side the grave. In perfect possession of his faculties, Lord Elgin made his will, arranged his affairs, and even gave detailed instructions as to his funeral. When it was found that there was no hope of recovery, a chaplain, the Rev. Mr. Baldwin, had been summoned from Lahore—not, as is too often the case when clergymen are summoned to the bedside of a dying man, to hold out the hope of repentance then for the first time embraced, but to solace and to cheer, and to accompany to the verge of the grave the soul that was about, not unprepared, to meet its God. So long had he lingered thus between life and death, so fully had he arranged, as it were, all the preparations for his journey, that the coffin had been ready many days before it was required, and the design for the tomb and the stone and inscription had been ready planned and fixed upon. It was his thoughtful care for Lady Elgin that induced him to press on these preparations, usually left to the mourners after death. But he would spare her the painful details, and wished that after his departure she might see the whole complete before she quitted the spot for ever. Lady Elgin herself selected the site for the tomb, which is marked by a plain massive stone and inscription, and a cross, also of stone, twenty-seven feet in height.

So died, on the 20th November, 1863, the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, K.T., G.C.B., K.S.I.

He was the eldest son of the Earl of Elgin whose name is inseparably associated with the "Elgin Marbles" in the British Museum, which the Earl had removed when he was ambassador at Constantinople. As Governor-General of Canada, Lord Elgin had exhibited considerable aptitude for the difficult work of controlling and soothing down the excitement of party rancour, of amalgamating discordant elements, and introducing broad principles of sound political economy in place of an administration conducted to suit the selfish interests of individuals and cliques. It is said to have been a wish formed early in life that he might become



Governor-General of India. If so, he affords an instance of a man living to attain the object of his early ambition, though not permitted to enjoy it long.

Lord Elgin's experience in representative government, gained in Canada, would have been but of little use to him in India. Up to the time of his death, he had not been long enough in the country to acquire the knowledge which it is necessary for a Viceroy new to the country to possess, before he can inaugurate or adopt any particular line of policy. It is impossible therefore to know, as it is now fruitless to inquire, whether he would have answered the high expectations formed of him, and which his success in the post he had held previously in a measure justified.

The news of his death reached England a few days after the event. The eyes of the Government were becoming opened to the gravity of the political crisis on the frontier, enhanced by rumours of secret disaffection in the provinces. The danger from the latter source appeared all the greater from the uncertainty attending it. That there was a movement of some kind going on among the Mahommedan population, and that it was instigated by the preachers of Wahabeeism, was indeed known, but it was not till December of this year that Captain Parsons was able to discover the connecting link between the Patna conspiracy and the action on the frontier. Under the circumstances, the Government set aside all considerations of party feeling, and nominated the best man they could find to take the helm when there were portents boding stormy weather on the political horizon; and for the first time in the history of India a member of the Indian Civil Service whose previous career had given him a claim to something more than the credit of a successful Indian official, was appointed Viceroy. Sir John Lawrence's nomination was variously regarded in India. By some it was hailed with acclamations, but in the higher ranks of his own service Sir John's merits had been more tardily recognised than elsewhere, either from a feeling of jealousy, or from an idea prevalent among his former

associates and contemporaries that he had been somewhat overrated in England after 1857-8. But England could not forget the claims of the man who had done so much to steer her out of a great difficulty. At home, men saw in Sir John Lawrence the vigorous administrator who had saved the Punjab, and then with the resources of the Punjab had come to the rescue. Men of his own service in India saw in him the quondam collector, and the lucky commissioner who had climbed into eminence on the ladder of his brother's fame. In England, men saw that the Punjab system had succeeded when other systems had completely failed, and rejoiced to think that the man who had inaugurated, might now be in a position to extend it. Those on the spot, who had a nearer view of that much-vaunted system, could see its faults, which statesmen afar off could not. They knew it to be a system well adapted for a new province, and calculated to work well in the hands of a man of genius and vigour, but they also knew that the system had already developed its own inherent defects, and would in the ordinary course of things continue to develop them still more under the control of less able minds; and they dreaded lest they should see all India undergoing the process of Punjabization. Thus Sir John Lawrence's advent as Viceroy was hailed with different feelings. Old Indian civilians shook their heads. The younger ones were divided between the opinion of their seniors, and the compliment paid to their service by the selection of one of its members for the post. With military men and the non-official community the appointment was generally popular. Among the natives it was popular too, as far as popularity can be claimed at all from such a quarter: they felt that at last India had a Viceroy who would not have to go to school for the first three years of his incumbency. But the effect of the selection was most marked in the immediate subsidence of all that petty effervescence of disaffection that had been so long agitating the substrata of native society.



Upon the death of Lord Elgin the temporary vacancy was filled by Sir William Denison, who went round from Madras to Calcutta, taking his staff with him, to enjoy for a brief period the honours of the viceregal office. Sir Wm. Denison had not been popular in Madras. The charge brought against him was the same that may be urged against every new governor of a colony or a dependency, who sees it for the first time as its ruler—that of doing nothing. It is, in fact, impossible for a Viceroy strange to the country to do much for the first year or two but apply the whole powers of his mind to learning the nature of the duties entailed by his new position, and acquiring information about the country and the people. In the difficult question of land tenure Sir William Denison refused to be entangled. But in the extension of education and the general improvement of the country, measures which required the application only of broad principles of administration, he did exert himself. He had lately advanced a scheme for the introduction by Government of agricultural implements, which it appeared to him were so much required in lieu of the rude contrivances the ryots and zemindars had received from their forefathers. Sir William Denison was right so far, but the main difficulty to be overcome was not to procure the implements, but to induce the natives to use them. The rude country cart, and the plough that barely scratches the surface of the soil, the primitive apparatus for irrigating the fields, which may be constructed out of the materials the fields themselves supply, are probably the same now as they were a thousand years ago, or at the earliest commencement of agricultural enterprise. The natives are satisfied with them; they will use no other. English ploughs, steam-pumps, spades and wheelbarrows are articles they will not use—at least of their own accord—because their fathers and forefathers before them were content without these things. For a long while after wheelbarrows were introduced in the Public Works Department, and forced upon the coolies on the



roads, whenever the eye of the European overseer was turned away they would load the barrows and put them on the heads of three men, one supporting the wheel and the two others the legs, and so convey the material. What Sir William Denison should have done if he had wanted to introduce agricultural improvements into India, was not to procure the necessary implements, but to endeavour to introduce such changes in the system of administration as would admit of and encourage the settlement of European capitalists (not colonists) as farmers on a large scale, or zemindars. Where a European has occupied this position, a marked improvement has been observed in the condition of the labourer. Not only the ryots on his own land or farm, but all in the neighbourhood within a practicable distance, soon get to look up to him, to resort to him for advice and protection, for medical aid in time of sickness. They see him working with improved implements, and they appreciate the advantages he derives from them; and after a while, if left to themselves, will begin to wish for them. Precept goes for little with the natives of India. Example goes a great way, especially if they are left to gather their own impressions from what they see, and are not forced to embrace the convictions of others. It was a bad day for India when the excitement consequent on the indigo disturbances in Bengal left the impression on the public mind that the European planter was the oppressor, and not the friend of the ryot. But while Sir William Denison aimed at the introduction of improved agricultural implements, the complaints of the planters in Wynaad against his obstructive measures, and the little encouragement afforded them in the construction of roads, indicated a neglect of the only means calculated to effect his object.

A question of the utmost importance engaged Sir William Denison's attention immediately on his arrival at Calcutta. To appreciate thoroughly the nature of the crisis, an acquaintance with the outlines of the Umbeyla campaign is indispensable. Our troops had entered a



difficult country in the mountains beyond the Indus, in pursuance of a plan of the campaign sketched by General Sir Neville Chamberlain, in conjunction with Colonel Taylor, the civil officer in charge of that portion of the North-West frontier. Opposed first by physical obstacles and then by political difficulties, the force had come to a standstill in a mountain pass surrounded by hostile tribes. Incessant fighting and great losses had reduced the strength of the division to a condition of dangerous weakness, in spite of the reinforcements which were being pushed up with all haste to the scene of danger. All the neighbouring garrisons had been denuded of troops for this purpose. The fanaticism of the warlike trans-Indus tribes had been thoroughly aroused, the Akhoond of Swat was preaching a holy war against the infidel, and we were threatened with a most formidable combination, and a hostile movement against our whole frontier. The bulk of the army consisted of native troops, enlisted in a great measure from among the very tribes who were now being called to arms against us. Hitherto they had indeed behaved nobly, but the instincts of human nature taught us that there must be a limit to their fidelity when incessant appeals were made to their patriotism and fanaticism, and when they saw us hesitating to advance, and holding with daily decreasing strength, though with unabated determination and bravery, the position we had gained. Lord Elgin lay lingering in his last illness, utterly unable to attend to business, and a heavy responsibility devolved upon Sir Robert Montgomery, the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab. From the frontier post the officers in charge reported the excitement of the neighbouring tribes, and their growing determination to take part in the war. A persistence in offensive measures appeared as if it would lead with certainty to an expensive and an extended campaign. To make matters worse, General Chamberlain lay badly wounded and unable to attend to business, while the tribes were gathering in front,



increasing daily in strength, and a disaster would have set the whole country in a flame. Sir Robert Montgomery yielded to a sense of responsibility, and telegraphed to the General his permission to retire, without regard to political considerations, if he deemed it advisable. The effect of this was to shift the responsibility on to the shoulders of the officer in command of the force, now disabled by a serious wound.

Sir Hugh Rose, who was a member of the Supreme Government, as well as Commander-in-chief, was with Lord Elgin in his last illness. Upon the emergency arising, he left the Governor-General's camp and hastened to Lahore, where he remonstrated most strongly upon the proposed withdrawal of the troops, and ordered fresh reinforcements by forced marches to the frontier. At that time there were 25,000 troops north of the Jhelum. Sir William Denison arrived in Calcutta on the 1st December, and found the majority of the Council, in spite of Sir Hugh Rose's remonstrances and the opinions of the civil and military officers on the spot, in favour of withdrawing the force. At once his judgment pointed out to him the disastrous consequences of such a step. Unfettered by that fear of responsibility which is the inevitable tendency of an official mind accustomed always to one groove and ever dependent upon the authority of a superior, Sir William Denison set aside the timid counsels of his advisers, and at length induced them to cancel their final decision. He wrote:¹ "The Government, yielding to these pressing instances, conceded to the wish of the Lieutenant-Governor, and gave directions on November 26th that the troops should be withdrawn as soon as it could be done without risk of military disaster, or without seriously compromising our military reputation. . . . My opinion was, and is, that the withdrawal of the troops from what has proved to be merely a defensive position would be con-

¹ "The Sittana Campaign." By Sir John Adye, C.B., Bengal Artillery.



sidered by the mountain tribes as equivalent to a victory ; and although I do not doubt the possibility of withdrawing the force without serious loss, I yet felt convinced that the moral effect of such a move upon our troops would be of the worst description. I was, and am of opinion, that a movement in retreat would probably bring about all the financial difficulties so vividly described by Sir Charles Trevelyan : for the certain result would be such a series of aggressions on the part of the mountain tribes, elated by their supposed success in causing us to retreat, as would compel us to make a more serious attack upon them in the course of the next year, for the purpose of asserting our superiority."

It was a fortunate moment indeed for India that Sir William Denison appeared upon the scene at that crisis ; for a retreat would have not only brought upon us an invasion which might have sorely taxed our resources to resist, but would have destroyed the confidence of our native troops, and endangered a second mutiny even more disastrous than the first. In addition to which, the movement which provoked the Umbeyla campaign, as was fully shown afterwards, was a deep-seated spirit of disaffection, which had spread over one-half of India at least. Retreat under such circumstances would have been to the last degree disastrous.

Having calmed the fears of his Council, and brought them to see the matter in its true light, Sir William Denison telegraphed to Lahore, expressing his entire confidence in the measures undertaken by Sir Hugh Rose, and desiring that the operations might be pushed on with vigour and determination—and India was saved a second rebellion.

During the whole of 1863, the spirit of commercial speculation, first aroused by the discovery of the inexhaustible character of India's natural resources, and awakened into thorough vitality by the rise in the value of cotton consequent on the American war, was unusually active.



It partially developed itself in the mania for tea cultivation, alluded to in a former chapter, but it was very far from confining itself to that limit. For a while it seemed as if all the European community in India had gone mad after Joint Stock Companies. Members of both services, from top to bottom, speculated in some company or other. If ten men met at a dinner table, five being officers of the army and five of the civil service, the chances were that ere the first course was removed the conversation would turn upon the share list; one would have shares in a steam tug, another in a coal mine, a third in a general dealer's business, a fourth in a wine company, a fifth in a grain company, a sixth in a cotton-screwing concern, a seventh in an iron company, and so on. Each would be equally sanguine of the success of his own favourite speculation. A year or two later, the same men might have met one another, and, on comparing notes, would have discovered that in every case their money was either lost altogether, or the company in process of liquidation. But it was not only in official circles that the joint-stock mania found victims. The commercial world was just as much a prey to it, and it would take a long time to reckon up the number of companies that came into existence in 1863-4. Almost every private business, no matter of what kind, was sold by the proprietor to a company, he himself generally taking a large part of the purchase money in shares, and in every case realizing a large sum. The *Friend of India*, writing in December 1863, says, that he is within the mark in estimating the amount which within the following three months would be swallowed up by calls of Joint Stock Companies, in Calcutta alone, at one and a third millions sterling.

Towards the end of the year this state of things was followed by a most severe depression in the money-market, which is worthy of observation and study, because it was a result exactly the contrary of what might have been anticipated from the enormous advantages India had been



reaping by the rise of cotton and the increase of her exports. In 1861 three hundred and forty-three million pounds of cotton sold for Rs. 9,26,35,531. In 1862, three hundred and sixty-five million pounds brought Rs. 14,83,54,800.¹ The first symptom of the great depression in the money-market occurred in Bombay in the month of October,² and its effects upon the revenue were more particularly marked in the item of opium. The Customs' receipts from the same cause fell to 140,166*l.* less than the actual receipts of the previous year. This decrease in the Customs' duties was mainly owing to the continued high price of manufactured cotton from Manchester. The stagnation of the manufactured cotton trade, coming at the same time as the increased call for the raw material from India, contributed indirectly to the abnormal condition of the money-market at this period, yet the phases this branch of commerce underwent at the time are very curious. Colonel Baird Smith had shown that the stagnation of the cotton-trade in 1859-60 was to be attributed to the depression in stock caused by commercial difficulties in England in 1857-8, and to the large shipments made on speculation in addition to the usual exports, to take advantage of the high prices arising from the preceding cause. At this crisis came the American war, and the supply of cotton threatened to cease. The proprietors of goods held in India then instructed their agents to demand an equivalent advance to that which had taken place in Europe. Believing that the native dealers and consumers would be obliged to give in to their high prices, the exporters continued to ship; but the native dealers, aware of the large stock held in Europe, and expecting a cessation of the war in America, when they knew the prices would fall, refused to purchase. A glut of the market in piece-goods consequently ensued. Sir Charles Trevelyan, whose budget statement for 1863-4 has been quoted here, is careful to point out the real cause

¹ *The Friend of India.*

² Sir Charles Trevelyan's budget statement for 1864-5.



of the depression in the trade, because the blame of it was laid by the Manchester houses upon the import duty of 5 per cent. levied in India. Sir Charles Trevelyan on the same occasion was careful to point out also, that the English merchants in India, who had better means of information than their corresponding houses at home, did not apply for any reduction of the duty, because they knew that that duty was not the cause of the depression of the trade. Upon this state of things there came a sudden reaction in 1862. "This great population," says Sir Charles Trevelyan, "never had so much money." Their increased wealth was owing to the demand for Indian raw cotton, but the people hoarded their silver, and would not purchase manufactured cotton, as they were waiting till prices should go down. When they found that prices did not fall, they opened their hoards and began to purchase, and then there came the reaction in the piece-goods trade, in the course of which, the *Friend of India* says, one Calcutta house alone realized a profit of 210,000*l.* in a few months. At that time the prices had risen so much that 7-lb. shirtings, which were once dear at five rupees, were cheap at nine, and the price continued to rise.

But although this sudden demand temporarily relieved the stagnation in the piece-goods trade, and made the fortunes of some few individual firms, the absorption of silver bullion in India had been going on at a rate that threatened to exhaust the silver currency altogether. In 1862-3 more than twenty-two millions of silver was imported into India. In Bombay alone, the import from the 1st May to December was five millions. During the year the export trade from India rose from forty-three to sixty-three millions; and, when it is recollected that the bulk of this was paid for in silver, which flowed into the agricultural districts, till, as Sir Charles Trevelyan says, the enormous population of India never had so much money, and that then it was hoarded, buried in the ground, or converted into ornaments, it is not difficult to understand that it



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should be followed by a severe depression in the money-market. In the early part of the following year the attention of the Chamber of Commerce of the three Presidency towns was directed to the subject, and they drew up memorials to the Viceroy. According to the memorial from the Bombay Chamber, which seems to have taken the lead in the discussion, during the last six years in India alone the average annual absorption of silver had been eleven and a half millions sterling, and in the previous year had been fourteen and a half millions; while the produce of the silver of the whole world only amounted to ten millions; so that during the previous six years India had consumed fifteen per cent. and during the previous year fifty per cent. more silver than the whole world annually produces. While the production of silver had remained stationary, that of gold had increased at least 150 per cent. more than silver; and although not a legal tender in India, its importation had increased for many years, in the previous year the amount being seven millions sterling, while in Bombay alone from the 1st May to the 31st December, 1863, three and a half millions were imported. The report concludes with recommending very strongly the introduction of a gold currency.

Up to the present time (Sept. 1868) the Government have not ventured to adopt any of the various schemes submitted to it for the introduction of a gold currency; but the subject is, and has been for some years, under consideration, and it is not impossible that before these pages go to press, some definite step may have been taken. A country with so rich an export trade as India, and so poor a currency, cannot be otherwise than in the position of an absorbent of bullion. Nor is there any visible limit to its capacity in this respect. It is vain to look for the time when the vast agricultural population of India shall be glutted with silver. If India's

capabilities for absorbing bullion are tested to the last, it will be found that they will not be exhausted, even if all the precious metals of the world are drained into her ample bosom.

Next to the gold currency, an extensive paper-currency is to be looked upon as a source of relief; but as yet, writing in 1868, the currency notes have not become popular; they are appreciated by the European community, but the natives, the mass of the people, still prefer their old system of "hoondeean," as it is called. Social reform is slower in its progress in India than in any country in the world, and time must be allowed to elapse before the people are sufficiently enlightened to invest their money instead of hoarding it, or to prefer the convenient medium of currency notes to their own "hoondees," or bills of exchange.

Saving these remedies, the only method by which we can escape the inevitable result of India's absorptive powers in respect of silver, is by inducing her to take in exchange for her raw produce and her rapidly increasing exports, manufactured goods. In dealing with America, England paid her for her raw produce with her manufactures. It is to be hoped that as facilities of communication increase, and civilization progresses among the agricultural population, this mode of payment may become more extensively adopted. This much is clear, that if India's capacity for absorbing precious metals is so great that all the world's produce cannot satiate her, her capacity for purchasing English manufactures must be equally unlimited. The more civilization advances, the greater will be the demand for the products of the looms, mills, and factories of Manchester, Sheffield, and Birmingham; and in proportion as the influence of education spreads, will the commerce between the two countries, increasing as it grows, keep itself within the natural and easy channels of reciprocal advantage, regulating its demand and supply



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not only in quantity but in kind. When a man has learnt to read and think, the first thing he feels the want of, next to food, is clothing; and, in reality, it is the schoolmaster who will do more than any other person to open out that almost inexhaustible market for Manchester goods, which now lies undeveloped throughout the half-savage agricultural districts of the continent of India.



CHAPTER VIII.

1864.

Sir John Lawrence—The condition of the English soldier in India—Soldiers' workshops—Personal religion in the barracks—New style of barracks—Hill climate—Distribution of the army—Lahore Exhibition—Sir Robert Montgomery's address—Progress in the Punjab—Sanitation—Cholera Commission—The Meean Meer hospitals—The cyclone at Calcutta—Durbar at Lahore.

ON the 12th January Sir John Lawrence landed in Calcutta, and was enthusiastically received not only at the Presidency, where there was more heartiness of welcome than method in displaying it, but in the provinces. Enthusiasm has no part in Asiatic character; the nearest approach to it that we have witnessed in India, at least with reference to a Governor's popularity, being the reception Sir Charles Trevelyan had met with at Madras; and even then his claim to popularity, according to a native orator, rested on the fact that he was the first Governor who had varied the monotony of official routine. For the first time we read of the proclamation announcing the arrival of a new Viceroy being received with hearty cheers by the soldiers on parade, headed by their officers. Without any external show—affectionation is an offensive word—of philanthropy, Sir John Lawrence has ever evinced the most thoughtful consideration for the welfare of the British soldier. As Viceroy and Governor-General, it was not his province to originate or enforce suggestions for the improvement of their diet or their personal comfort, although in these respects he has ever leaned to the liberal side in every matter which has been referred to him. But, actuated himself by deep



religious principle, he has never failed to see in the soldier something more than the mere State machine. Utterly untractable are the difficulties we meet with on the very threshold when we aim at improving the moral condition of the barracks. There is absolutely no solution to be found for them. The mortality of the English soldiers in India will be considered in another chapter more in detail; here it is only necessary to remind the reader that out of the 60 per thousand who never live to return to their native shores, by far the greater majority—authorities differ as to the actual proportion; we shall not be far from the mark at putting it down at four-sixths of the whole—fall a sacrifice to passions and habits to which the warm climate of the East renders resistance doubly difficult, at the same time that it aggravates tenfold the mischief of indulgence. The moral effects of the Indian climate are far more dangerous than the physical. We place the half-educated lad with perhaps but very imperfectly developed ideas of religion, probably with no experience in himself of the virtue of self-denial, in a position where to be chaste and temperate requires a struggle which might well appal a member of a religious brotherhood earnest in attempts to subdue the frailties of human nature. It is impossible altogether to avoid this, although much might be done, with the resources at our disposal, to mitigate the force of the temptation to immorality to which the soldier in India is exposed. The long tedious hours of the Indian summer day, which must be spent indoors, are often wearisome enough to the man of intellect and cultivated taste. Even with the resources of music and painting in addition to those of literature and society, the time often hangs heavily indeed upon the educated though unemployed man; what must it be to the soldier in a crowded barrack, who has no resource but to lie on his bed and gaze on the barren, ugly, whitewashed walls, or keep up a monotonous conversation with his comrade—monotonous from the absence of any topic of interest, or change of scene, or intervals of solitude



to invigorate the mind by thought? The pipe and the strongest Cavendish tobacco are called in to lighten the dreary burden till the declining sun will allow of a lazy stroll through the bazaar in the sweltering heat. From incessant smoking comes incessant thirst, aggravated intensely by the heat; and in addition to this there is the craving for stimulants of an opposite kind which the use of tobacco begets, and which lies, perhaps, somewhere near the source of that mysterious sensation—the pleasure of smoking—which no smoker has ever yet been able satisfactorily to describe. To appease the demon, resort is had to the canteen; but the allowance procurable there is limited, and the shops of the spirit-dealers in the bazaar who surreptitiously supply the European soldiers with the most pernicious substitute for rum and gin, is the next place visited; and, failing these, the general shops always have on hand a large stock of what is called eau-de-cologne, which is sold at three or four shillings a dozen, and in reality is nothing but gin put into old eau-de-cologne bottles, slightly scented with some perfume. Equally, if not more fatal in its effects than the vice of intemperance is the indulgence of those passions which a life of idleness and vacuity of mind is peculiarly calculated to encourage. The ravages of disease upon the constitution of the soldier in India from this cause are fearful to contemplate, though it is satisfactory to know that in some garrisons the activity of the medical officers, when supported by the commandant, in supervising lock hospitals, has been attended with marked success.

Sir John Lawrence was at one time a warm advocate for the plan of allowing an increase in the percentage of the soldiers permitted to marry. The time is not far distant, we may hope, when this all-important subject will receive the attention it deserves from Parliament. Sir Hugh Rose, who was unflagging in his exertions to improve the condition of the soldier, regarded the question from a practical point of view; arguing with much force, that a small army really efficient was of much more value than one numerous



when reckoned by returns and muster rolls, but comparatively weak in actual fitness for field service. Throughout the whole of his career as Commander-in-Chief he unceasingly urged on the Government the establishment of more stations for soldiers in the hills, but from motives of ill-judged economy his call met with too slender a response. He succeeded, however, in carrying out a measure which served in some way to mitigate the worst evils of barrack life, viz. the establishment of workshops and gardens, where the men are encouraged to spend some portion of their leisure hours in useful occupation. This measure, however excellent in itself, is restricted in its operation; for resort to the workshop or garden is of course voluntary, and the majority of the men who enlist in the army do so to avoid, not to obtain work.

Another measure recently sanctioned by Sir John Lawrence shows that his views of the soldier's condition are grounded on a principle higher than that of securing, as far as possible, the efficiency of a State machine. There is, perhaps, no position in life so little favourable to the cultivation or the development of religious impressions as that of the private soldier, who lives day and night in the company of a large number of comrades. Once on a Sunday the regiment is paraded for divine service, the men of different persuasions attending their own place of worship. But there is scarcely anything so antagonistic to serious thought as a life perpetually passed in public. Retirement of some kind at some stated interval is indispensable to the cultivation of that communion between the soul and its Creator which is the very life-blood of personal religion. How is the soldier to attain this? From the moment when he is dismissed from morning parade to the time when the lights in the barracks are put out—lights so poor that it is difficult, if not impossible, to read by them—the soldier is surrounded by a crowd of men as a rule but slightly influenced by any thoughts beyond those of the mere passing hour, or of any consideration save that

of getting through the weary day with as much enjoyment and as little tedium as practicable. In most regiments, happily, now-a-days there will be found at least one officer who devotes his spare time and his influence to the encouragement of a religious spirit among those who feel disposed to listen to his exhortations or imitate his example. And with the view of facilitating such efforts, and at the same time affording the thoughtful soldier an asylum where, if courageous enough to disregard the taunts and scoffs of his more worldly-minded comrades, he may find an opportunity for silent meditation, devout reading, and prayer, Sir John Lawrence has recently directed that there shall always be a building in every range of barracks set apart for such purposes.

It would be impossible in this place to recapitulate all the arguments that have been repeatedly urged in almost every public journal in India for years past in favour of Sir Hugh Rose's scheme for availing ourselves much more than we do at present of the benefits of a hill climate for the soldiers. Within the last six years Government have expended enormous sums on the construction of barracks almost palatial in their extent and appearance, in many of the garrisons in Upper India. The new style of barracks is a large double-storied building, the upper story being used for purposes of habitation, the lower devoted to exercise and athletic sports and amusements. The advantages derivable from double-storied habitations in India have been strangely overlooked by the past generation, who constructed most of the dwelling-houses and barracks now in use. The practice of sleeping on a ground-floor in a tropical climate is well known to invite the influence of malaria, and it is not easy to calculate the diminution in the mortality in European life in India for the last century, had it been always the practice to build in double stories. Before the introduction of railways into India it was necessary to locate our European soldiers in garrisons throughout the country, in order that they might be on the



spot in the event of any emergency. That necessity is diminishing yearly as our railway system develops itself; and with railways to the foot of the different hill ranges, there is no reason at all why the soldiers should not be quartered in a healthy climate. It is urged, on the one hand, that there is a certain moral effect produced upon the minds of disaffected natives by the constant presence of English soldiers close to their large cities. No doubt this is true; but, on the other hand, the moral effect would be quite as great, probably much greater, if it were known that the outer ranges of the Himalaya mountains, the Neilgherries in Madras, and other mountain ranges available for the purpose in Central and Western India, were studded with barracks full of Englishmen in the prime of health and strength, who might, at the interval at the most of a day or two, be transplanted by rail to any given point.

The best arrangement for the relief and quartering of the European garrison of India would be as follows:¹—Instead of sending out regiments, as is now done, to Calcutta for Bengal, to Madras and Bombay, and confining their tour of duty to those presidencies, a regiment should be told off, before relief, for Bengal Proper, another for the North-West Provinces (including Oude), another for the Punjab, a fourth for the Central Provinces, a fifth for Bombay, a sixth for Madras, a seventh for Scinde. We should then have seven localities, or districts, of not unmanageable extent, to which each regiment, in its tour of Indian service, would be confined. An examination of the map will show that in each of these territories, or divisions, there is at least one sanitarium within a reasonable distance of the furthest limits of the division; in one at least—the North-West Provinces—there are several. Scinde is the only place where as yet no hill sanitarium has been discovered; and until some salubrious site shall be found, or in lieu of it if never found,

¹ For these suggestions I am indebted to Deputy-Inspector-General Munro, of the Umballa Division.



the sea-coast will afford a much better substitute than is generally supposed. For a great proportion of the diseases and complaints for which men are sent to a hill-climate, the sea air, when there is proper accommodation provided, is in effect far more beneficial.

The regiments thus told off, as it were, to their respective provinces might be moved about within those limits as the exigencies of the service required; and a certain proportion for each regiment should be retained alternately always in the sanitarium, instead of using the latter, as is done under the existing system, as resorts for dépôts of invalids, who mostly reach the elevated regions when too far gone to derive much permanent benefit from the change. At present there is no good sanitarium in the Central Provinces, although there are several sites which might be adapted to the purpose. But the Himalayas are within not inconvenient distance of the garrisons in this part of India, and, with the railway communication between the most distant of these garrisons and the hills, the journey might be accomplished in two or three days. At present a regiment sent to Bengal may be quartered in any station from Calcutta to Central India or to Peshawur, the climate between these limits differing as much as it does between England and India; and although there is no such thing as acclimatization, in the sense of an Englishman becoming inured to the influence of a tropical sun or malaria, yet the repeated exposure of the soldier to different climates, each in its way equally unfavourable to the European constitution, during his tour of Indian duty, cannot but be regarded as prejudicial.

Under the proposed system it would be possible to maintain a just and fair proportion in the distribution of regiments and detachments in healthy localities, which is under existing arrangements unattainable. Were troops located in hill stations, there is no reason why a larger proportion of the men should not be allowed to have their wives with them; while out-of-door occupation, as salutary



in that climate as it is in England, would relieve the soldier of at least one-half the temptations that now lure him to the destruction both of body and soul.

Sir John Lawrence landed on the 12th of January. By that time the campaign on the North-West frontier had been closed. The Umbeyla Pass, indeed, had been entirely evacuated the day before Christmas Day ; but a few regiments were left to assist the Guides in the work of burning and destroying some villages in the country recently occupied by the enemy. In India events succeed one another with a rapidity equalling that of the change of scenery upon the stage. Hardly were the embers of the burnt homesteads in the Indus valleys cold in their ashes, when the Punjab was taking the lead in a prominent manner in the cultivation of the arts and commerce. The Lahore Exhibition of Arts, Manufacture, and Produce, was the first attempt to imitate, on a humble scale, those magnificent displays with which the memory of the late Prince Consort is so intimately associated. There had been a collection of cattle at Benares, for which the ambitious title of an agricultural exhibition was claimed ; and at Calcutta a similar collection, on a larger scale, varied by agricultural machinery, was most creditable to Bengal. But the Lahore Exhibition assumed a more pretentious character, and aimed at a higher mark. In both cities the exhibitions were opened with all the *éclat* of an imposing ceremonial. At Calcutta the Viceroy was present ; and as much enthusiasm as could be got up for enormous bulls, huge buffaloes, unexceptionable Arab horses, a pony no larger than a Newfoundland dog, and machinery that could not be worked for want of steam-power, was shown by a mixed crowd of European ladies and gentlemen and native grandees, whose rich and brilliant dresses add much to the general effect of an assembly of the kind in India. At Lahore no official of higher rank than a Lieutenant-Governor was present to conduct the proceedings, but the collection of curiosities from all parts of the province and



its neighbourhood, the specimens of raw produce, minerals and ores, the models architectural and mechanical, the richest products of the far-famed looms and the skill of the handicraftsmen of Cashmere, the thousand and one objects of interest that can find their way into an exhibition whose programme is wide enough to embrace everything in art or nature that is capable of being transported to the spot—together made a display up to that day unique in India. Ceremonies on such occasions bear a great similarity to one another. There are the processions, the band, the soldiers, the uniforms, and the guns thundering a salute—particulars which befit the columns of a newspaper rather than the page of history; but a few sentences from Sir Robert Montgomery's address to the committee are deserving of more lasting record :—

“I receive your address with pleasure, yet with a mournful regret that the loss sustained by the Queen and the empire in the lamented demise of the late Viceroy, Lord Elgin, should cast a shade over this day's proceedings, even as the death of the Prince Consort, the great and good institutor of these displays, saddened the opening of the International Exhibition, which we now, however distantly attempt to imitate.

“It is true, as you have observed, that there are few traces here of that cultivated taste and refinement which have called forth in Europe the beautiful and delightful art of painting, sculpture, and music, and that the local manufactures are unaided by the wonderful inventions and extraordinary mechanical power which have so greatly strengthened the productive industry of Great Britain.

“But God has richly blessed these provinces with natural gifts; with mountains abounding in forest timber; with plains needing nothing but artificial irrigation to produce the finest crops; with rivers capable of watering the whole soil. But to render them increasingly serviceable to human sustenance and comfort, they must be brought under more complete subjection by human labour.”

The last province brought under British subjection except Oude, the Punjab, has made the furthest advance of any part of British India in a general diffusion of those ideas and habits of thought which are the necessary elements in civilization. With the exception, of course, of



the Presidency towns, and certain classes of the native community here and there throughout the provinces who have adopted English almost as a native language,—who speak, write, and read in that tongue as fluently as Englishmen themselves,—the Punjab has become more Anglicized in the short time since its annexation than any portion of the older provinces. At one time, indeed, there was a remarkable spirit of inquiry abroad on religious questions, which awakened a delusive hope that the people of this land would in a body embrace Christianity. The indication was deceptive; but there are many reasons for believing that, if ever Christianity is destined to be the national religion of India, or part of India, the reformation will be initiated in the Punjab. Without entering into any discussion of the peculiar characteristics of the non-regulation system, which have been alluded to under the chapter on legislation, it is sufficient to remark here, that the system is undoubtedly better calculated to extend the influence of English ideas and civilization generally, than that called in contradistinction the regulation system. The progress in the Punjab was not, however, due only to the system, which has been in operation in many other parts of India without producing any of the effects we see here. Oude, for instance, which, although it has not been incorporated with the empire so long as the Punjab, is yet under the non-regulation system, is as conspicuous for the absence of these landmarks of progress as the Punjab is for their presence.

As between these two provinces, the difference may be accounted for by the fact that the Punjab has been well governed, while Oude has been badly governed, misunderstood, and mismanaged from the very date of annexation. But a great deal of the success which has attended our efforts in the Punjab must be attributed to the character of the people. The races of Northern India are better developed altogether than the Hindostanees, possessed of



finer qualities, and presenting a better block for the sculptor's chisel. A Punjabee is more easily fashioned into a good specimen of his race than the native of other parts of India. In addition to this, the Government was especially fortunate in its officials. It is not necessary to say anything of the two Lawrences, Sir Herbert Edwardes, Colonels Lake, Taylor, Nicholson, James, Coke, and a host of others who may be called collectively the Lawrence school, some of whom are still at their posts, and some living in retirement, and some are silent in their graves. The names of the leading men have already attained a place in history; but there was a host of juniors and subordinates of whom history has never heard, one and all of whom strove hard to work up to the model which every Punjab official in former days put before him. It is to the united influence of all these men put together, working on the good foundation of the Punjabee character, that has made the province even now, in spite of its having long ago worn threadbare the non-regulation system, one of the foremost in the race towards civilization.

The progress of sanitation is of sufficient importance to demand a chapter to itself. It was in the present year that the Sanitary Commission was first appointed, at the head of which was Mr. John Strachey, formerly Judicial Commissioner of the Central Provinces, subsequently Chief Commissioner of Oude, and, later still, member of the Governor-General's Council. Previous to the institution of the Sanitary Commission, or, as it may be called, the Board of Health for all India, which was established permanently, two other commissions, appointed for a special purpose, had been sitting. These were the Commissariat and the Cholera Commissions. The former was assembled at the instance of Sir Hugh Rose, to investigate the system under which the Commissariat arrangements were carried on. The other, the Cholera Commission, was employed in collecting statistics, and recording opinions upon the phenomena, the progress, the treatment and its effects,



of epidemic cholera. The President of the Cholera Commission, Mr. John Strachey, accompanied by the other members, one of whom was a military, and the third a medical officer, visited the different places where the cholera epidemic of 1861 had been particularly severe, and collected such evidence in the shape of facts and opinions as were considered worthy of record. The report was never published *in extenso*, as originally drawn up, partly on account of a difference of opinion among the members, who were not unanimous in the conclusions deduced, partly in consequence of the shocking abuses revealed. So appalling were the recorded results of cowardice and neglect in some of the garrisons in Upper India, that the bare statement of them in a dry, official report was too terrible to be allowed to see the light. A considerable time has elapsed since then; and under the more efficient system that now prevails, a similar catastrophe, it is to be hoped, can hardly occur again. It will, therefore, not be imprudent, while it may serve some useful purpose, to intimate briefly the character of some of the abuses brought to light, which, shocking as they are, were nevertheless not deemed unfit for publication. There can be no question that, during the outbreak of 1861, numbers of lives—valuable lives—were thrown away by sheer neglect, or sacrificed on the altar of red-tapeism. A practice had been shortly before adopted of removing regiments and troops, as soon as the disease appeared among them, into camp. Cholera generally breaks out in Upper India in the rainy season, when the air is much cooler than in the previous month, the earth damp, low ground under water, large tracts of country turned into a swamp, and roads often almost impassable. It is obvious that at such a season the practice of moving troops into camp, if intended to benefit the health of the men, must be conducted with at least ordinary attention to arrangements for supplies, carriage, &c.; yet on many of these occasions, corps were actually marched out into the district, away from comfortable, dry barracks,

to bivouac on the wet ground; in other cases their tents were pitched, but for want of the ordinary camp-bedsteads, through mismanagement, the men would have to sleep on the damp earth. At other times, they were taken toilsome marches over ploughed ground, where they sank ankle-deep in mire at every step, and brought up to the camp or bivouac exhausted by fatigue, and exposed to drenching rain. But the most appalling picture was that of the hospital at Meean Meer, the garrison at Lahore, situated about five miles from that city. Here might have been seen in a cantonment, during a period of peace, all the results of a panic on a field of battle. The hospitals, large buildings but badly constructed, were made to hold half as many again as they were intended for. The verandahs were crowded, and ventilation to the interior blocked up. The latrines were so foul that the effluvia from them are described as overpowering; and as the committee report—a fact incredible, but for the weight which the names of the members give to their representations—the latrines contained the accumulated filth of ten years! Over and over again had their condition been reported; over and over again had the authorities been warned that, sooner or later, Nature would take a dire revenge for the insult offered to her in the open neglect of her laws. What *esprit de corps* is capable of accomplishing among departments, when it has risen to that point at which it is held a lesser evil that a whole army should perish than that one department should go an inch beyond the limit of its legitimate province to do the work belonging to another, we saw in the Crimea. As regards the latrines at Meean Meer, it would be difficult at this distance of time to point out with certainty the department or the office that should bear the blame of their intolerable condition. It did not rest with the medical officer, that is clear. It will very seldom be found that regimental medical officers neglect the sanitary condition of their hospitals. But their authority is very limited, and when they have reported a circumstance that



demands attention, or, it may be, requires an outlay of public funds to remedy, their resources are exhausted. Their requisitions may be attended to, or they may be lost in a labyrinth of official channels permeating through the Deputy-Inspector-General's, the Public Works', and the Quartermaster-General's departments. The state of things shown to exist at Meean Meer well illustrates the evils of divided responsibility, and a too unwieldy machinery of administration. There is no House of Commons in India to call to account the culpable neglect of public men. The head of each department fights the battles of all his subordinates, and the practical result is often seen in the total impossibility to lay the blame of some great disaster upon any individual.

The barracks must have been inspected twice yearly, according to regulation, by the general of division, ever since they were first occupied, yet for ten years the most ordinary rules for the preservation of the health of the soldiers were neglected. Without attempting definitely to fix upon the officer in fault on this occasion, it is impossible to escape the conviction that if the Quartermaster-General's department had done its duty, such a condition of things could not have been allowed to remain unnoticed.

These latrines, filled up to a distance of twenty-three feet from the surface, emitted effluvia perceptible in the stillness of the sultry night in all directions, but especially towards the barracks, and the air seemed everywhere impregnated with the foul exhalations. It was further shown that the filth from the native latrines was regularly sold for the purpose of feeding the sheep destined for the butchers' market.

The hospital was already filled with as many patients as it was adapted for when the epidemic appeared. Yet the cholera-patients were thrust into the already crowded wards. Under the pressure of work, and in the panic that ensued, the native establishment struck, and eventually matters came to such a pass, that the floor of the hospitals

was covered with excreta, which were never removed. The stench became insupportable; the very punkah-ropes were saturated with what Mr. Sloggett, the chaplain, described as the concentrated smell of cholera; the smell, the filth, the disorder, the cries, groans, and shoutings in the dismal place, where the thermometer stood day and night at 100°, formed altogether a combination of horrors amid which no man in rude health could be expected to live, and where the unfortunate patient was consigned to almost certain death under every external circumstance that could possibly aggravate the sufferings of men in the last extremity. The attendants, the comrades of the patients who were carried to this pest-house, succumbed under the accumulated horrors, till at last the victims stricken with the disease were left too often untended at all; they were simply placed there to die. Nor can it be wondered at that men allowed the disease to reach an unmanageable stage before they incurred the risk of being consigned to such a place as this. At Delhi, and at Morar the cantonment adjacent to the city of Gwalior, matters were very little better than at Meean Meer. The latrines were in the same neglected condition, the hospitals were pest-houses, instead of asylums for the relief of suffering.

The story reads more like an episode in some history of the Black Death two or three centuries ago, than a report of an occurrence in the nineteenth century, in a regiment of the British army.

Although not connected with the administration of India, the more immediate subject of these pages, the great cyclone which visited Calcutta in the latter part of 1864 deserves a passing notice in a record of the time. The cyclone, or hurricane, commenced about four o'clock in the morning of the 5th October, and lasted till about a quarter to ten. After a complete lull of nearly an hour the gale returned, and lasted till two o'clock, when it subsided. Its influence extended over an area of a hundred miles in diameter. Some idea of the violence of the wind,

and the destructive effects of the storm-wave, may be gathered from the following accounts, culled from the Calcutta papers and the official records ; but no pen can do justice to such a subject, or convey to the mind of the reader any adequate idea of the scene. The treacherous river, which a few hours after the storm was as placid as an inland lake, raged and foamed like an angry sea, and rushed in huge, black waves over its banks, threatening to engulf all before it. Large trees were torn up by their roots, and tossed about as if they were wisps of straw ; the roaring of the wind, the crashing of falling trees, verandahs, houses, and huts, was incessant, and for hour after hour the appalling strife continued till it seemed as if Nature herself mourned over the universal wreck which she had caused.¹ A writer in the *Englishman*, who was himself exposed to the storm, thus describes his sensations :—

“ Within three yards of the doorway (of the Post-office), I was borne off my legs as if I were a stray scarecrow, arms and legs all abroad, brought up against the wall of the house, and dropped into a torrent, which almost swept me along the open drain. . . .

“ About an hour later I ventured to try again, and the first thing I saw on leaving the shelter of a wall was the ruin of two street carriages (four-wheeled cabs of a large and strong make), which had been blown over bodily, and not far behind them was a native boat, a dingy, which having been blown ashore at the end of a street, was charging straight along it in the gusts which were then coming more fitfully. What is called the Strand Bank runs along the river-side, about six feet above the level of the ordinary spring tide ; it is a good wide road, and is bordered by large mercantile godowns (warehouses), offices, and the like, and along part of it runs an iron palisading or a low wall. Over wall and road the river at its height was literally leaping with the sort of short tumbling sea one sees in very bad weather in the Mersey ; the walls were carried away, the telegraph posts blown down, roofs blown off into the road, doors and windows blown clean away, and what should have been the roadway one rolling mass of the *debris* of cargo boats and their cargoes, dingies, rice, jute, rattan-cases, bales, and here and there the huge bulk of some ship or steamer driven right up beyond high-water mark. The gale was still so strong that it was impossible to make out any details of the growing ruin when darkness settled down with the rapidity which marks these latitudes.”

¹ *Friend of India.*

Another account, extracted from the same journal, gives a more comprehensive view of the general effects of the storm.

"During the whole of Tuesday night the weather was marked by a succession of squalls and heavy rain from the N.N.E., and it maintained the same character till about half-past ten on Wednesday morning, gradually increasing in violence. The wind then veered round to the east, and began to blow more steadily and with increased fury. The weaker trees were uprooted or broken short, but, for the first hour or so, no greater damage was done. Between eleven and twelve o'clock, a noise like that of distant thunder, which probably may have been heard from as far as two miles, gave warning, as it gradually increased, that something worse was coming. In about two minutes from this time the cyclone was upon the town. Wherever there were trees, they were either uprooted and fell, carrying with them in many cases walls, railings, and buildings, or their branches were snapped off like reeds and hurled away with the wind. Carriages and palkees were upset and strewn the roads, mingled with the *débris* of roofs, verandahs and gates, and fallen trees. Corrugated iron roofings were torn, doubled up, and blown away like sheets of paper. By two o'clock the eastern and southern suburbs of the city, and those parts of it to the westward which, from their proximity to the plain and the river, were the most exposed, were more or less a wreck. Except the cocoa-nut and other palms, scarcely a tree was anywhere to be found standing. The beautiful avenues in Fort William were entirely destroyed; the Eden Gardens turned into a wilderness; in Tank Square the trees and shrubs were blown away, and in many parts the iron railing torn up and overthrown. In Garden Reach the roads were blocked up and rendered impassable from the trees that fell across them. The splendid avenue of usoth (*Polyalthea longifolia*) trees in the compound of the school opposite St. James's Church, some of which must have been four or five feet in circumference, was entirely destroyed, the trees being snapped off above the level of the wall which protected them, but which is now no longer standing. The damage done to buildings was considerable. Among these, we notice that the roof of the Free School was blown away; the upper part of the Roman Catholic Church at the upper end of the Bow Bazaar Road entirely destroyed, and the steeple of the Free Church of Scotland; the minarets of the Mosque in Dhurrumtolah were all blown away; St. James's Theatre was unroofed and nearly destroyed; the roof of the cathedral is much damaged; the sheds of the East India Railway Company are unroofed, and Messrs. Thacker and Spinks' premises seriously damaged. Our own troubles we described yesterday. In fact, scarcely a pukka¹ house in Calcutta has escaped without

¹ Built of masonry, in contradistinction to mud, "wattle and dab" edifices.



THE CYCLONE AT CALCUTTA.

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injury, while the native huts, especially in the suburbs, were almost all blown down. The telegraph lines are interrupted in all directions. All these losses are sufficiently annoying and lamentable; but it is on the river that the storm has been attended by the most disastrous consequences. To give an accurate or connected account of the loss among the shipping is as yet impossible: all is confusion, and it is scarcely known what ships have been entirely lost, what are irremediably damaged, and what are safe. The last are few indeed; perhaps not more than half a dozen are in a state to go to sea without extensive repairs. With few exceptions, the shipping were driven from their moorings and cast ashore, or jammed together on the opposite side of the river, while several were sunk in mid channel, and others stranded by the storm wave high up on the Calcutta shore."

It may easily be imagined that the crowded shipping in the river would be exposed to the utmost possible danger from the violence of such a tempest. But the raging winds were not the only antagonists that the shipping and the river population had to contend against. For the cyclone was accompanied by one of those terrible engines of destruction which a violent commotion of the elements not unfrequently produces in tropical hurricanes. Stretching from shore to shore, and as far as eight miles inland on either side, a mass or wall of water, by some accounts fifteen, by others thirty feet in height, rushed up from the mouth of the Hooghly, carrying devastation before it, sweeping over the strongest embankments, flooding the crops with salt water, annihilating entire villages, and involving men and cattle in one vortex of destruction.

As long as the shipping had to contend with the violence of the wind alone, the one hundred and ninety-five vessels that were moored or anchored within the limits of the port on the morning of the 5th rode it out without much damage; but when the storm wave added its expiring strength to the force of the wind—for happily it had worn itself out ere it quite reached Calcutta—one vessel after another drove from her moorings, and as each ship swept on she fouled others in her course, and the whole becoming massed together and utterly unmanageable were sunk or driven ashore. To the few spectators



who could manage to stand on the bank, and view the progress of destruction, there appeared to be an ever-shifting, ever-changing scene of havoc and ruin passing before their eyes. "As fast as vessels either entangled or clogged together, or singly, drifted by, others replaced them, some dragging their buoys, others, whose cables had parted and left them at the mercy of the elements, drifting to inevitable destruction. Cargo boats, and smaller craft in shoals, were hurried along, and every now and then a *boliyo*,¹ swamped, but not sunk, bobbed up and down like some great monster hunting for its prey. And when the force of destruction could no further go, the river was left in front of the spectator clear of shipping, where there had been before a perfect forest of masts and chimneys, and not a single small boat to be seen." One hundred and fifty-five vessels were driven on shore. The *Ally*, with a living freight of 335 coolies, was totally lost with all on board, save seven of the crew, and twenty-two emigrants. A tug-steamer, the *Alligator*, like the creature from which it derived its name, crawled into the jungle; the *Admiral Casey* was found in the middle of a rice field. The *Prince Albert* and the *Red Rose*, two railway steamers were transported out of their proper element into a neighbouring garden, and the *Earl of Clare* was landed, high and dry, up on the top of a heap of stone ballast in an adjacent yard. Out of the one hundred and ninety-five ships, thirty-nine were damaged slightly, ninety-seven severely, and thirty-six totally lost. By the 19th October, one hundred and one grounded vessels had been got off.

It is not easy to ascertain the loss of life caused by the storm and the accompanying inroad of the sea, for the banks towards the mouth of the Hooghly are inhabited by a floating population, whose numbers probably no living person could at any time reckon. Almost all those, of

¹ A passenger boat, propelled by some six or eight or more oars, with cabin, painted green.

*DURBAR AT LAHORE.*

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course, who were within the limits embraced by the action of the storm wave were swept to destruction. In one district, Saugor Island, out of a population of six thousand souls known to be there before the storm, there was a remnant of one thousand four hundred and eighty-eight only left. To this list must be added those who were swept away with their boats, dingies, canoes, and rude craft of all kinds that swarm all down the river. Where data are so uncertain, it is almost fruitless to attempt to indicate the number of lives lost with nearer approximation than that they were certainly over five and probably not under twenty thousand.

Sir John Lawrence had spent the summer in the cool breezes of Simla, but early in the autumn went into camp, and marched to Lahore, where he held a large durbar. There are many features that rendered the occasion especially interesting. It was the locality where, just twenty years before, Sir John had taken the first step on the ladder by which he had reached his present eminence. The chiefs and sirdars of the Punjab beheld in the Viceroy the officer they had so long revered as Commissioner; and for the first time in the history of India, the Viceroy was to be heard addressing the assembled chiefs in their own language. They listened to him with marked attention, and doubtless, as the words fell from his lips, reflected that there was now one more link between them and the British Government, in that the representative of the Queen could at any rate speak their language and understand them. There was, perhaps, a good deal less dignity, but more sympathy and more individuality in Sir John Lawrence's address, than those of previous Viceroys. They had spoken, indeed, in noble language and well-turned sentences, but their addresses had to be rendered into Hindostanee, and were read in an inaudible voice by the secretaries of the Foreign Department. Speeches delivered on these occasions are usually mere matters of form, but Sir John Lawrence's address was more: it was



intended to convey, not the stereotyped expressions of empty compliment and good wishes, but sentiments and feelings he had himself at heart. As such it is worthy of record.

“Maharajas, Rajas, and Chiefs! Listen to my words. I have come among you after an absence of nearly six years, and thank you for the kindly welcome you have given me. It is with pleasure I meet so many of my old friends, while I mourn the loss of those who have passed away.

“Princes and Chiefs! It is with great satisfaction that I find nearly six hundred of you assembled around me in this durbar. I see before me the faces of many friends. I recognise the sons of my old allies, the Maharajas of Cashmere and Puttiala, the Sikh Chiefs of Malwah and the Manjha, the Rajpoot Chiefs of the hills, the Mahomedan Mullicks of Peshawur and Kohat, the Sirdars of the Derajat, of Hazara, and Delhi. All have gathered together to do honour to their old ruler.

“My friends! Let me tell you of the great interest which the illustrious Queen of England takes in all matters connected with the welfare and comfort and contentment of the people of India. Let me inform you, when I returned to my native country, and had the honour of standing in the presence of her Majesty, how kindly she asked after the welfare of her subjects in the East. Let me tell you, when that great Queen appointed me her Viceroy of India, how warmly she enjoined on me the duty of caring for your interest. Prince Albert, the Consort of her Majesty, the fame of whose greatness and goodness has spread through the whole world, was well acquainted with all connected with this country, and always evinced an ardent desire to see its people happy and flourishing.

“My friends! It is now more than eighteen years since I first saw Lahore. For thirteen years I lived in the Punjab. For many years my brother, Sir Henry Law-



rence, and I, governed this vast country. You all knew him well, and his memory will ever dwell in your hearts, as a ruler who was a real friend of its people. I may truly say, that from the day we exercised authority in the land we spared neither our time, nor our labour, nor our health, in endeavouring to accomplish the work which we had undertaken. We studied to make ourselves acquainted with the usages, the feelings, and the wants of every class and race, and we endeavoured to improve the condition of all. There are few parts of the province which I have not visited, and which I hope I did not leave in some degree the better for my visit. Since British rule was introduced, taxation of all kinds has been lightened, canals and roads have been constructed, and schools of learning have been established. From the highest to the lowest, the people have become contented, and have proved 'loyal. When the great military revolt of 1857 occurred, they aided their rulers most effectively in putting it down. The Chiefs mustered their contingents, which served faithfully, and thousands of Punjabee soldiers flocked to our standards, and shared with the British troops the glories as well as the hardships of that great struggle.

"Princes and Gentlemen! If it be wise for the rulers of a country to understand the language and appreciate the feelings of its people, it is as important that they should have a similar knowledge of their rulers. It is only by such means that the two classes can live happily together. To this end I urge you to instruct your sons, and even your daughters.

"Among the solid advantages which you have gained from English rule, I will now only advert to one more. It has given the country many excellent administrators. Some of the ablest and kindest of my countrymen have been employed in the Punjab. Every man, from the highest to the lowest, can appreciate a good ruler. You have such men as Sir Robert Montgomery, Mr. Donald Macleod, Mr. Roberts, Sir Herbert Edwardes, Colonel



Lake, and Colonel John Becher, officers who have devoted themselves to your service.

“I will now only add that I pray the great God, who is the God of all races, and all the people of this world, that He may guard and protect you, and teach you all to love justice and hate oppression, and enable you each in his several ways to do all the good in his power. May He give you all that is for your real benefit. So long as I live, I shall never forget the years that I have passed in the Punjab, and the friends that I have acquired throughout this province.”



CHAPTER IX.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE CENTRAL PROVINCES.

The Central Provinces—Boundaries—Climate and inhabitants—Sir Richard Temple—Progress and present condition—Sir R. Temple resigns—His administration—The future of the Central Provinces.

THE Central Provinces may be roughly described as a portion of the table-land of Central India, lying between 18 and 25 degrees latitude, and 78 to 85 longitude. In form it is lozenge-shaped, the southern apex reaching far down in the Madras Presidency, about fifty miles from the sea-coast, where the Godavery empties itself into the Bay of Bengal; the eastern apex trenching in a similar manner on Bengal Proper, up to a point which would be intersected by a straight line drawn from Arrah, near Dinapore on the Ganges, to the Bay of Bengal. From the northern apex to the southern, the distance as the crow flies is between 450 and 500 miles, and from east to west the area covers a still larger extent of country. On the north-west face it is bounded by Bundelcund and the dominions of the Maharaja of Gwalior, on the north-west by Behar. The south-west and south-east faces look out upon the Nizam's dominions, and that part of the Madras Presidency lying between the mouths of the Godavery and the Mahanuddy. The upper portion of this large territory is destined to be the highway for traffic between the North-Western Provinces, including Oude and Bombay, for it is to be traversed by the railway at present constructed so far as to connect Allahabad with Jubbulpore, a distance of 228 miles, where it is to be

joined by the Great Indian Peninsular line from Bombay. In the north-west corner of this territory is the district of Saugor, with the capital city of that name, containing, with the adjacent military station, a population of about 50,000 souls. About a hundred miles due south of it is the sanitarium in the Puchmuree hills. Another stretch of about eight miles due south leads us to the city of Nagpore, with the adjacent cantonment of Seetabuldee. From Nagpore a line of railway passes through the rich cotton district of Berar down to Bombay. Although separated by long distances, and often by almost impassable tracts of jungle and forest land, the territory abounds in large and populous cities, the names of which are familiar to the general reader of Indian newspapers, books of travel, and statistics, such as Hoshungabad, Baitool, Kamptee, Chanda, Seroncha, Raepore, Bhundara, Jubbulpore, Saugor, Nagpore, and others. But perhaps the name which of all others will sound the most familiar to the English reader is the Godavery river, which for the latter part of its course to the sea-coast, about 160 miles, flows along the south-western face of the lozenge, forming on this side a boundary to the Central Provinces. A large river, called the Wyn Gunga, which rises in the heart of the Provinces, after a winding course of about a hundred miles, flows into the Godavery, just where that noble stream strikes the boundary towards the west, in its progress to the sea. The city of Seroncha lies at the confluence of the two rivers.

The temperature of these regions is considerably lower than that of India generally, the level portions being elevated table-land, and the mountain ranges large forests and broad rivers, all contributing to this result. It is peopled by various races of men, the aboriginal inhabitants far outnumbering the Hindoo and Mahommedan. Many of them are savages, but possess qualities which give promise of their eventually becoming, under the influence of civilization, a thriving agricultural population.



The study of the characteristics of these wild tribes, their language, habits, and mythology, is deeply interesting to the philologist and the ethnographer, while the remains of ancient buildings and temples—the scanty records of past ages—which are met with in so many parts of the Central Provinces, deeply imbedded in jungle and evidently of vast antiquity, may hereafter serve to throw some light upon an obscure page of Indian history. Rich in mineral resources, with an extremely fertile soil, except where uncleared forests and mountain ranges check cultivation, abounding with large rivers, and inhabited by a peaceable and docile population, this magnificent tract is capable hereafter of being developed into one of the most valuable subdivisions of the Indian empire. And it is fortunate that shortly after the different districts were first incorporated by Lord Canning into one chief commissionership, there was a man of Sir Richard Temple's calibre available for its charge. For a while, civilization and progress halted under the rule of a worn-out valetudinarian, Colonel Elliot; but upon his absence, in the first instance on furlough, and subsequently on his removal, Sir Richard (then Mr.) Temple was placed, at first temporarily, and afterwards permanently, in charge. In addition to great administrative talent, and that useful habit for one who is destined to be a ruler of men, the thirst for information, Sir Richard Temple is endowed with marvellous physical powers and capability for enduring fatigue. To mould into shape such an unwieldy mass, to introduce system and organization and good government into so vast a tract of country, covered for so many miles with pathless forests and unexplored mountain ranges, it was absolutely necessary for the Chief Commissioner to make a personal survey of his domains. This Sir Richard Temple accomplished (a feat from which most men might well shrink), travelling by foot and on horseback, and by boat, upwards of 4,000 miles—further, as Mr. Strachey observes, than if he had marched from Cape Comorin to

Cashmere and back again; visiting every place of importance, and making the personal acquaintance of every official under him, and of every native gentleman of note, and every chief. The result of this extended tour of inspection he has given in his Administrative Report for 1862-3. "During the past year," he says, "I have been able to complete the tour and circuit of all the districts in the Central Provinces, and to pass up and down the two great rivers, the Godavery and the Mahanuddy." Quitting Jubbulpore on the 26th April, 1862, Sir Richard Temple marched first to Mundla on the Nerbudda, a place of great antiquity, the neighbourhood of which is rich in the remains of temples and buildings of a very great age, now completely buried in jungle. Thence he turned southwards to Seonee and Nagpore. Starting from Nagpore in the height of the hot weather, in the month of May, he traversed the mountainous district of Chindwarra, at the foot of the Sautpoora range of mountains, a district rich in mineral resources, and containing valuable seams of coal. The plateau of the Mohtor mountain district, thirty-four miles from Chindwarra, is from 3,500 to 4,000 feet above the level of the sea. The neighbouring hills and valleys are clothed with low and thick underwood, but the plateau itself is open, and the climate during the winter and spring and early summer delightful, but liable to more or less malarious influence between July and November. The soil and water are everything that can be desired, the atmosphere cool and invigorating, and the sun not overpowering. The inhabitants of the district, the Gonds and Korkoos, are the descendants of the wild tribes who, whether aboriginal or not, inhabited the country before the Aryan immigration. In appearance they differ from the rest of the tribes, having broad flat noses and thick lips; but their language has never yet been scientifically studied. From Chindwarra, Sir Richard Temple travelled westwards to Baitool, then turning southwards to Berar, visited the great cotton-fields of Oomrawattee,



thence northwards by Bhundhara to the Nowagon lake, returning to Nagpore on the 12th June. On the 8th August, the indefatigable officer went down the Godavery and its affluents to Coconada, on the coast of the Bay of Bengal, returning to Nagpore on the 10th September. In November following he travelled up the valley of the Nerbudda, and then struck across to Bundelcund. Again, in the following January, he made his way westwards to Sonepore, a place on the extreme boundary of the province, on the river Mahanuddy, where, embarking in a boat, he followed the stream a hundred and twenty miles to Cuttack, at which place he met the chief engineer of the East Indian Irrigation Company. From Cuttack, his way led through vast tracts of jungle to Sumbulpore, a distance of about one hundred and fifty miles, and from thence across the Chutteesghur plateau to Nagpore, a distance of not less than three hundred and twenty miles in a straight line, visiting the different zemindaries on the way. He reached Nagpore on the 29th April, and again, on the 17th May, set out, and passing over the Puchmurree hills, traversed the Chundla and Seonee districts, returning to Nagpore on the 19th June, having in these successive tours visited every station and district, and meeting almost every native chief, and the majority of the landholders, throughout the country.

This brief sketch of Sir Richard Temple's travels contains too many unfamiliar names to render it of much interest to the general reader; but the outline may enable him to realize in some measure the amount of labour, exposure, and fatigue which that officer did not scruple to undergo in the course of his duty. Nor was travelling in such a country as this that luxurious pastime which the official tour of the Anglo-Indian commissioner is generally represented. Pathless jungles and forests, and uncertain tracts abounding with wild beasts, and yielding little in the shape of supplies beyond what the gun of the sportsman may be able to collect, had to be traversed on horse-



back and on foot. The heat of the sun, malaria, and jungle fever, had each in its turn to be encountered. And the journey to which Mr. Strachey compares it, from Cape Comorin to Cashmere and back, might be performed with a tithe of the labour and exposure unavoidable in such a country as this.

It is not to be wondered at that Sir Richard Temple's principal impression after concluding his tour should be one of vast distance and extent of area. He says: "It appears to me, that in these provinces the distinguishing characteristic and the standing difficulty consist in the extent of area, vast out of all proportion to its wealth and population, and in the great distances which consequently have to be traversed." As regards the exposure to the weather, he says:—

"The seasons in this part of India are not on the whole favourable to lengthened travelling. The autumn, owing to the prevalence of jungle fever, would be prejudicial to any one, even with the strongest constitution, who should venture to move about in the interior. Marching, therefore, cannot safely commence until the beginning of November. Then the winter is short, and the hot weather sets in by February; and lastly, the dry season does not last long, for the burst of the monsoon is to be expected by the end of May. Travelling, though difficult, is, however, practicable throughout June; and in some quarters, such as the Godavery country, if one disadvantage be balanced against another, the best time for travelling is in the midst of the rainy season. Those, therefore, who would see and know the Central Provinces in detail, must be prepared to face the scorching winds of the summer and the drenching rains of the monsoon. Nor is travelling facilitated by those appliances which now exist in the more advanced parts of India. Here as yet there is no railway, no steam communication, no horse-carriage transit over metalled roads.¹ The work must be generally done on horseback, save when the more precipitous hills have to be ascended on foot."

¹ Since Sir Richard Temple wrote this, the railway has been opened to Jubbulpore, and post horses put upon the road between Jubbulpore and Nagpore, so that the journey from Allahabad to Bombay can be performed with tolerable ease and comfort, and most travellers from Upper India prefer that route to England to the old route *via* Calcutta.



Sir Richard Temple then proceeds to show how necessary it is that the chief ruler of such a country should make himself acquainted with its different features, which can only be done by personal inspection. Points of interest and importance are not concentrated in particular quarters, the remainder of the country being blank: "Nature and circumstance, with a severe impartiality, have distributed the points of interest and importance over the whole length and breadth of the land. In one distant direction it will be the local political affairs that claim attention; in another, the land tenure; in another, the navigable rivers; in another, the arrangements for defence and protection; in another, the forests; and in another, the communication through the passes."¹

When the backward condition in which this territory was, when Mr. Temple took charge, is compared with what it is now, it almost appears as if the work of settlement and organization had been pushed on with something of superhuman force. Enthusiasm and energy are the soul of a successful administration, for they are communicated from one official to another; and where the influence proceeds from the head of the Government, it permeates all the subordinate departments,—as the sap in a tree ascends to the furthestmost branches, carrying with it the elements of life and vigour. A few facts culled from the latest administration report now published, that for 1866-67,² will give the reader some idea of what has been accomplished under the impetus imparted by Mr. Temple's supervision. "Over almost the whole of these provinces the land settlements have been completed. All rights in the soil having been investigated, defined, and recorded, a moderate land-tax has been fixed for periods of twenty or thirty years. Every class interested in the land, the feudatories, the petty

¹ In the season of 1868, Sir Richard Temple rode out from Simla forty miles into the interior, and, without resting, ascended to the summit of a mountain 10,000 feet high, to sketch.

² Written in September 1868.



chiefs who own large estates, the ordinary landholders, the proprietors of holdings, and the occupiers of fields,—each one knows what his absolute and relative rights in the land are, and what are his obligations either toward the public treasury, or towards his feudal superior. So closely are the interests of the people and the State interwoven, that while all these matters have been arranged, it has been found feasible at the regular settlement to raise the Government land-tax from fifty-four to fifty-eight lacs of rupees. And while ownership in all the cultivated land, and even a large extent of waste land, has been recognised in private landholders, the rights of the State in unoccupied, waste lands have been asserted and defined. In this way some twenty thousand square miles of waste land have been marked off as State property.”

A similar improvement has been effected in the magisterial and police department. Many of the native gentry have received commissions as honorary magistrates, by whom one-fifth of the magisterial business of the country is performed with credit to themselves and satisfaction to the people.

It is a well-recognised principle of political economy that litigation increases in proportion as a country enjoys the blessings of peace, wealth, and prosperity. An uncivilized community, or a pauper population, have neither the wish nor the means to resort to a court of law for the arbitration of their disputes. It is only when the restless habits of a nomad people, or predatory hordes, yield to the influences of peace and civilization—when they settle down into organized communities, and engage in commerce and agriculture—that the conflicting interests awakened by the sustained efforts to amass property eventuate in those complications which can be solved only by a resort either to law or to physical force. In the rude condition in which the greater part of the Central Provinces were, when Mr. Temple took charge, the tendency among the people is to settle their disputes by the latter.



Men's quarrels must be arranged somehow; and when a cheap and equitable administration of justice is within their reach, they will fight their battles out in court rather than on the village plain. The popularity of the Civil Courts in the Central Provinces may be measured by the fact that when Mr. Temple first assumed charge of the administration, there were on the average nineteen thousand suits registered annually, while during the year 1866-67 there were no less than forty-five thousand original suits instituted.

In hygiene and sanitation the progress has been most marked. In 1862 there were sixteen dispensaries; there are now (1866-67) fifty-six of these institutions at which one hundred and fifty thousand patients are treated annually. A special agency has been organized for spreading vaccination, and tens of thousands of children are annually protected from small-pox; while quarantine and other sanitary regulations have very materially diminished the ravages of epidemic cholera. The progress of educational effort is shown by the institution of fifteen hundred and seventy schools, where instruction is imparted to fifty-eight thousand scholars; while Government aid has been extended to schools opened by missionary bodies and private benevolence. Altogether during the last year, fifty thousand pounds sterling were expended on education, of which a fourth was contributed by private individuals.

No one had more reason to appreciate the advantages of a good road than a traveller like Mr. Temple. In addition to the railway to Jubbulpore, which has been completed by the East Indian Railway Company, there were four hundred miles of made road metalled and bridged at the conclusion of the year under review, and a hundred and fifty more under construction, while the local committees at the different large towns were engaged in constructing feeder roads to the several railway stations. It would be tedious to enumerate; but a large list might be given of churches, barracks, magazines, court-houses,



hospitals, rest-houses for travellers, museums, police stations, and wells, erected by Government and private liberality during this period of progress.

The forest department yields a revenue of forty lacs of rupees, while the increase of revenue from the salt tax, from 90,000*l.* to 180,000*l.* a year, without any increase of duty, is a sure sign of the growing prosperity of the poorer classes. The material progress of the country may be further measured by the fact that during the years 1866-67 the people of these provinces paid into the public treasury 1,210,000*l.*, compared with 820,000*l.* in 1862; that during the past year they voluntarily contributed about 35,000*l.* to charitable objects, to public and local improvements, and to industrial exhibitions, whereas in 1862 they scarcely gave a rupee towards anything of the kind; that during the last twelve months they exported to other provinces 4,340,000*l.* worth of produce and manufactures, as compared with 1,650,000*l.* worth in 1863, the earliest period for which there are statistics; and that they imported during the same time 4,642,000*l.* worth of foreign commodities, exclusive of bullion, as against 980,000*l.* worth in 1863.

In 1866 Sir Richard Temple resigned the post of Chief Commissioner of the Central Provinces for the Residency at Hyderabad, whence he was transferred to the Governor-General's Council in the place of the Hon. Mr. Massey, the first civilian appointed to the post which was originally designed especially for some financier straight from England. Sir Charles Trevelyan is no exception, for although formerly in the Civil Service, he had retired a long while before he came to India as Finance minister. Sir Richard Temple was succeeded by Mr. Morris, who drew up the report on the administration of the Central Provinces for 1866-67, already quoted. He speaks in the following terms of his predecessor, paying a noble and well-merited tribute to his genius and energy:—

“Whatever of progress has been noted in the foregoing paragraph, was secured during Mr. Temple's rule. No such progress had been



seen in this part of India before. Much of it may, nay must be, due to the action of natural, commercial, and social forces. But something, at any rate, may have been the result of good government, and must have been due to the personal exertions of Mr. Temple, to the system which he introduced, and to the body of officers which he trained.

"Perhaps among the many ways in which Mr. Temple benefited the Central Provinces, that service will not be reckoned the least important which he rendered by placing before the Supreme Government and the public full reports of the country, its people, its resources, its capabilities, and its trade. The thorough knowledge of the country gained in his many long and arduous journeys, performed at all seasons of the year, enabled him to report fully upon schemes for roads, for railways, for irrigation, for navigation, for mining enterprises, the full accomplishment of which will hardly be seen by the present generation."

Mr. Morris might safely have asserted not only that no such progress had been seen in that part of India, but that no such progress had been seen anywhere before. Instances are numerous where, under the influence of Anglo-Saxon energy, favoured by nature with a fertile soil and a good climate, and convenient harbour, a colony has sprung into existence and made more progress in the time than the Central Provinces had accomplished between 1861 and 1867. But here it was not Anglo-Saxon energy that Mr. Temple had to work with, but an Asiatic population in a backward stage of civilization, the major part, indeed, in absolute barbarism. The natural advantages of the territory were in his favour; without that he would have been powerless. But administrative genius shows itself best in a capacity to seize opportunities, to make the most of every advantage; and as the greatest triumphs of science are those in which she has subdued the forces of nature and taught them to subserve some useful purpose, so the greatest achievements of administrative ability have been evinced in exercising influence over the human will, and bending it to subserve the purposes of national progress and general prosperity. This achievement it was Sir Richard Temple's good fortune to accomplish; and a man who may be said to have raised by the force of his own

will and vigorous intellect a whole population from a condition of barbarism to that of a decent and well-ordered commercial and agricultural community, must be reckoned amongst the benefactors of mankind.

That a great future is before the Central Provinces must be apparent to anyone who will study the map of India. Consisting mostly of elevated plateaux of table-land, fertile beyond description; lying in the very heart of the Continent, with a climate that will be salubrious and tolerably temperate when the jungle has been cleared away and the country drained; within easy reach by rail of the western coast and the harbour of Bombay; watered by some of the largest rivers in the world, navigable even now for hundreds of miles, and capable by engineering efforts of being made navigable for as many more; with river communication extending on one side to the Bay of Bengal, and on the other to the Indian Ocean; intersected by the main arteries of traffic between Europe and Upper India; in a political and strategical point of view the safest part of the whole continent, because the furthest removed from the frontier, and in close communication with our resources; a table-land upon which, if the British army were driven from every other part of India by some great combination of European or Asiatic prowess, it would be placed in an impregnable position; itself a region as yet unsubdued by any former conqueror of Hindustan,—the Central Provinces bid fair to be hereafter the nucleus of British enterprise and the heart of British power in the East. Geographical and political considerations will eventually place the capital of British India at Jubbulpore or somewhere in its neighbourhood.

Thence, as from a central point within easy access of England, and within reach of every corner of the Indian continent, the Supreme Government will be able, when the network of railways now in course of construction is complete, to supervise and control with ease and efficiency the administration, even to the most distant limits of the Empire.



CHAPTER X.

1865.

00 The Bhotan embassy—Sir Herbert Edwardes—Indian estimate of public men—Sir Charles Trevelyan—Budget for 1865-66—Speculation mania in Bombay—Value of land in Bombay—Time bargains—Mr. Justice Anstey—General crash—Sanitary condition of Bombay and Calcutta—Port Canning—Madras—Assassination at Peshawur—Fanaticism—Insecurity of European life—The Mhow death march—Roorkee College—Sir Bartle Frere's address to the Mahratta Sirdars.

THE second year of Sir John Lawrence's administration opened with favourable auspices. A series of petty failures and disappointments in Bhotan reiterated the oft-repeated warning against embroiling ourselves with barbarous neighbours, difficult of access and unmanageable either by the arts of peace or war when reached. But the mischief had been done before Sir John came out, and in no way can he be held responsible. Towards the end of the year, when the circumstances more fully detailed in another chapter became publicly known, an unseemly recrimination took place between the officials whose credit were at stake, or their partisans, and some serious accusations of giving to the public garbled despatches and official documents, with the view of misleading them as to the real source of failure and disgrace, were not satisfactorily answered. It is easy to be wise after the event, but there can be little doubt that the envoy, the Hon. Ashley Eden, was most anxious to proceed to the capital, in spite of the repeated hints that he was not wanted there, and in face of



the obstacles put in his way. To have abandoned the enterprise would have perhaps laid him open to the charge of timidity or want of zeal, but real diplomatic genius evinces itself in the avoidance of political dilemmas, as much as courage and presence of mind in escaping from them when caught in their toils.

In the early part of the year India was deprived of the genius and ability of one of the most eminent of that school of soldier-statesmen who in the past official generation had done such good service to the country. Sir Herbert Edwardes' last public act of importance was the trial of the Wahabee conspirators. He had filled successively the post of Commissioner of Peshawur and Umballa, and, if the public voice could have controlled the selection, would have been appointed Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, upon Sir Robert Montgomery's retirement. His brilliant services are too well known to need recapitulation, and India could ill afford to lose the experience, the personal influence, the undaunted courage, the presence of mind combined with the power of action in great emergencies, of the man who held the helm in the Peshawur district during the rebellion.

It is too much the custom in England to ignore the existence in India of anything in the shape of public opinion. Public opinion, indeed, there is not in the same sense as it exists in England, for there is no House of Commons as the ultimate court of appeal, without which the press would be powerless. The press in India is consequently dependent on the extent to which it can influence Government by sound argument or cogent reasoning. But the public opinion of India, such as it is, ought not to be totally ignored. The major part of it emanates from the official classes, and is the experience of the thoughts and views of members of the different branches of the public services, who, through the medium of the press, make known sentiments and opinions for which the regular official channels of communication with



the Government afford no vent. In such matters as the selection of governors and appointments of men to high offices in the State, the expression of opinion in India, especially when unanimous or nearly so, might with advantage be consulted in the selection of candidates, of whose abilities the Indian public (including the official world) is in a much better position to judge, and will judge, more accurately than the English.

The merits of the policy Sir Charles Trevelyan adopted in his last budget for 1865-66 will be discussed under the chapter on Finance. The history and fate of that budget may be related here. Sir Charles Trevelyan's determined opposition to his *bête noir*, the Income-tax, has a melodramatic air about it which may reconcile the general reader to a subject usually so repulsive as a budget. Recalled from Madras because he condemned the Income-tax, and sent out again as Finance minister because Sir Chas. Wood saw he was right in condemning the Income-tax, though wrong in the way he did it; forced during his three years of office to permit the existence of the impost, he was determined not to quit India and leave his foe behind him. But there was a deficit, and how should that be met and the Income-tax nevertheless demolished? He proposed a loan for public works for 1,200,000*l.*, and an increase on the export duties. The proposition was received in Council with disfavour. Sir John Lawrence had the power, but declined the responsibility, of rejecting the budget altogether. Outside the Council chamber the resolution was received with dismay. Export and import duties touched the pockets of the class who were quite powerful enough to be feared by a Secretary of State; the Liverpool and Manchester merchants re-echoed the cry uttered from Calcutta and Bombay, and the budget was returned "disapproved." Sir Charles Wood preferred a deficit to an equilibrium produced by a loan and a tax on raw produce. Meantime, Sir Charles Trevelyan had left the field to his enemies, having had the grim satisfac-

tion before he went of laying up the Income-tax, as he expressed it, "a potent but imperfect fiscal machine upon the shelf, complete in all its gear, ready to be re-imposed in case of any new emergency." Sir Charles Trevelyan was right in his determined opposition to the impost. It has lain where he placed it in all its gear, but no succeeding minister has cared to use it, though it has been several times taken down, turned over, and then put back again.¹

Another public man, who during his tenure of office had left an ineffaceable mark of his genius upon the department of the administration allotted to him, left India this year. After being feasted and toasted at a public dinner in Calcutta, the place where three short years before he had been at the very height of unpopularity, Sir Hugh Rose made over the command of the army in India to Sir William Mansfield, and sailed for England in March. The same year which saw Sir William Mansfield removed from Bombay to the head of the army, and Sir R. Napier installed in his place, witnessed also the retirement of another distinguished officer, Sir Hope Grant, from the Commander-in-chiefship of Madras, and the advent of Sir Gaspar Le Marchant in his room.

The spirit of wild speculation which had in the last two years infected, more or less, all classes of the community, this year reached a climax, and was followed by the inevitable reaction. The growing traffic of Bombay and the impetus given to the import trade by the opening of the railways had increased enormously the value of land in the island. The population, on such respectable authorities as McCulloch and Martin, was in 1861 at the surprisingly low figure of a little upwards of half a million. But this half-million of souls were confined within the narrow limits of an island of an oblong shape, eight miles

¹ Since this was written, Sir R. Temple has re-introduced this tax in a modified form.



in length from north to south, and between two and three miles wide. In such a position it is obvious that any land reclaimed from the sea would become of the utmost possible value; and during the time of the unexampled prosperity which the Western Presidency enjoyed from 1861 to 1865, reclamation schemes were in high favour. The present year 1865 was a period of wild speculative excitement in Bombay. Enormous fortunes had been realized in the cotton trade, and capitalists were longing for investments. House accommodation, at best of times very dear and most scanty in proportion to the requirements of the European and the heads of the native community, rose to a fabulous rent. A writer in the *Times of India* stated that there were at that time (April and May) twenty or thirty English gentlemen residing in Bombay houseless. A well-known official had given up his house because the owner raised the rent to 300 rupees (30*l.*) a month, refusing to pay so large a sum. The owner immediately afterwards declined an offer of 750 rupees, and would not take less than 1,000 rupees a month. A mercantile house paid 107,500*l.* for offices which in Calcutta would not have fetched 20,000*l.*; and another rented a ground-floor warehouse at 2,400*l.* a year. Shares in the Colaba Land Company rose from 10,000 rupees at par to 1 lac and 20,000, or twelve times the par value. Back Bay shares went up from 2,000 rupees to 54,000. Equally great was the rise in Press property. Shares in the Elphinstone Press Company went up from 40,000 to 1 lac and 35,000 rupees; and the Apollo Press Company from 12,000 to upwards of 20,000. It was in the height of this speculating mania that the Bank of Bombay, one of whose directors was the famous Premchund Roychund, at one time possessed of almost countless wealth, commenced the course of action which eventuated in the crash of 1868. A clause in its charter empowered it to make advances on the security of shares, and it did so, among others, to the Back Bay Company,

reckoning its shares at the then fictitious value of 25,000 rupees.

But if this speculation, wild as it was, had been conducted on anything like sound commercial principles, the consequences would not have been anything like so serious as they were. But the wealth which rested on the caprice of the share-market was imaginary. Shares, it is true, were bought and sold at fabulous prices, but the greater part of these transactions were what is called time bargains; that is to say, the purchaser bought shares and promised to pay at a long future date, trusting in the meantime to realize the amount due by a profit on a further rise in prices. He sold again immediately at a large premium on the same terms, and the person who bought from him sold again to a fourth party under similar conditions. It was during the prevalence of this gambling mania that Mr. Chisholm Anstey, formerly of the Hong Kong and more recently of the Bombay bar, was raised to fill a temporary vacancy in the bench of the High Court. It may well be supposed that these time-bargains were not likely to be very favourably viewed in a court of law; and Mr. Justice Anstey—who combined with great eccentricity of manner much determination of character, and an unusually vehement habit of expression—struck terror into the hearts of insolvents who had dabbled in questionable transactions. An Augæan stable required a Hercules to clean it, and a Hercules was found. In one of the first cases that came before him where the time-bargains formed the subject of the suit, the indignant judge, in dismissing the case with costs, remarked that, “According to the custom of these miserable gamblers, of whom the native community of all races, except the Moslem, appeared to be full, they made a double venture; first of all a venture in the way of purchase, and then again in the way of resale, without any intention to give delivery or to take delivery, but merely to settle the differences in both.”

Most English readers are familiar with the name of Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeeboy, the millionaire Parsee baronet, who raised himself from a vendor of old bottles to be one of the wealthiest men in the world. In the crash of falling firms and wide-spread insolvency that swept like a cyclone over Bombay in the latter part of 1865, the nephew of the wealthy baronet had to seek the protection of the Insolvent Court. His assets were $13\frac{1}{2}$ lacs as represented, and his debts 55 lacs, or 550,000/. Mr. Justice Anstey sent him to jail for two years for fraud, but somewhat weakened the effect of his remarks in sentencing him, by offensive allusions to his uncle's origin. "A man," he said, "who is originally a dealer in old bottles, gambles till he has contracted debts to the amount of 55 lacs."

The speculating mania in Bombay at this time almost amounted to a moral epidemic, like the dancing and other epidemics of the Middle Ages, with which Hecker's interesting pages have made us familiar. It was succeeded by the inevitable reaction. Failure followed failure, confidence was gone, and amid the general dismay, when no one dared trust his neighbour, the day fixed for the settlement of the time-bargains, the 1st July, approached. It usually happens that the apprehensions of impending calamity are worse than the reality. The state of commercial affairs could hardly have been worse than it was before the 1st July. The climax of the crisis on that day and the succeeding Monday, the 3d, was less disastrous than had been expected, perhaps because, where so many had failed to meet engagements, the means or the will to force the consequence of failures on the defaulters may have been wanting. No more striking and sad illustration of the consequences of a gambling, speculative mania is to be found than the fact of a once thriving and prosperous commercial community urging the Legislature by a memorial to amend the Insolvent Act, so as to simplify and accelerate its process, "with all the haste the constitution of the country will admit."



Much light will probably be thrown upon the commercial history of Bombay at this juncture by the publication of the report of the commission of inquiry into the affairs of the Bombay Bank. While that inquiry is incomplete, it will be dangerous to hazard, and unjust to express, an opinion on the conduct of the Bombay Government. From what is before the public now, there was unquestionably a want of firmness and of caution, and an inability to foresee the extent of the danger that surrounded them. As has been mentioned in another place, Sir William Mansfield, one of the members of that Government, does not hesitate to plead on his own behalf and that of his colleagues the dangerous doctrine that it was too much to have expected the Government to resist the tide of public feeling. And when the condition of the Bank had become known, though not perhaps to its full extent, there was a backwardness on the part of the subordinate in affording the Supreme Government all the information it wanted. Nothing, however, has been urged in extenuation of the reckless imprudence which caused the ruin of the Bank.

Towards the end of September a slight reaction from the state of deep depression in which the market had fallen took place in consequence of a sudden rise in the price of cotton, owing to the discovery that the supposed resources in America had failed to realize what was expected. But the system had been too much shattered and disorganized by the late attack of the epidemic for any healthy reaction to ensue so soon after the crisis of the disease, and the speculation that followed partook of the same wild character that had distinguished the era of time-bargains. It was followed by a crisis in the money-market at the close of the year, when the Supreme Government, acting upon urgent requisition for aid transmitted by telegraph to Calcutta, sent round 60 lacs (600,000/.) in silver, while about 30 lacs more were supplied by private firms. Two steamers were engaged to convey this large

amount of specie, and thus poured into Bombay upwards of a million sterling within a fortnight.

The European reader is familiar with the contrast Oriental cities so often afford, between enormous wealth side by side with abject poverty, squalor, and wretchedness. In spite of the scarcity of money in the exhausted treasury of the Government and the Bank of Bombay, it is allowed on all hands that the city contained enormous wealth. Some of the most munificent gifts for charitable institutions that modern times can boast have been made by wealthy merchants of Bombay. Sir Jamsetjee Jeejeeboy, the bottle-seller, and David Sassoon and others, have enriched their native city, and immortalized their names by their princely donations to hospitals, and other endowments, to relieve the wants and mitigate the sufferings of humanity.¹ Yet a city whose merchants might, even in the hour of depression, after a period of unwonted excitement, have paved their streets with silver, could call forth the following remarks of the Municipal Commissioner in 1861 :—"Go into the native town," says Mr. Crauford, "and around you will see on all sides filth immeasurable and indescribable, and at places almost unfathomable ; filthy animals, filthy habits, filthy streets, and with filthy court-yards round the houses of the rich, and masses of filth around the dwellings of the poor, foul and loathsome trades, crowded houses, foul markets, foul meat and food, foul wells and tanks and swamps, foul smells at every turn, unventilated drains, and sewers choked with animal and human ordure, and the garbage of an Oriental city. Men, women, and children, the rich and the poor, living with animals of all kinds and vermin ; seeing all this, smelling and inhaling the tainted, deadly atmosphere, and dying by the thousand. And this," he adds, "is Bombay, as it will be ere long, the focus of the trade of India, fed by thousands of miles of railway, its population doubled, overflowing the island, daily—nay

¹ Mr. Premchund Roychund, at the height of the epidemic, gave £20,000 to the Bombay University.



hourly—adding to the horrors faintly depicted here.” Much has been done since that was written, although much remains to do. But the visitor to the capital of the Western Presidency cannot fail to be struck with the contrast between the external appearance of Bombay and the natural beauties of the place, as he sees them, and the handiwork of its inhabitants, as described by the Municipal Commissioner.

The harbour, one of the finest in the world, is formed by a crescent-shaped group of islands, of which Salsette (connected by a causeway), Elephanta, and Colaba are the most familiar to English readers. The rays of a tropical sun are tempered by a delicious breeze; innumerable boats glide here and there on errands of business or pleasure; stately ships ride securely at anchor in the offing; picturesque islets rise abruptly from the ocean, clad from the summit to the very edge with the richest tropical verdure; and the branches of the trees hang so close over the water that they seem to coquet with the rippling waves as they toss themselves in wanton sport upon the pebbly shore. Such a scene, under the clear blue Indian sky and bright sunshine, as it meets the eye of the exile who enters India by its western gate, is well calculated to impress him favourably with the land of his adoption. Nor would he be undeceived as long as he remained content with a superficial view of the place. A nearer acquaintance might reveal enough to justify the strictures of Mr. Crauford and the denunciations of Mr. Justice Anstey.

Three years of persevering energy in working out sanitary reforms have, however, done wonders. A writer in the *Friend of India*, in April 1868, thus eulogizes the results of Mr. Crauford's efforts:—“In three years, assisted by a good health-officer, he has wrought a marvellous revolution. Except in a few obscure lanes, the city is almost devoid of bad odours. Its area is nearly thrice that of municipal Calcutta, yet every street and house, and



every road is daily swept as well as watered, and the dust is carefully removed. Its natural effect has been seen not merely in the comfort of all classes of the inhabitants, but in the fact that cholera, which used to be endemic in the city, as it is in Calcutta, has not been known for some time."

But Calcutta felt the effect of the speculative mania, though not to the same extent as the sister Presidency. Situated a hundred miles from the sea, with which it is connected by an awkward river, most difficult of navigation, the capital of British India enjoys a trade unsurpassed by that of any commercial city in the Eastern hemisphere. The noble river—for at Calcutta the Hooghly is well worthy of the name—is crowded with a forest of masts, the vessels all lying comparatively close together, so as to present a much more imposing appearance than double the number of vessels at anchor in a spacious harbour like Bombay.

Ill adapted for commerce, the Hooghly affords the best defence a maritime capital could have. It is only by the assistance of trained pilots, who have to spend their lives from early boyhood in mastering the difficulties of Hooghly navigation, learning the intricacies of the channels, and watching the ever-shifting shoals and sand-banks of the capricious river, that any ship of large burden can reach the port. Were the landmarks, and the lights, and the buoys to be removed, no human skill or caution could steer a vessel through the narrow winding channels of which the unpractised eye can perceive no trace. The experiment would be attended with certain destruction to any ship that attempted it. Even with all the precaution that a careful supervision, constant watching, and a large establishment can secure, accidents frequently occur; and a ship that has reached the Bay of Bengal from Calcutta in safety, may sail round the world and return again without encountering any danger in navigation so dangerous and difficult as the voyage down the Hooghly. For a long while it was believed that the channels of the Hooghly, intricate as they are, were annually becoming more diffi-

cult in navigation by the silting of the bed of the river. Whether this be so or no, there can be but one opinion as to the advantage of a seaport within easy distance of the Bay, and connected with Calcutta by rail. The delta of the Ganges, which is almost double the size of that of the Nile, begins to be formed about two hundred miles from the sea. It consists of a vast alluvial level covered with vegetation, and intersected with a network of innumerable streams and channels, each connected with the other, and appearing to the eye a vast maritime labyrinth of natural canals. The delta is about two hundred miles in breadth, and is bounded by two principal arms or bifurcations of the main stream, the easternmost of which preserves the name of the Ganges, or the Bhagirathi; the westernmost branch flowing by Calcutta, is called the Hooghly. At one of the numerous outlets by which the waters of the holy river find their way to the sea, a site has been fixed upon for a harbour, and called Port Canning. The choice of the site, and the scheme altogether, is due to Lord Dalhousie, although the locality now goes by the name of his successor. A railway was sanctioned under the usual system of Indian railways, by guarantee: but for years the scheme hung fire; the Government expecting that the commercial community would carry out a measure in which it was so much interested, the community looking to Government to complete what they had begun. Matters were in this unsatisfactory state when an enterprising merchant of Calcutta, Mr. Schiller, took them in hand, and got up the "Port Canning Reclamation and Dock Company," with the object of securing valuable landed property in the new port and town of Canning and its immediate vicinity, building upon it, constructing docks, wharves, &c. &c. The capital was 1,200,000*l.* in shares at 200*l.* each. The company had not been started long before the 2,000 rupee shares went up to 12,000. But though the railway company runs its trains daily between Calcutta and the port, the trains go and come empty, except when



some traveller is tempted by curiosity to visit the silent city; or some English gentleman from Calcutta, in search of change of air, takes his belongings with him to enjoy the sea-breeze on the Mutlah. There may be seen the strange spectacle of a city without an inhabitant; extensive wharves and docks without a ship, warehouses unoccupied, and not a human being visible upon the quays. It has been said that the Mutlah port does not possess the advantages it was supposed to enjoy when Lord Dalhousie fixed upon the site as the future harbour of one of the richest countries in the world. It is about forty miles from the sea, but the navigation is much less dangerous and difficult than that of the Hooghly, and it is not easy to see any reason stronger than the caprice of fashion, or the objection of sailors to a dull harbour, for the original scheme not being carried out in its entirety. It was thought that the great cyclone of 1864 would prove an illustration of the adage that it is an ill wind that blows no good, and that when the disadvantages of a confined space like the Hooghly for the Calcutta harbour were so fully and so fatally evinced, vessels would eagerly embrace the opportunity afforded by the Mutlah of securing a safer harbour. Unfortunately at the time it was not quite ready, and as these heavy cyclones generally come at an interval of twenty years, the usual mode of reasoning was resorted to; and the merchants argued, the next cyclone would not come in their time, and after that, if a deluge swept over the place, they would be unaffected by it. After passing through the furnace of hot speculation, the Port Canning Company has recently been cooling itself in the law courts, owing to disputes among the directors and shareholders, which are now, however, terminated. Its ultimate fate it is impossible to foretell, but the final abandonment of the magnificent project of its enterprising founder would be almost a national misfortune.¹

¹ The whole history of the Port Canning scheme has recently been collected and published by Government with the view of encouraging

Two other grand schemes divided the attention of the Calcutta speculators at the same time: one was a Reclamation and Irrigation Company, to reclaim a vast salt

public discussion on the question, and with the forlorn hope that some light may be thrown upon the present dilemma.

It is a strange story, a chapter of mistakes from beginning to end. The panic about the gradual deterioration of the navigation of the Hooghly in 1853, the *fons et origo mali*, was a mistake. But that great statesman, Lord Dalhousie, shared in it, and directed the purchase, at a cost of 11,000 rupees, of the lot of ground on which the existing skeleton of the township was erected, and ordered a survey of the Mutlah estuary, and of the country between it and Calcutta, with a view to the construction of a railway. Major Baker reported favourably of the country for railway works, and Lieut. Ward of the estuary. "There was nothing," he said, "to prevent vessels of the largest tonnage from proceeding up and down the river at all times."

The Government lay the blame of the first movement in the matter on the Bengal Chamber of Commerce, which first raised the alarm of the closing of the river. Within the following two years they had altered their decision, for when the Committee on the Hooghly made their report, it was rather in favour of adopting measures to improve the Hooghly than to carry on the Mutlah scheme. The experience of the thirteen years that have since elapsed has confirmed the impression of the Chamber of Commerce in 1855, and it is the opinion of many competent judges that the navigation of the river, so far from deteriorating year by year, is, if anything, improving.

Meantime, as if nothing could be done right in this business, Government made the discovery that the vendor from whom they had purchased the lot had previously alienated all really beneficiary rights: in short, what he sold he had no right to sell. No explanation is afforded as to how the Government, with their staff of solicitors and Advocate-General, could have made such a blunder; for the expression in the *Gazette*, "that the purchase was a hasty one, and made secretly without the usual forms," only raises a question without answering it.

On the 14th December in the year 1855—a great day in the history of Port Canning—a ship actually made its appearance in Mutlah! This notable event cost the Government, however, 15,000 rupees, which sum was sanctioned for "buoying off the estuary."

On the 12th March a committee of Government officers and "a party of merchants," says the *Gazette*, proceeded to inspect the site of the proposed port and the estuary. "The report of the merchants" and of the committee were alike *coulour de rose*, the committee quoting with something like incredulous scorn a remarkable prophecy of Mr. Piddington, as follows:—



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marsh in the neighbourhood of Calcutta, irrigate it, and utilize the sewage of the city upon an area of 130 square miles, capital 600,000*l.*; and the other was a project to

“Supposing the head of the Mutlah were to be fixed upon as a mercantile and naval depôt, everything and everyone must be prepared to see a day when in the midst of the horrors of a hurricane they will find a terrific mass of salt water rolling in or rising upon them with such rapidity that in a few minutes the whole settlement will be inundated to a depth of from five to eighteen feet.”

This is precisely what did occur on the occasion of the last cyclone in November 1867.

It will not be necessary to detail the different measures proposed, some to be rejected, others to be carried out up to 1857, during which year the site of the projected town and its vicinity was cleared of jungle, and arrangements made to reclaim 667 acres of land in the immediate neighbourhood. Up to 1858 only thirteen vessels had taken advantage of the port, and the consignees of these ships experienced so much difficulty in disposing of their cargoes that for at least four years not another ship entered the port !

The projectors, however, were not discouraged, and an association called the Mutlah Association was founded in 1858 to further the scheme, which at this stage enjoyed the support of the then Lieut.-Governor of Bengal, Mr. Halliday.

About this time the railway project was started, but Lord Canning and the members of his Government threw cold water on it. The association, however, returned again and again to the charge; and having the support of Mr. Halliday and influential people at work on their behalf in London, the Secretary of State on the 12th November, 1858, authorized a guarantee of five per cent. on £280,000, the *then* estimated cost. When it was found the expenses came to £500,000 instead of £280,000, the Government could not very well help themselves, and having once put their neck into the collar of a guarantee, were obliged to keep it there, and to extend the security to the half-million. The line was opened in 1863, and has never paid its expenses. This year (1867) the company have made it over to the Government.

The next important step was the creation of a municipality under sanction of Mr. Beadon's government, and the transfer to this body, in trust for the town of Canning, of certain lots of land, on which it endeavoured unsuccessfully to raise a debenture loan of 10 lacs at 5½ per cent.

In March 1864, the municipality sent in an estimate to Mr. Beadon of 21 lacs, which were required for various improvements, drainage, roads, &c., and Mr. Beadon so far met their views as to ask for a loan of 4½ lacs to complete improvements of the most urgent kind. Sir C. Trevelyan

reclaim and bring under cultivation the area of the Sunderbuns, the alluvial tract before described between the mouths of the Ganges. Neither of these schemes resulted in anything beyond wild speculation in shares.

The usual placid atmosphere of Madras remained unstoutly opposed the measure, but Sir John Lawrence addressed the Secretary of State with a view to obtaining a sanction of a loan of 4½ lacs, on condition that the municipality raised 15½ lacs for themselves.

After a little pressure had been put on Government by the Chamber of Commerce and some Calcutta firms to go on with the scheme without effect, Mr. Schiller came forward with his "Port Canning Land Investment Reclamation and Dock Company (Limited)," in the height of the speculative mania of 1864. Upon the strength of 60 lacs of rupees raised by this company, the municipality claimed the loan of 4½ lacs conditionally promised, and it was granted.

Hitherto, so far as being resorted to by vessels, the Port Canning scheme has proved a failure. There is nothing particularly against the port, the navigation of the Mutlah is good, and although the place is not very healthy, it is clear that as long as the navigation of the Hooghly does not deteriorate, ships will not go to Mutlah. Meantime the municipality has spent much money upon the drainage of the place and upon the construction of metalled roads. The jungle has been cleared, and the land more or less cultivated. The Port Canning Company has erected a spacious hotel, and costly rice mills and one or two other buildings. They have nearly completed the excavation of a boat dock, and have done a good deal for the protection of the fore-shore, and have erected some jetties. The Government and the railway company have also erected some buildings.

After giving a history of the whole affair, and describing its present condition, the Commissioner who compiled this report proceeds to call upon Government to determine what to do next, whether to abandon it altogether or to complete it altogether, or to temporize, that is to say, leave it as it is, withdrawing all establishments, and just keeping the place from falling to actual ruin, and let everything remain *in statu quo* till the Hooghly becomes unnavigable, when ships will be only too glad to resort to the new port. On the other hand, if completed, all efforts should be made to carry out the original design. The port should be declared a free port for the next five years, and to set things going, all Government marine establishments should be moved and located there at once. This would cost about 20 lacs.

Another proposition is that made by Mr. Schiller, for the Government to guarantee the interest on £2,000,000 sterling, to be raised by a company to buy up the Sunderbuns, the railway, and the present Port Canning Company.



disturbed by the whirlwind which passed over the share markets of Calcutta and Bombay, and only lent itself to one scheme of utility and importance if it had been but sound—an Irrigation and Canal Company with the magnificent project of carrying water over 400,000 acres, and affording 300 miles of uninterrupted navigation. Unlike the other schemes and projects in Calcutta and Bombay, the Government sanctioned a guarantee of five per cent. upon a capital of 1,000,000*l.* to the Madras Company. Sir William Denison, whose project of supplying agricultural machinery for the use of the natives has been before noticed, had in the meantime become convinced that the introduction of improved agricultural implements would be premature till the people were willing and instructed how to use them, but he adopted and endorsed the views of Sir Charles Trevelyan, who in his rejected budget had advocated the policy of constructing permanent public works by means of loans.

But few political events of importance took place this year. In Upper India, at Peshawur, two valuable lives were sacrificed to the fury of Mussulman fanatics. Major Adam, the Deputy-Commissioner of Peshawur, was suddenly attacked and cut down at the gate of the city, and Lieutenant Ommaney, of the Guide Corps, was shortly after stabbed. Determined to make an example which should crush the growing spirit of assassination, Mr. Macnabb, who had taken Major Adam's place, rode out to the locality where the murderer of Lieutenant Ommaney had been apprehended on the scene of his crime, had him hanged, and his body burnt on the spot, a proceeding which was subsequently fully confirmed by Government.

A wild, fanatical Mussulman, from the regions about Peshawur, has little enough to all appearance to make life dear to him. With neither kith nor kin that he cares about, neither wife nor child, no property, no habitation, no friends, very little clothing, and scanty food, an ex-

change from this world to the next must be a clear gain. A firm belief in the promises of the Koran and the dogmas of his bigoted moollas, or religious instructors, a fertile imagination, a strong will, and physical daring, are elements of savage enthusiasm well calculated to arouse the excitable temperament of the Affghan, and the state of mind thus produced may very often be intensified by a tendency to hereditary insanity. When a mind thus constituted and prepared for crime becomes impressed with the idea that to compass the death of one of the hated English unbelievers is to secure instant admission into the Mahommedan paradise; when a condition of abject poverty will be changed at once to inconceivable bliss—a bliss in which the possession of many wives and plenty of camels, with abundance of good food, are principal ingredients;—when a man of the nature above described, takes home the idea to his heart, dwells upon it, and cherishes it, there is nothing to be wondered at that it develops into action. English officials are to a fault careless about their personal safety. Any man who intends treachery can easily gain access to almost any officer of any rank in India. Their doors are open all day, and generally all night. Some few sleep with loaded revolvers by their side, or under their pillows, but they are exceptions. In the morning and evening rides they are unaccompanied by any escort, and without any weapon of defence. Almost at any hour of the day or night, the hand of the assassin might be directed, with unerring aim, against the life of almost any officer in India. The marvel is, not that assassinations occur, but that they are not much more frequent; especially in and about a country like Peshawur, where there are hundreds of fanatics for whom death has really no terror.

But as in the early part of the century it was found that the capital punishment of criminals had no effect in suppressing Italian brigandage, until the practice was adopted of executing them without allowing the access



of a priest, so the only hope of checking the practice of assassination among the wild fanatics of the Peshawur valley was to adopt some penalty which should affect the state of the criminal in the other world besides dismissing him from this. Accordingly the plan of burning the bodies of assassins was tried, first in the case of the murderer of that distinguished officer Colonel Mackeson, the Commissioner of Peshawur, in 1853. Colonel Mackeson had been stabbed through the lungs and chest while sitting in his verandah reading some official papers. The long, sharp, Affghan knife, a murderous-looking weapon, is pretty sure to deal a mortal blow when struck home with a vigorous hand. The assassin was seized; but utterly regardless of his fate he awaited death with the utmost composure, while his victim lingered for a week enduring the most frightful agonies, from which death at last released him. The murderer was condemned to be hanged; but hanging was to him a comparatively pleasant death—an almost painless entrance into Paradise, the reward in store for the martyr who had compassed the death of the representative of the British Government. That loss was deeply felt, for he was an intrepid officer, much dreaded by the wild Affghan tribes, and with a more extended experience of the frontier than any man then living. But what if, after all, Paradise was not to be attained by this deed of treachery? What if the unbelievers, fertile in resources, could devise a scheme to shut the gates of Heaven against the assassin? The authorities were advised to strike terror and dismay into the hearts of the thousands of Mahommedans who, it was known, sympathised deeply with the murderer. It was to be effected by burning the body after execution, which, according to Mussulman superstition, would shut the gate of Paradise on the criminal. It was done, and with the most salutary results. Simple death by hanging had no terrors for these men, but followed by cremation it had, and ever since the practice has been retained.



A more terrible tragedy occurred in the Western Presidency, owing to the indifference of the senior military authorities, and their habit of sacrificing everything to red tape. It had been resolved to break up a European battery at Mhow, and transfer the men ; but the necessary orders could not be issued till the hot weather had set in. There was no pressing necessity at all for the battery to march. It had been in existence for a hundred and four years ; and as the season was advanced, and the route would necessarily lie along a road flanked by impenetrable jungle, a hotbed of disease, as it was known that cholera was raging in the villages by which the detachment would have to pass, the departure might have been delayed for nine months or so, till the weather was more favourable for marching. But no ! under the burning sun, exposed to the fiery heat of the hot winds, and through this death-bearing country, the hapless band of men, women, and children were ordered to proceed ! It was a cruel and wanton sacrifice of human life. Paralysed by the severity of the attack, nineteen corpses of men, women, and children having accumulated in that little camp in a few hours, the officer commanding halted, hesitated, and then returned whence he had started, carrying with his camp the seeds of the disease, in the shape of sick and dying, and leaving the dead behind him in the jungle. The "Mhow death march" would have escaped notice had it not been brought to light by the press ; as it was, the authorities were forced to inquire into it, and the officer commanding the division, General Green, was reprimanded and removed. It may be difficult, as in the case of the tragedy at Meean Meer, to fix with certainty on the department or the officer to blame ; but here, as there, no doubt can be entertained that, if the Quartermaster-General's department had done its duty, a second tragedy might have been averted.

During the year the examples of the Lahore and Calcutta Exhibitions were pretty generally followed ; efforts



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being mostly confined to the display suited to an agricultural community. But the Nagpore Exhibition of arts, manufactures, and produce, in the Central Provinces, under the auspices of Sir Richard Temple, at the close of the year, was conspicuous for the success which attended it. The cause of progress was further advanced by the institution of a college of engineering for the instruction of officers and men in that science. Roorkee, near the foot of the Himalayas, and close to the spot where the waters of the Ganges flow into the great canal, was the site selected for the college. Under the presidentship of Major Medley and his staff of professors, Roorkee College, on the plan designed by Sir Hugh Rose, has turned out one of those institutions that are destined to confer a lasting benefit upon the country. It must be further developed to become the West-Point of India; but it is a germ capable of such development, and well worthy of the hearty support and encouragement of Government. The object of this college is to qualify officers and other students for the engineering profession. The former must be under the rank of field officers before they enter. Leave of absence is granted from regimental duty, and the time spent at the college is reckoned as active service. Non-commissioned officers and soldiers of good character can also get leave to be admitted to the college, and a certificate of proficiency is pretty sure to obtain them staff employ in the Public Works department. Civil students, or those who do not belong to the army, must be not under the age of eighteen, and must furnish a certificate of having passed the first examination in arts at the Calcutta University, or an examination equivalent thereto at any recognised college or university; the usual certificate of good character, soundness of constitution, &c. are also required before matriculation. To officers of the army who study and pass the necessary examinations no appointment is guaranteed, but as a general rule all who qualify obtain employ, only they are required to join the



staff corps. To the non-military student there are eight appointments in the Public Works department, guaranteed annually to men properly qualified; and to those who enter into an engagement, on joining the college, to take employment in the service of Government, if found qualified at the end of the course, the instruction is gratuitous. The educational course embraces all the subjects of instruction imparted at schools and universities in England; and the opening in India for the engineering profession is so great that for many years to come Roorkee College will afford to industrious men a sure stepping-stone to a noble profession and a handsome independence. Indeed, in the opening it gives to young men of promise there is no institution in the United Kingdom to be compared to it, saving always, of course, the disadvantage of a residence in India. The scientific engineer in every country must be prepared to meet with difficulties peculiar to its conformation, the character of its rivers, plains, and mountains, the nature of its soil, and of the means, appliances, and resources it affords. To grapple effectually with these, local knowledge is indispensably necessary. Experience is sometimes too dearly paid for by failure, and the instruction imparted at the Roorkee College cannot fail to be highly valuable to the engineer, whether civil or military, whose field of operations is to be confined to India.

A brief *résumé* of the principal events in Indian administrative progress during 1865 would be incomplete without allusion to an admirable address delivered by Sir Bartle Frere to the Sirdars of the Deccan in durbar. Twice he met the Mahratta chiefs, once on the northern, and on the second occasion on the southern limits of their territory. Alluding to traditions of the past, the great deeds and the renown won by the famous heroes of antiquity, Sir Bartle Frere must have won a way into the hearts of those still uncultured descendants of warrior chiefs, who almost within the memory of the present generation were



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the chivalry of Southern India. Crediting the sons with the warlike energy of the fathers, the speaker endeavoured to bring before them the contrast between the present and the past—between an age of peace and an age of war—showing them that the same energy and vigour which could win victory in battle could, if rightly directed, win no less valuable victories in peace. “Though it is no longer necessary,” he said, “to build forts, you may rival the Pandoo heroes of your early history by cutting roads over mountain gorges and building bridges over unfordable streams. You may emulate Asoka by works of irrigation, or of shelter to travellers, or by building hospitals for the sick and needy, and your name may be remembered with gratitude by future ages when all traditions of the mere fighting chieftains of former days shall have passed away.”



CHAPTER XI.

1866.

Famine and irrigation works—Orissa—Official blunders—Sir William Denison—Irrigation and private enterprise—Horrors of famine—The currency—Gold as a standard—The Currency Commission—Lord Napier visits Wynaad—Sir Bartle Frere resigns—The Bishop of Calcutta—The Indian chaplains—Dr. Cotton's untimely fate—His influence, usefulness, and character—The High Courts.

IF it be true that the horrors of famine may be averted in India by artificial irrigation, the fact that during a review of the history of that country for ten years it has been my lot to record two visitations of that terrible scourge becomes one of much significance. The first visitation within the period embraced in these pages was in 1860-61; the second was in 1866; and the record of 1868 closed with the gloomy prospect of a severe famine over at least one-third of the continent of India. Happily the fall of rain, long withheld in the early part of 1869, has in a great measure belied these forebodings, but in spite of this the distress has been very great, and India has had a very narrow escape of a third famine within the decade. These famines are the most awful visitations. An earthquake, which is destructive enough to form an epoch or a landmark in history, such as the great convulsion at Antioch or at Lisbon, and the recent catastrophe in Peru, occurs once or twice in a century, and carries off its twenty thousand, as in South America, and its sixty thousand, as at Lisbon, and its two hundred and sixty thousand, as at Antioch. There is always a tendency to exaggerate estimates of

great numbers in connexion with striking historical events ; and the longer the interval since the occurrence, the greater is the opportunity for the imagination of successive writers to add to the previous statement. It will be quite sufficient for the purpose of illustration to suppose that the earthquake at Antioch destroyed no more than double the number that fell at Lisbon. Suppose these visitations occurred three times within ten years in the same country, and suppose further, that the researches of science had disclosed a means for averting the calamity, what would be said of a government or a people that in spite of this discovery, and in face of this ever-recurring calamity, persisted in doing nothing to avert it ? When the earth opens and swallows up a dense crowd of men, women, and children, and the sea rushes in with overpowering force, and sweeps away its thousands, or when buildings fall and crush the trembling wretches who have sought shelter under their walls, there is little of physical suffering for those who perish, and the after consequences on the survivors are not to be dreaded ; but when famine comes, the victims who fall under it die by the most horrible of deaths, and the amount of human suffering is perfectly appalling. Added to which, it is invariably followed by an outbreak of epidemic disease—either cholera or fever. The sufferers by earthquake or by war are reckoned by the thousand, but the victims of these Indian famines by the million ! Yet there can be no question that, unlike the earthquake, unlike epidemics, even unlike war, this terrible scourge might be certainly to a great extent, if not entirely, averted.

To the south-west of Calcutta, connecting the Bengal and Madras Presidency, there is a large tract of country on the western coast, washed by the Bay of Bengal, called Orissa. It is intersected by the great Mahanuddy river, which flows by the city of Cuttack into the Bay. In former years this country was inhabited by an industrious and wealthy population. In the time of Akbar it was perhaps at the



height of its prosperity, and the large and populous cities, the temples, the bathing places, the gardens, and buildings on the banks of the Great River,¹ rivalled those which adorned the holy Ganges. Many traces of its former magnificence are found in the shape of ruins now overgrown with jungle. It is not likely that the Mahommedan conqueror would depopulate and destroy a country incorporated by conquest with the empire; but that race of plunderers, the Mahrattas, who followed, were less scrupulous, and partly under the oppressions exercised by them, partly by misrule, and mainly from natural causes, Orissa has sunk during the last century or two from a populous and thriving country to the condition in which we now behold it, inhabited by an indolent and superstitious pauper population, said to number five millions, scattered over an area the size of England and Wales.²

Owing to a failure of the usual rains in 1865, great scarcity, developing as time went on into actual want, began to be felt in Orissa in the latter part of the year. In the early part of 1866, the distress was so great that the East India Irrigation Company began importing rice to feed their people. As usual, the alarm, being given by the non-official Europeans residing in the district, and by the press, was disregarded by the Government; and after the scourge had fallen, after about a million of human beings had perished miserably from want, a commission was appointed to investigate the extraordinary apathy evinced by the local government, and their report, with the minutes and official comments together, makes up a blue book of two thick volumes, which was published in 1867. The cries of the suffering people, and the indignant remonstrances of the press, reached England, and the Secretary of State called on the Viceroy for explanation. The old question was asked who was to blame, and the public was amused and scandalized by a triangular duel

¹ Mahanuddy, or "The Great River." ² *Friend of India*.



between the Viceroy, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, Sir Cecil Beadon, and the Calcutta Board of Revenue; the local authorities in Orissa itself coming in for occasional stray shots from all three.

The Viceroy, in a minute dated 20th April, 1866, concurs with the commission in their opinion, the record of which reads almost like a grim satire, "that timely measures were not taken," and that "valid reasons were not adduced for this neglect." "It seems to me," the Viceroy adds, "beyond all doubt that there was a want of foresight, perception, and precaution, regarding the impending calamity, which was quite unaccountable even when allowance has been made for the fact alluded to by the commission that the officers under the Government of Bengal had with scarcely an exception no previous personal experience of the character of famines."

This must be regarded, however, at best as but a poor attempt to shuffle off the responsibility. The Supreme Government were neither deaf, nor blind, nor dumb; they could read the papers, they could not help hearing what was being talked about everywhere. If a "terrible calamity" was impending, and the Local Government were taking no effective measures to meet it, were the Supreme Government tied hand and foot that they could not remonstrate? Or was it that, according to tradition and custom, the regulations of the service, and red tape, an impending calamity must be allowed to fall, and tens of thousands of human beings be allowed to perish, because the "impending calamity" had not been represented to be "impending" through the "usual channels?"

We have seen that in January the East Indian Irrigation Company found it necessary to import food for their establishments. Mr. Beadon visited Orissa himself in February, and after his return saw the Viceroy and related the result of his visit, and the Viceroy remarks, "that it was after hearing all which he (Mr. Beadon) had to tell me of the state of things in Orissa that I came to the con-



clusion that all which appeared to be necessary had been done for the country." To which Mr. Beadon somewhat testily replies in the Appendix to the Blue Book, at p. 4: "If His Excellency means to say that he does not believe what I have said, and what every witness examined on this point by the Commission has said, there can be no further room for discussion. But the fact is, as shown abundantly by the Commissioners' inquiry, that at that time no one feared that there was not food enough in the province to last till next harvest." It is clear, however, that the Irrigation Company did know there was fear of an absolute failure of food. Sir John Lawrence remarked that Mr. Beadon should have attached more weight to the views of those who held an opinion contrary to the officials, such as Colonel Rundall, the Company's engineer, and others, and have helped them to combat the opinion of the Board of Revenue, to convince them of the real state of the Province.

The inaction of the Board is thus excused by Mr. Grote, the senior member. At par. 20 of the Appendix, he says: "We have been charged with inaction in having failed to import food despite the warnings of the non-official community of the Province conveyed to us through the press. On such statements, *all unsupported as they were by those of our own local officers*, we have been held to blame for not doing in February and March what we had at last to do in May." The reasoning by which the Board was led to their conclusion is curious. They refused to import food into Orissa because Sir Charles Trevelyan's account of the second Irish famine in 1846, published in the *Edinburgh Review*, No. 175, of 1848, shows that "the Government of that day throughout stated interference inexpedient in a crisis assumed to be similar to this." Mr. Grote then quotes the whole passage upon which he relies, and adds:

"I have made this quotation in the belief that it will explain and justify our hesitation to recommend a depar-



ture from rules and principles which paragraph 8 of the Secretary of State's despatch admits should not be lightly interfered with," (the interference by Government with the ordinary operations of trade;) "the question which so anxiously occupied the Home Government in 1846, and which was finally dealt with by adopting measures confining their interference in Ireland to a minimum, did not till the end of May come before us in the same form. It was then only that the actual crisis presented itself to the Commissioner of Cuttack, and that with him we saw the necessity for sacrificing every consideration" (even the *Edinburgh Review* of 1848) "to that of humanity."

In April the Supreme Government betook itself to Simla, and shortly after Mr. Beadon retired to Darjeeling, and the people in Orissa perished in thousands for lack of food.

The episode is worthy of this detail because it illustrates most forcibly the prominent defect in the constitution of the Indian Government, the excess of its bureaucratic element, its bondage to red tape, its exaggerated jealousy of external influence or non-official interference, and the contracting effect upon the mind which long years spent in the official groove of departmental routine inevitably imparts.

While Mr. Beadon, the old Bengal civilian promoted to Lieutenant-Governor, kept himself cool at Darjeeling, and only repaired to Calcutta, and that for a short time after the setting-in of the rains, in obedience to the order of the Viceroy, Lord Napier, the Governor of Madras, himself went, in the scorching month of May, to that portion of the district affected with famine which lay within the limits of his charge, and deputed the best officers he could find to other parts; and doubtless Sir William Denison would have done the same, had he been then in office, but he had recently retired on the expiration of his time, and had been succeeded by Lord Napier. It is another proof added to those we see daily in India, that an official career



is not the best school for governors of provinces. The famine raged the whole year, and many orphans were thrown upon public charity, most of whom were transferred to Calcutta to be brought up in the various charitable institutions in that city.

After getting several prizes for fine celery and onions, and being equally fortunate in the more refined department of flowers and plants at the Horticultural Exhibition, in the beginning of the year, Sir W. Denison took leave of Madras. It would be unreasonable at any time to charge with indolence a man of well-known scientific acquirements, who had already been successful in his career as Governor in Australia; but the press of Madras found fault with Sir W. Denison for indifference to public duties, although, when suddenly called upon to act for once during his Indian career in the face of a formidable crisis, he had exhibited all the genius of a great administrator. It is impossible to say what may not have been the consequence had Sir William Denison not been guided by his own sense of what was right, and had he not depended on his own judgment rather than on the experience and advice of others; if he had shirked responsibility, and confirmed the timid counsels of those who ought to have known India a good deal better than he. His firmness, at any rate, saved the country from a long and dangerous campaign, from political excitement which might have thrown it back a quarter of a century in as many months, and awakened afresh the spirit of disaffection which we fancied had been lulled into a feverish and passing slumber, but which was even then, though we knew it not, awake and active. In his own Presidency, there was little to do that might not be done quietly and without any display of statesmanship, and it is probable that Sir William and Lady Denison's influence was none the less beneficially felt in their respective circles because unattended with much *éclat*. The Governor was not wont to sound a trumpet before him when he went about his public duties; and the story



which is told of him, that during the few weeks he held office as Viceroy, after Lord Elgin's death, he took the opportunity of calling up all the cases which had been referred from Madras to the Supreme Government (some of them, no doubt, appeals from his own decisions) and settled them all, shows at any rate that he was alive to the interests of his own government, and could work with a will when there was necessity, as well as accept responsibility. He was indefatigable in his efforts to advance the cause of education, and if he kept the wheels of the state machine in very tolerable working order, revolving at exactly the same speed as his predecessor had left them, perhaps he thought he had accomplished all that was required of him. For once, during a three weeks' term of office as Viceroy, a tremendous responsibility was thrown upon him, which he cheerfully accepted, and by his firmness and judgment saved India from a very heavy political disaster. That he should have received no recognition for such an act will not be wondered at by those who know and can appreciate the influence of the Indian Civil Service. Lord Canning sacrificed India to his civilian counsellors; Sir William Denison saved at any rate the upper half of it in spite of them.

The Governorship of Madras was not the only office which changed hands this year. During the period three men successively filled the post of Secretary of State, or the Wuzer i Hind, as the natives somewhat euphoniously style that official. Sir Charles Wood was promoted to the Upper House as Lord Halifax, and was succeeded by Earl de Grey and Ripon, who was a short time after, in consequence of a change of ministry, succeeded by Lord Cranborne.

Two questions of vast importance and great interest came under discussion during this year. One of these, whether extensive irrigation works should be undertaken by the Government, or made over to private enterprise, came prominently into notice in connexion with the Orissa



famine; the other, the currency question, had been under discussion by the local and the home governments and the press in India ever since Mr. Wilson had initiated reform in the finances, and it was this year submitted to a committee consisting of Sir W. Mansfield and the Hon. H. S. Maine, Mr. W. Grey (afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal), Messrs. Cowie, Ross, Lushington, Halford, and Mr. George Dickens, manager of the Bank of Bengal. A vast amount of evidence was taken by the committee, but for some reason or other they refused to publish it as it was taken daily; and their report, which came out towards the close of the year, was the most meagre and disappointing production of the kind ever seen.

There appears to have been a great deal of difference of opinion as to whether irrigation works were legitimately the exclusive department of Government, or whether they formed a fair field for private enterprise. Lord Canning clearly was of opinion that private enterprise should be encouraged in the construction of irrigation works, for it was he who sanctioned the East India Irrigation Company's operations in Orissa, where they undertook a grand scheme for the irrigation of the delta of the Mahanuddy and the adjoining country. They only commenced, however, in November 1863, and by the time the famine began they had progressed almost, but unfortunately not quite, up to the point where their canal might have been brought into partial use.¹ Under the pressure of the famine, however, they made fresh exertions, and by January could undertake to fertilize 10,000 acres, and within the following six months the canal was capable of watering 30,000 more.² Unhappily, owing to the apprehension caused by the approach just at that time of a new land revenue settlement, and an intimation from Mr. Beadon that the indirect result of irrigation would be an increased land-tax, the inhabitants would not take advantage of the oppor-

¹ The Blue Book on the Orissa Famine, vol. i. p. 19.

² *The Friend of India*.



tunities offered them. The Commissioner of Orissa, Mr. Ravenshaw, subsequently in a proclamation told the people that irrigated land would be treated as unirrigated in any future settlement; and then, as if to awaken as much anxiety and distrust as possible on a question so important to the people, the Commissioner was told that he had exceeded his authority in making such a declaration, and that the pledge should have been confined to the next approaching settlement.

Lord Stanley had also encouraged private enterprise in irrigation works by giving the Madras Irrigation Company a guarantee of five per cent. on a million sterling for twenty-five years. This company, it will be recollected, was started at Madras during the time of the great speculation mania at Bombay, in 1864. It was an unfortunate essay of Lord Stanley's, for after spending their million the Company found they had nothing to go on with; a further advance of 600,000*l.* was sanctioned by the Home Government; a condition, however, attached to the concession being, that should the canal not be open by 1871 the works are to be made over to the Government.

Sir Charles Wood, however, and his council appear to have been in doubt all this time whether it was a sound and prudent policy to entrust irrigation works to private enterprise, and in 1863 the opinions of the heads of the local governments were called for. Some were strongly against private enterprise being entrusted with works of this nature, and maintained that they were the exclusive province of the Government; others held that, under certain conditions and restrictions, private companies might fairly be called on to assist. Mr. Maine argued very strongly against private enterprise, saying that in Europe the question could never even have come under discussion, because it was a principle universally acknowledged in all countries where public affairs are conducted in accordance with the generally accepted principles of jurisprudence, that water, like air and light, can never become private property. Sir

John Lawrence objected to private enterprise mainly on the ground that it would be putting the population of the country in the power of a joint stock company; for when the agricultural population had come to depend upon canals for irrigating their fields, they would in fact be dependent for the means of existence upon the proprietors of canals.

It is much to be regretted that the prosecution of irrigation works was delayed, owing to this discussion. Until Government had made up its mind who should construct the canals they were left unmade, and the people exposed to the risk of ever-recurring famines. Mr. Massey went into the question in his financial statement for 1866-7, and stated the case very fairly, he himself being of opinion that Government and private enterprise might co-operate, which is a commonsense practical view of the case. To the Viceroy's argument, that it would be dangerous to abandon the natives to the mercy of a private company, Mr. Massey replied, that the country had for a century been governed by a trading corporation, and he was not aware that the East India Company's administration had contrasted unfavourably, either in generosity or humanity, with that of the Queen; that it is not a question as to who shall realize the profits, but one of much greater magnitude, involving the actual life of the people. And for irrigation works to be postponed while Government is haggling about the profits is as inhuman as it is impolitic.

Even so long ago as 1861, Mr. Laing in council remarked: "That Colonel Cotton had said that water was gold in India, but that it was more than gold—it was life." Yet for years the construction of works of irrigation had been suspended, while Secretaries of State, and Governors, and Members of Council wrote volumes of despatches to ventilate the question whether such works should be undertaken by Government or made over to private enterprise. In the two cases in which the experiment has been tried,



the conclusion has undoubtedly been unfavourable to the construction of extensive irrigation works by private enterprise. The Madras Irrigation Company started with a million capital guaranteed, and by the end of the first year was forced to apply for a guarantee for a further sum of 600,000/., with the prospect after all of having to hand over their unfinished works, in accordance with the agreement to that effect, to Government. And the East India Irrigation Company, which commenced work in Orissa, was obliged to come to Government for assistance to prevent the sudden stoppage of their operations—a calamity which the Commission represented would cause great loss to the Province—and eventually to make over to Government their unfinished work, stock, and plant.

In addition to the subject of agency is one of construction. Unfortunately, there is a great difference of opinion between two schools of engineers in India, the Madras and the Bengal school. As long as the engineers of each province confined themselves to their own field, with whose peculiarities and requirements they were familiar, all went well; but, in an evil hour, in consequence of a reported failure of the Ganges canal, which in reality was not a failure, a Madras engineer of great repute was sent to examine and report on it. The general principles of engineering are applicable everywhere, and under all circumstances, but it is easily conceivable that there should be features in the character of rivers in Madras which are not met with in those of Upper India—a theory put forward by Mr. Login, C.E., and long scouted by his official superiors, but eventually proved by him to be sound; and this simple fact will account for much of the difference of opinion that has prevailed among eminent men. In the budget debate of 1867, Mr. Massey speaks of this unhappy dispute in the following terms:—

“We have had differences of opinion, differences very likely to arise between eminent engineers, as to the mode in which these works should be carried on. I should rather say there has been a conflict



of opinion between the two schools of engineers on the subject. While that conflict was raging, it was difficult for an unskilled Government to take upon itself to pronounce an opinion. But steps have been taken to reconcile the conflicting opinions, and I am sure that the ability and zeal which actuate the professional men who have given their time and talents to projects of this magnitude may be relied on to remove minor causes of difference, and to reach some practical conclusion advantageous to the country, conducive to their own fame, and satisfactory to the Government."

No pen, no language, can do justice to the overwhelming importance of this subject. Three famines in ten years will carry off four millions of people at least; yet in the time canals might be constructed which would keep those four millions alive. And it has been shown, on incontestable evidence, that irrigation works may be constructed at no loss; on the contrary, at a certain profit. But nothing was done, because Government was uncertain whether the interloping spirit of private enterprise should be allowed to interfere,—whether abstract principles of jurisprudence justified them in getting others to do absolutely necessary works which they could not do, at least had not done, for themselves, while their officers were squabbling about gradients and cubic feet of silt. It was as if two surgeons allowed a patient to die of hæmorrhage while they disputed about the kind of bandage that should be used to stop the bleeding.

The Government have, however, at last awakened to a sense of their responsibility on this head; and by the appointment of Colonel Strachey as Superintendent of Irrigation, and by other measures, indicated a determination to put their shoulder to the wheel. A brief statement of the projects now in course of being carried out was made by Sir John Lawrence to the Council on the 31st March, 1868, and I cannot do better than quote His Excellency's own words on the occasion. He prefaced his statement with remarking that, in the first place, irrigation works were by no means so profitable as had been represented, at any rate in many parts of India; and secondly,



that however anxious the Government might be to construct them, and although the principle had been fully established that they could borrow for the purpose of carrying out reproductive works like canals, yet the utmost care was necessary that more designs should not be taken in hand than could be carried out with due regard to economy and to their resources, which consisted of borrowed money; and thirdly, that they had been a good deal hampered by the want of properly instructed and experienced officers to superintend the operations.

His Excellency said :

"To show generally what had been done in the way of pushing on projects during the last year, the operations of each province would be briefly mentioned.

"Beginning with the Punjab, they had the new project for a canal from the Sutlej, roughly estimated to cost about two millions, which would immediately receive sanction to admit of the exact line being marked out on the ground, and the detailed designs and estimates of the works prepared. It might be hoped that work would actually be begun next season.

"Next, the remodelling of the Bari Doab Canal, with a view to increase the supply of water from the Beas River, was under consideration. Also a large project for improving the Western Jumna Canal, and for extending it into the arid districts near Sirsa.

"Surveys had also been put in hand for projects for canals to be derived from the Sutlej during the monsoon months, for the country between Ferozpur and Multan; and like surveys were also going on for extending the canals on the right bank of the Indus.

"There had been some difficulty in finding qualified officers for all these surveys, but they were believed to be going on satisfactorily.

"In the North-West Provinces, a new project for a canal from the Jumna, to leave it below Delhi, and to irrigate the Agra and Muttura districts, at a cost of about half-a-million, had been sanctioned in the rough, and was already in great part marked out. The remodelling of the Ganges Canal, and the arrangements needed for making it a complete line of navigation throughout its length, were in progress, and some part of the designs had already been received. When these and other contemplated navigation lines were carried out, there would be continuous water communication from Lahore to Delhi, Agra, the Doab, and on into Oudh.

"Plans were under consideration for carrying out extensive works in Rohilkhand, on the north of the Ganges, which would combine irrigation and drainage.

"Engineers were also at work in Bundalkhand, preparing projects for utilizing the water of the three chief rivers which flowed through that province. In connexion with these operations, it would be seen whether a further supply of water could be secured from the lower part of the Jumna to be led to Allahabad.

"In the province of Oude surveys were also in progress for a canal to be taken from the Sarda. This would be a first-class work, not smaller than the Ganges Canal, and might probably cost two millions or more.

"In Bengal, on the north, the engineers were at work in Tirhoot, with a view of utilizing the waters of the Gandak River. Also surveys had been begun in Nuddea, which might lead to the formation of a canal, often talked of, to be led from the Ganges near Rajmahal, perhaps as far as Calcutta. A project was well advanced for a canal from the Damoodah, to serve as a navigation and irrigation work, and communicating between the coal district at Rániganj and the Hooghly. Other designs on some of the other neighbouring rivers of this part of Bengal were also in hand.

"The canal from the Soane, which was to have been carried out by the East India Irrigation Company, would probably be handed over to the Government for execution, and arrangements would be made for beginning it as soon as the negotiations with the company would permit. The works of the same company in Orissa continued to progress.

"In the Central Provinces, an officer had been obtained from Madras for the special prosecution of irrigation works, and two promising projects were well forward, and might probably be in a fit state for submission to the Government of India for sanction in a month or two.

"In Madras, the attention of the engineers had been specially directed to the preparation of projects for the completion of the great works connected with the anicuts on the Godaveri and Kistna. Portions of these had already received sanction, and the rest were expected soon to be sent up. Two very large tank works were in course of execution near Madras itself. A large project had lately been sanctioned for the extension of the irrigation from the Pennair River in the Nellore district.

"A survey had also been carried out for a canal to turn the water of a river rising in the higher ranges of the Travancore mountains into the plain of Madura. There were considerable difficulties to be encountered in the realization of this scheme, but it was hoped that they might be satisfactorily met.

"Other projects of value were under preparation in the Madras Presidency, and important improvements in the Cauveri works were also contemplated.

"In the Bombay Presidency, beginning with Sind, a very large



scheme for a canal from the Indus at Roree, to irrigate the Hyderabad collectorate, was under consideration. Other projects were in hand for improvements of other existing canals in that province.

"In Guzarât, a project for a canal from the Tapté had just been sent up for sanction by the Government of India, and another project was believed to be in preparation for another valuable work.

"In Khandeish, one work of importance was already in operation, and the engineers were employed in preparing for its extension.

"In the Deccan there were numerous projects in various stages of progress, and several new schemes of magnitude almost ready for final submission to Government.

"Lastly, in Mysore, additional vigour had been given to the progress of irrigation works, and it had been proposed to apply a large sum from the accumulated surplus revenues, in excess of the annual grants from current income, to the prosecution of these works.

"To strengthen the hands of the Government in respect to engineers for employment on the new works, which would soon begin to be ready for execution, the Secretary of State had, at the urgent request of the Government of India, sent out to this country thirty civil engineers of experience, the greater part of whom had already arrived, and would be immediately distributed among the local governments, where their services were likely to be most needed. Increased numbers of young officers would also be appointed by the Secretary of State in the course of the coming year, so that it was hoped that no further difficulty of importance would be met with from this quarter.

"Generally, it might be affirmed that the Government of India had taken all necessary steps to inaugurate the policy of extending irrigation to the utmost. It had already established in every province a separate head to the Irrigation Branch of the Public Works Department, and would be ready to consider favourably every proposal having in view the improved administration of this class of works. It was the peculiar duty of the Government of India to see that all proper precautions were taken to prevent the hasty or wasteful application of borrowed money to new works; and at the same time to provide all needful funds for the prosecution of works of ascertained utility and satisfactory design; and till the present time, it was believed that no question had arisen as to the manner in which these duties had been performed by it."

If, as Sir Erskine Parry says in the minute already quoted, so many disasters have arisen in India from the error of clothing vague theories in the rigid garb of law, it may be safely asserted that many failures have occurred from an indiscriminate application of general principles of political economy, which are held to be indisputable



axioms in Europe, to a country like India, where the conditions under which those principles are to come into play are wholly different. Sir Charles Wood was entitled to speak with authority on the Currency, from the fact of his having been chairman of the parliamentary committee of the Bank Act of 1841, and from the part he took in the discussions on the Bank of England Charter Act in 1844, as well as from the experience he acquired while Chancellor of the Exchequer in the monetary crisis of 1847.¹ Of Mr. Wilson's, and his successor Mr. Laing's, capacity to deal with a subject of this nature there is no need to speak; yet it is not too much to say that the measures which were inaugurated by the experience of all these eminent men have been failures; and if the reason be asked, the answer is plain, because their experience was gained exclusively in England and applied to India. Once or twice the Indian Government has had to ship back to England gold bullion—sovereigns sent out from England to be forced upon the country; it was found that outside Calcutta every sovereign was worth a little more than the ten rupees it was intended to represent, the value increasing with the distance from the Presidency, and therefore, as a standard currency, it was useless. When Mr. Wilson first came out, there were in circulation, besides the rupee, a copper coin of standard value and gold mohurs, which can scarcely be said to have been in circulation, as they have not been received at Government treasuries in payment of revenue since 1852, and the native coins fetch a variable price in the market. There was, besides, a limited circulation of bank notes issued by the three banks at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, in which banks Government were shareholders, and were represented in the board of directors by their own officers.

Sir Charles Wood's views were fully explained to Mr.

¹ "Sir Charles Wood's Administration of Indian Affairs." By Algernon West, late Private Secretary.



Wilson before he left England, and after his arrival in India he drew up a minute on the subject of the Currency, in which he recommended three principal measures: to withdraw the paper then in circulation; to issue in lieu of it Government notes at the three cities—Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, and in circles in the interior, the note of each circle being a legal tender within its limits, and payable on demand at the central treasury and in the presidency cities; and that coin or bullion, to the extent of one-third of the notes issued, should be retained, and Government securities held for the remainder.

Mr. Wilson did not live to complete the scheme; and during Mr. Laing's tenure of office the Government of India passed the Currency Bill, deviating from Mr. Wilson's suggestion, which had Sir Charles Wood's cordial support, in making the banks in the presidency cities and their agencies, the centres of issue and exchange of notes. To compensate the banks for the loss of privilege of issuing their own notes, they were made treasurers to the Government, and entrusted with the management of the Government debt. This change in the constitution of the banks necessitated a new charter, in which the Government of India inserted a provision that was not in accordance with Sir Charles Wood's instructions, viz. a clause authorizing them to draw bills payable out of India, and to purchase bills for the purpose of providing funds to meet their drafts. Sir Charles Trevelyan, who was a more staunch supporter of Sir Charles Wood's views than either of his predecessors, succeeded in inducing the Government of India to agree to cancel that part of the agreement.

As regards a gold currency the main difficulty of introducing it is, that the State loans, and indeed all other public engagements of a commercial character in India, have been contracted in silver, and it would be impossible to have two standard currencies in circulation—a gold and silver one; and as the introduction of a gold standard would necessarily affect the value of silver, it would be



impracticable to introduce it without causing the utmost possible confusion in the account between debtor and creditor. Mr. Wilson underrated the advantage of a gold currency, and held firmly to the opinion that a widely circulated paper currency was what India principally required. Experience very soon showed that a paper currency in India was an exotic which it would require many years to acclimatize; it would not at once take root, though supported by the soundest principles of political economists. In 1864 the Chamber of Commerce of the three presidency cities addressed the Government, urging on them to introduce a gold currency. After much discussion the Government of India supported Sir Charles Trevelyan in suggesting that British and Australian sovereigns and half-sovereigns should be made a legal tender. Sir Charles Wood took a more correct view of the case than even the local government, borne away a little perhaps by the urgent representations of the Chamber of Commerce, whose unanimous opinion carried necessarily great weight with it. He pointed out that, at the existing price of silver, a sovereign was worth more than ten rupees; and that to make it a legal tender for less by law would be useless. Yet he allowed the experiment to be tried. It was tried with the result already seen, the sovereigns had to be shipped back again to England.

At the same time the Government, by a notification dated 13th November, 1864, intimated that English and Australian sovereigns and half-sovereigns would be received at all treasuries in payment of Government demands at par value. This order has recently (October 1868) been cancelled, and in substitution for it another notification issued, dated 31st of October, to the effect that the sovereign and half-sovereign will be received at ten rupees four annas, and five rupees two annas respectively, and that they will be issued, when available, at the same rate. When, however, sovereigns are selling in the market, as they were then, at ten annas, or one shilling



and threepence each, it is not likely that they will be paid into the treasury at four annas, or sixpence over the par value of ten rupees.

No further steps were taken till the Currency Commission was appointed in 1866, and much disappointment was occasioned by their report, in that they had been expected to compass impossibilities, and had not done so.

They recommended certain alterations in minor details, such as separating the offices of Currency Commissioner and Mastership of the Mint, advising Accountants-General not to exhibit too great a jealousy of remittances in notes, &c. The nature of their recommendations excited as much ridicule as indignation, for it was expected that the great authorities composing the commissions would solve the difficult problem which had been puzzling successive Secretaries of State and Finance Ministers for the last seven years. As regards the gold currency they remark that the following points seem to be generally and firmly established :—1. That gold coins are generally at par, and above par, both in the presidency cities and the Mofussil; a fact which was patent to every one. 2. That they are sought for in the provinces by merchants and bankers, and as a medium of reserve wealth by the people at large. 3. That when gold is below par, it is either because it is practically unknown, or because people are too poor to create a demand for it. 4. That the demand for a gold currency is unanimous throughout the country. 5. That gold coins of the value of 15, 10, and 5 rupees would find more favour than notes of that value; and that the introduction of gold would facilitate the establishment of the currency notes, outlying treasuries being assisted by such a measure towards the convertibility of the notes. 6. That the opinion seemed unanimous that the currency should consist of gold, silver, and paper.

The Commission proceed to say that, with the general wish of the country before them, they cannot hesitate to express a hope that the Government of India will persevere



in the policy which was recommended for the approval of the Secretary of State two years ago, to cause a legal tender of gold to be a part of the currency arrangements of India, that which is believed to have been erroneous in the original proposal being modified.

The Commission conclude with the suggestion, that as the institution of the paper currency in 1861 was eminently of a tentative character, and introduced with excessive caution, its partial failure should not be taken as a criterion of the success which may ultimately be anticipated. It is unreasonable to expect large or perfect results from what has hitherto been but an experiment.

It is not easy to see how the difficulty which Mr. Wilson observed on the very threshold is to be evaded. All commercial transactions, including state loans, have been in rupees, and debts so contracted must be liquidated in like manner. The forcible introduction, therefore, of either a gold or a paper currency seems to be an impossibility. No Englishman can the least realize the intensely conservative nature of the Indian character. There is no section of the human race, not excepting the Chinese, who are so resolutely opposed to anything in the shape of innovation. However plainly you may demonstrate to them the advantage of a gold and paper currency over silver, they will not avail themselves of that advantage; and if you force it on them, they will resent it with that spirit of sullen obstinacy and passive resistance which forms so marked a feature in the Oriental character. Legislation will not change men's natures, education may. And here, as in everything else, we revert to the same point to which every consideration connected with the fiscal, political, and commercial condition of India ultimately leads us, and we must look to the schoolmaster to sweep away all obstacles in the path of progress. By degrees, natives will become accustomed to gold and paper currency, and by degrees they will begin to use them. No better arrangement than that of circles for the paper currency can possibly be



introduced. A universal note for all India, or for one presidency, is an impossibility, because the Government would have to maintain a thousand banks,—every treasury at every little station or town in the Mofussil would become a small bank, and must be prepared at any time to cash the notes. This would involve an unmanageable establishment, over which supervision would be impracticable. If the note is not cashable at every place where there is a treasury, it will have to be discounted, and will not pass at par except in presidency cities, and cannot therefore be made a legal tender. But if British sovereigns and half-sovereigns are introduced and set afloat without any attempt to assign an artificial value to them, they will by degrees get into circulation, not as a standard currency of course, but as a subsidiary currency. We must not expect much progress in the present generation ; but in the next generation, and when the results of the educational efforts now in operation come to be felt, our successors will find the paper currency in free circulation, and the gold also will by that time have come, gradually, so far into use that it may be possible then to assign to it a standard value by law.

Above all things, crude and rash experiments by amateur financiers with the circulating medium of the country should be avoided.

Lord Napier, towards the close of the year, proceeded on a tour of inspection into the district of Wynaad, which is the great seat in the Madras presidency, next to the Neilgherries, or perhaps even before them, for European enterprise. It is for the greater part table-land, the most elevated section of the whole district not being more than 3,000 feet above the sea-level. It was first selected as a suitable spot for coffee cultivation as long ago as 1840. When Lord Napier visited it, the Europeans engaged in this and other kindred pursuits numbered upwards of 200. It was visited by Sir W. Denison once at least during his tenure of office, but the constant cry which the settlers

incessantly uttered for roads had never been heard. In 1864, the planters having formed themselves into an association, held a meeting to discuss their grievances, and consider how they should bring them to the notice of Government with the best chance of redress. Their efforts, however, were attended with no satisfactory results. Roads there were none. The coffee had to be transported to the coast for exportation on bullocks, or by coolies; and grain for the use of the latter, who to the number of 35,000 were employed on the plantations, had to be imported in a similar manner. Lord Napier had an interview with the planters' association, and assured them that the spectacle of English enterprise which he then witnessed was one which no governor could behold uninterested and unmoved. He promised them roads, and redress of many other grievances, of which they had, as he could not but acknowledge, not without justice complained.

In the latter part of the year, Sir Bartle Frere prepared to make over his charge to his successor, the Right Hon. Seymour Fitzgerald, and return to England, where he was shortly afterwards appointed to counsel. The popularity which attended the first period of Sir Bartle Frere's administration of Bombay did not accompany it to the end, yet he left India with a reputation scarcely perhaps surpassed by any of his contemporaries. He first came prominently into notice in Sind, where he held the office of Chief Commissioner during the anxieties of 1857, and subsequent years. As Governor of Bombay he fully sustained the reputation he had earned in the small non-regulation province. With energy and aptitude for business, with liberal views, and a great experience of the country, he put himself at the head of every movement which had for its object the welfare of the native community, or which was inspired by the spirit of progress. For a while he seemed to have solved the impossible problem of an Indian governor being popular with all classes, natives and Europeans, official and non-official.



With military officers and subordinates in civil employ, he was an especial favourite, for he had fought their battle vigorously in the height of the monetary crisis, and set forth their claims to some increase of salary to enable them to meet the unusual pressure upon their resources. With the native community he fell into disgrace on account of the appointment to the bench of Mr. Justice Anstey, who made himself so unpopular that the natives held a public meeting, at which a memorial was drawn up to the Secretary of State praying for his removal. As the chief ground of their dissatisfaction, however, was the severity of his sentences on fraudulent speculators in the height of the share gambling mania, their memorial met with but little favour, and the petitioners for the time turned the tide of their disappointed wrath upon the Governor.

India, which has been very prolific in great statesmen and warriors, has made but few additions to the roll of names illustrious in literature or science. The result is no other than we should expect. Anglo-Indians are too busy as a rule to engage in literary or scientific pursuits, and the English clergy are so small a body, and the prizes open to them so little tempting, that it is not to be wondered at that few men of note have come forward from among them. Outside the limits of the Established Church there are names, household words in India, which will be venerated wherever the story of missionary enterprise is listened to with any interest. Within the Church, Bishop Heber acquired a reputation for his zeal, and he was perhaps the first writer who in any sense brought India home to the English mind. He was the first to effect an introduction between the two countries, and give rise to an acquaintanceship which has, however, hardly yet ripened into intimacy. Dr. Daniel Wilson, who was Dr. Cotton's immediate predecessor, was a good and zealous man, simple-minded, straightforward, and plain-spoken, with many eccentricities and oddities of manner, which, though excused in one whose character for religion and

piety stood high, were scarcely calculated to excite respect. To him we are indebted for the erection of the Calcutta cathedral, a handsome ecclesiastical edifice in comparison with the hideous and unsightly piles of buildings which, as churches, disfigure the metropolis and all the old settlements in Upper India; for the ugly, oblong, brick and mortar barn, with bottle-shaped spire, which was the prevailing style of Indian church architecture in former days, seems designed to give expression to what it is to be feared was the predominant feeling towards religion and its ordinances. It looks as if a beer-chest and a black bottle had been the ideas uppermost in the minds of the men who designed these buildings. The Calcutta cathedral, though by no means what a cathedral ought to be in the capital city of our Eastern Empire, was nevertheless a great improvement upon the barbarous barrack and beer-chest style of a former generation. But Daniel Wilson, as he was generally called, cannot be said to have left any trace of his personal influence upon the society among whom he laboured. A zealous Christian and a pious man he was, but not gifted by nature with the qualities that go to make up a great one. To Dr. Middleton, another bishop of Calcutta, we are indebted for the foundation of Bishop's College, designed for the education of a native pastorate. The college, a plain, unadorned, and ugly, though rather massive-looking building, is the first object of art that attracts the visitors' attention on the left bank of the Hooghly as he nears Calcutta. But whether from its position, being separated from Calcutta by the river, or whether from the insalubrity of the site—a low meadow on the banks of the Hooghly—or whether because it was supposed to be the centre or head-quarters of what were regarded in India as High Church views, and therefore unpopular in a society immersed in the mere worldly pursuits and pleasures of a wealthy and luxurious commercial capital, or from other causes, the institution has never, even under the supervision of the most zealous and



learned Churchman that ever went to India, Dr. Kaye, answered to the desired extent the noble design of its founder.

In many respects, Dr. Cotton, who succeeded Dr. Wilson, was admirably suited for the post of Metropolitan of British India. In the first place, he enjoyed, to all appearance at least, good health and physical strength—no unnecessary requirement for the supervision of a diocese that extends about 2,500 miles in one direction, and nearly 2,000 in another. A good scholar, and a sound Churchman, of no extreme views, he could sympathise with the Non-conformist missionary struggling to plant an oasis in the desert, and with the High Church chaplain, eager to introduce the outward symbols and representations of Divine truth in an ornate and decent celebration of Divine worship. With a fine voice, and clear, impressive delivery, his sermons betokening deep thought and more feeling than they who knew the Bishop only officially could suppose he possessed, were listened to in crowded churches in Calcutta with deep and reverent attention. Transferred late in life to a sphere of action totally different from that in which all his previous career had been passed, Dr. Cotton exhibited a marvellous facility for adapting his genius and energies to the circumstances around him, and the duties before him. And perhaps the habit of command, acquired during his tenure of office at Rugby and Marlborough in the atmosphere of the schoolroom as it is in the region of the master's desk, was not altogether thrown away upon a bishop of a diocese like that of Bengal.

The chaplains, who stood towards him something in the position of sixth-form boys at Marlborough, felt that they had at their head one whom they dared not disobey, and out of whose control they would not be allowed to wriggle by any subtlety of military law or civil regulations; for Dr. Cotton had the full confidence of the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief. He had, indeed, every one's confidence, for every one respected, and not a few feared him.



And sore indeed was the need which the Church had for such a man as Dr. Cotton. Readers of romance and of history too, who are familiar with the character the English clergy held a generation or a generation or two ago, can hardly believe that they belonged to the same class of society, or professed to discharge the same duties, as the clergy of our own day. That tide of wholesome reform which swept away so many defects in the character of the English clergy was slow in reaching India. Indeed, it was only in Dr. Cotton's time, and partly, no doubt, owing to his influence and strength of will, that the tide swept up into the Anglo-Indian Church. The indolence and laxity, if nothing more, that unhappily not very many years ago were so prominent a feature among the chaplains in the ecclesiastical establishment of the East India Company, as it was called, has almost wholly disappeared, and a layman may enter a church in India now without fearing that his feelings will be shocked by indecent and irreverent celebration of the Church's ordinances.¹

¹ It was not so formerly. The English reader will scarcely believe in the existence of such irreverence and want of decency as was common even in recent times. For years one of the chaplains was known to be almost always in a state of intoxication, and the matter was only taken notice of at last in consequence of his falling with his head upon the book in a state of drunken insensibility while reading the service in a church where the Commander-in-Chief's wife happened to be present. Among a large body of clergy it was to be expected there would be some black sheep, but I fear the instance alluded to was far from being exceptional. The consequence was a very low standard both among the laity and clergy; an indecent and irreverent mode of conducting divine service; churches as a matter of course shut up all the week and opened on Sundays for a couple of hours, during which the morning and evening services, clipped according to the fancy of the chaplain, were read, and a sermon, in which the preacher acted the part of the traditional signpost, delivered to a sleepy and listless congregation. The indolent habits which the climate is calculated to engender, and which every English resident is sure to contract, unless he is always on his guard against them, are very apt to result in a careless, slovenly performance of Divine service. One effect of this is the objectionable practice of employing native (heathen)



The pastoral tours, which the late Bishop's predecessor for many years was too feeble to make, were regularly undertaken by Dr. Cotton, who visited in turn every church and parish in his immense diocese. The effect was marked. The careless and indifferent chaplain felt that there was a superior over him who could and would call him to account for gross and scandalous conduct, or neglect of duty ; and the laity saw that there was a desire and an intention on the part of the Bishop, if he could not awaken zeal where there was none, at any rate to enforce a decent discharge of duty. Thus it was that the Church of England in India seemed to awake from a lethargic sleep under the episcopate of Dr. Cotton, and to feel that she had a mission to fulfil. The educational institutions which owe their origin or growth to Dr. Cotton's zeal or fostering care have already been mentioned, and it was when he was in the midst of all these good works that a fatal accident in the autumn of 1866 carried him suddenly away from the sphere of his usefulness. He was engaged in the distant province of Assam, in one of his pastoral tours, during which, with true apostolic zeal, he was wont to visit the churches, encouraging, consoling, edifying. After having seen all the principal places in the province, travelling chiefly in the Lieutenant-Governor's barge,—which, however, the difficult navigation of the rivers and streams often obliged him to leave behind, and to make his way in a native boat,—he had nearly completed his tour, when one night (it was on the 6th of October), as he was getting on board the steamer, at a place called

servants in subordinate offices, which the clergy are too lazy to perform themselves. Thus it is not pleasing to see a native servant with a crumpled cloth under his arm stroll up the aisle during Divine service, and proceed to lay the cloth, by no means a clean one, on the altar, or to see him bring to the officiating priest, or even place on the altar itself, the vessels and the elements for the celebration of the Holy Eucharist. There has been an undoubted improvement in these matters within the last five or six years, but there is still too much of the old style remaining, more especially in mission churches.



Kooshtea, he accidentally lost his footing, and fell into the water. He had that evening consecrated the cemetery at Kooshtea, and had despatched his chaplain to the telegraph office to send a message announcing his speedy return to Calcutta. It was dark when he reached the water's edge, and he ascended, or attempted to ascend, a platform which was faultily constructed, having no handrail. So sudden and complete was his disappearance, that although attempts were at once made to rescue him, no trace of the body, nor even his hat, could be found.

Some idea of the estimation in which Dr. Cotton was held may be derived from the following proclamation, which was issued in the official *Gazette* upon the receipt of the intelligence, while all the ships in the harbour hoisted their flags half-mast high, and between the hours of ten and twelve in the morning the minute-bell was tolled from every church in Calcutta on the day appointed for the mourning: "There is scarcely a member of the entire Christian community throughout India who will not feel the premature loss of this prelate as a personal affliction. It has rarely been given to any body of Christians in any country to witness such depth of learning and variety of accomplishment, combined with piety so earnest, and energy so untiring. His Excellency in Council does not hesitate to add the expression of his belief that large numbers, even among those of Her Majesty's subjects in India who did not share in the faith of the Bishop of Calcutta, had learned to appreciate his great knowledge, his sincerity, and his charity, and will join in lamenting his death."

The last suggestion of the Viceroy illustrates in a very curious and interesting manner the force of Dr. Cotton's character. It is quite true the natives had learned to appreciate and like him. At first sight it would seem as if the circle of a bishop's duties revolved around a centre so far removed from the interests and associations of a heathen community that his mind could never by any possibility come in contact with native thought; but



without going out of his way, or abandoning his legitimate sphere of duty, he yet caused the light of his example to fall somehow so far within the shade of heathendom, that men who had no reverence or affection for Christianity could revere and admire the singularly manly character and the unaffected piety, the earnestness and the charity, of Dr. Cotton.

One of the greatest of all the mysteries that encompass human existence, and one of the greatest trials to the Christian's faith, and one of the strongest inducements to humility, is the phenomenon we so frequently see when men whose lives and labours are above those of all others valuable, and over whom we might expect a watchful Providence would ever extend its special protection, are carried away by some sudden and strange accident in the very midst of their career, and their work of usefulness cut short. So far as the human understanding can foresee what might have been, Dr. Cotton's life was perhaps the most valuable of any in the whole of India. His influence for good, which he had begun to exercise, would have increased as time went on. Unrestricted, like governors and generals, to a five years' tenure of office, he would probably have ended his days in his episcopate, not before he had seen the completion of those schemes and works of usefulness whose foundation he had laid. And even in the incomplete state in which he left them, they were a bequest perhaps the most valuable that could have been bestowed upon the Church in India.

Early in the present year, the Chief Court was established at Lahore, a Court possessing most of the powers of a High Court, and differing from it in little but in name and organization. Later in the year the High Court of the North-West Provinces was established by royal charter at Agra, under the presidentship of Sir Walter Morgan, Chief Justice. These tribunals have proved in every way most beneficial to the country, for they have earned in the fullest sense the confidence and respect of the people.



CHAPTER XII.

1867.

The Orissa disaster—Public meeting in Calcutta—New Governor of Bengal—The Bishop of Calcutta—Madras—The Madras Native Church—The Bishop of Bombay—The Licence Tax—Protest against the tax—The census in Upper India—The great Hurdwar fair—Cholera—The cyclone—The railway schemes—The Bank of Bombay.

EARLY in the year 1867, Colonel Strachey, who had been appointed Superintendent of Irrigation in India, came out from England invested with full powers to push on, as fast as his own judgment and discretion should warrant, the construction of canals. It seemed as if the Home Government had been awakened out of a deep sleep, or suddenly become conscious of their responsibilities in this particular. No effort was to be spared, and a very wide margin allowed to the sums that were to be sanctioned for the necessary works.

If the conditions under which the existence of the human race is maintained in temperate climes and with all the advantages which civilization confers, as in European countries, are an inexplicable problem to the philosopher, what must it not be in the East and West? Here the reflective mind constantly finds itself repeating the question—a question vainly asked by man's finite intellect—Why, for what end, to what purpose, have these millions of human beings been brought into existence? Out of the population of India, whatever it may be, say a hundred and forty millions, there must certainly be many millions whose

existence from the cradle to the grave, with very few exceptional periods, is one course of physical suffering. But setting them aside, and allowing that the wretched people, to all appearance but one degree removed from their fellow-labourers the oxen, derive at any rate as much enjoyment from the mere physical functions of life as the brute creation, we are staggered when we find Nature, who at the best of times seems to deal so harshly with these hapless creatures, suddenly, as it were, lashing itself into fury against them, and setting in motion one after another the most terrible engines of destruction. The mind utterly fails to comprehend the magnitude, or to conceive the intensity of the misery, caused by such a calamity as befell the inhabitants of Orissa in 1866-67. A similar instance, under very analogous conditions, has recently occurred in the West, where many thousands have been swallowed up by earthquakes. While the sceptic turns aside from the contemplation of some millions of human beings swept away by the ravages of famine or earthquake or the waters of a flood, with his doubts as to the existence of a Divine government of the world confirmed, Faith, with full assurance that in spite of these seeming contradictions "the earth is the Lord's and the fulness thereof," is content to wait for an explanation of the riddle.

We know very little more about the conditions of existence in the orders of life inferior to us, than we do of those which occupy a superior position in the grade of creation. In the former case, we can indeed watch the habits of ants and bees, and other insects which possess a marvellous instinct such as to compensate them in a great measure for the want of reason. There is no longer any question that ants have artificial conditions of life analogous to those with which we are familiar among ourselves.¹ They have separate communities, divisions of society, labouring classes, slaves, armies, and rulers who direct operations in war

¹ "The Insect World, with a Description of the Habits and Economy of some of the most interesting Species." By Louis Figuier. 1868.



and exercise the government during peace; they have laws by which measures that are necessary for the good of the commonwealth are carried out with regularity and exactitude; they build cities, granaries, treasuries, palaces, and fortify them, and the construction of their public works shows they have an instinctive acquaintance with the principles of mechanics. All this we know from observation of their habits. Of their inner life we know nothing, but we see that they plainly have the power of communicating ideas to one another. One hour of our time is to them perhaps a long period, during which great political changes may take place, revolutions be effected, campaigns conducted, settlements destroyed and founded. Yet these little creatures, intent on their own concerns, wrapt up in affairs that appear to them as momentous as a change of ministry or a new reform bill does to us, must, if they are capable of observation, get occasional glimpses of another world out of and beyond their own circle of existence, and immensely superior to it in all its conditions and in respect of the forces it employs. The morning of a summer's day, to them perhaps half a generation, has been spent in the construction of a large city: the site, selected by the most intelligent of the community, has been an unlucky one, but the engineers and surveyors had not the gift of prescience, and could not divine that a party of young ladies and their attendant cavaliers would after luncheon go out to play at croquet upon the very site where a community of hundreds of thousands of living creatures have been for half a century constructing their city. At last the engine of destruction approaches, and a revolution of the roller sweeps away the hopes of thousands, the glory of a commonwealth; all its public institutions, its palaces, its dwellings, its fortifications, and the terrified survivors are scattered houseless over the face of the earth. If they possess *Quarterlies* and *Saturday Reviews*, they doubtless discuss the prodigy in all its bearings. Whence did the roller come, and what force propelled so huge a mass of rock? Why where so many thousands



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of living creatures cut off in the midst of life and health, and the career of so many public characters, rising into fame and power, stopped short by death? Would the calamity recur? If so, when, at what interval, under what conditions?

The contemplation of such calamities as befel Orissa in 1865, '66, and '67,—as have recently befallen the cities of South America,—is calculated to awaken in the mind uncomfortable doubts and misgivings, which are apt to spring up, because we are always prone to forget that the finite cannot compass the Infinite. We no more see and understand the whole system of the government of the universe than the ants do the motives and operations preceding the catastrophe that overwhelmed them on the garden plot. They get a glimpse of a mighty power external to and infinitely beyond them in resources, exercising forces which they can neither comprehend nor measure, and which nevertheless every now and then seem to be applied to their destruction with most deadly effect. No doubt they believe, if they have the faculty of reason, that the roller was sent by some law of Nature specially set in motion to compass their destruction. And when it is recollected that the laws and conditions of the universe are infinite in number, in variation, and in their operation, and that our reason and science in reality bear a smaller proportion to the vastness of infinity than the instinct of the ant does to the nature, the motions, and the actions of the croquet players, and their antecedent phenomenon the roller, though we get no explanation indeed, we may cease to perplex ourselves with a vain inquiry into the system of a Divine government which permits such catastrophes as the Orissa famine and inundation, or the Peruvian earthquakes, to overwhelm huge masses of human beings.

Early in the year it was deemed desirable to call a public meeting at Calcutta, and the very unusual spectacle was presented of the Viceroy seeking the co-operation of the residents and the non-official public. It would be better

for India if the spectacle was less rare. The enthusiasm with which Sir John Lawrence was received, and the hearty response which his request for aid called forth from all classes, shows how greatly the people of India are misrepresented by writers who make out that the want of sympathy between the governing races and the governed is on the part of the latter only.

Sir John Lawrence, in addressing the meeting, thus summed up the disasters under which Orissa had suffered :

"I will here remind you that in 1865 there was a general failure of the crops in the three districts of Orissa, followed by very indifferent harvests in 1866, while in the autumn of that year a large part of the province was also inundated. The floods of the Mahanuddy and other rivers broke through their embankments and submerged extensive tracts of land in their vicinity. All the crops in these localities were spoiled, and property which had escaped the famine was carried away or destroyed. What the drought had spared was engulfed in the wide vortex of water. In this way one-half the district of Cuttack alone, extending over an area of 1,500 miles, has been devastated. From the most reliable accounts it is estimated that from one-fifth to one-fourth of the population of the province has already perished. What famine and starvation began, diarrhœa and pestilence have completed. It is estimated that we may have to import into the province not less than 1,200,000 maunds of rice, equal to about 27,000 tons. We have already arranged for the introduction of half that quantity by the 1st of April, and the rest will follow as rapidly as may be found necessary. There were already," he added, "1,500 orphan children to be provided for, which might increase to 2,000 more, and ten lacs of rupees, or £100,000, would be required for their maintenance."

The Viceroy had previously telegraphed to the Secretary of State, then Lord Cranborne, begging that a subscription might be got up in England ; to which the following curt refusal was transmitted in reply :—"January 21st. Your



telegram received, and sent to the Lord Mayor. He thinks no subscription could be raised here. I have made inquiries, and think he is right. Distress here from panic, frost, and strikes is terrible, and engrosses public attention." Sir John Lawrence, alluding to this refusal of assistance at the meeting, remarked, it was only the more necessary for those present to exert themselves. Eight persons on the spot subscribed 2,500 rupees each, and the Viceroy himself gave 10,000 more towards the relief fund.

It is impossible to make any very accurate estimate of the total number of lives lost by this calamity, but the *Friend of India*, on sound data, reckons that it could not have been under two millions! and there is no reason to suppose that it was an over-estimate.

In this year Sir Cecil Beadon retired from the government of Bengal, and was succeeded by Mr. William Grey; while Sir Gaspar Le Marchant—after three years' tenure of the Commander-in-chiefship of Madras, during which time, if we are to be guided by the journals of that Presidency, he had done less for the army than any of his predecessors, and succeeded in making himself universally unpopular—retired, and made way for General McClaverty.

The bishopric of Calcutta, vacant by the lamented death of Dr. Cotton, was, after being refused by several divines in England, eventually accepted by Dr. Milman, who was installed in the Calcutta Cathedral on the 2d April.

The new Bishop was regarded by the Evangelical party in Calcutta with some suspicion, as a report had preceded him that his views on Church matters were tinged with a tendency to Ritualism. But he soon gave indication that, whether holding High or Low Church opinions, he had come to India fully impressed with the importance of the duties he had accepted. On his way to Calcutta, he had landed at Madras, where, in answer to an address presented to him by the Bishop and clergy of that Presidency, he said, that "he looked upon his work as essentially missionary. At the present time, the gradual development of the Native

Church was a matter full of interest, and he should rejoice to watch over, and as far as possible assist its progress. He was to carry on to the utmost of his ability the labours which the sudden and awful summons of Bishop Cotton had so unexpectedly arrested." Like the Ephesians of old in the presence of their great apostle, who paid them a passing visit on his voyage, those present at the meeting then knelt down and, the Bishop of Calcutta leading, joined in repeating the Litany. They then bade him "God speed" on his journey, and he passed on to the head-quarters of his diocese, where his unceasing labours and untiring energy in the cause of religion and the Church have fully borne out the high estimate that was passed of his character by his friends and associates.

In Dr. Gell, the Bishop of Madras, Dr. Milman must have found a sympathising friend and a warm coadjutor. Differing as regards his views of Church matters from his metropolitan, the Bishop of Madras has won all hearts by his fervent piety, and awakened the respect of all who have watched the primitive zeal with which he has devoted himself to his apostolic duties.

Early in the year he delivered a charge which is especially interesting in an historical point of view, as it supplies much statistical information regarding the condition of the Church in the South of India, otherwise difficult to get. He had, when he delivered the charge, visited the whole of his extensive diocese; he had confirmed 6,600, of whom over 5,000 were natives; several ordinations had been held, at which 11 native deacons were ordained and 18 admitted to priests' orders, of whom 9 were natives. The numbers of licensed clergymen were 162, a number totally inadequate to the work of the diocese. The number of Protestant Europeans and East Indians in the diocese is estimated at 24,000, scattered over 47 chaplaincies and stations.

The Bishop paid especial attention to the condition of the native churches in the districts of Tinnevely, Tanjore,



and Travancore. Those who are unacquainted with the extent to which the bonds of caste fetter the minds of the people of India will be surprised to hear the Bishop's testimony to the extent to which caste is a burden upon the Christian Church. Now, as thirty years ago, when Bishop Corrie and Bishop Wilson visited the place, the strange anomaly is presented of the Christian high-caste convert refusing to kneel at the same altar with his low-caste brethren. All the efforts which have been made to induce these professors of a faith that admits of no distinction of persons, to lay aside their prejudices, have been in vain. As Bishop Gell says, "The cords of caste-tyranny are stronger than those of Christ's love." The Syrian churches in the South, which attracted the attention of Bishop Wilson, and led him to indulge the hope that they would be one day amalgamated with the Protestant churches, have shown some symptoms of life and progress. Some of them have ceased to celebrate Divine Service in an unknown tongue, and use the vernacular, and in other respects they give indication of a desire to conform to the usages of Protestant worship. During the three years preceding the Bishop's visitation, there had been an increase of 7,243 members to the native churches, making a total of baptized Christians of 55,495. In addition to which, there were 21,093 persons who had renounced idolatry, and were being prepared for baptism. The number of European and East Indian missionaries is 53; there are 34 native clergymen, a number which has since been increased to 40.¹

The diocese of Bombay was less fortunate in its Bishop, Dr. Harding, who rendered himself notorious all over India by his iconoclastic zeal on Christmas-day, when on entering the Cathedral, before taking his seat, he stood in the aisle and deliberately stripped to pieces the ornamental floral cross which fair hands had the afternoon before

¹ The *Madras Times*, March 27th, 1867, from which the statistics condensed from the Bishop's charge are taken.



affixed to his seat, throwing the poor withering leaves and petals on the ground; and when he approached the altar for the celebration of the Communion service, his first act was to destroy with similar Vandalism the cross of flowers and evergreens on the altar-cloth. And this incredibly bad taste was evinced on two occasions on two successive Christmas festivals.

The political history of the present year centres upon the introduction of the Licence Tax by Mr. Massey. This was a tax, as its name denotes, on professions and trades, to which the utmost opposition was raised outside the Council—a public meeting being held at the Town Hall at Calcutta to protest against it. In principle the tax, although it was so unpopular, has little that is objectionable; in the way in which it was introduced, and in the extent to which the operation of the tax was limited, it was most objectionable. In their method of dealing with this bill, the Council irresistibly remind us of mischievous little boys bent on the pastime of ringing door-bells and then running away. The bill was proposed for the first time on the 8th March; and as if the Legislature were engaged in some work of which they felt ashamed, or as if it was an act the consequences of which they feared, the most unheard-of and unprecedented expedient was adopted, and the bill was brought before the Council and became law on the same day! The promoters of the memorial to the Secretary of State who addressed the public meeting very aptly remarked, "That a measure of such grave importance should not have been laid before Council for final decision without due notice being given to allow of some expression of opinion upon it on the part of the public, and the haste with which the bill was hurried through the usual stages and passed was as unseemly as it was unnecessary."

As it is unlikely that the Council was actuated either by fear or shame in passing the bill, there is only one other motive upon which the "unseemly haste" is to be



explained. No one can study the progress of Indian administration for the last ten years without being struck with the ever-recurring expression of contemptuous indifference to the wishes and opinions of the public which characterises the measures of Government, and too often colours the speeches of its members in Council. Of whatever material the European community in the three Presidency cities may be composed according to official tradition, one would suppose that the interest and opinions of an important class—for, after all, what would India be to England if it were not for commercial transactions between the two countries?—would not be deemed utterly beneath the notice of the governing body.¹ It is not impossible that the manners of the Indian official world may have been corrupted by the evil communications of the Home authorities, some of Sir Charles Wood's despatches being famous for the contemptuous indifference with which he seems to have regarded the views and representations of the local government, and that the scant courtesy dealt out to Chambers of Commerce and deputations may have proceeded on the principle that seems to be inherent in human nature, and by which the boy who cannot retaliate upon his oppressor vents his feelings by bullying one weaker than himself; and so the scale runs down from the top to the bottom of the social ladder. The practice is at times mischievous. If Lord Canning had not, acting under the counsels of his civilian advisers, refused with this contemptuous indifference the aid of the Calcutta European community to raise a volunteer force early in June 1857, the tragedy at Cawnpore might have been prevented, hundreds of invaluable lives saved, and untold sufferings averted. Courtesy and respectful treatment of our neighbours cost little and are often of much value.

¹ See also a recent work of Colonel Chesney on "Indian Polity," where throughout the official view of all independent classes, especially the European, colours the representations and language of the writer.

The great fault to be found with the Licence Tax was that all professional incomes above 25,000 rupees a year paid no increase of duty. Thus members of Council, who legislated for themselves, and other high officials drawing 100,000 a year, paid no more than the barrister or the collector drawing 25,000; while the tax demanded as much from an income of 10,000 as from one of 24,000, from 5,000 as from 9,000, from 1,000 as from 4,000, and from 500 and 200 as from 900 and 400 respectively. And while the wealthiest classes wholly escaped proportionate taxation, the hard-earned pittance of 20% per annum was mulcted in a sum of eight shillings. The objections to the clause affecting companies are similar in principle. On a paid-up capital of 5 lacs, the same sum was to be levied as on a capital of 9 lacs; on 10 lacs as on 1 crore or 100 lacs, whether such companies had paid dividends or not.

The meeting which protested against the unseemly haste with which this measure had been passed into law, and appealed against its injustice, was not actuated by any foolish opposition to taxation on general principles. They were fully prepared to admit that a permanent addition to the resources of the country was an imperative necessity; all that they argued was, that a tax unjust in its operation, which was to yield only 500,000%, which practically exempted the wealthiest classes to which the Legislature themselves belonged, so hastily shuffled through Council, was a measure unworthy of a Government like that of India. Their appeal to the Secretary of State met with the usual fate of such representations, and was rejected.

The episode, however, exemplified the force of the old adage, "the more haste the less speed;" for, after hurrying the obnoxious bill through Council, with the chance of its being vetoed upon the representation of the memorialists, the Government did not like to put it into operation, and it was eventually delayed much longer than it would have been if the ordinary course of procedure had been



observed. The original bill was repealed, and another bill in an amended form passed later in the year.

Another instance of this contemptuous indifference to public opinion is afforded by a characteristic incident which occurred early in the year. One of the social peculiarities of the natives of India is a generally-accepted idea that there is something derogatory in having to attend a court of law. No matter whether as a suitor, a defendant, or a witness, a native of high rank considers it an insult to be forced to attend court. The Government, who have from time immemorial humoured the natives into one-half of what are called their "caste prejudices," always winked at this little weakness, and have by law exempted from attendance at court a certain class of persons. The Bengal Government, acting on its privilege in this particular, granted the usual coveted exemption to seven Bengalees, one of whom was a merchant, on the ground that they either had been or were members of the local Legislative Council. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce remonstrated against this silly extension of a most mischievous Act, for the members of the Legislature surely of all others have, or ought to have, the least reason to be ashamed of the courts of the country, and might be expected to set a good example in this respect to their less-enlightened fellow-countrymen. The Chamber of Commerce pointed out that the privilege was one unknown in any other part of Her Majesty's dominions, that it is opposed to the first principles of justice, and that it should only be allowed in certain families where it had been held as an hereditary privilege for many generations. To this very reasonable memorial the Lieutenant-Governor replied, declining to withdraw the boon, ending with thanking "the Committee for the interest and trouble they have taken in a matter which had no apparent connexion with the commercial interests of Bengal, and regarding which, therefore, it did not occur to the Lieutenant-Governor to consult them!"

The results of efforts to obtain an accurate return of the



population of two of the principal subdivisions of British India—the North-West and the Central Provinces—were published this year. We are much indebted to Mr. Chichele Plowden, the Secretary to the Board of Revenue, for a very clear and lucid statement of the census of the North-West, which presents us with several very interesting facts. The Hindoos bear the proportion of more than six to one of Mahommedans, the former being 25,674,819, and the Mahommedan 4,105,206. The Hindoos have been divided into the four great castes or sections, for the word “caste” hardly represents the distinction between the original great divisions of the race or races. These four divisions or sections are, as every reader of elementary geography knows, the Brahmins or priests, the Cshetriyas or military, the Vaisyas or agricultural, and the Soodr or servile classes. The castes proper are no less than 560, but the four great sections of the Hindoo community stand respectively as follow:—Brahmins 3,451,692, Cshetriyas 2,817,768, Vaisyas 1,091,250, Soodres 18,304,309. It would be uninteresting to the general reader to follow the census into details, although, from the list of trades or occupations set down, some amusement might be derived. Here we find all the degrading pursuits invented to minister to the lusts and passions of the rich which are unhappily represented in every community that has made any advance in civilization. But apart from these we have callings and trades, some of which, though they may have their counterparts in European communities, are seldom represented by separate classes, such, for instance, as “pedigree-makers” and “flatterers for gain,” of whom the North-West Provinces can supply twenty-eight in the one case, and 226 in the other. Although there are in the list upwards of 400,000 beggars, and 111 of another species of the same genus called “alms-takers,” 900 “budmashes” or scoundrels who live by their wits, the whole province is represented by the official returns to contain but one “yagabond.” Of “ear-piercers” there are eighteen, “sturdy beggars” thirty-



five, "hangmen" the prodigious number of 133, "fortune-tellers" three, "jesters" 800, and one "informer." It is remarkable that the numbers of informers and vagabonds should be represented by the unit, and it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that he may be the same person under two characters. The number of native Christians is set down as 14,126, Europeans as 27,761—which of course includes the army, and 5,069 Eurasians. This census, compared with Bishop Gell's census of the Native Church of Madras, shows that native Christians are as one to four in the North-West Provinces and the Southern Presidency, a proportion we should have been fully prepared to find.

It is important to notice that out of the whole population the agricultural class is said to number 17,656,006, the industrial 3,868,822, among whom there are reckoned no less than 135,515 gold and silver smiths.

The Census of the Central Provinces was taken on the 5th November, 1866, after great precautions to impress on the people, who are less advanced than the inhabitants of the North-West, that the process of numbering them was not to be followed by any unpleasant consequences, of which they appeared in much apprehension. In these provinces we find the Hindoos bear a much larger proportion to the Mahommedans than in the North-West, there being 6,864,770 Hindoos to 237,922 Mahommedans. The aboriginal tribes number very nearly two millions. The proportion of population to area in the Central Provinces is 365 to the square mile of cultivated soil, whereas that of the North-West is 351. But the immense extent of waste and jungle lands in the former territory is illustrated by the proportion of only 79 to the square mile, if the whole area, cultivated and uncultivated, is reckoned. The whole population of the North-West is given at 30,110,615, the Central Provinces 9,104,511, making a total of upwards of thirty-nine millions, out of which four and a half millions only are Mahommedans. Statements of figures on paper convey to the mind but



an imperfect idea of the actual number represented. But some notion of the amazing extent of the population of India in the aggregate may be gained by a visit to the great religious gatherings or fairs as they are called, which periodically attract millions to some central spot, generally the banks of a sacred river, for devotional purposes. The most famous and most familiar to the English reader of all these fairs or religious gatherings, is that of Hurdwar. In the present year (1867) the collection was unusually large, owing to the return of a sacred cycle which recurs every twelfth year, and is called the "Coombha" fair, so named from the planet Jupiter being then in the sign of Aquarius, at which season the pilgrimage to the sacred river, and bathing in it, are supposed to be accompanied by especial and peculiar blessings. Every 144th year the sanctity of the ceremony is increased in proportion to the rarity of its recurrence, and the cycle fell in 1867. "In addition to this a belief had gained ground in all parts of the Peninsula that the sacred character of the Ganges was being interfered with, and that ere the time of another gathering could arrive, it would be entirely destroyed." This idea, it is suggested, arose on the completion of the Ganges Canal, which it was supposed would eventually dry up the river by exhausting its waters. The notion may also have a deeper signification, indicating that the advance of intelligence, the result of British rule and education, is destined to undermine the influence of the Brahminical priesthood, and the sanctity of the holy stream.¹

Some particulars of the Great Coombh, as related by an eye-witness, may not be uninteresting. It is necessary to premise that, owing to the immense concourse of people which was expected, and the certainty that it would be attended or followed by the outbreak of some epidemic,

¹ These are the suggestions of the late Mr. Robertson, of the Bengal Civil Service, magistrate of Saharunpore. See an interesting account of the Hurdwar fair of 1867, in the fourth annual report of the Sanitary Commissioner with the Government of India for 1867.



the Government had taken every precaution possible to secure attention to sanitary arrangements, as well as to preserve the peace, for large bands of devotees assemble in thousands under rival spiritual guides, and not uncommonly enact the same sort of scene that might be witnessed in former years, at the church of the so-called Holy Sepulchre, where pilgrims who came to pray remained to fight.

The gathering of the people from different parts of India commenced about the 10th of March, and increased steadily up to the 7th of April. From that day till the 11th, the rush of pilgrims pouring in upon the sacred spot was immense. It is supposed that there were not less than from two and a half to three millions collected in the place. On the 12th, the sacred day, this mighty concourse of human beings arose as one man for the ceremony of purification.

One of the first objects of the authorities had been to erect ten bridges across the river at certain intervals, which were placed under the charge of police, and marked off with different coloured flags, in order to prevent collision between streams of people crossing over bridges in different directions. One of the most striking features of the fair is the assembling of the different sects or followers of various "fakirs" or "mahunts," who are noted for some peculiarity in their religious teaching. In 1843 a very serious collision took place between the followers of two opposing sects, regarding precedence in bathing, which was attended by loss of life. On the present occasion measures were taken to bring them in under an escort, which both acted as a guide and prevented any breach of the peace. It was a curious sight to watch these processions of devotees, under the leadership of their several "fakirs," marching with a cavalry escort headed by the magistrate, a road being made for them through the surrounding mass of human beings by the foot police. After performing the seven prescribed immersions in the sacred

water, the processions returned as they came across the bridges to their respective encampments. The writer, whose account was published in the *Delhi Gazette* of the 18th April, proceeds as follows:—

“I must here make prominent mention of the admirable arrangements made by Major Watson, Superintendent of Police, for checking the progress of the overwhelming crowd approaching the ‘sacred ghaut’ (bathing place) at the time when the sects of ‘faquirs’ were in the water. This was executed by means of red flags placed in the hands of policemen stationed on prominent localities at intervals of three and four hundred yards all along the main road appointed for the people, and where strong bodies of police were posted and barricades erected. When each set of faquirs approached the bridge of boats to cross over to the ‘sacred ghaut,’ the red flag at the ghaut would be exhibited, a signal for all other flags to be waved, indicating that the ghaut was occupied by the faquirs. The police at the barricades immediately drew up in line, and stopped the onward progress of the multitude. The communication was so rapid and effective, that the mass was simultaneously broken into divisions, and stopped without the dread of the people falling over one another and being crushed. When these flags were withdrawn, it was a signal for the crowd to be allowed to proceed again. Had this method not been adopted, great loss of life would inevitably have occurred during this momentous day. But one death happened on the Dehra Dhoon side, owing to the giving way of one of the barricades through the immense weight on it, and by which a few persons were injured.

“The greater portion of the crowd took up their position on the vast tract of land opposite the river, familiarly called the ‘Island of Roree.’ This part of Hurdwar was marked off into bazaars, ‘mohullas,’ and marts for cattle of all kinds, and placed by Major Watson under the superintendence of Captain Bramly, who worked it as a district, with six police stations, composed of 140 constables, irrespective of officers. The sanitary arrangements of this island, together with that for the whole fair, were conducted by Dr. Cutcliffe, F.R.C.S., the civil surgeon of Saharunpore. To this officer’s unremitting exertions the total absence of sickness was attributable; his close supervision and directions to the police respecting the keeping clean all latrines, and the burning and reducing to ashes all filth, in furnaces erected for the purpose, effectually checked the birth of any disease. No epidemic or infectious diseases showed themselves. Hospitals were erected in different parts of the grounds to accommodate the sick, but happily they were but little used. It would only take up too much space were I to detail the sanitary arrangements; suffice it to say that, had irregular squatting been permitted, as was too well experienced at the late Agra



darbar, cholera would to a certain extent have made its appearance in so dense a crowd.

"I cannot mention in language too high the commendable exertions of the police of the North-West Provinces and Punjab. They have as a body worked hard and with a will; their exertions at the 'sacred ghaut' were the theme of praise. Young and old, infirm and blind, alike received their needful help in pulling and assisting them up the wooden steps at the water's edge. Women in hundreds rushed frantically into the water with babes in their arms, which in the immense crowd were torn from them, but none lost their children; people who had accidentally lost their wives and children found them after a short time at an adjoining police station, where all were conveyed and kept till owned. It is wonderful that no loss of life occurred.

"It would have been impossible to have made anything like a correct estimate of the crowd which assembled at this fair, but calculating by the Oriental system of one lac of souls to every square 'coss,' it was judged that there were no less than three millions of people at this 'Coomb fair.' For miles round Hurdwar, and on the Dehra Dhoon side, a vast encampment as far as the eye could reach was seen. Most conspicuous of all was that of His Highness the Maharajah of Cashmere. His Highness the Rajah of Bhurtpore offered up his orisons to the shrine of 'Mahadeo,' but in quite a different way to the pomp and show displayed by the Maharajah of Cashmere. Various people of note and respectability were here, among them Sir Deo Narain Singh, K.S.I., with bare head and the customary small winding sheet; but now all, poor and rich, are wending their way homewards.

"This fair will long be held in remembrance, chiefly and solely for the completeness of the arrangements that were adopted for the convenience and well-being of the crowd, both as regards the 'sacred ghaut' and in a sanitary point of view. Certainly some little confusion and discontent made itself apparent at the onset, but a little trouble soon made the people acquainted with the different routes appointed to take them to and from the 'ghaut,' as well as the object of the latrines which had been prepared for them on different parts of the ground. The names of Major Watson and Mr. Robertson, the magistrate of Saharunpore, with those of other officers, will long be remembered, and will spread far and wide, as the 'pundits' have made a note in their books of all officers' names. This vast crowd is fast dispersing, praising the *British raj*, and crying out '*Watson, sahib ke jye*,' for the ease and convenience they little expected to find, as it is notorious that no 'Coomb fair' has yet taken place that has not been attended with loss of life and sickness."

The arrangements which reflected so much credit upon the officials were successful in preventing disease as long as



the concourse remained subject to them ; but the moment the fair broke up, and the pilgrims commenced their return march, their route, diverging as it did into thousands of different directions, was tracked with disease. Cholera broke out, and all Upper India was threatened with a tremendous visitation of the scourge, carried, as it was feared it would be, by the pilgrims into every large city, into thousands of villages, along every high road.

The report of the Sanitary Commission for 1867 deals exhaustively with the subject of the origin and spread of cholera in and by the Hurdwar fair. The progress of the disease is traced from station to station, from city to city, and the conclusion is inevitable that its *dissemination* was due to the fair, and the pilgrims returning from it. At any rate this is undoubtedly the case within certain limits. In all the cities of the North-West of India, and the southern portions of the Punjab, the progress of the disease is clearly traceable. It would only be natural that the further we get from the source the fainter should become the track of the great destroyer ; and, accordingly, when we get to Peshawur and to some of the trans-Indus towns, the ostensible connexion is so slight that many altogether deny that the outbreak in these places, at any rate, had any connexion with the fair.

It is well known that during the actual existence of the fair itself the pilgrims were remarkably healthy. It was wonderful, considering what an immense mass of human beings had collected on one spot, that there was so little disease among them. It was only when the gathering was over, and the pilgrims had set about returning to their homes, that the disease appeared in any formidable shape. Up to the 12th April, according to the returns from the dispensaries and hospitals, there were not more than one in two thousand sick. All the medical officers concur as to the remarkable immunity from sickness. As far as can be ascertained there was no case of cholera till the 13th April, and on that day eight cases were sent to hospital. But



from noon on the 12th the vast multitude had begun to depart. The 12th, the last day, was the great day for bathing, which concluded the ceremonies, and the pilgrims were then at liberty to return to their homes. By the evening of the 15th they had all left.

It is highly probable that the disease received its first stimulus on the last day, when the great ceremony of ablution took place. The bathing-place was a space 650 feet long, by about 30 wide, shut off from the rest of the river by rails. Into this long, narrow enclosure the pilgrims from all parts of the encampment crowded as closely as possible from morning till sunset. The water within the space was during the whole time thick and dirty, partly from the ashes of the dead brought by surviving relatives to be deposited in the sacred waters, and partly from the washing of the clothes and bodies of the bathers. The custom is for the pilgrims to dip themselves three times into the liquid filth (water it can no longer be called), and then, oh horror! to drink it! This part of the ceremony is never omitted; and when two or more members of a family bathe together, each from his own hand gives to the other water to drink. And the reciprocal offerings of water take place between friends as well as relatives, the drinking being accompanied by vows of love, and fidelity, and friendship. The quantity of water thus imbibed varies, but it is never less than about as much as can be taken up by the palms of two hands held together so as to form a cup, *and usually several cupfuls are drunk.*¹

It appears, further, that a place called Bazpore, near Hurdwar, was infected with cholera at the time, and the people from the adjacent places do not come to the fair till the very last. It is therefore quite possible that some pilgrims with the seeds of the disease upon them might have come to the fair the last day, and taken part in this

¹ See Report of the Sanitary Commissioner with the Governor-General for 1867.



final bathing, and every subsequent phenomenon that took place is thus accounted for. The disease broke out the following day.

The report is accompanied by a map showing the different places between the Himalayas and Peshawur at which the cholera made its appearance, and the date—in almost every instance, a day or so subsequent to the entry or passage of some pilgrims through the place, except at Peshawur, and Bunnoo (where, however, it is said to have been introduced from Kangra), Dera Ismael Khan, Jhung, Murree, Huzara, and Simla (where it is traced to a traveller, not necessarily a pilgrim).

It is to be noticed, however, that Dr. Brydon, "who has studied," as the report says, "the general facts of the actual distribution of cholera in India with an industry and research which have been unsurpassed," does not agree with the opinion that the outbreak originated with the Hurdwar pilgrims. As early as the 25th February, judging from his experience of general laws that appear to regulate the phenomena of cholera, he predicted an epidemic in 1867, at Hurdwar, and over Kumaon and Ghurwal in April and May. He drew attention at that early period to the probability of a distribution of cholera parallel with that of 1857-8 and 1862. Dr. Brydon's anticipation proved correct, but the fact does not militate against the theory of the dissemination of cholera over the whole country by means of the pilgrims.

If the general reader, with the average knowledge of Indian history which is attained by most educated people in England, were asked what were the characteristics and prevailing features of Indian history, he would at once reply, military operations. Yet a review of the past nine years, so far as we have gone, will leave in the mind of the reader the impression of a series of natural catastrophes,—a succession of floods, famines, and epidemics rather than of military operations. Nature appears to be ever holding a scourge of some kind over the country, and applying it



year by year with merciless severity upon some portion or other of the vast continent. During the period India has been partially free from war, and it is seldom visited by severe earthquakes, but the destructive effects of famine and pestilence and flood are much greater than those resulting from either of the former visitations, terrible as they undoubtedly are. Nor is the record even yet complete. While the rapid and extensive spread of cholera after the Hurdwar fair was carrying consternation into every bazaar and every garrison all over Upper India, Calcutta was visited with another cyclone, not quite so terrible as the great hurricane of 1864, but very destructive and very awful to witness. It occurred on the 1st November, and the conflict of the elements was in one sense more appalling than on the last occasion, as it took place in the darkness of the night. The centre of the storm passed to the east of Saugor Point, and swept round the north of Calcutta. Indications of the approaching disturbance were observed early in the morning of the 1st. At Calcutta the wind was from the north-east, and shortly after dark it became fitful and threatening, the gusts gaining gradually in strength until they reached their maximum between 2 and 3 A.M. of the 2d. The loss of life was not nearly so great as on the last occasion, although the hurricane of 1867 was also accompanied by the storm-wave which destroyed the tramway belonging to the Canning Company, and carried off about 2,000 feet of metal from the roadway, besides committing other ravages along the coast. The police-reports returned about a thousand lives as having been lost in and about Calcutta, including women and children ; two ferry-steamers were destroyed, sixty-seven cargo-boats, and between four and five hundred boats of other kinds. Some thirty thousand huts were levelled to the ground, and about two hundred brick houses blown down. The shipping escaped with comparatively few disasters. The passenger-ship the *Blenheim*, which was at the time making its way up the Bay of Bengal, and was



dismasted by the storm, was able to put into Coconada to refit.

It remains to say a few words about the discussions on the proposed railway schemes that took place this year, and the condition of the Bank of Bombay.

In marking out great lines of railway across a continent, it often happens that the calculations and forecastings of the wisest men are at fault. Every consideration that can be urged seems to indicate a certain line of country as the one which should be selected for a projected railway; experience gained after it has been completed shows that it would have been more advantageous to have adopted a different route. This has been the case even in England; it has been the case to a certain extent in India.

The outlines of Lord Dalhousie's great scheme were to connect Calcutta with Delhi by a line up the valley of the Ganges, prolonged from Delhi through the Punjab to Attock on the Indus, which is within fifty miles of Peshawur. A second line was to run from Bombay through Baroda to Agra, thus connecting Upper India with the western seaboard and Europe. In the Madras Presidency he recommended a line across the peninsula to Beypore, a seaport on the western coast, and another to the north-west to unite with a south-eastern line from Bombay.

The first of these schemes has been carried out by the East India Railway Company, whose line runs from Calcutta to Delhi, and the Madras and Beypore line has also been completed. The Madras railway is to join the Great Indian Peninsular from Bombay at Sholapore, about half-way between the two seaports. Great expectations were at one time formed of Beypore as a seaport, which experience has not borne out, but the railway is not altogether thrown away, as it passes by the foot of the Neilgherries, the great sanatorium of the Southern Presidency. From Delhi, the Punjab and Delhi railways will be, by the time these pages come before the public, open as far as Umballa, a large military cantonment, near a city of that



name, the head-quarters of the Sirhind division, and within fifty miles of the foot of the Himalayas in the direction of the hill-stations of Dagshai, Subathoo, and Simla. From Umballa northwards there is a break as far as the river Beas, in the Jullundur Dooab; but from the Beas, all the way passing the cities of Umritsur and Lahore, there is unbroken railway communication to Mooltan. Below Mooltan to a place called Kotree, on the Indus, opposite Hyderabad in Scinde, there is another hiatus. This part of the journey has to be made by the steam flotilla, and occupies about three weeks in ascending the stream from Kotree to Mooltan, and about a third of that time descending. From Kotree to Kurrachee the Scind railway has been complete for some years.

From Bombay the Bombay and Baroda line runs up northwards *via* Baroda to Ahmedabad. And the Great Indian Peninsular connects Bombay with Nagpore, on the border of the great cotton-fields of the Central Provinces; the main branch of this line is eventually to meet the East India line at Jubbulpore, when there will be direct communication between Allahabad, on the Ganges, and the Western Presidency. This line will be open probably in 1870. At present, the traveller wending his way across the continent of India has to exchange the railway at Jubbulpore for a carriage, in which he travels over a splendid road and with great facility to Nagpore, where he meets the rail again. This line is a divergence from Lord Dalhousie's original plan, which was to connect Upper India and Bombay by the Agra and Bombay line. After much discussion he was persuaded to change this project, and to adopt instead a line across the continent, striking the Ganges at Mirzapore, a little below Allahabad, and eventually it was resolved upon making Allahabad the point of junction.

In this grand scheme two mistakes were made. The East Indian line ought to have been made direct from

Calcutta to Benares, instead of following the valley of the Ganges, and the route first marked out between Agra and Bombay ought to have been maintained. That part of the original design, the extension of railway communication to Attock, a most important section in a political point of view, was abandoned. Thus two great centres of communication remain to be connected,—the Western Presidency direct with Northern India, and the extreme Northern frontier at Peshawur and Attock with Lahore. Three lines were projected: one the extension of the Bombay and Baroda line to Agra, which would thus become the direct channel of communication between Upper India, the Western Coast, and Europe, the saving in distance by the adoption of the direct route, as compared with that *viâ* Allahabad and Jubbulpore, being enormous; the second, a line from Lahore to Peshawur; and the third, a line connecting Kotree on the Indus, the terminus of the Lower Scind railway, with Mooltan.

The subject was much discussed during the year in the papers, and a very able minute was penned by Sir Bartle Frere, who pointed out that of these three lines, two of them, at any rate, were quite distinct, and might fairly be entered upon together. Sir John Lawrence was not very favourably disposed towards either, but strongly deprecated the construction of more than one.

The question was disposed of by the Secretary of State in a minute dated the 7th March, 1867, who decided that complete surveys for the Rajpootana line, or the extension of the Bombay and Baroda line, which was to connect the western coast with Upper India by a junction at Agra and Delhi, should be carried out at once; the other scheme remaining in abeyance. Political considerations have, however, subsequently led to a modification of the policy; the survey of the Rajpootana line has been suspended, and the necessity of speedily completing the connexion between Peshawur and Lahore and Mooltan fully recognised.



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To show with what caution the recommendations of Indian officials, as to the selection of routes for railways, ought to be received, it may be mentioned that the adoption of a line west of the Aravelli range between Ajmere and Delhi, for the Bombay and Baroda extension, has been recently urged on Government. The route traverses enormous wastes of loose sand, where there is neither water, nor vegetation, nor human habitation. The chief argument in its favour is the absence of engineering difficulties, but anything more than a mere superficial acquaintance with the subject would show that an engineering difficulty of a grave and, as far as experience has gone, of an insuperable character does exist. In these deserts, the sands shift under the influence of winds prevailing regularly from one quarter. In this way huge hillocks are formed in parallel rows, like ranges of little mountains, a feature with which most travellers in Asia and Africa are familiar, and this moving sand is about the most formidable enemy the engineer or the architect can encounter, for in the course of time it even buries whole cities, a fate which would speedily overtake a railway, with all its accompanying buildings in the solitudes of Bikaner. Art, in the person of the railway engineer, has conquered nature in the obstacles offered by rivers, by valleys, even by mountains; but in the wide expanse of comparatively level plains of sand, nature is still supreme, and the traveller who would cross the lonely tracts of Bikaner must be content to journey by the old-fashioned ship of the desert, whose domains will not be invaded by the iron horse for many years yet.

The following table shows the extent of the main lines of railway completed, and the amount of guaranteed capital up to the date of the Report, 1867-8:—

LINES.	Extent, Miles.	Guaranteed Capital.	No. of Miles to be completed.
		£	
1. East Indian	1,501 $\frac{3}{4}$	28,650,000	145
2. Great Indian Peninsular	1,266 $\frac{3}{4}$	19,000,000	393
3. Madras	825	10,000,000	180
4. Scind, including Punjab and Delhi	675	10,624,000	266
5. Oude and Rohilcund	672	4,000,000	630
6. Bombay and Baroda	312 $\frac{1}{2}$	7,500,000	6 $\frac{1}{2}$
7. Great Southern of India	160 $\frac{1}{2}$	1,350,000	—
8. Eastern Bengal	159	2,662,000	45
9. Calcutta and South Eastern . .	29	600,000	—

In one or two instances, the figures in the third column, which shows the number of miles to be completed at the date of the Report, must be slightly modified before they can be taken to represent the existing condition of the work.

The story of the decline and fall of the Bank of Bombay will only be fully disclosed by the publication of the report of the committee of inquiry; and from what has already transpired during the progress of the investigation, it is to be feared that the disclosure will form one of the most disgraceful episodes in the commercial history of India. The temporary failure of the Agra and Masterman's Bank, in 1866, occasioned much distress among a vast number of old officers, widows, and families, whose savings were either invested or deposited there. But if the reckless trading that caused the temporary stoppage of the bank was discreditable to those who were entrusted with the management of its affairs, the speedy resuscitation of the institution evinced and justified the confidence of the public. But the Bank of Bombay was founded on a basis that attracted a far greater share of public confidence than would have been given to a mere private firm, and the trust therefore which the directors held was all the more onerous, and its breach all the more reprehensible. No doubt the public, who do not often take the



pains to inquire closely into the legal status of banks and companies they deal with, were under an impression which was in a great degree a false one, that the Government in reality were responsible for their deposits and investments. The Government were large shareholders, and were well represented in the direction; and although nothing can possibly excuse the moral delinquency of the officials who could so shamefully abuse such trust, it is another question altogether how far the State can be held legally responsible for the losses. Such a connexion as that which the Government of India has with the Presidency banks is not altogether free from objection. The Government ought either to be in a position to control their operations altogether, in which case, of course, it would be responsible to the public who invested in them, or it ought to have nothing whatever to say to their management. The position it held, or, which is much the same thing morally, the position it was supposed to hold in Bombay, was especially a false one, because it will not make itself responsible to those who confided in the bank on the strength of its State connexion. It will be interesting to note the opinions of some eminent authorities on this subject. In July 1867, Sir John Lawrence wrote: "I submit that the circumstances which have led to the ruin of the Bank of Bombay resulted from the neglect of obvious and reasonable precautions at a time of unprecedented temptation, and that if care had been taken in the selection of the Government directors, as well as in their supervision, that Bank would have surmounted all its difficulties, just as those of Bengal and Madras have done." This, in plainer words, is putting the blame of the failure on Sir Bartle Frere, for not selecting proper men for the direction, and not overlooking them after their appointment.

The *Friend of India*, which reflects faithfully Sir John Lawrence's views, speaks out more plainly. "To Sir Bartle Frere," it says, "or to his sanction, we owe that charter of 1864, which by doubling the capital of the

Bank added fuel to the flame which allowed advances on bubble shares, and, by permitting more than three lacs of rupees to be lent to individuals on personal security, created the scandals with which Bombay is still ringing." And again, "If Sir Cecil Beadon is responsible for the Orissa disaster, the late Governor of Bombay is more directly so for the moral and pecuniary ruin of Bombay."

Sir William Mansfield candidly confesses: "Having myself been a member of the Bombay Government during the years immediately preceding 1865, I am able to bear personal testimony to the manner in which a local Government can hardly fail to be carried along by such a movement as was witnessed in this year. It is too much to expect from human judgment, that when placed in the midst of such circumstances it should not be influenced by the swelling tide around, which is felt alike by every man and in every thing, and to take advantage of which in the public interest cannot fail to be the object of every Government."

Mr. Massey speaks more to the point. He says: "It would be understating the case to say, that the position of the Bank of Bombay was and is that of an insolvent whose liabilities are covered by a responsible guarantor. A guarantee would extend only to the debts of the partnership. But the Government, by the course it pursued, went much further than this. In the summer of 1865, the Bank was hard pressed; its shares fell below par. But no sooner was it announced that the Bank was supported by the unlimited credit of Government than the depositors brought back the balances they had withdrawn, and the shares rose to sixty per cent. premium. At that time the Bank had absolutely lost half its capital, and had two millions sterling of outstanding debts, which have since proved to be worthless. Thus, in consequence of the action of the Government, the public were induced to repose confidence in an establishment which was unworthy of confidence, and to give 160% for property which was



not worth more than 25%. But could the Government have refrained from interference? could they have taken any other course than they did take? I think not. They were [partners in the Bank; they were directors of the Bank. The difficulties (since ascertained to have been the ruin) of the Bank had been mainly caused by the culpable remissness of those Government directors. Sir W. Mansfield admits this to be the fact. But when his Excellency blames the Government directors, he blames the Government itself, which must be responsible for the acts of officers and nominees."

It would serve no purpose to recapitulate the discussions that went on through the whole of 1867, and the schemes which were proposed and rejected for the resuscitation of the Bank of Bombay, for its amalgamation with the Banks of Bengal and Madras,—measures stoutly and effectually resisted by the prudent counsels of the Madras Presidency; of the establishment of an agency of the Bank of Bengal at Bombay; and of the final relinquishment of the water-logged vessel to its fate, and the launching of a new one under better auspices. The committee of inquiry was not formed till a year later, and did not commence its sittings till the summer of 1868.

The principle enunciated by Sir John Lawrence was a sound one. The head of a Government must be held liable to some extent for the failure of the officers he appoints.

The excuse pleaded by Sir William Mansfield will not be admitted for a moment, for it is obvious that the same principle would justify the bloody assize of Judge Jeffreys, the atrocities of the French Revolution, or the barbarities exercised under the "No Popery" cry in the time of Titus Oates.



CHAPTER XIII.

1868.

Disturbances in Kattyawar—History of the Waghurs—Military operations—Mahommedan disaffection—Revolution in Muscat—Expedition to Yunan—Breaking up of the Chinese Empire—Affghanistan—The Oude and Punjab Tenancy Bills—The Bank of Bombay scandal—Progress of public works—Barracks—Fortresses—Security of the Empire—Railway progress—Failure of private enterprise—Earl Mayo arrives—Sir John Lawrence's administration.

THE freedom from political disturbances and military operations which, as a general rule, characterises the history of the Indian administration from 1859, appears to have ceased with the close of 1867. In the latter end of that year an affray of rather a serious character, which was attended by the loss of some valuable lives, occurred with the Waghurs on the Western Coast in the Bombay Presidency.

At the extreme west of the peninsula of Saurashtra, or Kattyawar—itsself the remotest province of India on the south-west—is an insulated point of land, called appropriately enough, Jugut Coont (land's end). On this island, comprising, together with the adjoining islet of Beyt in the Gulf of Cutch, the district of Okhamundel, stands the town of Dwarka, on the bold sea-coast; and on the most commanding eminence of the town is built the great temple of Krishna. That it is the holiest and most ancient of all the shrines consecrated to this divinity, may be inferred from another name for Krishna in the Hindoo mythology being Dwarkanath, or "Lord of Dwarka."

With reference to the remote situation of this celebrated temple, I may remark, in passing, on the strange superstition which has placed all the most sacred shrines of the Hindoos in the remotest and most inaccessible localities, as if to enhance, by material difficulties and dangers, the merit of the pilgrimages enjoined by their religion. The Hindoo shrines at Budrinath, Kidarnath, Gungootree, Jum-nootree, are situated in the most inaccessible heights of the far Himalaya. Other shrines, in different parts of India, will occur to the reader who has any local experience to illustrate this remark. So dangerous was the approach to Budrinath especially, that hundreds of pilgrims perished annually on the way, till the British Government, pitying the superstition it could deplore but not control, constructed the pilgrim road leading from Hurdwar up the valley of the Alakanundee and Guneshgunga, to that holy of holies, the main source of the Ganges.

The temple of Dwarka being so sacred a shrine attracted thousands of pilgrims annually, high and low, from all parts of India. The Waghurs who possessed it, as also the adjoining shrine at Beyt, appeared to have lived from time immemorial in idle dependence on its endowments and the votive offerings of the pilgrims. When these failed, or time hung on their hands, they are said to have followed piracy for diversion or profit—a course for which their position, at the mouth of the Gulf of Cutch commanding the approach from the Arabian sea, afforded peculiar facilities. The first attempt we know of to reduce the tribe to order was in 1809, when Colonel Walker was sent against them with a force, and defeating them after a stout resistance, decreed a certain sum against the tribe in compensation for their depredations. In 1815 the district of Okhamundel was sold to the Guicowar on payment among other purchase-moneys of the amount of compensation above referred to, which we had been unable to realize. The acquisition of so barren a district was valued by the Guicowar solely for the honour of becoming the patron



of the celebrated shrine. But the Waghurs did not approve of the transfer. After giving the Guicowar's officers much trouble, they defeated his troops, and turned out his Governor, thus re-possessing themselves of their strongholds and profitable shrines. As we had sold the district to the Guicowar, and been duly paid, we appear to have considered it necessary to reinstate his rule by force of arms. This was accomplished in 1820 by the employment of a force under Colonel Stanhope, but not without having to make an assault on Dwarka; in an ineffectual attempt to repel which the Waghur chief, Mooloo Manik, fell like Tippoo at Seringapatam, in the breach. After the mutinies of 1857, Okhamundel was re-transferred by the Guicowar to the British, and the fact of our having immediately to move a force against the Waghurs, and make the desperate assaults on Beyt and Dwarka, was proof sufficient, that during the long interval the district had remained under the Guicowar, he had wholly failed, even if he had attempted, to reduce to obedience that lawless tribe.

These people never wholly abandoned their restless and predatory habits; and whether under an idea that the vigilance of the British Government was relaxed, or that it had grown tired of coercion, or acting under some of those sudden impulses which occasionally drive half-savage races into wanton and fatal excesses, for the last year they had been incessantly giving trouble, plundering villages, and slaughtering inoffensive villagers. Accordingly, the Political Agent, Colonel Anderson, took the field against them with a small force of forty cavalry and thirty British infantry, with a native contingent, accompanied by his two assistants, Captains La Touche and Hibbert.

After marching some distance across the country, Colonel Anderson obtained information of the enemy being within twelve miles of his camp, and leaving the infantry to follow, the officers, accompanied by Captain Reynolds of the 17th, and the mounted portion of the little force, set off, and



after riding a considerable distance reached the foot of an isolated hill some three hundred feet high, upon the summit of which the outlaws were said to have taken up a strong position. The cavalry could not act upon such ground, so the party awaited the arrival of the infantry, who came up in about half an hour. The attack was then made: Captain La Touche, followed by a party of sepoy, gallantly assailed the position of the enemy from one direction, while Major Reynolds and Captain Hibbert ascended the hill on two opposite sides. Captain Hibbert was the first to cut down a Waghur chief, but was himself mortally wounded immediately after, being shot through the spine. Captain La Touche also fell in a hand-to-hand encounter while in the act of despatching the fourth of the outlaws he had slain with his own hand. Major Reynolds was dangerously wounded. Dearly purchased, the victory was complete; out of twenty-five desperate men, seventeen were slain, and two taken prisoners, but the success was a poor compensation for the loss of two such valuable officers as Captains La Touche and Hibbert.

A few months later, in February 1868, a body of rebellious Bheels were defeated by Captain Macleod, with parties of the 28th and 6th regiments of Bombay Native Infantry, and some of the Guicowar's horse. And shortly afterwards, on the further confines of the British Indian Empire, near Kohat, a gallant young officer, Captain Ruxton, lost his life in an encounter with one of the frontier tribes, the Bezooties, against whom a force had taken the field. The issue of the combat had been a little doubtful; but our troops vastly outnumbered the enemy, who were however strongly posted in such a position that it was extremely difficult to dislodge them. Captain Ruxton, carried away by excitement and youthful ardour, ventured rashly and against orders upon the ground held by the enemy, where he was killed, and his body left in their possession. They subsequently restored it to his friends.

Later in the year it was deemed necessary to assemble a considerable force on the North-west frontier, under General Wylde; and a regular campaign against certain tribes, occupying a large hilly region, called the Black Mountain, was undertaken. This being a military operation of some magnitude will be related in the chapter devoted to military operations on the North-west frontier.

It is somewhat curious that the symptoms of disaffection which accompanied the Umbeyla campaign of 1863-64, should have shown themselves in connexion with the Black Mountain campaign of 1868. There has been a repetition of the same activity among the Wahabee Mussulmen of the more southern part of India, especially in Bengal and the neighbourhood of Patna, which in 1863-64 eventuated in a regularly organized transmission of recruits and supplies from many of the principal cities of Bengal, even as far south as Dacca, to support the cause of the trans-Indus Mahommedan fanatics in arms against the British Government. And generally throughout India, during the year under review, there has been an active proselytizing spirit abroad, both among Hindoos and Mahommedans, itinerant preachers of both these religions having been constantly noticed in the bazaars and streets of large cities, preaching much as missionaries do, to any of the passers-by who may be disposed to listen. The feature is peculiar, because, generally speaking, neither Hindoos nor Mahommedans exhibit any proselytizing tendencies.

As on the former occasion in 1863-64, the conspirators made use of the ready-made machinery our commissariat system provided them with, to carry out their designs, passing men and money up to the frontier in the guise of commissariat *employés* and bills on commissariat agents, so now it appears they resolved to avail themselves of the means which modern civilization places within their reach, and established dépôts conveniently situated as regards the railways for the transmission of recruits and contributions.



The history of the Abyssinian expedition is foreign to the plan of this work. The preparations for the part which India took in it, however, for a while awakened almost as much interest in military matters as if the whole expedition had been an Indian campaign. It was not till the 9th of January of this year that the rear of the Bengal brigade left the Hooghly under Brigadier-General Stewart, with the mountain train battery and the last of the Bengal cavalry. But although the Abyssinian war, except for the share the army of India took in it, is unconnected with the history of that country, the state of affairs in the Persian Gulf, and the revolution in Muscat, can hardly with propriety be passed over. Some acquaintance with this subject is also desirable, because, unlike the Abyssinian campaign, matters in the Persian Gulf are very far from having reached the climax where our interest in them may cease, and a knowledge of the political complications that preceded the recent revolution will enable the reader to understand the object of any future operations which England may undertake in that quarter.

The "blue waters" of Oman, immortalized by the muse of the Irish bard, are subject to the sway of the Imam of Muscat. Early in the present century we were engaged, in conjunction with Syad Said, the then Imam, in waging war against the Wahabee pirates, who interfered with the commerce of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and ever since that time we have preserved friendly relations with the successor of the Syad. The venerable old chief, after a reign which extended over half a century, was gathered to his fathers in 1856, leaving several sons, one of whom became ruler of Zanzibar and another succeeded his father on the throne of Muscat. His name was Thowaynee. After these arrangements had been completed, the two brothers of Muscat and Zanzibar fell out, the Sultan of Muscat claiming a tribute from his brother of Zanzibar. This tribute had no doubt formerly been paid by the ruler of the latter country to the Imam of Muscat: and the

brothers not being able to settle their differences, agreed to refer them for arbitration to Lord Canning. This nobleman being the referee—as if he had not enough to claim his attention in India—gave a decision, calculated, as he supposed, to content both parties. He ruled that Zanzibar should be independent of Muscat, but that the tribute should be paid.

So matters went on till 1865, when the Sultan of Muscat was murdered, it was supposed by his own son, Selim, who, after a nominal acquittal of the guilt of parricide by the chiefs and people, was raised to the throne, and the British Government being but little concerned in the matter of the guilt or innocence of the new sultan acknowledged his authority. His uncle of Zanzibar, however, deemed it a good opportunity for crying off the tribute, and receiving some countenance from the Shah of Persia, declined to pay it any longer. The Shah had for many years allowed the Imams of Muscat to occupy for trading purposes the port known as Bunder Abbas, on payment of a certain tribute. In short, the Imam rented the port on a sort of lease, but he had been a tenant for so long that he claimed at last rights of occupancy; and the Shah, although he would have been glad to dislodge him so as to resume the harbour, did not know very well how to set about it, for he had no marine that could cope with that of Muscat. Pretending, however, a righteous horror at the alleged parricide of the reigning Sultan, he declared his lease of Bunder Abbas forfeited and prepared to seize the place, while the Imam, on the other hand, threatened a blockade. At this juncture the British Government were obliged to interfere to protect their own interests, which palpably would be better served by keeping the ruler of Muscat in possession of so important a marine port as Bunder Abbas, and they refused to allow the Shah to obtain possession of the coveted harbour. The question of the tribute was under discussion when news was received of another revolution in Muscat, Sultan Selim having been driven from his throne by his



brother-in-law, Azan ibn Ghas, who took the capital by assault with little trouble.

This was the condition of affairs at the close of 1868 and the commencement of 1869. It may be remarked that Muscat is a place of some importance, as it commands the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and our policy will probably be directed to maintaining, as it has always done, the authority of the *de facto* sovereign.

The reader is now solicited to follow me across the continent of India to the extreme eastern limit of British dominion, where the noble river, the Irrawaddy, flows through the forests and swamps of Burmah. Upon its bank, in the dominions of Burmah Proper, is the capital city of Mandalay. Following the course of the river up the stream, to the north of Mandalay is another city, marked in large letters on the map, called Bhamo.

In former years a brisk trade existed between Yunan, the south-western province of China, and Burmah, and of late years a desire has often been expressed to re-open, if possible, the long-choked-up channels of commercial intercourse. With the view of collecting the necessary information regarding the physical geography of the intervening country, and the disposition of the inhabitants there, and in the province of Yunan, Captain Sladen was despatched early in the year at the head of a small party of explorers, to make his way from Bhamo to Momein, the first city of importance on the route, in Yunan, and if possible to the capital of the province, Tali. After a great deal of trouble, and after overcoming many obstacles and difficulties, which were chiefly due to the treachery and jealousy of the King of Burmah and his people, Captain Sladen accomplished the purpose for which he had been sent, and returned in September, having left in January, after penetrating as far as Momein. His further progress to the capital was barred by the disturbed state of the country, over which the Chinese imperial troops were swarming, nominally engaged in resisting the progress of the revo-



lutionary party in Yunan. The officials at Momein received him most courteously, and expressed themselves most anxious that the old trade should be restored. They entertained him and his suite with the utmost hospitality, and his return journey was accompanied with none of the difficulties and deprivations that our treacherous ally, the King of Burmah, had contrived to throw in his path before.

There can be little doubt that the Chinese empire is disintegrating. Apart from the rebellion of the Taepings, several other movements of a similar kind have been in progress for years past, though very little has been known about them in Europe. One of these, and not the least important, has been brought to light owing to the proximity of the Russian forces to the territories where the revolutionary spirit has been at work, and a missing link in the chain of events has been supplied by the information collected and forwarded to the Government of India by the Political Resident at Leh, together with that furnished by Mr. Johnson, who was an uncovenanted *employé* of the Indian Government engaged in the survey under Major Montgomerie, and who incurred the displeasure of his superiors by penetrating without orders as far as Khoten. The revolution effected in Western China has been mainly a Mahommedan movement. There is a little uncertainty as to the events which led to the settlement of Mahommedans in Western China, but it appears to have originated in a Mahommedan contingent sent at the request of two successive Emperors of China,¹ in the eighth century, by the Caliphs of Bagdad. When the work for which their aid was solicited and supplied had been accomplished, a portion of the contingent, either as a grant in lieu of pay, or in reward for services rendered, were allowed to settle in one of the provinces of Western China. Here they flourished, and multiplied. The descendants of these men, who are called by the Burmese, Panthays, claim an Arabic origin; and the more learned among them still cultivate that

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, March 1868.



language, not only as the language of their religious services, but as the medium of polite communication. This would seem to indicate a difference of origin between these people, who belong to the southern districts of Western China, and the Mussulmans of Northern China and Eastern Toorkistan, who are clearly of Toork descent.

The Panthays, or Mahommedans of Arabic descent in the South-West, are of the sect of Soonees. It is supposed they took advantage of the progress of the Taeping rebellion in 1855 to assert their own independence, which they succeeded in establishing, now twelve years ago, and have maintained ever since. In 1857, vague rumours were abroad of a great Mahommedan movement somewhere in the unknown regions to the eastward of our eastern frontier, which it was suggested, might have some connexion with the Mahommedan element of strife then active in India. But there appears to be no foundation for the report, for the Mussulman rebellion in China commenced two years before the mutiny occurred in India. Success attended the effort. The imperial troops were everywhere defeated, and the new Mahommedan kingdom was established under a sovereign called by the Mussulmans themselves Suleiman, by the Chinese Tuwintsen. He assumed all the signs and symbols of imperial sovereignty, and was assisted in the government by a council of eight (four military and four civil) ministers. The administration is conducted much on the old Chinese model; taxation is light, consisting principally of moderate assessment on land.

One curious result of this change of rule has been the total cessation of traffic that formerly existed between this part of China and Burmah. It will be recollected that a project for a railway connecting Rangoon with Western China was recently set on foot, and it now appears that, had it not been found impracticable owing to physical obstacles, and the difficulty of obtaining labour in the tract of country through which the proposed rail-



way would have had to be constructed, the results aimed at would not have been attained, in consequence of the policy adopted by the King or Emperor Suleiman, who, true to Chinese prejudices imbibed during the connexion of the country with the celestial empire, forbade his subjects to engage in trade with outside barbarians.

The exclusiveness of the Chinese is, however, rapidly wearing off, and accounts go to show that no impediment is now offered to a European traveller provided with proper passports. A similar influence appears to have guided the counsels of the Yunan government in their acceptance of Captain Sladen's proposal to renew the traffic so long closed.

While the southern part of Western China was thus becoming disintegrated from the dominions of the Emperor of Peking, the northern portion of it also, which is bounded on the west by Thibet, was slipping from his grasp. Very little is known even now about the progress of the rebellion in this portion of what was the Chinese empire. The reader may recollect the expedition undertaken by Colonel Sarel some years ago, which penetrated within 150 miles of Ching-tu-fu, and then was forced to return in consequence of the whole country being in a disorganized state from rebellion. This rebellion must be still making head, as Jung Bahadoor's embassy, which started from Khatmandoo in August 1866, was unable to reach the capital, and forced to return to Nepal, in consequence of the country being in such an unsettled state. After crossing the Chinese frontier, a message reached the ambassador from Peking, desiring him not to proceed, as the journey was impracticable, but to exchange the royal presents at the frontier town and return. This rebellion is not a Mahommedan movement, as was that in the Southern Province, although it is supposed there are a great many Mahommedans mixed up in it. It appears to have arisen from a love of plunder and a desire for independence, advantage being taken of the embarrassment caused to the



Imperial Government by the old Taeping rebellion. That the country has been much desolated by the violence of the rebels appears from the following extract from the report furnished by the Nepalese ambassador:—

“In our journey onwards from the city of Batang, every city we passed through had been destroyed by fire and deserted by the inhabitants : habitations were rarely met with. As far as Lithang the country is in the same bad state, and everything is dear. . . . The war has now lasted nine years, and the country is in a miserable condition.”

To the northward, again, of this tract of country lies a vast territory, comprising Eastern Toorkistan and Dungan, the desert of Gobi, and the Chinese provinces of Kansu and Shensi, inhabited mostly by a race of Mahommedans called Toonganies or Dungeas. They are Soonees, like the Mussulmans of the Lower Provinces, and in their observance of the tenets of the Koran exhibit considerable enthusiasm. They are completely under the influence of their Imams or Akhoonds, even in secular affairs. They are remarkable for their abstinence from spirituous liquors, opium, and tobacco ; but in temper they are passionate and overbearing, and unhappily addicted to the use of the knife in the settlement of their disputes with one another. But they have the character of being industrious and honest in commercial dealings. They had a great antipathy to the Imperial Government of the Manchoo dynasty, which feeling was not lessened by various measures designed to coerce them into subjection, and which, as might have been expected, had the very contrary effect : such were imperial decrees subjecting them to heavy taxation, requiring the men to wear the hated pigtail, and the women to compress their feet into the dimensions prescribed by Chinese fashion.

Long smouldering, the spirit of rebellion burst into open flame first in 1862. The Imperial forces were despatched to suppress the outbreak with the usual result, and the insurrection spreading, the enthusiasm of the Mahom-

medan population was everywhere aroused by the well-known artifice of preaching a holy war. The emissaries despatched to proclaim the "jehad" went to work with a will, "and ere long there was not a town in the two provinces where the mosque had not rung with their passionate exhortations."¹

It is hardly necessary to repeat that the rebellion was successful. And from the seat of its origin it rapidly spread over a very large tract of country, designated by names of provinces, cities, and mountains altogether unknown to and unrecognisable by the general reader, until the tide of revolution washed up as far as Yarkund and Kashgur, names with which we are all of us more or less familiar. At Yarkund the rebels speedily drove the Chinese troops into the fort, and there besieged them. At Kashgur, the commandant of the Imperial troops adopted a bloody stratagem with the view of destroying his enemies. He invited the Toonganies to a feast in the fort, and while they were doing justice to his hospitality he opened upon them a volley of musketry, which destroyed the whole of the guests except fifty, seven hundred having been invited. This atrocity was the signal for all the Mahommedan population of Kashgur to fly to arms, and the result was that the Imperial troops, with their treacherous commander, were shut up in the fort. Almost at the same time a similar tragedy was enacted at Khoten, where an attempt was made to massacre the Toonganies, who, however, proved too strong for their assailants; and the latter, having no fort to take refuge in, were totally destroyed, a moolla named Hajee Habeeboolla being raised to the throne of Khoten. The beleaguered garrison of Yarkund, being pressed by fresh reinforcements sent to the aid of the insurgents, set fire to their own magazine, and perished in the conflagration.

Meantime the Chinese troops, in the fort of Kashgur, were as hard pressed as their fellow-soldiers had been at

¹ *Edinburgh Review*, March 1868.



Yarkund. The insurgents were aided by a leader from Kokand, called the Kooshbegee, or commander-in-chief of the Kokand forces, who in 1847 betrayed to the Russian general, in return for a large sum of money, a portion of the territory of Kokand committed to his charge. This man arrived one day at Kashgur, with a following of about five hundred men. The siege was pressed, the garrison was decimated by famine; and in March 1865 the remnant committed suicide, and Yakoob Kooshbegee became master of the place.

The new Mahommedan power thus established in the north-west of China was now divided into three principal factions. In the east one named Rashud-ood-deen—whose rise to fortune space has not allowed me to relate—held sway; in the south reigned Habeeboolla, who, as we have seen, was raised to the throne of Khoten; and at Yarkund, Yakoob Kooshbegee, with the help of his Kokand followers, had seized the reins of government. The first and last of these successful adventurers were the first to come to blows; the third, or the Khoten ruler, standing aloof. And it was at this crisis of the affair that, in October 1865, Mr. Johnson, the first European traveller who, with the exception of M. Adolphe Schlagentweit, had been seen there for centuries, made his appearance at Khoten. The Khan Habeeboolla had sent him an invitation, which he accepted on his own responsibility. For this he incurred the displeasure of the Government, who reprimanded him for placing himself, without orders, in a position which might have led to serious political embarrassment. Much as we may admire the spirit of curiosity and research that induces travellers to venture into unexplored regions, and place themselves in the power of barbarian chiefs and rulers, Englishmen have too lively an impression of the enormous cost of the Abyssinian expedition to countenance acts of rashness in individuals which are calculated to lead to the loss of their own lives, or of the perhaps still more valuable lives of those whom



the country may deem it its duty to despatch to their rescue.

The contest ended in the victory of Yakoob Kooshbegee, who seized Yarkand in April 1860, and reduced to submission a large tract of country, including Khoten; the ill-fated Habeeboolla, Mr. Johnson's host, an old man of upwards of eighty years of age, having been cruelly murdered.

This brief outline of recent events in a large, and to us not unimportant tract of Southern and Central Asia, belongs only indirectly to the history of Indian Administration. It is quite certain, however, so far as we can say that any future event is certain, that the writer who shall record the history of Indian Administration during the ensuing ten years will have much to relate of these countries in connexion with Russian progress and politics, as well as, it is to be hoped, in connexion with an extended trade between India and the Southern and Western provinces of China.

It is worthy of remark that, as the Russian power has approached the limits of the Chinese empire, a revolution, or succession of revolutions, should have come to a head, which have had the effect of bringing them in contact in the next step of their advance with a Mahommedan instead of a Manchoo power. With this new dynasty of Mussulman Chinese the Russians have next to deal, as soon as they have established themselves in the territories recently overrun. But although Mahommedan fanaticism is capable of arousing a martial spirit among races who could not be induced to offer any resistance worth speaking of by any lower motive, and although this instrument will no doubt be freely used to oppose Russian progress, the check their advance will meet with from the newly-constituted Mussulman kingdom of Western China will be only temporary. If Bokhara, with all its prestige and associations as the seat and centre of Islam in Upper Asia, has failed to kindle a spirit capable of resisting the encroachments of a Christian power, we need not expect



any result but that of a speedy victory from a conflict between the Czar's troops and such a man as Yakoob Kooshbegee. There can be no question but that all who desire to see the extension of civilization and the expansion of trade will find matter for congratulation, rather than alarm, in the establishment of a Christian Government in the room of the crumbling and blood-stained dynasties of Central Asia.

Allusion has been made to M. Adolphe Schlagentweit. He was murdered at Kashgur. It was during the progress of one of the insurgent movements, the outline of whose progress has been just detailed, that the lamented traveller happened to visit the country. One of the bloodthirsty monsters who during that period alternately rose to power, Wulee Khan Turra by name, had gained temporary possession of Kashgur (and memorialized his short reign—for he was soon driven out by the Chinese) by erecting a pyramid of human skulls on the banks of the river. As one after the other the heads of Chinese and Mahommedans were brought to construct the hideous pile, the savage sat and watched its growth. The heads of some of the best and bravest of his own followers were cut off to gratify the whim of the monster, and the head of Adolphe Schlagentweit was taken to crown the apex of the pyramid.

The recent history of Affghanistan, since the death of Dost Mahommed, affords nothing more interesting to the general reader than a succession of internal feuds, battles, and sieges. The outline of events, however, may be thus briefly described. Dost Mahommed died in 1863, after nominating his son, Shere Ally Khan, as his successor. Shere Ally's seat on the throne, however, was insecure, owing to the jealousy of his two brothers: one, Afzul Khan, who was at the head of the Toorkistan army as it was called, that is, the troops quartered in the northern region of Affghanistan; and the other, Azim Khan, who governed the country to the south and east between Cabul and the British frontier. Against both these rivals Shere Ally was



at first successful, having gained possession of Afzul Khan's person by treachery, and driven Azim Khan out of the country. The latter repaired to Rawul Pindee, a town and British settlement in the north of the Punjab, where he resided with a few followers, till another revolution in the political wheel of Affghan affairs enabled him to return. Shere Ally carried his brother, Afzul Khan, a captive to Cabul. The latter, however, fortunately had a son, a chief of some genius and energy, and a favourite with the troops composing the Toorkistan garrison, which his father had for years commanded during the lifetime of Dost Mahommed. Putting himself at their head, he marched on Cabul, dethroned and drove away Shere Ally, liberated his father, and seated him on the vacant throne. Afzul Khan did not live to enjoy for long the royal honours; and on his death was succeeded by Azim Khan, Abdoolrahman Khan, the son of Afzul Khan, generously waiving his rights in favour of his uncle. The uncle and nephew now became fast friends. But Shere Ally was indefatigable in his efforts to regain the throne he had lost; and obtaining assistance—some say from Russia, others from Persia—or depending solely on his own resources, he managed to collect an army, and principally by the genius of his general-officer, Yakoob Ally Khan, fought his way back to Cabul and the throne, which he re-occupied in July 1868. Azim Khan, and his nephew Abdoolrahman, have still a strong party in their favour, and, it is said, the sympathy and secret assistance of Persia. But since the close of the year the Ameer Shere Ally has been received with every demonstration of respect by the Viceroy, Earl Mayo; and although the British Government have not pledged themselves to any line of policy in Central Asian affairs, yet the mere fact of a cordial reception having been given to the Ameer by the British Viceroy has so raised his prestige that, unless the rival claimants to the throne are powerfully aided from some external quarter, they are not likely to succeed in again



dispossessing Shere Ally, who is now both *de jure* and *de facto* sovereign of Affghanistan.

The year 1868 is remarkable for having witnessed, under the administration of Sir John Lawrence, the conclusion of a controversy which for the last century has divided Indian statesmen into two opposing schools. It may be briefly described as the Tenant-right controversy, although many rights, besides those of tenants, were involved in it. The outlines of this dispute are familiar to most readers who take an interest in the modern history of India. To enter fully into it, even to recapitulate, however briefly, the opinions and views which have been set forth by writers on both sides, would occupy volumes. The mass of opinions, in the shape of evidence taken before parliamentary committees, in minutes, and Indian blue-books, &c., which have accumulated upon this much-debated question, is enough to appal the most enthusiastic or most diligent inquirer.

The broad principles upon which land settlements are made in new provinces are laid down in Regulation VII. of 1822, and it is that settlement-officers are to inquire into and record existing rights as they find them. This has ever been the law and procedure. It is somewhat illustrative of Indian legislation, that in 1868 the question should be mooted in Council, as it was in the discussion on the Punjab Tenancy Bill on the 21st October, whether, after the period for which the first settlement was made has expired, the settlement-officers had or had not the power of revising the records of rights made at the first settlement. It is strange that a point so important, striking at the very root of our whole administrative revenue system, should have remained undetermined for forty-six years. The Punjab Tenancy Bill was passed on the 21st October, 1868, and the necessity for the interference of the Legislature with the tenant-right of that province arose in this way. The first settlement having expired—a settlement which Sir John Lawrence not unnaturally upholds as being as perfect

and just a measure on the whole as could be effected—another became necessary ; and it seems that the officers engaged upon it, acting of course under the orders of the local government, considered that they were called upon to take cognizance of claims to rights whether or not they superseded or set aside those recorded at the first settlement. “It appears,” says Mr. Maine, in the debate on the bill, “that in the single division of Umritsur 60,000 heads of households were recorded at the first settlement of the Punjab as entitled to beneficial rights of occupancy. At the recent settlement 46,000 of these cultivators have been degraded to the status of tenants at will. If the same proportion be maintained for the whole province, these numbers denote some hundreds of thousands. It would appear, however, from a minute of the Chief Court of the Punjab, that though the settlement-officers employed the Settlement Regulation of 1822 to produce these formidable results, they did not think fit to follow the prescribed procedure, but have adopted a procedure of their own unknown to the law. The Chief Court states accordingly that all the settlement operations have effected is a superior description of registration. But this is not all. It seemed that the settlement-officers, from compassion or compunction, did not in all cases degrade the occupancy tenant at once to a tenant at will. They allowed him a period of years, during which he was to retain his rights of occupancy. The Chief Court has decided that they had no power to do anything of the kind, and that in such cases the higher status must continue indefinitely. This decision of the Chief Court in the division of Umritsur alone affected no less than 22,000 cases. In one division there have been 46,000 rulings on rights to land, of which 22,000 are bad in law. We are threatened with an agrarian revolution, to be immediately followed by an agrarian counter-revolution.”¹

¹ *Gazette of India* (official), debate on Punjab Tenancy Bill, October 26th, 1868.



We have seen in a former chapter¹ the disastrous effect of the crude settlement made in Oude in 1856, which of itself shows how little dependence is to be placed upon the supposed guarantee afforded by the regulation of 1822, that the settlement-officers will confine themselves to a faithful record of existing rights. Mr. Strachey has shown, in the passages from his speech quoted in the former chapter, what terrible havoc the civilians of the North-West Provinces committed with existing rights under the shelter of this regulation. And the fate of the two original settlements in Oude and the Punjab will not inaptly illustrate the nature of this controversy.

It appears most strange, when we come to reflect upon it, that for near a century the ablest men the Indian services have produced have been at issue upon a question of fact. The differences that separate contending parties of politicians, the disputes between opposing schools of science, philosophy, and theology, are matters of principle. It is scarcely conceivable that for half a century statesmen should be at issue upon facts. Yet it has been the case in India, and it is so unique and singular a phenomenon as to suggest an inquiry into its cause. No Indian administrator has ever desired, or would ever advocate, any interference with existing rights in land. To discover what was the species of tenure under which land was held when a province first came under British rule has always been the aim and intention of every successive government. Inquiries were always conducted on the spot, and generally by picked men, often by the ablest and best officers that could be employed. Yet it would be impossible to state two conclusions more diverse and irreconcilable than those at which the highest authorities have, with seemingly the same data to go upon, arrived, on the subject of Indian land-tenure.

The inquiry dates back even to a period anterior to 1796, when Lord Cornwallis introduced the Permanent

¹ Chapter II.



Settlement of Bengal; and in 1812, and again in 1832, an immense mass of most valuable evidence was recorded by the parliamentary committees that sat to investigate this point in both these years. We need not, however, dive into the depths of these bulky volumes for an instance in illustration of the singular error into which some of the highest authorities have fallen. It is now amply shown that the settlement of Oude in 1856, so far from recording existing rights, trampled them down on every side.

One would think, *à priori*, that it could not be possible for statesmen to be at issue for upwards of half a century upon the fact whether proprietary rights in lands belonged to the cultivator or to the superior landlord, zemindar, or talookdar, or raja, under whatever name he might happen to be specified in each different locality. Yet it is upon this point that the two schools of Indian politicians have been divided, one party contending that the cultivator held as tenant or tenant at will of the superior landlord; the other that the landlord had no proprietary right at all in the soil—in short, that there was no such thing as a landlord in our sense of the word, but that the peasantry were peasant-proprietors under other designations. In Bengal the zemindar, who, it is pretty clear now, was originally merely an official collector of revenue for the Crown, has been recognised under the Permanent Settlement of Lord Cornwallis as landlord, and thus he was confirmed in rights which may be said to have been created for him by law. At that time the tendency clearly was to recognise rights in superior tenure, even to the extent of creating them when they were not previously in existence. When the territory known as the North-West Provinces came into our possession, the inclination was altogether the other way. Then the proprietary right was recognised as vested in village coparcenaries. No one can come into frequent contact with the transactions of Government in the first ten or fifteen years of our rule in the Upper Provinces without feeling that their most prominent feature was the systematic



setting aside of farmers and talookdars, and the admission of village proprietors to direct engagements.¹

This was the system often called, but erroneously so, the Thomasonian, for Messrs. Bird and Thomason, to whom the policy is popularly ascribed, acted merely as the executive, carrying out the policy of their superiors, and as channels to convey to subordinate officers the orders of the Supreme Government. But by whatever name it may be recognised, it was the system in vogue for many years, and formed the principle of revenue administration most warmly advocated by the school to which Sir John Lawrence was attached.

In Southern and Western India different principles prevailed. Throughout the greater part of Madras the normal state of the ryots is to hold immediately from the Crown; "and wherever he so holds without the intervention of any middleman, proprietary right is vested in the occupant of individual fields, or it has a tendency so to grow up, though often imperfectly, and shackled by special incidents."²

Throughout Bombay the tenure of land resembles that in Madras. There we mostly find villages with their municipal constitution complete, and their headman as their representative, who is called the "Potail." The entire cultivated area is owned by the ryots, each man's holding being his share. The same system prevails in Sind, and in the large tract of country called the assigned Berar district, belonging to the territory of the Nizam in the Deccan. And a tenure similar in its essentials was found to prevail generally over the southern and western portions of the continent.

How, then, it will be asked, did it come to pass that throughout this long period, from 1796 to 1868, the best authorities on Indian revenue questions have been at issue

¹ *Vide* Memorandum by Sir William Muir on the investigation into tenant right in Oude, in the Second Blue Book, 1867, Appendix II.

² *Ibid.*



upon facts? There are two or three considerations which it appears to me will serve to throw some light on the matter. We all know how utterly impossible it is for any living man, no matter how able he may be, to arrive at a fair, just, and discriminating decision on any single point, when he comes to a consideration of it with a bias one way or the other. Take the most ordinary question that may present itself to our mind for solution, and let there be a bias one way or the other, and how forcibly facts, arguments, premises, and conclusions dovetail themselves so as to suit that view to which the mind was previously inclined! It may be doubted if it is possible for any man to enter on the consideration of any question with a mind quite evenly balanced. The scale may be turned one way or the other during the course of the investigation, but a preponderance one way or the other there will be from the first. This is why in all judicial questions, where facts are in issue, the decision should be entrusted to more than a single judge. To do justice absolutely and perfectly, the mind must be perfectly evenly balanced. But justice is an attribute not of man, but of God, and nothing short of a perfect nature can possess or exercise the attributes of perfection. Hence it is that no inquiry which requires an even balance of mind to elicit a just conclusion ought to be conducted by one man. There must at least be two, for one mind cannot divide itself so as to provide within itself a counterpoise and check. It is not easy to imagine any field for inquiry where the mind would be more readily warped by a leaning one way or the other than the Indian land question. The more evenly balanced the evidence on both sides, the more liable is the conclusion to be influenced by preconceived ideas. In this case there was every danger not only of evidence being forced to lead to a preconceived conclusion, but of its being absolutely created in accordance with that conclusion. Take an instance, selected almost at random from the thousands that might be cited out of the voluminous mass of records from the days of Holt Mackenzie to



Muir, a sentence out of Sir John Lawrence's speech on the Punjab Tenancy Bill in 1868: "When the Jalandhur Dooab was being settled," he says, "I remember asking the Hill rajas, To whom did the land belong? With one voice they answered, 'To us, the rajas.' Then when I asked the same question of the dominant section of the villagers, they said that the land belonged to a particular class or caste in the village; the Rajpoots, Brahmins, and the like. The cultivators, lastly, would affirm that while the lands held by the village proprietors and the waste lands certainly belonged to those parties, the lands in possession of the cultivators also belonged to that class. The real explanation of all this is simply that the land as a rule exclusively belonged to no one class."

Now this is a most instructive passage, as illustrating the foregoing remarks. The reader here sees a field for inquiry, where a preconceived conclusion would be quite sure to find something to support it.

A settlement-officer with an idea of a landed aristocracy foremost in his mind, would here find undoubted testimony of such a tenure. Another, with his mind prepossessed in favour of the cultivator's right in the land, would here find the condition of things he anticipated. A third, with a strong feeling that if there were no cultivating occupancy rights there ought to be, would adopt exactly the conclusion which Sir John Lawrence adopted, "The land belongs to no one—here is a *tabula rasa*, with which we can do what we like."

It would probably be impossible to have found anywhere a single settlement-officer, or any one else, who could if he had tried have gone into the inquiry without a leaning one side or the other. And Mr. Forsyth, the Commissioner of Jalandhur, struck the key-note of the whole question in a remark quoted by Sir William Mansfield in the debate on the Punjab Tenancy Bill: "I have not given," he says, "my assent, . . . because I consider that a commission of some kind should be first appointed to ascertain the general



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feelings and wants of the people *before we create new rights which tend to perpetuate a double property in the soil.*"

But it is often more difficult to destroy than to create. It may be too late now, except as a matter of historical research, to decide the question whether it was right or wrong to create these rights. Assuming, as many do, that the rights were created on the first settlement of the Punjab, the question is, having created them, what is to be done with them? Shall we destroy the work of our own hands? Shall we break up the existing state of things, and seek to make a *tabula rasa*, as Lord Canning did when he confiscated all rights in the soil of Oude, in order that he might obliterate for once and for ever, not the iniquity of the old Nawabate, but the iniquity of our own settlement made in 1856? There is undoubtedly much in Mr. Maine's argument, that even if these beneficial rights of occupancy were really planted in the Punjab by the British Government, they have grown up and borne fruit under its shelter, and that it is not for its honour or interest to give them up to ruthless destruction now.

When, however, we recollect how long this subject has been a disputed one; how for near a century the best authorities have been at issue upon essentials; how upon Sir John Lawrence's own showing there was so much room for doubt; how of all questions that could come before successive governments, this one requires the most delicate handling and the most indefatigable and impartial research; we cannot fail to see the force of Mr. Forsyth's recommendation, that before the views of a majority of the small body composing the Legislative Council were stereotyped in the rigid garb of law, a commission consisting of men of both schools should have been appointed to give to the long-disputed point the benefit of a careful and sifting investigation.

This brief outline of the main points involved in the land tenure controversy will, with what has been said above¹

¹ Chapter II.



regarding the previous policy in Oude, enable the reader to understand the position of the respective parties in the dispute about talookdary tenure and tenant right in Oude, which has formed so marked a feature in Sir John Lawrence's administration.

In the summary settlement made with the talookdars under Lord Canning's order, there was a reservation either expressed or implied that any adjudication of proprietary rights then made might be subject to revision at a future and more regular settlement.¹ Sir Robert Montgomery, however, declined to sanction that reservation, partly because it was deemed unfair to the talookdars, and partly because it was considered that the inquiry had been sufficiently complete to render any reinvestigation at a future time unnecessary. This settlement, it would appear, was made by the officers who conducted it under the belief that it was to be subject to future revision; nevertheless, after it had been completed, it was declared to be final. Subsequently to this, the talookdars, feeling not altogether secure in face of the leaning which our Government had of late years shown to a recognition of village proprietorship, begged that "sunnuds," or title-deeds, might be accorded them which should confirm them in their rights. These title-deeds were accordingly granted in October 1859, accompanied by a stipulation introduced by Lord Canning to the following effect:—"It is a condition of this grant that you will so far as is in your power promote the agricultural prosperity of your estate, and that all holding under you shall be secured in the possession of all the subordinate rights they formerly enjoyed."

In addition to this, and with a view of rendering his meaning still more clear, Lord Canning wrote as follows in a letter accompanying the "sunnuds":—

"The 'sunnuds' declare that while on the one hand the Government has conferred on the talookdars and on their heirs for ever the sole proprietary rights in their

¹ *Calcutta Review*, Feb. 1868.

respective estates, subject only to the payment of the annual revenue that may be imposed from time to time, and to certain conditions of loyalty and good service ; on the other hand, all persons holding an interest in the land, under the talookdars, will be secured in the possession of the subordinate rights which they have heretofore enjoyed.

“The meaning of this is, that where a regular settlement of the province is made, whenever it is found the zemindars or other persons have held an interest in the soil intermediate between the ryots and the talookdars, the amount in proportion payable by the intermediate holder to the talookdar, and the net ‘jumma’ (revenue) payable by the talookdar to the Government, will be fixed and recorded after careful and detailed survey and inquiry into each case, and will remain unchanged during the currency of the settlement.

“The talookdars cannot, with any show of reason, complain if the Government take effectual steps to re-establish or maintain in subordination to them the former rights, as these existed in 1855, of other persons whose connexion with the soil is, in many cases, more intimate and more ancient than theirs ; and it is obvious that the only effectual protection which the Government can extend to these inferior holders is to define and record their rights, and to limit the demand of the talookdars as against such persons during the currency of the settlement to the amount fixed by the Government on the basis of its own revenue demand. What proportion of the rent shall be allowed in each case to zemindars and talookdars is a question to be determined at the time of settlement.”

It having been brought to the notice of Lord Elgin's Government that the rights of tenants, who held a somewhat higher status than that of mere tenants at will, were liable to be obliterated altogether from their being omitted from the settlement made, as well as from the fact that the talookdars themselves exercised certain



Judicial powers, the Viceroy drew the attention of the Chief Commissioner of Oude to the position of this class, intimating a desire that they should be entered in the settlement papers, so that there might be some record extant of their existence.

The matter was in this position when Sir John Lawrence assumed the reins of government in 1864. The question, of all others, that was likely to interest him most, immediately attracted his attention, and he at once inquired what measures had been taken to preserve the rights of these tenants. He was informed in reply that no such rights as those referred to existed. Not satisfied with this the Viceroy directed further inquiry, and in order to secure its being conducted in a thorough and complete manner, appointed an officer upon whose co-operation he knew he could depend, Mr. Davies, Financial Commissioner; not, however, before the Chief Commissioner, Mr. Wingfield, had declined to carry out the investigation himself, feeling that it was in a measure a reversal of his policy, and inconsistent with the Report he had already made.

A full and searching inquiry then took place amid a storm of angry discussion in the papers, many of which pointed out that to institute for the second time a search after right of this kind was in India tantamount to offering a premium to fraud; for that if heretofore the rights had had no existence, as reported by Mr. Wingfield, the measure looked very like a determination, on Sir John Lawrence's part, to create them. Very much to the credit of the Oude peasantry, the investigation resulted in establishing the fact that such rights did not exist. The result was creditable to the Oude peasantry, because it might have been expected that they would have taken the opportunity of fraudulently setting up claims which it was clear the Supreme Government were then only too anxious to find established. What rights, or rather privileges, they did possess, were shown to be in reality no rights at all,



but privileges they enjoyed by favour of the landlord. These privileges the talookdars refused to convert into rights. What amount, or what kind, of pressure was brought to bear on them it is impossible to say, or whether the pressure was wholly imaginary on their part. Certain it is that they were in an excited state about it, and clamoured lustily that the British Government had committed a breach of faith; that the promise made by Lord Canning had been broken by his successors; and, as Mr. Strachey says, they appealed to the proclamation once so loudly condemned as an exceptionally harsh measure, as their Magna Charta.

Sir John Lawrence indeed, in Council, in July 1867, indignantly denied that any pressure had been put by him on the talookdars to induce them to agree to any terms they did not approve. But then his Excellency forgot that pressure may very easily be put upon people in the position of the talookdars without the direct authority or even knowledge of the Viceroy, when it is publicly known that he has identified himself with a particular party in a dispute.

It will be observed, that the class of tenants about whom all these dissensions had arisen were a class superior to the mere cultivators of the soil, who have been designated—and the term is not a very clear or intelligible one—sub-proprietors.

Both in the case of Oude and in that of the Punjab the breach has been patched up, and the long-continued controversy between the two schools of politicians plastered over by a compromise, to which in the former case the talookdars themselves were a party. The Bill which defines their rights and those of their tenants was not passed till the select committee reported that the talookdars were completely satisfied with the provisions of the Bill. Mr. Strachey, in the debate on the 22d July, stated that they had repeatedly declared that the Bill carried out faithfully all the engagements of the Government;

and they had also themselves confirmed to his Excellency in person the accuracy of this statement during the Viceroy's visit to Lucknow in November 1867. The essentials in this compromise were, on the part of the talookdars, an agreement to recognise the privileges of all cultivators who had been once proprietors of these lands, so that what they held by favour they should hereafter hold by right; on the part of the Government, that all the orders recognising a right of occupancy or preference in non-proprietary cultivators should be cancelled: while the important principle was established, that, under certain circumstances, tenants might claim compensation for unexhausted improvements.

The charge of over-hasty legislation occasionally brought against the Indian Government, and not without cause, cannot with justice be laid to their door in the case of the Oude Tenancy Bill. Both in that and the Punjab Tenancy Bill, indeed, the subject underwent deep and prolonged discussion, so far as such subjects can be discussed by means of official inquiries, recorded opinions, minutes, and the like. The Oude Bill, as we have seen, was not passed till the matter had been before the public for a whole year, and reference had been made to the Talookdars, and conferences held by them. They have, since the passing of the Bill, declared themselves dissatisfied, and have once again raised the cry of breach of faith against Sir John Lawrence's Government. And they persistently deny, what has been so positively asserted by Mr. Strachey, that they saw and approved of the draft of the Bill *as it now stands* before it was passed, and that it was not passed till they had given their assent to it.

With regard to the Punjab Tenancy Bill, much difference of opinion still exists, diametrically opposite accounts of what occurred at the debate having been published. Certain efforts were made, no doubt, to discover the views of the people through the medium of the Punjab officials, but the result of those efforts was negatived by the constitution of



the Council at the time the Bill was passed, which in the absence of Sir H. Durand left a majority on the side of the President. The draft of the Bill as it originally appeared was returned to Sir Donald McLeod, the Lieutenant-Governor, for reconstruction, and as a matter of course the two parties in the Punjab, one deprecating legislation at this period and the other advocating its interference as the only method of solving a great difficulty, expressed their respective views, which in the one case, for lack of valid support and efficient advocacy in Council, served little purpose besides recording an empty protest. But it is said that some very important papers bearing on the subject at issue had been received at Simla only a few days before the debate, and Sir William Mansfield, as the representative of the party opposed to the Bill, declared that they had not had time to read them. Mr. Cockerell, another opponent, pressed for a postponement, but Sir John Lawrence refused to accede to it, and after some sharp recrimination the Bill was passed through Council, Sir John Lawrence himself announcing a decided wish, equivalent in such a case to a command, that the Bill should become law that day.

Thus a Bill affecting the dearest interests of the whole population of an important province was passed in the face of a declaration from a very large body of experienced officials, that its provisions were ill calculated to secure the prosperity or contentment of the people. Nothing can show more effectually the defects of a machinery for legislation which can admit of such a procedure. It would be better to leave the Viceroy altogether unfettered, and force him to bear the whole responsibility of enactments passed in face of an opposition which, though ineffective, was entitled at any rate to a fair hearing.

It may appear to the English reader not a little strange that such a crisis as that which was put forward as justifying and necessitating the passing of this Bill should be allowed to arise in consequence of the procedure of officers who, it must be presumed, understood their work, or at any rate



were supervised by those who did, and who, especially in the Punjab, were known to be picked men. That there should be a difference of opinion as to the bearing of Regulation VII. of 1822—that throughout all this long period of time the essential point should never have been determined, whether or not the record of rights framed at the first settlement may be recast at the second—is indeed singular. But, as Mr. Maine remarks, “these older enactments were not intended to stand the test now applied to them; if they were carried out in a sense not intended by their framers, an executive order which in fact emanated from an authority identical in point of *personnel* with the Legislature corrected the error. But I believe, chiefly because the authors of the Regulation were great men and men of strong sense, that they intended nothing so preposterous as a periodical wholesale officious revision of the record.”¹

But the question will occur, how was it that these rights, recognised at the second settlement, were not put forward at the first? Why were rights allowed to remain dormant and claims to slumber for fifteen years, and then set up, when the difficulty of establishing them must have increased a hundredfold? The explanation is given by Sir John Lawrence. “Under the Sikh rule,” he says, “the position of the hereditary cultivators was practically very much on a par with that of the proprietors in the same village. And although the Sikhs in their social relations to each other set a high value on proprietary rights in land, more particularly when these were ancestral, their rulers acted very differently, and cared little who held or who cultivated these lands, provided that the revenue was punctually paid.”² When British rule supplanted the comparative state of anarchy which succeeded the death of Runjeet Singh, rights in land were practically of so little value that those who might have claimed them did not in all cases think it worth while to do so. Many may have thought they would obtain

¹ Debate on Punjab Bill, *Gazette of India*, Oct. 26th, 1868.

² *Gazette of India*, Oct. 26th, 1868.



easier terms if registered as hereditary cultivators instead of proprietors. "As years passed by," says Mr. Forsyth, the Commissioner of Jalandhur, "the people, ignorant and careless, continued in their old way, taking no heed, and probably unconscious of the" [effect of] "the erroneous entries. But now, as lapse of time gives a validity to titles otherwise untenable, we are frequently assailed by petitions to correct alleged errors." Another cause for the *insouciance* of the Punjab proprietors may be found in a doubt as to the permanency of our then newly-acquired dominion. As time went on, and they saw the British Government more and more firmly seated on the throne of the Moguls, this feeling would wear away; and as land rose in value, as it does rise every year in India, rights that at first were thought little of became too precious to be neglected any longer. And here the question will at once present itself to the reader's mind, how far are men entitled to a resuscitation of rights which they have allowed to remain dormant, either from neglect or a want of faith in the permanency of our rule, or because these rights were at first worth nothing, though they have since acquired value? Sir John Lawrence was of opinion that legislation on the subject was imperatively called for. It was not likely that his successor, or any successor who might follow him, would be able to bring to the consideration of the subject the vast information and experience which he undoubtedly possesses. It is to be regretted that the matter did not engage his attention at an earlier period of his five years' tenure of office, when there would have been time to have appointed a committee of inquiry composed of settlement-officers of both schools, who by a careful and searching investigation might have satisfactorily cleared up the difficulty. Still some concessions have been made even in the Punjab Tenancy Bill to the representatives of the old aristocracy, but not sufficient, it is to be feared, to allay discontent. As regards Oude, it is the general impression among those friendly to the cause of the talookdars that their interests have gained rather



than lost by the recent enactments, their result being to confirm them in their rights and privileges, and to protect them from any encroachments on the part of the ex-proprietary tenants. Both Bills are shorn of many of the more obnoxious and mischievous provisions of Act X. of 1859, the Rent Law in force in the older provinces. And both in the Punjab and in Oude it is to be hoped that the people will accommodate themselves to the conditions fixed by the Legislature, and that those whose interests are injuriously affected by the new laws will set against that the many palpable advantages which they derive from British rule, without which the rights in land now so highly esteemed would have been valueless whoever retained them.

The affairs of the Bank of Bombay continued to occupy a great share of public attention during 1868; indeed in the Western Presidency itself they may be said almost to have monopolized it. This disgraceful episode in Indian history has been briefly noticed in another chapter. It is only necessary to add here that during the year the new bank was opened with a capital of twenty-five lacs as a temporary arrangement, the old bank being put in liquidation. In May a commission was appointed under orders from home, consisting of Sir C. Jackson, Major McLeod Innes, R.E.V.C., and Mr. Maxwell Melville, of the Bombay Civil Service. They commenced their inquiry at Bombay on the 29th June, and concluded it, so far as the Indian evidence was concerned, on the 9th September. On the 25th they left for Europe, to continue the investigation there, several witnesses having to be examined in England. The evidence taken in India was such as to astonish all who heard or read it. In the history of bank failures, and careless, amounting to dishonest, management, it is to be feared that the episode of the Bank of Bombay will occupy a prominent position.

The administration of Sir John Lawrence has been marked by very considerable progress in public works of utility and permanence, which are destined to contribute



much towards the stability of our Indian Empire. One of the results of the great rebellion of 1857 was the recognition of the necessity for providing better and more extensive barrack accommodation for our European troops, and fortresses and posts of defence in localities important in a strategic point of view. These "military works," as they are sometimes called, were sketched out as far back as 1862-63, on a scale that was calculated to entail an expenditure of 10,000,000*l.* sterling. At the same time designs for irrigation works were added to the extent of 30,000,000*l.* more. We have seen in a previous chapter that the efforts of the Government to carry out irrigation works are necessarily limited by the extent of the means available—money and supervision. But the principle has now been fully admitted that the expenses of reproductive public works, such as canals and railways, may fairly be saddled upon posterity, and for the future the necessary funds for constructions of this nature will be raised by loans. In addition to the designs for irrigation works, on which 30,000,000*l.* are to be spent, there is a scheme for railway extension throughout India, generally calculated to cost 40,000,000*l.* more, so that the whole outlay which it is proposed to devote to these purposes amounts to no less than 80,000,000*l.* At the close of this year it is calculated that 5,000,000*l.*, or just one-half of the sum devoted to barracks and fortifications, will have been disbursed; the remainder will have been expended and the designs completed in 1872, after which it is proposed to devote the whole energies and resources of the department to those reproductive works upon which the wealth and progress of the country mainly depend. It is no doubt a wise policy to secure our hold upon India before proceeding with the investment of the enormous sums of money which it is intended to raise for the extension of railways and canals. The style of barrack which has been recently adopted is a vast improvement upon the old low thatched buildings in which our soldiers have been housed for the last half-century. In the minor



Presidencies these buildings have been commenced at Kirkee and Bangalore, but the main effort has naturally been confined to the Bengal Presidency, throughout which, in almost all the important cantonments, very considerable progress has been made. Altogether, six and three-quarters out of the whole ten millions are to be spent on the Bengal Presidency, the remainder being divided between the two minor presidencies of Bombay and Madras.

Fortified posts, consisting of an enclosure flanked by bastions and containing hospitals and barracks, are to be erected at Sealkote, Jalandhur, and Umballa, in the Punjab; at Nowgong, in Central India; and Secundrabad, the military cantonment adjoining Hyderabad, in the Deccan; while at Peshawur a fortress on a more extended scale is being erected, to be supported by two others at Mooltan and Rawul Pindee. These fortresses will contain barracks for troops and protection for large arsenals.

Allusion has been made in a previous chapter to the slender extent to which the British Government has hitherto availed itself of the means within its reach of quartering soldiers in healthy situations in the hills, and it is a question whether it would not have been a wiser policy to have expended the money now laid out in the expensive barracks under construction, in carrying lines of railway to the foot of the mountain ranges, and locating the soldiers on their summits and slopes, where they might be kept in a condition of the utmost possible physical efficiency, and at the same time be within easy distance by rail of almost every part of the country where their presence is ever likely to be required to quell an *émeute* or resist aggression.

While about seven millions sterling have been or are to be expended in the construction of better accommodation for soldiers in the plains, but few hill-garrisons have been added to the scanty number already available as dépôts for invalids.

The most superficial acquaintance with India is sufficient to show that the only danger to which our empire in the

East is at all likely to be exposed—except, of course, from internal disaffection, which need not of itself be feared so long as a European garrison of the present strength is maintained—lies in the chance of invasion from the north and north-west. Nor is there any danger here, except from a European power. I have purposely avoided entering on the much-debated question of Central Asian policy; but so long as ordinary prudence and foresight guide the counsels of our rulers, no rash attempt to provoke or accelerate a conflict by putting ourselves in a false position will ever endanger the safety of British India. No more unsound policy was ever advocated than that of interfering with the affairs of Affghanistan with the view of strengthening our hold upon India, or—as it is the fashion to express it—to meet Russia on the Oxus now in order that we may not have to meet her on the Indus hereafter. If ever the two Powers are destined to come into hostile contact in Asia, it is sufficiently obvious that that Power will fight at a disadvantage which is the furthest removed from its resources. To go to the Oxus, therefore, to meet Russia, would be to abandon in her favour an advantage we now hold. Every hundred miles that we march northwards to meet the invader will be so much gain to him and loss to us. And as to immediate interference with Affghanistan, while it is certain that the possession or the military occupation of that country, at any rate, must precede any attempt by Russia upon the Indian frontier, it is clear that whichever of the two—England or Russia—first occupies Cabul will be exposed, in the event of war, to the danger of internal disaffection aided by all the resources of the rival European power. In case of our interfering with Affghan politics again, let it be for the purpose of delivering or aiding the people to deliver themselves from the hated yoke of the foreigner. If Russia has any definite designs upon India, those writers and politicians are her best allies who advocate British interference with Affghan affairs. Should Russia attack



us, let it be on our ground, not hers; upon the banks of the Indus, the point the furthest removed from her resources and nearest to our own. With good railway communication between Kurrachee and Peshawur—and on strategic grounds this line ought to be completed without delay by the extension of the lines from Kotree on the Indus to Mooltan, and from Lahore to Peshawur—the field of action would be far nearer the fountain-head of our resources than that of our rival: while, with her communications to keep up between the Caspian Sea and the Hindoo Koosh, through a country peopled by turbulent races, held in subjection at the best of times with difficulty and not without great expenditure of means—any break in which line of communications would be fatal to her—Russia must be indeed bent on her own destruction if she ventures to assail our position on the Indus within the next century.

It remains to notice very briefly two great public works, the one wholly, and the other partially, dependent for its success on private enterprise. On the 15th November, the section of the Delhi railway connecting Delhi and the East Indian line with Umballa, a city thirty-five miles from the foot of the Himalayas, on the high road to Simla, was completed and opened with much *éclat*, the Viceroy himself being present at a great public breakfast. As many as 500 or 600 guests assembled to do honour to the occasion, which was especially interesting as being the last opportunity that offered itself for Sir John Lawrence's old Punjab associates to gather round their chief on the eve of his departure. And, viewed in this light, some of the speeches made on the occasion are almost worthy of a place in history. Sir John Lawrence, in returning thanks, alluded with much feeling—his voice faltering with ill-disguised emotion—to his brother Sir Henry, and the other distinguished men with whom he had been so long connected. The section of the line then opened is especially valuable, because it connects Calcutta and the intermediate cities by rail (an interval of thirty-five miles only,



at the foot of the mountains, intervening) with the hill-settlements of Kussowlie, Dugshai, Subathoo, and Simla.

No such *éclat* has attended the other public work alluded to, the East Indian Irrigation scheme, designed to construct an extensive canal system in Orissa. At the close of 1868 it was finally determined to abandon this scheme so far as it is a work of private enterprise, and to make it over to the Government. It would be tedious and uninteresting to trace the causes which have led to these results. Suffice it to say that the company declares the main cause to be the want of encouragement afforded by Government. Whether there is any real ground for this allegation or not—and it is not very easy to see how, if the company were in a position to carry on their work to completion, it could have been affected either by official encouragement or the reverse—the result is lamentable, as showing how, with the best prospects of success, with great resources and long-sustained efforts, the attempt to carry out the scheme by independent capital has failed. The shareholders will suffer no loss, for the Government undertakes to purchase the works for a sum equal to the whole paid-up capital, with five per cent. interest, and a bonus of 50,000*l.* besides.

Before the year 1868 had quite ended, Earl Mayo landed at Bombay, and Sir John Lawrence prepared to make over to his successor the cares of office. In any estimate that is formed of Sir John Lawrence's character as a public man, his career previous to his elevation to the Viceroyship, and that subsequent to it, should be ever carefully distinguished. There are many who think that his name would have held a higher place in the estimation of posterity had he not been called upon to assume the government of India. It is certain, however, that his policy as Viceroy was conducted on the same principles as those on which he acted as Chief Commissioner of the Punjab. Whether that policy is to be approved or condemned, will depend upon the view which those who criticise or review



his public career hold upon the subject of Indian land-tenures. No reputation is so dear to the Bengal civilian of the old school, to which Sir John essentially belonged, as that of success in revenue administration. This principle is plainly marked throughout the whole system of Indian government. In every single instance all other branches of the administration are subordinated to the revenue. A young civilian who acquires a reputation as an efficient collector or subordinate revenue officer is sure of a rapid promotion, which no legal attainments, no diplomatic ability, no talent for organization, no genius for executive, magisterial, and police work, however brilliant, can ensure. After the grade of collector has been reached, or that which is equivalent to it, though it may be called by different names in different parts of India, an efficient officer is promoted in the revenue branch to a commissionership; an inefficient, or an indolent, or incompetent one is made a judge. And there can be no doubt that Sir John Lawrence, in taking on himself to settle the two most important revenue questions of the day, the land tenure in Oude and the Punjab—though I do not mean that he was actuated solely, or even mainly, by so low a motive—aimed at that which is calculated more than anything else to stimulate the ambition of a civilian, the reputation of being a great revenue authority. Beyond these two measures, he cannot be said to have initiated and carried through any policy peculiarly his own. During his tenure of office, the country happily enjoyed almost perfect immunity from those political troubles which usually monopolize the attention of the writer or the student of Indian history. That much of this immunity is due to the weight of his name, and the awe in which he is held by all natives of India, as well the independent sovereigns of Hindustan as the rulers of surrounding states, no one who is acquainted with the general feelings of the people can doubt. When he was first appointed, there was a general ferment of disaffection at work under the surface



of Mahommedan society, which might very possibly have been developed into overt acts of insubordination. The moment he landed it ceased; or at all events, if it went on at all, it went on so silently as to escape notice. And were the same thing to recur, were even organized disaffection to show itself, so much is Sir John Lawrence feared all over India, that his return to the country would of itself intimidate the conspirators into an abandonment of their design—provided, of course, they were not acting under any external political influence. The Bhotan *imbroglio* was a legacy left him by his predecessor. Under Sir John's administration the unhappy business was brought to as speedy and satisfactory a conclusion as was possible. The only other warlike operation he had to conduct was the Black Mountain campaign. The policy in this campaign, as well as on the frontier generally, acquired for him much unpopularity. That policy has been discussed elsewhere: here it is sufficient to say, that future history will approve of it as sound and statesmanlike. The interest Sir John Lawrence has always taken in the welfare of the European soldier has also elsewhere been noticed; indeed that class of his countrymen shared with the members of his own service the regard which seemed to be denied to every other section of the European community. As to the non-official portion of that community, Sir John scarce took the pains to disguise the sentiments which are engrained in every civilian of the old school, and in too many of the new—a tendency to discourage European enterprise, and to make English residents in India feel that they are in a false position there. With every mile of railway that is constructed in India there is a proportionate increase of the European element, whether in the shape of capital, of skilled labour, or of executive control. This is the secret of the obstacles which independent chiefs invariably throw in the way of railway extension through their territories. Nor can it be wondered at, for the class of Englishmen with whom the railway brings them and their subjects into

contact is just the class which the native of India holds in the utmost dread and abhorrence. In this feeling the civilian sympathises to a degree that is actually ludicrous. And the majority of them (possibly Sir John himself, could he be brought to confess his real feelings) would aver that the enormous advantage which railways are conferring upon India, and the rapid reformation which they are working out in the habits and character of the natives, is but dearly purchased by the introduction into the country of so many Englishmen. For a long while Sir John successfully opposed the extension of railways in Upper India, and only yielded at last under pressure to sanction the Lahore and Peshawur line, a line which but for his opposition would have been far advanced towards completion by this time, and which when completed will add the strength of fifty thousand men to our northern frontier.

From the non-official European population Sir John could scarcely have looked for popularity. By his own service, whose interests he keenly watched, he was undeservedly disliked. The feeling is unaccountable except on the score of jealousy, for his warmest eulogists will not deny that the Civil Service derived to the fullest extent the benefits a close corporation might expect from one of their own number being raised to the post of authority and endowed with the enormous patronage that falls to the lot of an Indian Viceroy. By the native aristocracy, with whom as a class Sir John had little sympathy, he was detested; not with the passive dislike of Oriental temperament, but with an actual hate, the more intense because accompanied by fear. By the cultivator class, for whom he did or intended to do so much, he was not known, nor have they yet learnt to value the privileges and rights he struggled to obtain, and did obtain, for them. Among the mass of the Anglo-Indian community, which consists chiefly of military men, officers of various branches and departments, and their families, he was unpopular; but this arose mainly from his



manner and behaviour to them when guests at Government House, or waiting on the dreary ceremonial of an Indian Viceregal levee.

If unpopularity be the test of the success or failure of an Indian Viceroy, there can be no doubt as to the judgment that history must pass on Sir John Lawrence's viceregal career. But there is probably no position in the world where popularity is less the test of success, or where a ruler, if he chooses to disregard public opinion, can do so with more complete impunity. The Indian Government is a despotic one, as despotic as that of Russia, more so than that of France. An official, in a recent debate in Council, not incorrectly described it as a despotism tempered by right of petition, which means a despotism pure and simple. In Russia or in France the will of the ruling power is a good deal under the influence of public opinion; but the despotism of the Indian Government is only tempered by the action of the Secretary of State, who may be, but very seldom is, swayed by public opinion in England. It is this that makes English residents in India so dissatisfied with the system. They go out there carrying with them their favourite notions of constitutional government and political freedom, and imagine that in a dependency of the British Crown they are to enjoy all the rights and privileges of their native land. They very soon find out their mistake, the right even of trial by jury of their countrymen being denied to them; but they never cease to chafe against the iron collar of despotic rule, so distasteful to every man that has once lived under a representative constitution. To administer successfully such a government as this, so long as it is what it is, there is obviously no necessity to canvass popularity. A despot with an iron will, a long head, and no heart, will be found the best man for the post. I use the word "despot" in no bad sense. There may be good and conscientious despots, as well as wicked ones, and Sir John Lawrence essentially belonged to the first, not the last. As he said in his fare-



well speech at Calcutta, he had laboured conscientiously before God and man to do his duty, and so no doubt he had, and he carried away from the shores of India the consciousness of having exerted himself to the utmost to do what he thought right. But he was none the less a despot, and as such eminently suited for the government of India as it is. Were that dependency endangered to-morrow, either by political disturbance within, or threatenings from without, or both, Sir John's presence in India would be worth an army. If England's object is simply to hold the country, a Viceroy of Sir John Lawrence's stamp is the best man for the post; if her object is progress—the moral and social elevation of the people—if it is her wish to encourage trade and promote commerce, to introduce European capital, and by the example of European to awaken and stimulate native enterprise, to instil into the native mind some idea of those political principles which have made England what she is, then she must select her Viceroys and her Governors from some other quarter than the ranks of the Civil Service.



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THE
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FROM 1859 TO 1868.

VOL. II.



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THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA

FROM 1859 TO 1868:

*THE FIRST TEN YEARS OF ADMINISTRATION UNDER
THE CROWN.*

BY

ILTUDUS THOMAS PRICHARD,

(GRAY'S INN,) BARRISTER-AT-LAW.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

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It is always easy to be wise after the event; and considering what a little there was to gain, and how much might be lost, by hostilities with such a country as Bhotan, it seems strange to us, now the affair is over, that the Government of India were ever so infatuated as to embroil themselves with the country at all.

It is hardly within the compass of this work to go back and trace the history of our connexion with Bhotan from the earliest time. But some acquaintance with the causes of the rupture that eventuated in war is absolutely necessary to enable the reader to understand the story of the campaign.



Bhotan is a mountainous country lying between Bengal Proper and Assam on the south and Thibet on the north. To the west is the territory of Nepal and Sikkim, to the east again Thibet. Indeed it may be regarded as a piece cut out of Thibet; to which country it very possibly, as asserted by Dr. Rennie, originally belonged, having become separated owing to the difficulty experienced by the Thibet Government in keeping the people in subjection.

Our quarrels and disputes with mountain frontier tribes are almost always a repetition of each other. Our barbarous neighbours are almost—in fact, we shall be safe in saying always—the aggressors, and generally wanton aggressors. All along at the foot of the lofty ranges that skirt the boundary of Hindustan on the east, as well as the north and west, lie rich and fertile valleys, studded for the most part with villages, and peopled by a community often perhaps connected with the adjacent Hill tribes, but as a rule peacefully disposed, and inclined to agricultural pursuits. But their farms and houses, their cattle and grain, their sons, daughters, and wives, are an incessant source of temptation to the Hill people, who ever and anon descend and help themselves to slaves, women, cattle, or grain. Having harried the district, and swept off the inhabitants and cattle, they return with their booty to their fastnesses in the mountains, and the survivors come weeping to the nearest British authorities, and tell the sad tale of desolated hearths and ruined homesteads. Then follow measures of reprisal: a force has to be despatched into the mountains to chastise the robbers, and if possible recover the booty. Sometimes these expeditions are successful, very often not. Or, if success attend our efforts, it is very dearly purchased by the loss of valuable lives, and a profitless expenditure. Under the most favourable circumstances, our troops almost always get a very severe handling; and although practically the victors, having gained the object of the expedition, they are generally seen out of the country by the mountaineers,

*RELATIONS WITH BHOTAN.*

who, having retreated before our advance, now harass our rear, loot our baggage, and finally mount the heights commanding the road into the plains, whence they fire their last shot and throw their last stone at the retreating column.

A disciplined force always fights at a disadvantage with undisciplined barbarians, because it is unwilling to resort to the only method of coercion that can be practised with effect. The necessity, however, is unavoidable, and in these expeditions we generally leave behind traces of our visit, in the shape of blackened ruins of villages and the ashes of crops destroyed by fire; and if the force has been openly resisted, the loss of life inflicted is usually severe.

There is another method frequently adopted of bringing these people to reason. It generally happens that the inhabitants of bleak, rugged mountain regions are dependent in a great measure on the plain country for supplies of grain for themselves and cattle. In such cases, to blockade the passes leading from the mountains to the valleys is to deprive them of the necessities of life. This system is almost always successful, and only fails in those exceptional cases where the mountaineers can depend on their own resources for the supply of grain.

Military expeditions are occasionally necessary, but to send envoys or representatives, with secretaries, and all the paraphernalia of an embassy, into the interior of a difficult mountainous country, among a semi-barbarous people, who know nothing of the law of nations, with whom treaties are little else than waste paper, who are accustomed to settle disputes only by the sword or knife, seems to be the height of political folly. No good results can possibly follow from such communications.

If a treaty is made, we may be sure it will only be observed as long as it suits the interest of the tribes to observe it. Promises are not binding on them; whereas, they are binding on us. It is, of course, desirable to



induce such men to enter into trade connexions, to interchange commodities, and encourage commerce, because commerce is the only means of civilizing them. But until they have made some progress in civilization, until they have learnt that their interests are best subserved by cultivating peaceful relations—that, in short, trade is more profitable than war—it is never safe to trust them with the lives and liberty of an envoy and his suite. To keep a strong or an efficient force upon the frontier, to punish promptly all aggression, and at the same time hold out inducements to the Hill people to settle in the plain country and engage in agricultural pursuits in their own; to teach them gradually to submit their internal disputes to other arbitration than the sword, is the only policy that can be pursued with safety and advantage. How much more imprudent does it seem when the embassy is sent under the circumstances that attended the Hon. Ashley Eden's mission to Bhotan, where there was actually no Government to which the envoy could be accredited, when the country was in such discord and confusion that even the people themselves could not tell who were their rulers, and when at almost every step the mission took it was met with hints, remonstrances, and commands not to proceed.

Bhotan formed no exception to the general rule, the inhabitants of the highlands being mainly dependent upon the lowlands for their support. To these lowlands, a tract of fertile soil running along the foot of the mountain ranges, they laid claim. The breadth of this strip of fertile valley land is from ten to thirty miles, and the extreme length of it from west to east may be estimated at a hundred and twenty. The portion of the land that lies next to the hills is, as would naturally be the case, rugged and irregular—forest land, tenanted by wild beasts. Beyond this, we come upon a rich black soil, capable of producing perhaps crops of any kind, but especially adapted for cotton. This valley, or strip of level country,



THE DOOARS.

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at the foot of the Bhotan mountains, is called "The Dwar" or "Dooars." There is a good deal of uncertainty as to the origin and exact meaning of this word. It would seem that the lowlands are connected with the interior of the hills by a series of passes or roads, by which alone ingress and egress can be effected. These passes were, as Dr. Rennie says, looked upon as doors or gates leading from the highlands into the valley. The word "Dwar" in Hindee means a door or gate, and hence the term "Dooars" has come, by a figure of speech, to be applied to the valleys into which these passes lead. The "Dooars," however, are eighteen in number. There are eleven which are called the Bengal Dooars, because they border on Bengal, and seven called the Assam Dooars, because they lie contiguous to the Assam frontier. But it does not seem that there are anything like so many as eighteen passes or Dooars proper. There appear to be only five passes from the Bengal Dooars, each of which is presided over by a Bhotanese officer, called a Jungpen, who has also control over the land adjoining his pass, and to which in some instances only the same name is given as that which belongs to the pass itself. Altogether, the derivation of the word "Dooars," as applied to the valley district, is scarcely satisfactory. The five passes from the Bengal Dooars which formed the points of attack of the different columns of the invading British force are called, commencing from the west end, Dhalimkote, Chamoorch, Balla, Buxa or Pusakha, and Bishensing, and they were nominally defended by forts bearing the same name. To the eastward of Bishensing is the Dewangiri pass and fort, a locality which acquired the greatest notoriety during the war from the circumstances attending the capture of it by our troops, their expulsion, and its final recapture and destruction.

To trace the causes of the dispute it will not be necessary to go back further than the annexation of Assam, together with which province the Government



assumed the relations existing at the time of annexation between it and the Bhotanese. These were rather of a complicated character, and just of such a nature as to embroil us with our semi-barbarous neighbours. The former rulers of Assam had made over to the Bhotanese the seven Dooars, on condition of receiving a tribute annually of yaks' tails, musk, gold dust, ponies, blankets, and knives. These articles, which were supposed to represent a stated sum of money, used to be sold by auction, and, as might have been expected, did not always, and came at last very seldom, to realize the necessary amount. When the British Government demanded arrears, the Bhotanese rejected the claim, because, as they said, the articles given in kind were sold for less than they were worth. At the same time, the Hill tribes took to indulging their predatory habits, made raids into British territory, kidnapping men and women, and carrying off cattle. This was the state of things in 1837, when the Government sent Captain Pemberton on a mission to the Bhotan capital. This mission failed in effecting any real good, as such missions to such states must, and Government, then the East India Company, determined to annex the Assam Dooars. They agreed, however, to pay the Bhotanese Government ten thousand rupees annually, as compensation for the loss of territory. This arrangement was carried out in 1841, and appears to have been successful so far as putting a stop to raids in the Assam Dooars.

About 150 miles to the west of the Assam Dooars, between the river Teesta and Mahanuddee on the frontier of Bengal Proper, is a tract of country called Ambaree Fallacottah.

Many years ago, as far back as 1784, this district was taken from the then possessor of it by the East India Company, and made over to the Bhotanese. In consequence, however, of its lying twenty miles within our frontier, the possession of it by Bhotan was a source of constant trouble; and after the arrangement alluded to

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with regard to the Assam Dooars had been carried out, the Bhotanese desired the Government of India to effect a similar arrangement with regard to Ambaree Fallacottah,—that is, to take possession of it and pay them a certain sum in money annually in lieu of its revenue. This was accordingly done in 1842.

But no political measures, however skilfully conducted, no treaties or agreements, however equitable and just, can secure tranquillity upon such a frontier. And the more prosperous the agricultural communities inhabiting the plain country at the foot of the hills became, in consequence of the security afforded by British rule, the more they accumulated wealth in the shape of cattle and grain and crops, the greater was the temptation to their lawless neighbours to come down and help themselves. There is very seldom any controlling power in the shape of a central government strong enough to prevent such outrages, and the result is a constant state of petty warfare. It would be tedious to trace in detail the series of successive outrages that were committed from 1828 to 1861. Suffice it to say, they were a source of incessant annoyance to the British Government, the more so from the fact that the climate of that district was so unhealthy that it was impossible to keep regular troops stationed there. And although a force might be marched up into the hills to make reprisal or to exact compensation, or to recover captives, the moment the soldiers' backs were turned, down would come these robbers from their fastnesses, and recommence their deeds of violence. In the Assam Dooars the state of things was better, but throughout the Bengal Dooars the outrages continued, till it was resolved to see whether the withholding the revenue paid for the district of Ambaree would have the effect of putting a stop to them. At the same time it was intimated to the Bhotanese, that the payment would be resumed upon their complying with the demands made upon them, and restoring certain British subjects who had been kidnapped and carried away. No



good result followed. The aggressions still continued, and instead of at once employing force, it was in an evil hour resolved to send a mission into the country to confer with the head of the government, under an idea that the cause of failure in the negotiations was the fact that the resolutions and orders of the British Government never reached the Bhotan Court. The aggressive spirit of the Bhotanese was further manifested by an intention to attack the district of Darjeeling, information of which reached the authorities from four distinct sources, and was borne out by the appearance of a considerable force of armed men on the frontier who were making preparations to cross the boundary, viz. the river Teesta. At the same time the chief or jungpen of Dhalimkote pressed his demands in an insolent manner for the arrears of the Ambaree rents due since its attachment in 1860. The threatening movements were checked by troops being advanced to the frontier, two companies of H.M.'s 30th regiment and a company of the 10th Native Infantry being moved up in support.

The Government of Bhotan, like that of Japan, as far as we understand its constitution, consists of two nominal heads; one called the Dhurma Raja, or spiritual head, and the other the Deb Raja, or temporal ruler. In effect, there appears to be this difference between the constitution of the government in Bhotan and Japan, that while in the latter the Tycoon, or temporal ruler, is supposed to have the chief power, in Bhotan his authority is merely nominal. But, in truth, it seems very little was really known about the actual condition of the country, for it is not easy to understand how, if it had been known, the project of deputing an envoy to the capital could have been entertained. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to comprehend the policy of deputing an envoy to the sovereign ruler of a country which, as regards its internal political state, was a *terra incognita*. This much was clear, that whether the power of the central government was vested in the spiritual or temporal head of the kingdom, it



was little more than nominal, the different jungpens, or chiefs, acting pretty much on their own independent authority, and acknowledging in a very slight degree, if at all, the authority of their nominal rulers.

The Dhurma and Deb Rajas, according to the theory of the constitution, are supposed to be assisted in the affairs of state by a council composed of the chief secretary to the Dhurma Raja, the prime minister, the chiefs or governors or jungpens of three of the principal forts, the chief secretary to the Deb Raja, and the chief justice. In addition to these there were three extraordinary members of council, who were liable to be called on to assist in its deliberations in any emergency, and who regularly attended when they happened to be at the seat of government. They were the governors respectively of Western, Eastern, and Central Bhotan, called Penlows, their distinctive names being the Paro, the Tongso, and the Daka Penlows.

The first step taken to open negotiations with these intractable people was the despatch of a native messenger to the court of the Deb Raja in 1862, from Assam, with letters announcing the intention of the Governor-General to depute an envoy to confer on such matters as required explanation between the two governments. The Bhotan authorities were also requested to indicate the route by which the envoy should enter the country. This messenger did not get back to Assam till December, having been delayed by obstructions caused by the frontier officers. His reception was not a very friendly one, and the letter he brought back from the Deb Raja not such as to encourage further diplomatic measures. In the letter he admitted having received complaints from the British officers of the misbehaviour of his own subjects on the frontier, but gave it as his opinion that they were not of sufficient importance to be referred to the Dhurma Raja, and thought the British Government should not listen to them either. He threw cold water on the project of the mission, saying it would be attended with much trouble, owing to the state of the



roads ; and, moreover, the Dhurma Raja did not want an interview, but he promised to send certain officers, called Zinkaffs, to settle all disputes. These officers never came, however, and the Government determined to start off the mission without waiting for further reference to the court.

In November 1863 the envoy, the Hon. Ashley Eden, reached Darjeeling on his way to the Bhotan capital. The escort consisted of 100 men, half Sikhs and half Sappers of the Sebundy corps, a corps raised expressly for service in the Darjeeling district. Captain Goodwin Austin, Bengal Staff Corps, was appointed Assistant Envoy and Surveyor ; Captain Lance commanded the escort ; Dr. Simpson was medical attendant ; and Cheboo Lama, the most important personage perhaps next to the envoy himself, the Thibetan interpreter. This man is a native of Sikkim, a priest by profession, and resided at Darjeeling, as the political representative of the Sikkim Raja.

On the 10th September previously the Bengal Government had addressed another letter to the Bhotan authorities, informing them of the preparation for the departure of the mission, and requesting that an officer might be sent as far as the river Teesta to meet it, and conduct it to Poonakha, the capital. No reply was received to this, and on the 10th November Mr. Eden himself addressed the Bhotan Government again, requesting that the chief or jungpen of Dhalinkote, the principal fort on the westernmost of the Dooars, and the nearest to the British frontier, might be sent to meet him ; and he added that if this was not done he should report that no arrangement had been made, which would be considered as indicating the absence of friendly feeling.

The impolicy of sending a mission into the heart of such a country was still further shown by information which reached the Government after the despatch of this last letter of Mr. Eden. It appeared that a rebellion had taken place, the Deb Raja had been expelled from the throne, and after withstanding a siege in his summer



residence, and being forced to surrender by want of water, had been permitted to retire into a monastery. The rebel, or rather the revolutionary party—for they seem to have been successful—was headed by the governor of Eastern Bhotan, called the Tongso Penlow, and consisted of all the members of the council except one, the governor of Western Bhotan, called the Paro Penlow, and the chief of the capital—at least, what formed the capital during the winter months—a place called Poonakha. For it seems that the Bhotan Court, like that of Cyrus in former days, and of British India in more modern times, had two seats of government, one for the winter and one for the summer months. This rebellion led to further political complications nearer to the British frontier, for the chief or jungpen of Dhalimkote, the officer whom Mr. Eden desired might be sent to meet and convoy him to the capital, was a follower of one of the members of council who had taken part in the revolution. But he was immediately subordinate to the governor of Western Bhotan, who had remained loyal. The chief of Dhalimkote was accordingly called on by the loyal governor of Western Bhotan to surrender his fort to a successor, who was sent to take it over. As a matter of course, he refused to do anything of the kind, and a force was despatched against him, which only raised the siege on hearing that Mr. Eden's mission had started.

The imprudence of opening diplomatic relations with a government in the condition of that of Bhotan will become more apparent, if we suppose the case transferred from Asia to Europe. Would any cabinet or any sovereign in Europe select the time when a political crisis of so grave a nature had just occurred, when the whole internal organization of the country was in disorder, to send a diplomatic mission for the first time to the head of the disturbed state? With such a race of semi-barbarians as the Bhotanese, what result could have been anticipated from the step now taken, but discomfiture and further political complications?



It looks as if the chief of Dhalimkote thought the present a favourable opportunity for doing something for himself. We have seen that the report of the departure of Mr. Eden's mission, which exaggerated the strength of the party enormously, had such an effect on the country as to cause the siege of Dhalimkote to be raised. What more likely under the circumstances, than that the chief of Dhalimkote should take advantage of his propinquity to the British frontier to secure the good-will of his powerful neighbours, with the view of making political capital out of it, which might enable him to secure something good for himself in the general scramble that seemed impending? Accordingly, we find him suddenly animated by the warmest feelings of friendship for Mr. Eden. He sent message after message, assuring him that the delay which had taken place in answering the letter, and making preparations for the reception of the mission, was the result solely of the disorganized state of the country. He begged the mission to wait, and promised every assistance in his power, and requested that Cheboo Lama might be sent over to have an interview with him. Cheboo Lama accordingly went, and had an interview which lasted several days. The chief renewed his offers of friendship, and hinted that if a reply to Mr. Eden's last letter, of the 10th November, did not arrive soon, he would for a consideration give every aid himself to the mission to enter the country, even if he incurred the displeasure of his Government by so doing.

The office of Governor-General was then held temporarily by Sir William Denison, to whom Mr. Eden referred in this crisis for orders, and the intimation was to proceed with the assistance of the chief of Dhalimkote, because, it was argued, the rebellion having been successful, it was probable that the new Deb Raja would be glad to strengthen his position by an alliance with the British Government.

It is, as I have said, easy to be wise after the event, but it does seem a most extraordinary line of policy to adopt, to send an envoy with his suite accredited to the head of a



Government which had but just passed—if it had passed—through the throes of revolution, into a most difficult and dangerous country, inhabited by predatory tribes at war with one another, when the permission to the envoy to enter the country at all had been accorded only by a petty chief, himself at war with the governor of his own province. Nevertheless, on the receipt of Sir W. Denison's instructions, Mr. Eden prepared to advance, and wrote to the chief of Dhalimkote that he was on the point of starting, and requested that a party might be sent to meet him at the river Teesta.

Mr. Eden's difficulties commenced at the very outset. The route which had been selected for the mission lay through such a difficult country that the only means of conveying baggage was by coolies or porters. Had they taken another route—the route subsequently adopted by the troops—the baggage might have been carried easily upon mules. As it was, the coolies collected at Darjeeling were afraid to enter the Bhotan territory at all, and actually abandoned the camp on the British side of the frontier, refusing to cross the river. The baggage and camp equipment of the mission were despatched from Darjeeling on the 1st of June. On the 4th, the members of the mission followed, and overtook the camp at the river, twenty-two miles only from Darjeeling, and 6,000 feet below it. Here the party had to halt three days before coolies could be procured to advance, and these were only got through the influence of Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, who summoned his own tenants from the fields to carry loads. One march up the mountain on the other side of the river brought the mission to a spot 3,733 feet above the level of the sea, and here it was forced to halt again in consequence of the fresh desertion of the coolies. The head official of the place where they halted—and here, says Mr. Eden, as everywhere else, there were two officers, one in power and the other not—requested them to proceed no further, but eventually gave them guides to show them the way to Dhalimkote.



On the 12th the camp reached the valley of Ambiok, immediately below the fort of Dhalimkote. But its progress had been marked by the continued desertion of the coolies and an insult offered to the envoy by the chief of a place called Dhurmsong, who shut the gate of the fort in his face and insolently refused admission.

The day before the camp reached the neighbourhood of Dhalimkote, the chief of that place had ventured upon the first open reception of the mission. He sent out musicians, ponies, and mules, the former of which preceded the retinue, performing a noisy and monotonous national air on silver flageolets and brass cymbals, and during the day of their arrival at Ambiok a fire of matchlocks was kept up from the fort walls in their honour. The friendship, however, of this chief resulted in little beside these empty compliments, for when Mr. Eden sent to him for supplies which he had promised, he refused to furnish any till he had been paid in advance at the exorbitant rate of seven rupees, or fourteen shillings, for a maund of eighty pounds; while the market price of the commodity—rice—was only ten annas, or fifteen pence, for a similar quantity.

The next day, the 14th June, the chief visited the envoy in state. The principal topic of discussion, says Mr. Eden, was the quantity of spirits he could drink. He had as much given him in the envoy's tent as he called for, but finding that he was difficult to be satisfied and was repeatedly calling for more, Mr. Eden gave him permission to depart. He refused to do so, however, and after his visit had been prolonged for four or five hours he was at last forcibly carried off by his own servants. He, however, did not even then leave the camp, but repaired to the tent of the Thibetan interpreter, Cheboo Lama, where he sat drinking till late in the day. As he was leaving the camp he saw some of the coolies, who after having received large advances had deserted and were caught again, being flogged, whereupon he insisted on their release; and when the officer in charge refused to acquiesce in his wishes, he



drew his knife and rushed into the ring with his followers, threatening to cut down the commissariat-sergeant who was in attendance. The men of the escort ran to their arms, and the bullying and violence of the Jungpen and his followers was immediately changed to abject fear. "Seeing me approaching," says Mr. Eden, "he ran to meet me, trembling with fear, and begged for forgiveness. I ordered him out of camp, and the whole party ran off to the fort in a most undignified manner. I declined to receive any further visits from him until he sent me a written apology for his conduct, and this he did next day."

The whole of this scene, ludicrous as it is, indicates in the most striking manner the false nature of the position into which Mr. Eden had been forced. A British envoy, accredited from the Governor-General of India, has to flog his coolies for desertion, is forced to entertain a drunken savage for four or five hours, plying him with brandy, and then insists upon and receives a written apology for his conduct, as if he had been a member of a civilized community, and had misbehaved himself in a club or a mess-room.

The occurrence itself perhaps was not sufficient to induce the return of the mission after it had once set out, but it was quite sufficient to show that the mission had no business where it was.

The camp halted some days at this place, for it was found necessary to send Captain Austin back to the British station of Julpigoree to purchase supplies. Meantime Mr. Eden received a letter from the Deb Raja, who had been set up by the revolutionary party, desiring him to let the chief of Dhalimkote know what was the object of the mission, and he would arrange about the interview. The chief seems to have behaved with duplicity, lending colour to the opinion I have hazarded that his object all along was merely to make political capital to serve his own purposes out of his alliance with Mr. Eden. For, as that gentleman says, he evinced considerable interest in the success of the mission,



leading the envoy to believe that he was inclined to assist it, and yet being unwilling that it should proceed without further specific instructions from the court. This shuffling and double-dealing is so exactly the policy we should expect a semi-barbarous chief to adopt under the view suggested that it seems strange it did not show itself to the envoy in this light. Mr. Eden, however, appears to have suspected nothing, but wrote an answer explaining to the Deb Raja that his business was of such a nature that it could not be settled by the chief of Dhalimkote, but must be referred to the head of the State.

Again the envoy was placed in an undignified position by the desertion of the coolies. There were not enough left to carry on that portion of the baggage which was absolutely required, and in addition to this it had become necessary now to take on provisions for the camp followers. Application was made to the chief, who pleaded all sorts of excuses, and on the 29th, Captain Austin having returned with fresh supplies, Mr. Eden arranged to leave behind nearly all his tents and most of his baggage and stores, together with half the escort. It is quite certain, from what we know of the resources of the country, that the conveyance of Mr. Eden's moderate suite was not too great a tax upon them. The mere fact of his having consented to reduce his escort by one-half, and to leave behind so large a portion of his tents and equipage, was quite sufficient to encourage the accumulation of obstacles of all kinds in his path. Knowing how much the natives of a country like Bhotan are influenced by the mere externals of office and dignity, we cease to wonder that the British envoy was subjected to the insults and outrages which have made the Bhotan mission unique in the history of British India and its relations with foreign States.

It is true that previous missions which had been sent into Bhotan had adopted a similar course, in so far as to diminish their camp equipage and baggage as they advanced into the heart of the country. But Mr. Eden's mission was



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proceeding under different circumstances altogether from the former ones.

The coolies that had been with so much difficulty procured at Dhalimkote had agreed to go as far as a place called Sipchoo, which Mr. Eden was led to believe was in a populous district, where there would be no difficulty in obtaining fresh men. When he arrived there, on the 1st February, he found it was just the contrary; there were only five houses in the place, and not a man to be had. The official in command at the spot declined to give any assistance, saying he had received no orders, but if the camp would halt there for a few weeks instructions might arrive. Whereupon Mr. Eden committed another mistake, the inevitable result of the first, and left behind all the remainder of the heavy baggage, all the escort except fifteen Sikhs and ten sappers, Mr. Power, the uncovenanted assistant, the commissariat sergeant, the moonshees, the native doctor, and every camp-follower that could be spared.

On the morning of the 3d, they reached a pass in the mountains where the snow lay from one and a half to two feet, through which they had to push their way, spending the night at an elevation of 8,000 feet, and on the following day continuing their arduous journey. Many desertions of coolies had already taken place, but after crossing the pass, Mr. Eden adds, nothing but the fear of recrossing it prevented the great majority of the remainder from deserting too.

On the 7th, the mission halted at a place called Tsangbee, where the official, a jungpen, told the envoy that it was not the custom to allow persons to pass the fort without orders; but as the mission, even in its then reduced state, was too strong for him, he could not interfere, but would give no assistance in the shape of coolies. Many of those which had accompanied the camp were frost-bitten, particularly all the Nepalese, and Mr. Eden took a precaution which, with Dr. Rennie, we cannot help wondering had not been taken before, seeing it would have been one of the first



things any private traveller would have thought about—viz. of providing the men with boots.

Finding that there was no prospect of being able to bring on any part of his supplies, camp equipage, or retinue which had been left with Mr. Power at Sipchoo, Mr. Eden sent instructions to him to return to Darjeeling, taking with him all the extra stores and baggage, and all the detachment left at Dhalimkote, with the exception of five sappers. But he was to leave with the official at Sipchoo a store of rice and all the presents from the Governor-General for the Bhotan court.

On the following day an event of a novel kind altogether befel the mission, for the people of a village through which it passed, under the impression that Mr. Eden was come to take possession of their country, assembled to pay him their respects, which consisted, as we are told, after the custom of the country, in setting fire to little heaps of wormwood.

Up to this time, the indications of the existence of any central government at all in the country had been so slight, that Mr. Eden may well have doubted whether after all he was not wending his way in pursuit of an *ignis fatuus*. But at last he was destined to be furnished with some tangible proof of the existence of a person claiming the authority of a ruling power, in the shape of two letters which some messengers were taking to the chief of Dhalimkote. As they gave out that these letters contained orders to the chief to turn the mission back, they considered themselves justified in giving them to Mr. Eden to read. They consisted of two contradictory orders, as Mr. Eden remarks, "according to the Bhotan custom." One of these letters from the Deb Raja to the Dhalimkote chief was full of professions of friendship to the British Government, and instructed him to do everything he could to satisfy the envoy and settle any dispute there might be about the frontier, but it contained not a word about turning the mission back. The other letter, intended for the chief's



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private eye, and containing the real indication of the Deb Raja's wishes, threatened the chief with death for allowing the mission to cross the frontier, scolding him frightfully for his remissness, ordering him to pay a fine of seventy rupees to each of the messengers, and telling him not to let the envoy go away angry, but to try and entice him across the frontier again; and that if it was impossible to get rid of him, to send him round by another road, and to take care that supplies were furnished.

It is difficult to understand how Mr. Eden could have so far compromised his dignity as an envoy from the Governor-General, as to have allowed the question of his action to come in any shape before petty officials like these messengers. But this was not the only time he did so. Once or twice, if not oftener, during his progress, when beset by obstacles, he put the matter before some petty chiefs or officials in such a way as to lay on them the responsibility of his going on, saying if they liked to take upon themselves to refuse him permission to advance he would return, but they must answer to their own government for the consequences. Of course these men would not take the responsibility of interfering with the progress of the mission. Why should they? But their refusing to do so did not place Mr. Eden in a better position; on the contrary, the sacrifice of dignity he submitted to by laying the question at all before such men was a compromise nothing short of the most urgent necessity could have justified, and may very well account for the refusal of the council, when the envoy did reach the capital, to believe that in reality he was accredited by the Governor-General. On the present occasion, to these messengers (*zinkaffs*, they call them, probably answering to our Indian *chiprassees*) Mr. Eden put the question about his going or returning. To begin with, he had not improved his position by reading letters that were not intended for his eye. Then he says: "The *zinkaff*, after reading the letter, said it was clear that I should go back and enter the country by the



Samchee road." (This was the name of the road indicated in the letter.) Then an altercation seems to have ensued between the envoy and the messengers, who assuredly must have rather exceeded their instructions in reading letters entrusted to them to carry, and offering their comments thereon. At last the messengers wound up the conference by saying that the council had shown such folly in not giving proper orders for the reception of the mission, that Mr. Eden might go which way he liked.

On the 11th February, the mission reached a steep pass obstructed by snow; but though the elevation where the camp halted to spend the night was 11,800 feet, and the thermometer marked 13°, no individual out of the two hundred persons composing the retinue suffered seriously from the cold. Captain Austin remained behind in this pass for a day or two to complete some observations, but being caught in a snow-storm he had some difficulty in overtaking his chief, and lost several men and some property.

A little further in advance, the camp was forced to halt on account of the snow, but an effort was made to push on in consequence of intelligence that some more messengers were on their way to meet the mission and turn it back. Half the camp was accordingly sent on, under Captain Austin. This was on the 19th February. And on the other half preparing to start some hours after, the chief or jungpen of the place came down, and with a show of violence endeavoured to prevent them from moving, saying he had orders from the Government to stop them. Upon being requested to produce his orders, he declined to do so, affording a fair presumption that he had not any, and that all he wanted was to get a little money out of Mr. Eden; which he did under the guise of a present for furnishing guides and sepoys.

The party had a difficult and, as it appeared at one time likely to turn out, a very disastrous march after leaving this place; for, misled by information on the road,



they did not reach shelter till 1 A.M. of the day following, perfectly exhausted, having been marching through the snow continuously for fifteen hours, and not having tasted food since nine o'clock the previous morning. At this place the deputation or messengers of whose approach Mr. Eden had heard, met him, and presented a letter from the Deb Raja of an evasive character, suggesting at one place that he should not go back, as the Raja had never declined to receive the envoy, and in another, that the complaints had better be investigated on the frontier, and demanding payment of the arrears of rents for the Ambaree district. The messengers, moreover, verbally told Mr. Eden that their instructions were to return with him to the frontier for the purpose of re-arranging the boundary and receiving over charge of the Assam Dooars. Mr. Eden very properly at this time declined to discuss the subject with these men, but he did tell them, as if it was for them to decide, that he would either return to Darjeeling or go on to the capital. They begged him not to go back, but promised to go to the capital and make arrangements for his reception.

The mission now drew near Paro, the place of residence of that governor of Western Bhotan called the Paro Penlow, who had taken the part of the Deb Raja in the recent rebellion, and under whose orders was the chief of Dhalimkote. There was every reason to expect a more favourable reception at this place than elsewhere; for although the chief who had taken the part of the Deb Raja and, it will be recollected, had sent a force to subdue Dhalimkote, had been ejected from his government by the successful revolutionary party, he still resided in the fort, and retained all the real power in his hands, the nominal power and dignity of office being vested in his stepson. But although Mr. Eden, at the desire of the chief, halted a day, in order that suitable preparations might be made to receive the envoy's party with due honours, when they arrived they were kept standing on an open plain for two



hours, without shelter, and without being allowed to pitch their tents. Several efforts were made to get them pitched, and a spot was selected, but the Bhotanese officials objected to each in turn for some trifling reason, and when after a long delay permission was granted to encamp, it was upon one of those very sites which they had before been refused permission to occupy. There seems to have been a determination or a settled design, from the very first, to subject the mission on every possible occasion to studied insult. Whether its advance under such circumstances is to be attributed to a mistaken sense of duty, or to sheer fatuity, or to high-souled contempt for danger, may be disputed; but history, I believe, records no other instance of an envoy from a mighty power like the Government of British India submitting to such treatment from the hands of officials of a court to whom he was accredited as ambassador, and yet persisting in exposing himself to a continuance of it.

The indignities and insults to which the envoy was subjected at Paro, did not cease with the obstacles thrown in his way in the selection of an encamping ground. The officers and men were directed to remain in their tents till further orders, and treated with insolence if they disobeyed. Bhotan soldiers crowded the camp, stealing everything they could, jeering the coolies and camp-followers, calling them slaves, and drawing their knives upon them if they attempted to reply. The servants were fined for going about with their heads covered, and it was attempted to make Mr. Eden and the chief officers of the mission dismount from their horses, as a token of humiliation, on approaching the residence of the police-officers. Bhotanese were punished who were detected selling provisions, or holding any communication with the camp. The chief, at an interview with Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, had declared that he had orders to prevent the envoy from going on, but that if he would halt four days there would be time to get an answer from the capital, whither he would send at once, and meantime every effort should be

made to contribute to the comfort of the officers and men, and the mission generally should be treated with respect. When the series of petty insults—petty as taken separately, but in the aggregate, and as directed towards the person and following of an ambassador, most serious—had been continued for some days, and as the chief had not sent to the capital at all, Mr. Eden threatened to go back or to go on unbidden to the seat of government. After this the conduct of the chief changed; he sent a message to the council asking for orders, and in an interview with Mr. Eden endeavoured to persuade that officer that the insults and annoyances he had met with proceeded from the malignant disposition of the ex-chief. He promised, however, that if any violence was attempted on the mission at the capital, he would assist it.

An answer could have been received from the capital in two days, nevertheless Mr. Eden was kept waiting sixteen, and then none came. It transpired afterwards that verbal instructions had been sent to this chief to seize Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, and to send the rest of the party back. He refused, however, to act without written instructions, and these the council were afraid to give. And the chief then advised Mr. Eden to go on without waiting any longer, alleging as a reason for the gross neglect in not replying at all to his reference, the unsettled state of affairs at the seat of government. Accordingly the mission set out, but before it had reached the capital some more Government messengers arrived with orders, as they said, from the Deb Raja to return to the last place (Paro); and if they thought it necessary after hearing what Mr. Eden had to say, they might send higher officials to treat with him. The same altercation ensued that had so often been repeated during this strange journey, Mr. Eden offering to go back to Darjeeling if they said he was not to go on, and they, declining to take that responsibility on themselves, telling him he had better go on or wait. Mr. Eden resolved on going on, but the messengers refused to return with



him, having been, they said, despatched to Paro, where they were instructed to levy a fine on the chief for allowing the envoy to enter his territory.

At last, on the 15th of March, the wanderings of the mission came to an end for the present by its arrival at the capital, Poonakha, where every possible petty insult that could be devised by barbarian cunning was heaped upon it. On arrival the party were directed by a sepoy to move off the high road and descend a precipitous hill, so as to make their approach by a back way. This was the only notice taken of the envoy, till, after some delay, a demand was put forward for the surrender of two British subjects who had been kidnapped by the Bhotanese, and who had taken refuge in the envoy's camp. Mr. Eden gave up these men on a promise that they should be allowed to return after inquiry and investigation had taken place. As might have been expected, the instant they left the British camp they were sent off to slavery again, and Mr. Eden in reply to his demand for their restitution was told they should not be given up.

Two days after the camp reached the capital, the envoy was summoned to attend the council; and he did so, insulted by the crowd through which he passed, some of whom pelted him and his attendants. On reaching the council-house the British officers were kept standing outside, exposed to the gaze of the crowd, because the council were not ready to receive them. At last they were admitted, and as a favour allowed to sit on their own chairs, but no customary formalities were observed. Neither of the Rajas were present at this interview, and nothing in the shape of business was done beyond this,—that as neither party could understand a word the other said, it was proposed that the negotiations should be left entirely to Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, a proposition which came from the council, and certainly does no discredit to their intelligence. It is to be regretted that the same idea had not suggested itself to the Viceroy's council long before, when Cheboo Lama might



have been sent alone on the mission, the prestige of the British name would have escaped insult, and an expensive war and the loss of a vast number of very valuable lives would have been avoided.

It was not till Mr. Eden had been at the capital five days that he was accorded an interview with the Rajas. On the 20th he was summoned to attend them, and the insulting and aggressive conduct of the Bhotanese officers culminated to a point on this occasion. Exposed to the sun, to the insults of the crowd, the envoy and his attendants were hustled first into one tent, then into another where the council were sitting. There they were refused permission to avail themselves of their own chairs, and were forced to seat themselves on mats in the burning sun while the interior of the tent was occupied by the Bhotan grandees. After this they were hustled through a crowd to another little tent, or canopy, where the Deb Raja was sitting, and where Mr. Eden and his officers were forced to stand uncovered in the sun while the Viceroy's letter was brought in by a common coolie and given to the prince. He shortly after rose abruptly and left the tent, the envoy and his suite being pushed rudely aside to let him pass. They remained for a short time in the same place, when they were summoned into another tent to the presence of the Dhurma Raja, where a similar scene was enacted.

Mr. Eden now complained of the heat, and desired permission to depart, but was ordered to wait till the council had seen him. The two Rajas then returned to the city, and the officers of the mission were kept waiting for an hour longer, hustled and insulted by the sepoys. After a tedious delay they were taken again to the council, where the unreasonable demands already put forward by the Bhotanese were renewed, such as the cession of the Assam Dooars, the payment of the arrears of rent, &c.; the council assuring them that the injuries and matters of complaint were altogether on the side of Bhotan, and not



on that of the British Government. The interview ended by the chief Tongso Penlow crumpling up the draft treaty in his hand, and crying out, "Then we will have war! You are nobody: you have no authority from the Governor-General;" adding that they did not want Ambaree, and that a chiprassee might have been sent to settle the dispute. He ended by saying, "I will have nothing more to do with you—go."

On his return to camp, Mr. Eden indicated his intention of taking his departure. But the cup of humiliation for the British envoy was not yet full. Messengers came from the other members of council, begging that he would not take his departure, and endeavouring to excuse the treatment to which he had been subjected, on the ground that it was all owing to the Tongso Penlow, who was endeavouring to usurp the whole government. To this solicitation Mr. Eden yielded, and after a useless attempt at negotiation by letters, which only resulted in fresh insult, he consented to attend council again, on condition he was not hustled by the mob, and that Tongso Penlow was not present. Neither of the conditions was observed, the envoy being hustled as usual, and stones thrown, and Tongso Penlow being present in council, and as overbearing as before. A draft treaty was, however, agreed upon, Mr. Eden having consented to omit two of the articles which had been a great obstacle in the way of a settlement, as the Bhotanese had from the first insisted on their omission. These articles had reference to the residence of a British representative and of British traders in the Bhotan territory. Having consented to get the draft treaty as agreed upon copied as soon as possible, Mr. Eden and his officers were allowed to return to camp.

On the 24th March, the treaty being ready for signature, the envoy was summoned to the council. All this time the custom usually observed in like cases, of a ceremonious return visit paid by an officer of equal rank with the Viceroy's envoy, seems to have been scrupulously omitted,



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and that without attracting attraction or eliciting remonstrance. The fact of the envoy being repeatedly summoned to attend the council was in itself highly derogatory to his dignity, and he ought not, except under compulsion, to have submitted to it.

The matter of the cession of the Assam Dooars had not been mooted at the last meeting between the envoy and the council, under the express understanding that Mr. Eden would not attend the council at all if it was, and, strange to say, the council on that occasion kept their word. But at the next interview the Tongso Penlow renewed his demands for the cession of these provinces, and an altercation ensued between the envoy and the chief, the other members of council showing that they were quite in accord with the latter, and that their expression of regret at his former behaviour was altogether feigned, for they continued laughing and talking, and not attending to the business in hand. After a while the council adjourned, taking the mission with them to another tent in a more open space, surrounded by an immense crowd. This was no doubt with the view of making as public as possible the treatment to which it is evident these Bhotanese officials had resolved to subject the British envoy and his party. The personal outrage began by the chief Tongso Penlow taking a piece of wet dough, and rubbing Mr. Eden's face with it, pulling his hair, and slapping him on the back, immediately afterwards pretending it was all done in a friendly way, showing the terms of intimacy that existed between them. The amusement of the lookers-on, however, at this gross breach of propriety, showed how the matter was regarded. Another chief next selected Dr. Simpson as an object of insult, and, taking some pan leaf which he had chewed out of his mouth, tried to make Dr. Simpson take it into his, which he refused, and then threw it in his face. Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, next came in for his share, and a watch which he wore suspended by a ribbon round his neck, the



gift of the Viceroy, was rudely torn from him, and made over to one of the members of council, who secreted it in his clothes.

That the members of the mission, who were separated from their slender escort all this time, ever reached their camp alive after this treatment, is the most wonderful part of the whole story. In most semi-barbarous countries, insults such as these inflicted on an envoy from a powerful nation would naturally be followed by his assassination, and that of all his retinue. No such tragic result followed. After snatching away Cheboo Lama's watch, they seemed to think that they had perhaps exceeded the limits of official courtesy, and returned it to him; and they also went so far, not a very great way certainly, towards the *amende*, as to request Dr. Simpson to wipe his own face, which he refused. After this the party were permitted to leave the tent, and reached their own camp without further molestation.

When they returned it was too late to commence the march back that night, and had they done so it is more than probable, from what afterwards happened, that open violence would have been resorted to, and that they would all have been seized and imprisoned.

Negotiations, or rather a process of intimidation, was next day commenced through Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, who was sent for by Tongso Penlow, and through him the whole mission was threatened with seizure and imprisonment unless Mr. Eden consented to sign a paper ceding the Assam Dooars. In vain Mr. Eden protested that he had no power to cede them, that even if he signed the paper his signature would be of no avail, that the British Government would not ratify it nor consider it binding; all of which was communicated to the Bhotanese, of course, through Cheboo Lama, upon whose trustworthiness in translating correctly, and upon nothing else, Mr. Eden depended for the expression of his sentiments to Tongso Penlow.



Meantime the mission camp was straitened for supplies; sentries having been posted all round to prevent communication. In this crisis, Mr. Eden summoned a council of the officers of his camp, to decide what action to adopt. Three courses seemed open to them; either to leave Mr. Eden and Cheboo Lama on condition that the rest were allowed to withdraw, or to make an attempt to escape by night, or to sign the paper. The latter course was determined on. When this resolution had been communicated to the council, the envoy was summoned to attend them again on two occasions, on both of which, however, he was treated with decent courtesy. On the second (the 29th March) the treaty was signed by Mr. Eden and Cheboo Lama, the former having written above his signature, on the two copies that were made out, the words "Under compulsion." Whether any of the council knew what these words meant does not appear. The presents, that had meantime been sent for from the spot where they had been left, were distributed. A Bhotan demon, or large wooden image, was brought in and carried round the tent in state, notice having been given that if any injury was done to the Bhotanese the demon would resent it; and finally Mr. Eden received permission to depart. As soon as he had left council, the chief Tongso Penlow departed for his own territory, and the tents being struck an immediate march was ordered. Even then they did not get away without obstruction, a number of Bhotanese sepoy having placed themselves on the road and insolently demanded why the mission left without permission from the official who took up the reins of government on the departure of Tongso Penlow. Cheboo Lama then went back to the fort to represent matters and complain of the violence offered; the baggage and tents were sent on, and Mr. Eden, with the Sikh escort, remained behind to wait for Cheboo Lama.

He waited till it got dark, but the interpreter did not come. He, however, sent a message to Mr. Eden, telling



him to go on and he would follow next day. Mr. Eden accordingly acted on this advice, and he was afterwards joined by Cheboo Lama, who had not, however, escaped without difficulty.

Next day, further attempts were made to detain the mission and to seize Cheboo Lama, but Mr. Eden having shown a disposition to resent any such attempt by force they were eventually allowed to go on, and reached the comparatively friendly neighbourhood of the Paro fort on the 31st.

Their difficulties here terminated, and in thirteen stages the ill-fated mission reached British territory in safety.

The announcement that the British envoy had signed a paper ceding to the Bhotanese the Assam Dooars was received by the English community in India with a yell of indignation. And before the circumstances were thoroughly known, it was assumed that Mr. Eden, acting under the orders of the Bengal Government, had made light of the sacrifice of a tract of country by the cession of which the class who would chiefly suffer were the European settlers and tea planters of Assam. How the insult to the British nation and Government, in the person of the envoy, was to be wiped out, and the treaty cancelled with a due regard to our national honour, was debated in every circle. If war was the remedy adopted,—war against whom, or what? and was it justifiable or prudent to sacrifice the prestige attaching hitherto to the word of a British envoy, by immediately repudiating the terms of a treaty entered into by him after full deliberation and in a formal manner? Much casuistry was thrown away in discussion as to whether Mr. Eden ought, from motives of personal safety of himself and his attendants, to have so compromised the Government; and a great deal of stress was laid upon the fact of the treaty having been signed under compulsion. It seems to me idle to adduce the introduction of those qualifying words as an element in the argument at all, because it does not appear that the Bhotanese had any



knowledge of their meaning and force, and they would in that case be of no further avail than a mental reservation, which a man makes when he says "Yes," and means "No." Had they known the full force of the phrase, it is hardly likely, from what we have seen of their proceedings, that they would have been satisfied with so transparent a formality, or consented to receive a document in the face of it null and void. The translation of the document, of course, rested with Cheboo Lama, the interpreter, and it is not very likely that he was so scrupulously exact in his rendering of the whole paper as to have explained very clearly the meaning of the two words which made the whole treaty waste paper. The question resolves itself into one of general principle, whether any circumstances can justify fraud. It is clear that if they can, then was Mr. Eden fully justified in purchasing the safety of himself and the mission by the pretended cession of the Assam Dooars. It would have been lamentable indeed had his life and the lives of his companions been sacrificed in this silly attempt to treat barbarians with the forms and usages observed among civilized nations. And if the safety of the whole party was purchased at the expense of Cheboo Lama's conscience, perhaps the bargain may on the whole not be considered a very bad one. I am not aware that the Indian Government have ever adopted as their motto, "*Fiat justitia ruat cœlum*:" if so, it has been adopted very recently; at any rate, it is clear they did not act upon it in their relations with Bhotan, for the treaty ceding the Assam Dooars was at once repudiated.

The British Government, however, did not at once resolve on war; at first it was determined only to annex permanently the Ambaree district, and to withhold for the future the rent for the Assam Dooars. At the same time a demand was made for the immediate restitution of all British subjects held in captivity, the alternative being the annexation of the Bengal Dooars. These terms were, it is hardly necessary to add, not complied with, and in



November 1864 a proclamation of war was issued, and active preparations set on foot.

It will be recollected that the Bengal Dooars were protected or supervised by the chiefs of five forts, Dhalimkote the westernmost, then Chamoorcha, next Balla, Buxa, and lastly Bishensing.

The plan of the campaign was, therefore, to send a column against each of these forts, and the command of the whole force was given to Brigadier-General Mulcaster, with immediate control over the three right columns, the other columns to operate on the left being under the command of Brigadier-General Dunsford, C.B. A small reserve of Europeans was stationed at Darjeeling, the troops composing the force in the field being, with the exception of the artillerymen, entirely natives.

The first operation, the reduction of Dhalimkote, was attended with a sad disaster. The column sent against this fort consisted of three Armstrong Mountain Train guns, and two 8-inch mortars, a wing of the 18th Native Infantry, and the 30th Punjab Infantry. After one or two stockades had been captured without any actual resistance by a detachment under Major Gough, the column reached Ambiok, which it will be recollected was the halting-place of the mission camp just under the Dhalimkote fort, on the 5th December. Some communication passed between Lieut.-Colonel Haughton, the political officer with the column, and the commandant of the fort, which was attended with no practical result, and the guns and mortars were put in position. Owing to the nature of the country, it was found impossible to select a site for guns where the magazine could be deposited at a safe distance. The mortars were accordingly placed on a pathway where there was only just room for them, and the magazine on one side immediately below the ridge. On the column approaching the fort a fire of stones and arrows, and a few matchlocks, was directed against it. The infantry, after capturing a barricade, advanced to the foot of the ascent

leading to the fort, where they were exposed to another volley of stones, arrows, and matchlock balls; Captain Macgregor, the Brigade Major, and Major Longmore of the 18th Native Infantry, being wounded, the former by a matchlock ball, the latter by an arrow. The two five and a half inch mortars were throwing their shell into the fort, when suddenly a terrible explosion occurred, and three officers—Major Griffin and Lieutenants Anderson and Waller—of the Artillery, with four gunners, were killed on the spot, some of them being so disfigured that their forms could scarcely be recognised; an officer of the Royal Engineers and several artillerymen were at the same time very severely wounded. All accounts coincide in stating that the accident originated from a premature bursting of a shell. The shock, with its terrible results, was so instantaneous that it is difficult for the survivors who were nearest the spot when the catastrophe occurred, to recollect exactly the position which the unfortunate sufferers occupied at the moment they were blown up. Dr. Rennie states that Major Griffin was engaged in weighing out the charges. No doubt that was his particular duty at the time, but I am assured on the authority of an officer who was present, that the moment before the explosion took place he was leisurely sitting on a barrel of gunpowder, smoking a pipe with that contempt for danger which is the invariable result of familiarity with it.

The fort of Dhalimkote fell into our possession on the evening of that day, the Punjabees having effected an entry by a breach made with an Armstrong gun, which had been brought up after the explosion. The Bhotanese retired from an opening in the opposite wall as our own soldiers entered, and several buildings in the place, including a monastery, were destroyed by fire.

The occupation of the country around, and the villages and forts dependent on Dhalimkote, which was accomplished without opposition, kept the column employed till the 19th December, after which Brigadier-General



Dunsford descended from the hills, and directed his march towards the next fort, Chamoorcha. This was captured almost without opposition. The Bhotanese, indeed, exhibited a good deal of courage in attacking the advance party under Major Mayne, with arrows, stones, and matchlocks, but they appear to have offered no resistance at all in defence of the fort itself, which was captured by a party under Major Garsten, the garrison escaping and flying over the hills as our troops entered. A detachment of 100 men, under Captain Perkins of the Engineers, had been sent to the rear of the village to intercept and destroy the fugitives; an object in which, it is to be hoped, for the sake of humanity, they were unsuccessful. There were two men killed and three wounded on our side. The Bhotanese had thirteen killed, and were said to have carried off their wounded. The adjacent strongholds of Buxa and Balla were occupied by Captain Watson without opposition.

Meantime operations had been conducted against Dewangiri, the easternmost of the forts commanding the Dooars, from the Assam side. The column under Colonel Campbell, and accompanied by Brigadier-General Mulcaster, advanced with all the pomp and circumstance of war from a place called Koomree Katta, about twelve miles from Dewangiri, in fighting order. On the 9th December they made six miles, and halted near a pass in the hills. Meantime Captain Macdonald, with fifty of the Bengal police, had been sent on to reconnoitre. Early in the morning of the 10th the column continued its march in fighting order up the pass. About half-way through they came to a fortified position or stockade, from behind which they were assaulted by a shower of stones, and one man was wounded. The advanced guard, consisting of a company of the 43d Assam Light Infantry, returned fire, when it was ascertained that the position was exposed on both flanks, and that there were fifty Bhotanese in it. Upon this the advance guard was recalled, and the column halted for



the night. Next morning, while the Brigadier-General was reconnoitring, information was received that the fort of Dewangiri had fallen into the hands of Captain Macdonald and his police constables. The stockade in front of which the column had halted during the night was then examined, and found to be evacuated. Captain Macdonald's success had been gained with the trifling loss of one man killed and five wounded, for the garrison had offered scarcely any resistance beyond hurling a few volleys of stones and arrows, and one rude cannon shot, which occasioned the only fatal casualty.

Somewhat similar were the operations against the now only surviving fort, Bishensing. Against this the Brigadier-General marched with three hundred men of the 12th and 44th regiments of Native Infantry, and on arrival found nothing but a solitary house, inhabited by an old Lama priest. "Thus was the capture of the Bhotan hill fort of Bishensing effected," says Dr. Rennie, "for which duty a fully-equipped column, about 2,000 strong, accompanied by 150 elephants, had been detached."

The capture of all the forts and Dooars having thus been accomplished, the military force engaged was broken up. It soon appeared, however, that the Bhotanese were not going to let so valuable a portion of their country slip out of their hands without an effort to recover it. Sundry warnings were given that they were making preparations to recover the whole line of forts, but no one paid any attention to them, though the peasantry in the neighbourhood, who seem from the first to have welcomed the advent of the British, on several occasions gave information that ought to have put our people on the alert.

Besides this, it appears a letter was received at Dewangiri from Tongso Penlow, the chief who had taken such an active part in the ill-treatment of Mr. Eden; but as no one could read the letter it had to be sent to Darjeeling, a distance of 200 miles, to be translated by Cheboo Lama! What a comment is this upon the way in which our rela-



tions with Bhotan were conducted! Even after we had taken possession and declared ourselves masters of the richest part of the country, and established our garrisons and our civil officers for the administration of justice, a letter written in a language commonly used in the country has to be sent two hundred miles to be translated! This missive afterwards turned out to be a timely caution to the officer in command at Dewangiri, that the mighty Tongso Penlow was coming to attack him if he did not evacuate the fort within seven days.

The garrison of Dewangiri consisted of a detachment of the 43d Native Light Infantry, a company of Sikh Sappers, some Bengal police, and some guns manned by Eurasian artillerymen. Early on the morning of the 29th January, 1865, the troops were surprised by a Bhotanese force under Tongso Penlow, who had kept his word. The utmost confusion prevailed, as it always does in attacks of this kind just before dawn. The noise which at first disturbed the garrison, who seem to have been content to do without the usual precaution of posting sentries, was like that made by loose cattle running over the fortified enclosure. The soldiers fell in as well as they could in the dark; the artillery kept to their guns, and the infantry opened fire in the direction where the assailants were supposed to be. As soon as there was light enough to see the enemy, Colonel Campbell charged with the 43d and Sappers, and drove them out of the place. The only casualties were, Lieutenant Urquhart of the Royal Engineers, killed; and Lieutenant Storey, of the 43d, wounded; four men killed, and thirty-one wounded. The loss of the enemy was put down at about sixty men.

The Bhotanese, however, were by no means disheartened; they only changed their tactics. Finding out that the only supply of water for the garrison came from a spring about a mile and a half distant, the water being conveyed by means of a bamboo aqueduct, they easily succeeded in cutting it off, at the same time occupying in force the pass



which lay between the fort and the reserve of the British forces in the plain country. Colonel Campbell then applied to Brigadier-General Mulcaster for reinforcements, as he was not strong enough to dislodge the Bhotanese and recover possession of the springs of water so indispensably necessary for his troops. Brigadier-General Mulcaster, however, turned a deaf ear to Colonel Campbell's urgent solicitations, but consented at last to send him some ammunition; next to water, perhaps, the commodity of which the beleaguered garrison stood most in need. The ammunition, however, never reached its destination; for when the officer escorting it arrived at the foot of the pass he found it in possession of the enemy, and his detachment only consisting of thirty-six sepoy, he did not feel justified in attacking.

Thus the genius of contraries seemed to guide all our relations and operations with Bhotan from the first. The mission under Mr. Eden, which never ought to have been sent, when it started did almost everything it ought not to have done, and omitted to do almost everything it should have done. When war was declared, an expensive and elaborately equipped military force was despatched, under the usual organization of generals and brigadiers, to seize a number of empty forts, which might have been taken possession of by a few police. When the Bhotanese had mustered in force, and sent notice of their intention to attack us, the letter had to be forwarded two hundred miles before it could be read; and finally, when the garrison of the principal place wrested from the enemy was straitened, the supply of water being cut off, the general sent them ammunition, which never arrived because the pass was held by a strong force of the enemy, and the escort consisted of thirty-six sepoy only; and this is the same pass which, when it was occupied by a stockade garrisoned by fifty men who ran away in the night, it was thought necessary to employ a whole British column under the Brigadier-General himself to force.



Human beings, let them be ever so brave, cannot live without water ; and in consequence of the refusal to send Colonel Campbell reinforcements, that officer was compelled to take the disastrous step of evacuating Dewangiri. This was done at one o'clock on the morning of the 5th February, the pickets keeping up a fire to divert the enemy's attention. 250 men of the 43d were told off to carry and escort the sick and wounded ; 50 more to drag the guns, two twelve-pound howitzers ; and the remainder of the force, about 200 men, were available for duty on the front and rear of the retreating column. Colonel Campbell, however, realized the truth of the old saying, that a retreat is the most difficult manœuvre to manage in the whole range of military operations, and above all a retreat in the night.

The main column lost its way, the usual result of movements in the dark ; then a panic seized the men, the guns were abandoned, and, I am sorry to add, some of the sick and wounded—how many is not known ; and, in short, the retreat turned to a flight ; the gunners, unable to drag the guns when the sepoys of the 43d refused any longer to assist, acting under the orders of their officer, Captain Cockburn, threw them over the precipice with the view of preventing them from falling into the hands of the Bhotanese. The latter, however, managed to get them up, and retained them for a long while as trophies of their victory.

The ill-fated garrison at last reached the camp at Koomree Katta, the men and officers saving nothing but the things they wore or carried with them. The Bhotanese did not perceive the evacuation of the fort till about two hours after the troops had left, and then were too busily engaged in looting what had been left behind to think of pursuing the fugitives. The chief, Tongso Penlow, behaved exceedingly well, having treated with kindness and consideration the wounded who fell into his hands. Indeed, he sent a letter down to Koomree Katta, inquiring after the health of the Bhotanese prisoners in the British camp ;



adding that the British prisoners in his possession were going on well.

About the same time that this assault was made on Dewangiri, all the other forts as far as Chamoorcha were assailed in a similar manner. It would be tedious to relate the story of each attack in detail. Suffice it to say that in every instance except that of Dewangiri the attempt failed, either from greater precaution having been used by the defenders, or from reinforcements being promptly sent up.

The Government were resolved to take immediate steps to recover their lost prestige in Bhotan, and accordingly two batteries of Artillery, one from Meerut and the other from Calcutta, the 55th Regiment from Lucknow, and the head-quarters of the 80th from Dum Dum, the 19th, 29th, and 31st regiments of Native Infantry, were ordered at once to the frontier. At the same time Brigadier-General Tombs, C.B., V.C., was sent to supersede Brigadier-General Mulcaster, and Brigadier-General Tytler, C.B., to succeed Brigadier-General Dunsford, C.B., who resigned from ill-health. Of the force above detailed, the 3d Battery, 25th Brigade, R.A., the head-quarters of the 55th Regiment, and 29th Punjab Infantry were ordered to operate against Dewangiri, while the remainder of the force was attached to the left brigade.

It will easily be understood that the re-conquest of Dewangiri, and the work of driving the Bhotanese from the stockades which they had erected in the neighbourhood of some of the other forts, were very easily effected by the overwhelming British army now in the field.

Dewangiri was captured almost without any casualties on our side at all; an officer of the police, Mr. Weldon, having been shot in the groin, and three officers struck in the head with stones. There were about four-and-twenty of the sepoys also wounded.

While the British column was assembling for the final



operations against Dewangiri, two messengers were sent to Tongso Penlow to inquire after the prisoners. It was found he had treated them well; the messengers, too, he did not despatch on their return errand till he had given them a good dinner. He sent his compliments to the officers in camp, saying that he was quite well, and hoped they were so too. The amiable sentiments and really good behaviour of the chivalrous Bhotan barbarian were, however, but poorly returned by our own people, who on the capture of the place indiscriminately slaughtered 120 Bhotanese they found there, many of whom were lying on the ground wounded.

Thus ended the Bhotan war, which was nothing but a series of mistakes from the first. It was born in ignorance, bred in mismanagement, and concluded by a bloody and cruel butchery. The casualties among our officers and men in the field, however, are far from representing the total loss which the war entailed. With the most exquisite scenery, abounding in undulating hills clothed with verdure and forest trees, here and there presenting a grand panorama of lofty mountain-ranges, with all their diversities of hill and dale, Bhotan possesses a most deadly climate. Of all the various kinds of malarious fever known in India, presenting some type peculiar to each locality, the fever of Bhotan is the most dangerous. Once in the system, it seems incapable of being eradicated for years. And numbers of those who served in the country during the war carried with them to other scenes of duty seeds of a disease that too often proved fatal. The habits of the Bhotanese are excessively filthy. Strangers, as all semi-barbarous tribes are, to sanitary precautions of any kind, these people seem to have vied with Nature herself in making their picturesque country a very charnel-house. Some of the forts, which were permanently occupied by our troops after the termination of hostilities, which had been for years before used as places of residence by the people attached to the locality, were found to contain a foot and



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more in depth of accumulated filth over their whole area. This was especially the case at Dhalimkote, where an effort was made to clear the place, and render it in some degree fit for human habitation, by removing the filth which covered the space surrounded by the walls to the extent of 7,000 feet, and a foot and a half in thickness. But the disturbance or removal of the dried surface of the mass of accumulated horrors seemed to let loose the foul miasma which had been, like an evil genius, imprisoned in the dirt that generated it. The consequences were most disastrous; men and officers alike fell beneath its baneful influence. Kept on rations insufficient to enable their system to rally against the effects of such a pestilential atmosphere, the native troops succumbed in a most pitiable manner. Even in a country remarkable for verdure vegetable food is scarce, and the men, in addition to fever and ague, began to suffer from scurvy. Again and again the officer commanding the detachment addressed his superiors, urging on them the necessity of supplying the men with more generous diet, and above all vegetables. But the senior medical officer would not support the application with a recommendation of his own. At last the frightful mortality among the men attracted the attention of the military authorities; and when too late to save life, the long-solicited vegetables were sent up, at a season of the year which ensured their arriving in a half-rotten state, and additional rations were sanctioned.

In reviewing the whole story of our relations with Bhotan, from the starting of the embassy to the butchering of the wounded in the fort of Dewangiri—which it is but just to state the European officers endeavoured, but in vain, to prevent—the impartial historian cannot but see that, with the advantages of civilization and the teaching of Christianity on our side, even as regards those qualities which civilization and Christianity are supposed to foster, if not to beget, the balance is in favour of the despised, semi-barbarous Bhotanese. With the exception of the un-

gentlemanly (if such a word can be applied to a Bhotan at all) conduct of Tongso Penlow in spitting in the face of Dr. Simpson, and besmearing the features of the envoy with filth, their conduct throughout was marked by at least as much (shall we not say more?) good sense, straightforwardness, forbearance, and military skill as ours. If Mr. Eden obstinately persisted in pushing his way into the heart of the country, they firmly and consistently from the first did all they possibly could to prevent him from putting himself in a false position. No man could have had broader hints that he was not wanted. While their conduct, though occasionally vacillating, was for the most part frank and honest, even to the extent of Tongso Penlow's declining to take advantage of the laxity of discipline and want of alertness of the Dewangiri garrison without giving notice beforehand of his determination to make a struggle for the freedom of his country, a British envoy is driven to a disgraceful expedient to secure his own liberty and that of his suite. A British officer in command of an important outpost in a newly-conquered country allows his garrison to be surprised, fails to take measures to secure his men a constant supply of water, the most necessary of all the necessities of life, and is driven pell-mell, with the loss of his guns and all public and private stores, down the hills. A brigadier-general, with a considerable force at his command, fails to keep open his communications with his own outpost; while the Bhotan chief, self-taught in the art of strategy, surprises a garrison, cuts off its water, and secures its inevitable defeat. When our wounded, cast away in the hurry of disgraceful flight from the abandoned fort, fall into the hands of Tongso, he treats them kindly, and rewards our messengers, sent to his camp, with good dinners, and sends them back with polite messages. When our men attack a scarce-defended fort, we send a party to the rear on purpose to shoot down helpless fugitives; and when Dewangiri falls finally before a British force, the garrison, including the wounded, are

butchered. Even the original cause of dispute, the alleged aggression of the Bhotanese upon British subjects, was by no means all on one side of the account, for the Bhotan authorities from the very first declared they had more reason than we to complain of frontier outrages, and the truth or falsehood of the allegation cannot be determined, for it was never investigated.

The termination of active hostilities resulted in leaving us victors in the field. The Dooars had been seized, and the hill fortresses attached to them were in our possession; but so long as the country remained hostile, it was obvious that we should have to retain our possession of those places which had fallen into our hands at an enormous sacrifice of life; for it would be necessary to maintain large garrisons at the principal strongholds. It was therefore resolved, at the conclusion of 1865 and commencement of 1866, to organize a strong force of 7,000 men to complete the conquest and subjugation of the entire country. Happily, the necessity of resorting to this extreme measure was avoided by the conclusion of a treaty with the Deb Raja and Tongso Penlow, by which, on condition of the two guns deserted by Colonel Campbell's detachment being restored, and stipulations for the future to put an end to all aggression or annoyance on the British frontier, our Government bound itself to abandon the idea of further hostilities, and to pay yearly, as rent for the Bengal Dooars, a sum of 25,000 rupees, to be doubled in the event of the terms of the treaty being faithfully observed by the Bhotanese.

It only remains to add, that the writers who have laid the blame of this miserable chapter of British Indian history on the shoulders of the Bengal Government have done so unreasonably. The policy, whether good or bad, was Imperial policy from the first; and from Mr. Eden's mission down to the treaty of 1866, the Supreme Government is solely responsible. It is equally unjust to regard Sir John Lawrence as the author of the mischief.



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It was begun before he arrived in the country; and although it would have been much better if he had at once taken the responsibility of ordering Mr. Eden back, and declining to sanction any further attempt at a hopeless task, we can easily understand how unwilling he felt to cancel and upset at one stroke the policy of his predecessor.



CHAPTER XV.

THE UMBEYLA CAMPAIGN—THE BLACK MOUNTAIN CAMPAIGN—
GENERAL RESULT.

THE outrages of the Sittana fanatics upon British subjects, their interference with traffic, and their threatening attitude generally, induced the Government in 1863 to send a force under Sir Neville Chamberlain to reduce them to order.

About forty miles north of the Attok Fort, where the route to Peshawur crosses the Indus, and on the west bank of that river, is a large mountain called Mahabun, about thirty miles in length from east to west, and 8,000 feet high. The summit is mostly covered with forests of fir-trees, and in the winter months wrapped in snow, but the sides of the mountain are bare and rocky, and in places very steep, and only to be ascended by spurs which run out at intervals into the valleys below, separated by deep rocky gorges, so that in passing from one spur to the other it is almost always necessary either to ascend to the summit and descend from the point where the spurs commence, or go down to the valley, cross the gorge, and ascend from the foot of the other projection. Interspersed among the gorges and spurs, the rocks and forests, that alternate over the surface of this splendid mountain, are plots of cultivation and small villages inhabited by the hardy races who have made their homes almost on a level with the eagle's eyrie. The tribe against which military operations were now directed were the Hindustanee fanatics, the descendants of a band of desperate men who formed a colony in the trans-



Indus district in the days of Runjeet Singh. Their principal stronghold and head-quarters of late years had been at a place called Mulka, hidden in a cleft on the northern side of the Mahabun mountain, which, as it runs from south-east to north-west, turns its southern flank towards the Peshawur valley, and its northern towards the hilly districts of Bonair, and other territories as yet practically unexplored. The Indus at this part of its course has a direction pretty nearly due north and south. At a small bend the river makes just where it approaches the north-western corner of Mahabun is the city of Umb, and at the foot of the south-west corner is the town of Sittana, another settlement of these fanatics, whither they resorted always when intent upon hostile designs against their neighbours, and by which name they are known to us.

The stronghold of Mulka was therefore most securely situated. To reach it there were only two routes, either right over the mountain crest and down the other side, or round by the foot of the mountain to the north-west corner, where lies the sheltered valley of Chumla. This valley is bounded on the whole of the south side by the spurs of Mahabun, on the north by the rugged country of the Bonairs. The entrance to it is effected on the west by a pass called the Umbeyla pass, from a village of that name at its mouth, just where it debouches into the valley. The other, or the western end of the pass, enters the hills from the south, connecting a tract of plain country, called the Eusofzie part of the Peshawur valley, and within the British frontier line, with the Chumla valley. The mountain heights (for where the country is all one mass of mountain ridges, the principal heights can only be distinguished in a general description) overhanging the Umbeyla pass on the north flank are called the Gooroo mountain, and are in the Bonair territory, as also is the village of Umbeyla and the adjacent tract. Away to the north and west of Bonair, across another high range, is the Swat valley, and beyond that again the eye rests on range after range, till the snow-



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capped summits of the Hindoo Koosh bound the distant horizon.

From this brief description of the localities, it will be sufficiently clear that, in directing its operations against the stronghold of Mulka, the British force could more easily penetrate to the mountain fastness by pushing through the Umbeyla pass, making its way along the Chumla valley, and then, by turning sharply to the right, take the enemy's position, as it were, in the flank. When Sir Neville Chamberlain took the field, there was, as far as we were aware, no combination between the Mulka or Sittana fanatics and their neighbours, the Bonairs or the Swatees. Our relations with the Bonairs, so far as any communication had taken place, were not unfriendly. We had no quarrel with them, and did not wish to seek one. But these fanatical Mahomedan mountain tribes are easily excited and very suspicious, and, above all, extremely jealous of having their territories explored by British officers or British troops : and although the route of the force on its way *via* the Chumla valley to Mulka would necessarily have to pass through the Bonairs' territory, yet as they only laid claim to the tract at the Chumla end of the pass, where stood the village of Umbeyla ; and as all the information which our civil officers on the frontier had been able to obtain about the pass led them to believe there were no physical obstacles to prevent a small force marching right through it in one day ; and as the next day would see the column out of the Bonairs' territory again, and fairly on its way to Mulka, it was hoped that no opposition would be offered to the passage of our troops. Moreover, the object was to surprise, and there were grounds for apprehension that if we made a formal demand to the Bonairs for permission to pass through their territory, or rather intimated our intention of doing so, although it was added that we had no wish to molest or annoy them, they might, from a feeling of sympathy, though there was no real clanship between them, and the Hindustanee fanatics, apprise them of the approach

of a body of infidels bent on their destruction. So it was resolved to let them know nothing of our movement till the force was at the mouth of the pass ready to push its way through, and then it was hoped it would be possible for it to march along the valley the same day, and by nightfall reach a place called Kooria, at the easternmost extremity, where the route would turn off to the right towards Mulka. In fact, it was as if we would commit a little trespass first, and when we had reached the boundary of our neighbour's grounds, and were on the point of quitting them, we might ask permission, regardless whether it was acceded or refused, and a proclamation was to be issued to the Bonair chiefs, acquainting them with our peaceable intentions so far as they were concerned.

Accordingly, on the morning of the 20th October, the force—which consisted of half a battery of Royal Artillery, the three guns being carried along on elephants, the 71st Highlanders, the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, two companies of native Sappers, the 20th and 32d Native Infantry, the 11th Native Cavalry, two native mountain batteries, with eight small guns carried on mules, the Guides (infantry and cavalry), the 1st, 3d, 5th, and 26th regiments of Native Infantry of the Punjab Irregular Force, and the 5th Goorkhas—entered the Umbeyla pass; the proclamation having been issued the day before to the neighbouring tribes, informing them that the object of the force was to enter the Mahabun tract and punish the fanatics, and that there was no intention of interfering with other tribes.

Colonel Wylde, an experienced officer in this mountain warfare, led the way with his corps of Guides and 1st Punjab Infantry, under Major Keyes. After halting about an hour at the village of Soorkhawai, at the mouth of the pass, Colonel Wylde, accompanied by the Deputy-Commissioner, went on to feel the way. The prospect was not encouraging, for the road lay up a watercourse, in which were huge masses of rock and clear running water, the hills



high, towering on either side, and covered with brushwood and trees. The advance column had not proceeded far before it was greeted by a couple of shots, which necessitated crowning the heights on either side with flanking parties of Guide infantry, whilst the 1st, or Coke's Regiment, advanced up the watercourse. The way being thus led, the main body of the force, under Colonel Hope, of H.M. 71st, followed. The road is a gentle ascent the entire distance, without a single village. About seven miles from Soorkhawai brought the column to the crest of the pass of Umbeyla, where a halt was ordered, for none of the baggage had come up, and the men spent a most uncomfortable night. But a reconnoitring party, consisting of Col. Probyn with his regiment (cavalry), Captain Hawes with the Guides (cavalry), and a party of Sappers, were pushed forward under the command of Colonel Taylor of the Engineers as far as Kooria, some ten miles further on. The people everywhere were civil and obliging, offering their services, and tendering submission ; but the Bonairs were assembled in considerable force, part of them being visible from the camp at the mouth of the pass collecting on the hillside and occupying Umbeyla, the principal features of which were flat-roofed houses and a mosque, with corn-stacks and fields of tall-stalked Indian corn adjoining. It was evening, and night was drawing on. It was impossible to attack the enemy, for such no doubt they were, in a position of which our officers knew nothing beyond what they could see at a distance, and as yet no overt act of hostility had been made. The mountaineers, however, came out of their fastnesses, yelling and shouting defiance as our reconnoitring party returned, and the men of Probyn's regiment could not be restrained. They charged all who had been rash enough to leave the cover of the village. Hand-to-hand conflicts ensued ; several of the enemy fell. Unfortunately a dry nullah had to be passed in the charge, at which two of the horses fell, and went over to the enemy ; of these one belonged to the adjutant of the Sikh regiment. Several



of the Sikhs had their horses wounded, and one of the men received a smart sabre-cut on his head.

This affair occurring just below the camp, the 20th Punjab Infantry and a regiment of Muzbee Sikhs came down, and kept the enemy at bay until all our force had again re-entered the pass. It was by this time dark, excepting the moon's dim light, and the Bonairs pluckily followed our troops up to the crest, and continued to fight until three o'clock the morning following. The hills on both sides of the camp were lined with infantry pickets about half-way up the heights; nobody slept, and few got anything in the way of food or clothes, as the baggage could not be brought up; and for some days following provisions fetched exorbitant prices, flour selling at a rupee per two pounds, and bread at several rupees per loaf. The night was cold, but there was no want of excitement. A breastwork of commissariat stores was thrown across the narrow part of the mountain road in front, and defended by guns and infantry. Here the staff assembled; and here they witnessed the daring courage of the Bonairs, with which the whole force was destined to become more familiar. They advanced up to the breastwork—one man even leapt over it and cut down an officer of the Engineers, Lieut. Brown—while several of them crept stealthily into our camp, where they attacked any one they met. The night was too dark to allow of our men taking aim, but whenever a matchlock flashed through the gloom a shower of bullets from our soldiers' rifles sped in the direction thus indicated. But the enemy likewise availed themselves of this guide for their fire, and whilst the general and his staff were standing by the guns, a ball, which the lighted portfire had doubtless attracted, mortally wounded Captain Gillies of the Artillery, who fell shot through the heart. Meantime the pickets on the height were similarly occupied, and thus was spent the first night in the Umbeyla pass, in a hot though desultory engagement with an enemy with whom we had literally as yet had no quarrel. About three o'clock

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the firing ceased, and our jaded soldiers were enabled to snatch a little repose.

The difficulty of the situation now began to dawn fairly upon Sir Neville Chamberlain. It was certain he would have to fight every inch of the way; and, as far as mere fighting went, this he could have done; but his little army had to be fed, and where were his supplies to come from? He could not venture to advance without at least a fortnight's provisions, and how was his small but well-appointed force to fight their way, protect the baggage and supplies, and keep open their communications? For it was now clear that the very first device the Bonairs adopted, when the British force moved on, would be to close the pass. Thus circumstanced, he determined to stay where he was, and to send back for reinforcements and supplies, holding the position meanwhile. Stronger pickets were thrown out on both sides of the little camp, which was in the bed of the pass, flanked on the left by the heights of the Gooroo mountain, on the right by a high craggy peak to which our troops gave the name of the Craig picket, while the site selected for the picket on the left was called the Eagle's nest. The hardy and now excited mountaineers gave our troops no rest. Every day had its own story of little battles fought and won, vigorous attacks resisted, and the enemy again and again driven back, again and again advancing under the influence of their leaders, and hurling themselves upon the small compact force of British troops, who held their difficult position with the tenacity which British soldiers know so well how to evince. On the 26th the ranks of the enemy were swelled by the arrival of a number of the Swatees, who, assisted by a body of the fanatics from Mulka, against whom originally our efforts had been solely directed, made a desperate and combined attack upon the camp. The 20th Punjabees and Frontier Infantry Corps were hotly engaged, and their casualties heavy. A lieutenant of the former corps—Richmond, a man beloved by all who knew him—was shot



through the head, and died the day following; Major Brownlow lost his senior native officer and several men in addition to poor Richmond. Clifford, an excellent soldier, the adjutant of the 1st Punjab Cavalry, and a volunteer with the 3d Punjab Infantry, was killed, together with some native officers and men. In all, our casualties were eighty killed and wounded; among the latter being Drake of the Sappers and Barrow of the Artillery. The enemy suffered much, but were nowise daunted or discouraged. The hill fighting involved physical exertions to which many of our officers and men may well have been strangers. To mount the rocky paths which led to our pickets in some cases occupied three hours, and it was necessary for every party upon reaching a halting-place to protect itself by erecting a breastwork of large stones and fragments of rock, an art the enemy themselves taught us in their sungas or stone breastworks, with which we first became fatally familiar in the Affghan war.

On the 31st, Sir Neville Chamberlain wrote that there was a general combination of almost all the tribes, from the Indus to the boundary of Cabul, against us. Old animosities were in abeyance, and, under the influence of fanaticism, tribes usually hostile to each other were hastening to join the standard of the Akhoond of Swat. Meantime reinforcements were being pushed up, and by the end of October the force had been increased by the arrival of the 14th (Ferozepore) Native Infantry, the 4th Goorkhas, and two field-guns of a native Punjab battery, with additional supplies of food, ammunition, and medical stores.

The Bonairs, or Bonairwal as they were called, are a fine race of men. Clad in loose flowing garments, and turbans of blue, they are as formidable an enemy as one might wish to encounter. To watch any single one among them coming to the attack might remind the spectator of some tragic character fretting on the stage, as, with a huge shield on his left arm, and sword brandished in the air, he



starts towards his antagonist, and inspired by the shrill music of the hill-pipe—which differs little from the Scottish bagpipe—he shouts his war-cry. This is taken up by a thousand of the wild band; their drums beat and banners are waved frantically, and one and all charge down upon the breastworks.

With their swords and shields and matchlocks, and carrying six days' provisions on their backs, these hardy mountaineers rallied to the call that was ringing from every mountain crest and in every cavern over the northern frontier. The Akhoond of Swat and another famous leader, the Molvie Abdoolla, from their wild homes spread the fire of fanaticism far and wide, till the half-savage tribes assembled in thousands to fight for their fertile valleys, their hearths and homes, and above all their faith.

General Chamberlain, finding that his sojourn in the Umbeyla pass was likely to be rather prolonged, moved his position to the right, so as to occupy higher ground than that he held before, overlooking the pass below. But another step was necessary to render his position secure, and that was to provide safer communication with his supports than the roadway through the pass itself afforded, which might at any time be closed by the enemy, who, occupying the heights on each side, could oppose very serious obstacles in the way of an advancing party, and cut off supplies. With this object in view, a road was marked out by the engineers from our right defence to the rear over the slopes of the Mahabun, and at the same time another rough roadway was sketched out to facilitate the advance from the comparatively elevated position the force now held, when the time should come to push on. Working parties of the 71st and 101st had been employed upon the road protected by covering parties, but their defence was difficult; for the spurs of the Mahabun mountain, as before mentioned, projected into the valley in parallel ridges, "part covered with firs, and encumbered with



enormous rocks, and the intervening rocks are so precipitous that, to protect the workmen on one ridge, it was necessary to detach armed parties to the next. The result of this was, that the covering parties, although their actual distance from camp was not great, were very isolated, as owing to the ravines it was impossible to communicate with or reinforce them except by first ascending the mountain and then passing down the particular ridge on which they were posted.”¹

Friday, the sacred day among the Mahommedans, was a day of prayer with the Bonairs; and it was also the day for their most desperate and determined sallies. On the 6th November (Friday) our pioneers had nearly completed their work, and felt secure under the protection of their covering parties; but as the enemy was observed collecting in great force at the bottom of the pass, about the hour of midday, it was deemed necessary to withdraw the unarmed workmen, which was done in good time; but some misconception of orders appears to have taken place regarding the covering parties, the most advanced of which consisted of fifty Europeans of H.M. 71st, under Ensign Murray of that corps, and about the same number of natives of the 20th Regiment, under Captain Rogers, who being senior commanded this unlucky body of a hundred men, now becoming gradually surrounded by the enemy. Behind Captain Rogers' party was a second under Major Harding, to whom the previous day the general command of the working and covering parties had been entrusted. About eight hundred or a thousand yards still further to the rear was a picket of the 1st Punjab Infantry and the 20th Native Infantry under Major Keyes. The ground was a mountain crest and side, thickly covered with fir and jungle, so steep, precipitous, and rugged, that of the three parties posted there no one knew the exact position of the other, and all were a mile distant from the support of Keyes' picket. The enemy collecting in force, the working party, according

¹ “The Sittana Campaign,” by Col. Adye, C.B., Royal Artillery; 1867.



to instructions previously given, began to withdraw, and Murray's party, also being much pushed, retired towards its support. On its way it fell in with the 5th Goorkhas. Captain Rogers' party, a little further down the slope, was actively engaged, and Murray and Oliphant, hearing the sharp firing, joined him. By this time he was so encumbered with his wounded that he dared not attempt to retire, fearing no less than the enemy the displeasure of the general, without permission from whom no officer dared relinquish a post to which he had been appointed. The firing increased, and the difficulty of retreat became momentarily greater, because of the increasing number of casualties. The three detachments then took up a position under cover of an elevated ridge of rock, which acted as a breastwork, but served the double purpose, also, of a screen under whose shelter the determined Bonairs advanced, making excellent practice with their matchlocks. To raise the head above the ridge was certain death, and a cap or a piece of cloth held up as a decoy was riddled in a moment by the enemy's shot. Murray was the first to fall, wounded in the neck whilst peering over the breastwork to reconnoitre the enemy's movements. He fell back dead. Oliphant was also wounded in the shoulder. Major Harding, perceiving the importance of extricating the party from their perilous position, wrote urgently for assistance, and the note was carried by a gallant little Goorkha soldier, who ran the gauntlet through a perfect hailstorm of bullets. For a long time—for minutes in such circumstances seem hours—no answer came, and when it arrived it was in the shape of an order to retire, but without reinforcements. The mountain train guns, however, from Keyes' picket opened an effective fire, dropping shells in among the enemy's position. After trying several devices to deceive the enemy, sounding bugle calls to induce them to suppose that reinforcements were coming down the gorge, Harding ordered Oliphant and all the wounded who could walk to retire with Captain



Rogers and the detachment of the 20th, while he remained to hold the enemy at bay a little longer. The picket was about a mile and a quarter distant, and to this spot the party now under Captain Rogers made good their retreat. Harding and his party, after holding the enemy at bay a little while, followed as well as they could, but their gallant commander fell with a bullet wound in the neck. The Goorkhas tried to convey him away, but the enemy rushed on, cutting and slashing at them, killing poor Major Harding on the back of a gallant little Goorkha soldier, who was trying to carry him off.¹ One of the men of the 71st, who had been unable to keep up with his comrades, remained all night concealed beneath a bush among the dead and dying, watching the savage mountaineers stripping and mutilating the dead, and killing the wounded who were unable to escape.

This temporary success gave great encouragement to the enemy, and during the next few days they received reinforcements of 3,000 men from the distant territory of Bajour.

The Craig picket on our right had been more than any other point of our position the object of the enemy's attack. The movement of a portion of the force on to the elevated ground on the right of the pass, which preceded the transfer of the whole camp to that spot, as well as the construction of the road from the right rear towards the plain, led the enemy to believe that some intention of retreating from his position was in the mind of the British general. Buoyed up with this hope, excited by the repeated appeals to their patriotism and religious zeal, and encouraged by the accession of large reinforcements, they prepared for a combined and desperate attack on the Craig picket, on the night of the 12th November. About dusk the horde of men who had been seen collecting during the day, advanced, yelling and screaming, beating drums and blowing shrill pipes, towards the right of our

¹ Colonel Adye.



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position and the Craig picket, which was held by Lieut. Davidson of the 1st Punjab Infantry, fifteen sharpshooters of the 101st, and some sepoy of the 14th Native Infantry. The nearer they came the more invisible they were; for breaking up into single file they crept stealthily, like beasts of prey, shielded by rocks and trees, while the whole night they kept up an incessant and galling fire. At dawn they made a rush upon the picket, and the garrison, surrounded by hundreds of desperate combatants, were forced to retire. But Davidson and a small band of sepoy, who would not desert their commandant, as he would not desert his post, were cut to pieces. The loss of this outwork was a most serious disaster. It completely overlooked the other defences, so much so that the ground below was scarcely tenable while that was occupied by a determined enemy; and, to add to the gravity of the crisis, many of the camp-followers, mule and camel drivers, becoming now fairly disheartened, began to fly. Sir Neville Chamberlain, who was in the camp below when the picket fell into the hands of the enemy, had his attention drawn to the noise and dust and confusion caused by the rush of the camp-followers and animals down the hill, and, feeling certain some reverse must have happened, immediately ordered forward the 101st under Colonel Salusbury, which gallant regiment was fortunately under arms at the moment. The Craig picket must be recaptured, and at any risk, and Colonel Salusbury was directed to do it. Immediately the order was given six companies of the 101st, like antelopes, sped up the gorge, then over the level ground from which arose the ridge held by the enemy, and, with a cheer, the soldiers bounded over the breastwork and drove the Bonairs helter-skelter down the hill the other side. Colonel Salusbury and his gallant regiment was well supported by Major Ross and part of the Ferozepore Regiment, and an officer named Inglis, of the 14th Native Infantry, was one of the first who were inside the sunga.



For the next few days there was a lull, the enemy making no fresh attack, and General Chamberlain took advantage of it to complete the movement already described, throwing back his left flank, and concentrating his whole force upon the right. On the 19th, Major James, the Commissioner of Peshawur, arrived in camp, having just returned from England. This officer's presence was worth a division; he had been for years in Civil employ upon this frontier, he knew more about the country and the neighbouring tribes than any officer in India, and had the most extraordinary influence among them. His return from England had been anxiously expected; but by the time he reached the camp matters had progressed far beyond the point where the influence of a diplomatic officer could be of much avail, except to keep those who were wavering true to their allegiance to the British Government.

No sooner had the new disposition of our camp been completed, and the ground so long held on the left of the gorge under the "Eagle's nest" deserted, than the enemy made a demonstration in force, headed by a mounted chief. Their advance was greeted by a fire from our artillery, and the chieftain's horse was seen to falter and fall; the gallant rider, however, undaunted, pursued his way on foot, and directed the attack upon a picket held by Lieutenant Mosely, who defended the post with a party of sepoys till all the ammunition he had was exhausted, when, with his men following him, he bravely leaped over the stone parapet, and charged the enemy with the bayonet. He was overpowered and cut to pieces with several of his detachment. He had not fallen, however, without an attempt having been made to render him assistance. Major Ross and Lieutenant Inglis, supported by a company of the 71st Highlanders, under command of Captain Smith, advanced to his support, but were driven back; Captain Smith and another officer, Lieutenant Jones, being killed, Major Ross slightly wounded, and Lieutenant Inglis dangerously so.



with a bayonet. Lieutenant Chapman attempted to bring away Captain Smith's body, but was shot in the shoulder while raising it; he endeavoured to speak a few words to Major Ross, but died ere he could articulate his last wishes. None of our killed or wounded could be brought away, neither on that day nor on the next, the 19th, when a party went out for the purpose but returned unsuccessful. The next day a chance shot killed Lieutenant Aldridge of the 71st, and two men in the picket, and wounded Lieutenant Stockley, of the 101st, in both arms.

On the 20th, which was Friday, another desperate attack was made on the Craig picket, and was again successful. It was held then by Major Delafosse, one of the few survivors of the horrors of Cawnpore, Captain Goad, Lieutenant Sanderson, and Dr. Pile, with two companies of the 101st. The sudden assault of the enemy, accompanied with a tremendous matchlock fire and the usual yelling and beating of drums, for a moment startled from his propriety one of the few officers and a company of the 101st, but Delafosse bravely held on with Sanderson and Dr. Pile and the other company till further resistance was hopeless. Pile and Sanderson lay dead, together with twenty-six out of a company of fifty men.

Great was the rejoicing of the enemy at thus wresting for the third time this important post from the hands of British soldiers. But they were not allowed to retain it. Then, as before, it must be retaken at any cost, and the 71st Highlanders, under their gallant leader Colonel Hope, the 5th Goorkhas, and some of the 5th Punjab Infantry under Captain Beckett, with Sir Neville Chamberlain and his staff, and Major Keyes and several other officers, advanced to the assault. Under a perfect storm of matchlock balls and showers of stones hurled from the summit, Colonel Hope deliberately formed his men at the foot of the Craig, and sending the Goorkhas to turn the enemy's flank, he placed himself at the head of his corps, and, with a cool determina-



tion which excited the admiration not only of his own men but of every soldier in the force, proceeded to scale the height. Shot and shell were poured upon the brave garrison of the picket by Major Salt's battery, which throughout the whole war did excellent service, and the hearts of the Bonairs failed them as Colonel Hope and his Highlanders mounted the crest of the hill, and they evacuated the post ere the bayonets were upon them. The picket was thus retaken for the third time and the last, but at a great sacrifice. General Chamberlain was badly wounded, Colonel Hope also ; Colonel Wylde and Colonel Vaughan, Colonel Tyler and Major Campbell slightly, and Lieutenant Anderson shot through the arm, and one of the officers of the 101st disabled for the time by being struck repeatedly with the stones which the enemy hurled on the advancing force.

This attack of the 20th November proved to be the last attempt on the part of the enemy to drive us from our position. A change now came over the spirit of the scene. What war could not effect, diplomacy and personal influence, combined with the persistent bravery of our troops, began to accomplish, and Major James induced several of the tribes of lesser note to abandon the enemy's cause and return to their homes. They were, however, still strong ; 6,000 men from the province of Dher, under their leader Ghuzzim Khan, having joined the Akhoond. Meantime, every day brought large reinforcements nearer and nearer General Chamberlain's position. That officer was indeed unable to take any further active part in the operations, owing to the very severe wound he had received, and Major-General Garvock, who had earned distinction and gained experience in the frontier operations at the Cape, arrived to take the command. At one time it was proposed to retire. It has been related in a previous chapter how the suggestion of abandoning our position in the confusion and disheartenment that followed on Lord Elgin's death came to be entertained, how it was scouted by Sir Hugh Rose,



acquiesced in by the Council at Calcutta, but finally rejected by Sir William Denison.

A war policy having been determined upon, the only safe and prudent policy under the circumstances, no effort was spared nor time lost in carrying it out effectually. A brigade was assembled at a place called Hoti Murdan, about half-way between the Umbeyla pass and Peshawur, under Colonel Shipley of the 7th Fusiliers, to threaten Swat by another entrance called the Loond Khwar pass, composed of one troop of the 7th Hussars, 100 sabres of the Guide cavalry, Bunney's battery, some of the 7th Royal Fusiliers, and three companies of the 3d Sikhs; but by Major James's advice a move on Swat was not attempted. The troops in camp at Umbeyla, reinforced and under command of General Garvock, were divided into two brigades.¹

On the 10th December negotiations had so far advanced that the chiefs of Bonair came into camp and had an interview with the Commissioner. They left again the next day, having agreed that they would now aid the British troops in accomplishing the destruction of the Hindustanee fanatic settlement at Mulka, and promising to accompany them. The negotiation, however, came to nothing, public feeling in the enemy's camp being too strong for the Bonair chiefs, and further hostilities were inevitable. Still, no move was made till the 14th, when messengers arrived with the intelligence that the Akhoond and the other leaders, as well as the tribes themselves, refused compliance with our terms. The next day, the 15th, General Garvock moved out to the attack.

¹ First Brigade, under the command of Colonel Turner :—Peshawur Mountain Train; 71st Highland Light Infantry; 7th Royal Fusiliers; 5th Goorkha Regiment; 1st Punjab Infantry; 3d Punjab Infantry; 5th Punjab Infantry; 20th Regiment Native Infantry; 32d Regiment Native Infantry.

Second Brigade under Colonel Wylde :—H.M. 101st Foot; Guides; Heavy Guns; Huzara Mountain Train; 6th Regiment Punjab Infantry; 14th Regiment Punjab Infantry; 23d Regiment Punjab Infantry.



About two miles beyond the Craig picket stood the village of Laloo, and a few hundred yards in front of it one of the great spurs running up from the Chumla valley terminated in a lofty peak dominating the whole ridge.¹ Here the enemy had established themselves in great force, and, judging by the number of banners they kept flying, seemed determined to make a stand. It was a conical hill, more precipitous and considerably higher than the Craig picket; measuring its elevation by the eye, it appeared about 500 feet from the base to the summit. This position, strong naturally, had been further strengthened by a long breastwork, running completely across its summit, and down the steep towards Laloo. The scenery amid which the troops marched to the attack was strikingly beautiful. The road or rugged pathway led along the summit of the mountains, covered with large fir-trees, interspersed with patches of level land adapted for cultivation. Here and there small stone breastworks had been thrown up, but these were undefended.

As the several regiments approached the formidable position they were destined to assault, they were formed up under shelter of the higher ground, Colonel Turner's brigade being on the right. When all was reported ready, General Garvock gave the order to advance. It was a grand and imposing sight; for what might be wanting in the number of those engaged, to lend it the interest which attaches to great battles, and military movements on a large scale, was supplied by the romantic nature of the surrounding scenery; the grey rocks alternating with the green foliage of the trees, and in pretty contrast with the many-coloured uniforms of the different troops engaged, the picturesque costumes of the enemy, the rocky heights whereon they had entrenched themselves, and the rough crags behind which their sharpshooters lay concealed. Conspicuous in front of the advancing force were the scarlet uniforms of the 101st Fusiliers, a regiment which has been in the

¹ Colonel Adye.



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thickest of the fight in almost every action that has been fought since Plassey, and always distinguished itself; but the natives, the Goorkhas, Sikhs, and Pathans, vied with their European comrades in the struggle to be the first upon the foe. From behind every rock and shrub at the foot of the conical hill, small parties of the enemy jumped up and fled as the advancing columns approached. To cross the level ground was the work of but a few seconds, then the foot of the hill was reached and the ascent began. From stone to stone, from rock to rock, from shrub to shrub, rifle in hand, the soldiers steadily breasted the hill-side, and when the summit was gained, with a terrific yell, leapt over the breastworks and plied the bayonet upon the now disheartened enemy. Ere many minutes had elapsed, the peak from top to bottom was in the possession of British soldiers. The *dénouement* of the affair was so sudden when the advance had once commenced, that a good many weapons were recovered, coats, blankets, &c., and some banners with Arabic devices. The 101st and Guides remained to hold the place till the destruction of Laloo had been completed by Colonel Turner's brigade, which had been sent round to the right against the town, while the direct assault was being made by the brigade under Colonel Wylde.

The next morning at daylight the force moved against Umbeyla, Colonel Wylde's brigade marching down direct upon it, accompanied by a regiment of Light Cavalry and Probyn's Horse, Colonel Turner's brigade meantime making a *détour* by Laloo. The enemy were at first driven up on a height in front of the village, but they abandoned that position directly the 101st Fusiliers, 3d Sikhs, 3d Punjab Native Infantry, and Guides approached, and fell back skirting the edge of the hills under cover of the broken ground. The heights leading up to the Gooroo mountain and the Bonair pass were crowded by armed men, who swarmed there in thousands; but they were disheartened, and afraid to venture from their fastnesses, whence they



looked on while the cavalry scoured the plain and set fire to the village of Umbeyla.

Driven at last to the utmost state of exasperation, a party of them descended and attacked with the most sudden and desperate ferocity a line formed of the 23d and 32d Pioneers. So furiously did the mountaineers dash upon the 23d, which was commanded by Captain Chamberlain, that it wavered for a minute or two, and the commandant only preserved his own life by cutting down two of his opponents and wounding a third, he himself receiving a bad wound in the face. Lieutenant Alexander, another officer of that regiment, was killed, Lieutenant Nott badly hurt, and some thirty men *hors de combat*. Two companies of the 7th Fusiliers coming up to the support, the 23d rallied, and, supported by the 32d, charged the enemy and speedily drove them back. Meantime three field-guns under Captain Griffin (the officer who, as has been related in another chapter, was killed subsequently at the siege of Dhalimkote in Bhotan, by the bursting of a gun) had been shelling the heights, and the mountaineers, driven from the plains and unable to find shelter even in the rocks and crags of their native hills, abandoned the contest in despair.

The enemy had been driven back, the village of Umbeyla destroyed, and the Chumla valley was in possession of our troops, but the original object of the campaign, the destruction of the settlement of the fanatics at Mulka, was as far from completion as ever. To evacuate our position without penetrating to Mulka would have been tantamount to a defeat; but the chiefs of the Bonair, now deserted by their allies the Swatees and their Akhoond, the men of Bajour and Dher, and the other tribes who had come to their assistance, bethought themselves of making terms with the British Government, so they re-opened the negotiations that had been on foot before the last operations which terminated in their defeat, and consented to send a large party, with a few British officers, to destroy the stronghold of Mulka. The chance was too good to be thrown away.



In addition to the great risk which would be encountered by detaching a body of British troops through a most difficult tract of country, and the risk of further embroilment with the excitable people who had given us so much trouble, the moral effect of the destruction of Mulka by the hands of the Bonairs themselves would be as great as if the work was accomplished by our own men. It would show that the coalition between the tribes lately in arms against us, founded as it was on the sympathy of religious belief and patriotism, was yet not strong enough to resist the pressure which the British Government could bring to bear. So it was agreed that a large party of Bonairs, accompanied by a few English officers and a small detachment of the Guides, should proceed against Mulka and destroy it. This famous stronghold proved to be a large, well-built village, recently constructed of pinewood, standing high on a northern slope of the Mahabun, whose snowy crest rose precipitously behind it, whilst in its front a vast panorama of mountains stretched away as far as eye could reach. The village contained numerous workshops and a rude powder factory, but was found deserted. It was fired in the presence of the English officers on the 22d December, and the great column of smoke, as it rose over the mountain-top, proclaimed that the object of the expedition had been at length accomplished. This, the final act of the war, was witnessed by a crowd of mountaineers belonging to the minor tribes of the Mahabun, who gradually collected near the spot and angrily watched the conflagration. There was sorrow as well as anger expressed by their sullen looks, for in the village were many fresh graves of relatives who had fallen during the campaign; and what also deeply moved them was the hated presence of Englishmen in a part of the country hitherto sacred from intrusion. As there seemed a probability of their proceeding to acts of violence, they were addressed by Colonel Taylor, the late commissioner, and by an influential chief of Bonair; and at length they went away silently to their homes, and

the English officers with their escort marched back to the Chumla valley. On Christmas Day the troops left the mountains, and stood once more in the plains of Eusofzye, the mountaineers destroyed the entrenchment, breaking up the road as they marched away, and the war was at an end.¹

If the political advantages secured by the Umbeyla campaign were not very great, the Indian Government at any rate learned experience. The whole of the delay, expense, and the risk encountered by Sir Neville Chamberlain was occasioned chiefly from the fault to which British officers are so prone, of underrating the enemy. It was perhaps all for the best, as matters turned out, that the route through the Umbeyla pass was so much more difficult than had been anticipated, as to force a halt. For, looking at the matter in the light which the experience of subsequent events throws upon it, there can be little doubt that had the force, as originally intended, pushed through the pass and penetrated to Mulka, it would have found it extremely difficult to get back again, and it might have been forced to halt further on in a position where communication with its own supports was a great deal more difficult than it was at Umbeyla. However, in the Black Mountain campaign, which was undertaken towards the latter end of 1868, the lesson learnt at Umbeyla was not forgotten, and no onward move was made till a sufficient force had been collected to overpower all opposition.

The Black Mountain is a high oblong range running nearly due north and south. It is on the left bank of the Indus, and on the opposite side of the river to Mahabun and Sittana, and thus, of course, nearer our own territory. It is flanked on the west by Cashmere and on the south by Huzara, the principal settlement in which is called Abbottabad. Between this place and the Black Mountain is a tract of country called the Agror valley, in which is situated the village of Oghee, where we have a police

¹ Colonel Adye.



station. The immediate cause of the offensive operations undertaken in 1868 was an attack on the police station at Oghee in the Agror valley by a party of the Hussunzai tribe. This was the culminating point of the offences of the Hussunzaies, and although the police behaved so well that the assailants were driven away with loss, yet it was deemed necessary to send a force into their country and exact reparation of some kind for the insult offered to the British Government. General Wylde, whose name has been so often mentioned in connexion with the Umbeyla affair, had succeeded to the command of the frontier, and directed the operations of the campaign.

It was in the height of the hot season that the attack had been made, and, in spite of the risk attending the movement of troops at that time of the year, active measures were taken to collect an overwhelming force upon the frontier, so as to be ready to meet any combination of the tribes should the excitement spread, as it had done previously in the Umbeyla campaign. The troops were massed under the orders of the Commander-in-chief without in any way weakening the frontier garrisons, regiments and detachments being moved up from stations as far distant as Allyghur, south of Delhi. All these preparatory measures took time, and it was not till the 26th September that the advanced part of the expedition moved from Abbottabad into the valley. The whole force was divided into two brigades, the first being under command of Brigadier-General Bright, and the second under Brigadier-General Vaughan. Three pretty and pleasant marches along a good road brought the General and his staff, with the last, or nearly the last, regiments of the force, to Oghee; and all the arrangements, military and commissariat, &c., having been completed by the morning of the 3d October, the two brigades, leaving all their sick and weakly men at Oghee, commenced their march against the tribes of the Black Mountain.

The entrance to the Agror valley is by a long and



sloping and tolerably easy pass, known by the name of the Soosul pass. This position, as well as that of two other passes and the camp at Oghee, was held by a contingent which the Maharaja of Cashmere had sent down to our assistance. On one of the spurs of the Black Mountain at the northern end of the Agror valley, near the base, was the village of Koon Gullee, and at the summit of the spur, one of the most elevated peaks of the mountain, was a height called the Muchaie Peak. It soon became apparent that this Muchaie Peak should be the main object of attack. The 1st and 2d Brigades, under the command respectively of Brigadiers-General Bright and Vaughan, were to operate in different lines. The enemy had during our stay at Oghee, and almost up to the moment of our advance, shown in considerable numbers at the village of Koon Gullee; and whilst a portion of the 1st Brigade, led by the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, closely followed by H.M. 19th Regiment, assaulted this village by the direct road through Dilbooree, a village at the most northerly point of the Agror valley, a flank attack was to be made by the 2d Goorkhas, and other regiments of the 2d Brigade, upon the heights of Koon Gullee, by an approach from the east. For this purpose a portion of the 2d Brigade during the morning's advance had been deflected to the right, and it was expected that this column of attack would reach the Koon Gullee height about the same time as the troops advancing in front.

While the 1st Brigade, with the head-quarters following, were thus manœuvring, the main portion of the 2d Brigade had been directed to advance toward the Black Mountain range by a spur near to Oghee, known as the Sumbhul Bhoot spur. Alternately the whole of the 2d Brigade, on the completion of the flank attack on the east side of Koon Gullee, was to proceed along the same spur of Sumbhul Bhoot. The point they were told to make good in the first instance was the fort of Killaghie, held by a friendly chief; and had this movement been carried out



according to the original idea, the 2d Brigade would have reached the crest of the Black Mountain range by a spur known as the Akhoon Baba-ka-Choora, at a point considerably to the south of the Chutterbul Peak, where the 1st Brigade was ultimately to make good its position on the ridge. On the morning of the advance from Oghee it was not thought probable that the 1st Brigade would by that evening secure any position in advance of Koon Gullee, at the bottom of the spur, by which the crest of the Black Mountain was ultimately to be reached. Owing, however, to the vigour of the advance, more especially of the 20th Punjab Native Infantry under their gallant chief Colonel Brownlow, the direct line of attack having caused the enemy to evacuate hastily the village of Koon Gullee, the force was pushed some four miles further up the hill the same evening (Saturday); and ultimately the 20th, made good their position at Munna-ka-Dunna. An abattis of boughs and earth was thrown up, behind which the 20th entrenched themselves for the night.

There is no doubt whatever that Colonel Brownlow, or General Bright, or whoever the officer to whom the praise is due, acted with consummate judgment in pushing on to Munna-ka-Dunna; for had our troops rested content with their success at Koon Gullee, and halted there for the night, the enemy, firing at them from the exceedingly steep heights above Koon Gullee, would have terribly galled their pickets. At Munna-ka-Dunna the spur of the Black Mountain along which the 1st Brigade was advancing takes a little dip. The ground then becomes almost level for a few yards, after which it gradually ascends to a position where the enemy had assembled in some force at about 7,200 yards in advance of the foremost picket of the 20th Native Infantry. The 20th, by occupying this position, and throwing out an advance entrenched picket half-way down the slope, obtained for themselves against an attacking enemy exactly the advantage which the latter would have enjoyed had our troops remained at Koon



Gullee; that is to say, the enemy could now only advance up the slope to attack them. They did advance once and again; and indeed this was the only occasion on which the enemy showed any real pluck at all. It is needless to say their attacks made but little impression on the gallant 20th, whose men jeered and taunted the enemy, daring them to come on. It was not to be expected, of course, that this success could be achieved without casualties on our side. As the brunt of the attack fell upon the 20th Native Infantry, so upon them fell all the loss. Three men were killed and four wounded up to Sunday morning. General Wylde's head-quarters were at Dilbooree, but on Saturday evening, when the advance column had driven the enemy out of Koon Gullee, which is about a mile or more above Dilbooree, the head-quarters were established at Koon Gullee, where they bivouacked for the night.

As the day dawned, the enemy were obliged to draw off from Brigadier-General Bright's position. Our list of casualties was small, but it was clear to the General commanding that unless an immediate advance was made the harassing night attacks would be incessantly renewed in constantly increasing strength. Accordingly, on the morning of the 4th October, the 1st Brigade attacked the enemy's position, upon which a well-directed fire of artillery had long been maintained. The force engaged consisted of the 1st and 5th Goorkhas, the Huzara and Peshawur mountain batteries, the 2d and the 20th Punjab Infantry, and H.M. 19th Foot, 1st battalion. The enemy made but little stand against this overwhelming array, and Brigadier-General Bright, after a rapid march and a short but sharp contest, was in possession of the Chutterbul Peak on the crest of the Black Mountain. In the meantime the 2d Brigade had reached Munna-ka-Dunna, and the 2d Goorkhas and 3d Sikh regiment were thrown forward to occupy the breastwork from which the enemy had been driven in the morning. On the next morning, the 5th, the Muchai Peak, a stronghold 10,200 feet above the level of the sea,



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deemed inaccessible by the natives, was carried. The 6th was passed in completing a road which had been commenced up to the crest of the hill ; plenty of good water was found, and the troops had abundant supplies. Indeed, both public despatches and private accounts of this campaign are unanimous in speaking in the highest terms of the commissariat arrangements under Colonel Dickens. On the morning of the 7th the enemy had made no sign of submission, and a party was detached to destroy the village of the Pararee Syads, some of the most determined tribes arrayed against us. The 8th and 9th were passed in negotiations with the heads of the offending clans, who came into camp soliciting terms ; and the negotiations, which were somewhat accelerated by the burning of some more villages, resulted in a patched-up peace being concluded on the 10th with the chief Pathan clans. The 11th and 12th were occupied in withdrawing troops and stores to the camp of Munna-ka-Dunna, and after a kind of triumphant march through the adjacent villages, intended to impress the mountaineers with an idea of the imposing force that could be brought against them, even into fastnesses deemed inaccessible, the troops moved back to their camp at Oghee.

A great deal of dissatisfaction was expressed in India at the sudden termination of a campaign from which greater results were anticipated by those who were unacquainted with the views and policy of the Government. And none were so loud in denouncing what was called the pusillanimity of the Government as the officers of the force engaged.

It is one of the misfortunes of Indian administration that there is no machinery at hand for laying before the public the line of policy which the Government has marked out, and indicating the object and purpose of a military expedition. In Europe a declaration of war precedes active operations, and whether the object is to recover prisoners from captivity, to amend a line of frontier, or to

realize an idea, the public have some notion beforehand of what it is intended to accomplish. In India the favourite official theory is that there is no public. But it is a fatal mistake ; for every action of the Government is narrowly watched by a public which, if it is wanting in individual character in its component parts, numbers a good many millions of people. The elaborate preparations which preceded the Black Mountain campaign gave rise to the belief that operations were intended on a scale commensurate with the expense incurred. Just at the time the army was assembled, there was a good deal of excitement in the native mind owing to exaggerated reports of Russian advance, and the affairs of Affghanistan were, even for that turbulent country, in a disorganized condition. Throughout India, and from the Peshawur frontier right up to Cabul, and no doubt far beyond, the report spread far and wide that the British Government was massing troops upon the Indus, with the intention of developing at last some decisive policy in Central Asia. The next rumour spread abroad was that after a few skirmishes this grand army had been taken back to quarters and dispersed ; and there is no doubt it was generally said and believed that the British troops had retreated in consequence of the attitude assumed by the frontier tribes. Had a proclamation been issued in the *Government Gazette* before the operations commenced, setting forth the object of the campaign, and intimating the line of policy to be pursued, the loss of prestige which has undoubtedly followed upon one of the most successful and best-conducted military expeditions which has been undertaken on that frontier, ever since the annexation of the Punjab, would have been avoided. In many respects the history of the Black Mountain campaign resembles that of the Abyssinian expedition, of which England is so justly proud. The force advanced far into a difficult country, the troops marched so lightly equipped that shelter and food were as scarce as they were in Abyssinia, though the deprivation did not last for so long a period. Formidable



heights were taken by the sword and bayonet, and mountain fastnesses stormed in defiance of an enemy who, though unfitted for fighting in plain country, was no despicable antagonist—as he proved at Umbeyla and on the Black Mountain—when fighting on his own ground and in his own fashion.

Still there can be no doubt that the policy which the Government carried out was sound and prudent, for these frontier tribes may be made far more useful to us as friends than they are dangerous as enemies. We have seen what they can effect in the latter capacity. It is troublesome to have our frontier posts attacked, the districts harried, the villagers molested and robbed, and “kafilas” interfered with. But after all these are matters of minor importance. It is not likely such practices will ever be wholly put down. Suppressed they should be, of course, and retribution exacted, but they cannot become matters of national or imperial interest. As for an invasion of the plain country by these tribes in force, we know that alone they would never attempt it. They might in the wake of an invading host sweep down upon a prey already deprived of the power of resistance; but of themselves, or backed by an Asiatic host, however numerous, they would not stand five minutes in level open country against our disciplined troops. On the plains they are as helpless as a shark upon dry land, but on their native hills they are formidable. As a bulwark to British India, a key to lock the gates, and bar all ingress, these tribes are absolutely invaluable to us. We gain nothing by carrying fire and sword in among their homesteads. We only sow the seeds of a blood feud, which no time can obliterate; give rise to deep-seated feelings of revenge and enmity, which will for ever prevent a reconciliation. By showing them that our troops can with comparative ease scale their heights and seize their fastnesses, by a little well-timed severity, but no excessive measures, we teach them that we are strong enough to punish and too powerful to be afraid.



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To tame an untamed man or animal, excess of rigour defeats the object. Violence and cruelty will instil fear, but fear alone will not engender confidence. Show that you are able to punish disobedience, and by gentle treatment you may win attachment.

Conquest would not serve our purpose in dealing with this frontier, unless indeed we annex the country beyond these hills; and then nothing but absolute subjugation of the tribes will answer our purpose. When that line of policy is adopted (and we may be pretty sure it never will be), it will be necessary to carry fire and sword into pretty nearly every village and stronghold in the mountains; and no doubt we could do it, if it was to be done. We are quite strong enough to annihilate these people by degrees, to subjugate the country as the Russians have done Circassia; but that measure was imperatively necessary to Russia, because she intended to advance further east, and she dared not leave a formidable enemy in the rear of her advanced posts; and when we take up a similar position here, the same policy will become necessary for us. But in these frontier tribes, strong in their native mountains, nature has given us a shield and a barrier, and it is our own fault if we do not use it.

It should be our policy to establish such a connexion with them that we can, when it suits our purpose to do so, get them to close the passes; and when we have done that, the frontier of British India, from Huzara to the sea-coast of Scinde, will be simply impregnable.



CHAPTER XVI.

EDUCATION.

Extent of work to be done—Mr. Howell's note—Despatch of 1854—
Expenditure—Extent of present operations—Voluntary efforts—
Munificent liberality—Natives in the Civil Service—A Civil Service
College—The first noticeable feature—The second—The third—
Female education—Social condition of women in India—Statistics.

THE comparative importance of the subject of education in India is not to be gauged by the space accorded to it in a work of the present kind. In every difficulty that meets us in the consideration or treatment of measures designed to further the cause of commercial progress or of political security in India, we involuntarily recur to the one solution of every problem—education. Is it the obstacle in the way of an extended circulation of a paper currency that puzzles the financier? The remedy is education. Are we hampered by a necessary restriction of expenditure in the matter of public works of general utility, by reason of the enormous drain upon the resources of the country for a military establishment without which it is vain to hope that disaffection can be suppressed and political excitement subdued? The remedy is education. Are we dismayed at the slow pace with which liberal ideas make good their advance against the obstruction of ignorance, bigotry, and superstition? The remedy is education. Are we puzzled at the strange anomaly presented by a whole race, or races, preferring the arbitrary and capricious despotism of native governments to the



organized administration of British rule? We know that it is to the schoolmaster chiefly we must look to aid in removing from the mental vision of the people the veil that shuts out the light. Do we ask how we shall raise the agricultural population of India to the status of a free community? The answer is education. Do we ask how to secure permanent and lasting peace, apart, of course, from the distant danger of foreign invasion? The answer is education. Do we ask how we shall break the fetters of caste that bind millions of our fellow-subjects in social bondage? The answer is education. Do we wonder how it is that, after a century and a half of intercourse, the people of India are still as far separated from us as if there were scarce the bond of a common nature to unite us to each other? The answer is to be found in the slender efforts and the slow progress of education.

Here, as in all other subjects connected with Indian progress, the great difficulty which besets the English reader is the impossibility of realizing the enormous extent of country, and the vastness of the area over which our efforts must extend before we can hope to effect any sensible improvement. And in addition to this, there is the inertness of the mass we have to move. An Englishman accustomed to the energy of the Anglo-Saxon or the Celtic character, the freedom of thought, the signs of activity and life which beset him at every turn in his own country, can form no idea of the deadness and apathy of the Asiatic mind. The difference between national character in the West and East somewhat resembles that between youth and old age. In the one there is vigour, energy, self-dependence, a generous confiding spirit, a looking forward to the future, a constant struggle to improve; in the other, lassitude, indifference, a tendency to lean on others, to be satisfied with things as they are rather than undergo the exertion necessary to effect a change. Unable to help himself, the feeble octogenarian must have everything done for him; and if in ministering to his wants his attendants do not



always consult his ease and convenience, he finds fault with all their efforts, grows suspicious, and misinterprets their best intentions.

In so extended a field, and under such conditions, the progress of education must necessarily be very slow. We cannot expect to witness in the present generation many practical results from the efforts which, more especially of late years, have been made in this cause. Progress, of course, there must be among individual sections of the community, which come under the operations of our system of instruction. But, compared with the work of leavening the masses, such progress is infinitesimal. Still it is a commencement of a work whose importance cannot be overrated, for it is nothing else than imparting mental life and vigour to races numbering many millions, whom Nature seems to have compensated for the poverty of physical endowment by the gift of remarkable intellectual powers, which, though now dormant, are capable of being awakened into great activity. It would be vain, however, to look for much fruit from the influence which the present system is gradually working out, in so short a period as ten years. The comparative progress might indeed be shown by long tables of numerical returns, but they would be dry and uninteresting, and in themselves fail to give any real idea of the limits within which education has extended. The utmost I can attempt to do, without wearying the reader with a long array of bare tabulated statements, is to give in as few words as possible an outline of the results already attained by measures introduced since the great epoch of educational history, 1854. In doing this I shall avail myself of the information furnished in a very valuable report composed by Mr. Arthur Howell, of the Bengal Civil Service, now officiating Home Secretary, styled, "A Note on the State of Education in India in 1866-7," recently published.

The following table will show at one glance the present actual results of educational effort.



CSL

NO. I.—EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS FOR 1866-7.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11																					
Presidency or Province.	Area in square miles.	Estimated Population.	University.	Colleges.	Government Schools.						Aided Schools.						Total Colleges and Schools.	Pupils.										Proportion of Schools and Colleges to square miles—One in so many square miles.	Proportion of Pupils to population—One in		
				Government.	Upper.	Middle.	Lower.	Female.	Special.	Total.	Upper.	Middle.	Lower.	Female.	Special.	Total.		Colleges.		Government Schools.	Aided Schools.	Female Schools. Government.	Female Schools. Aided.	Special Schools. Government.	Special Schools. Aided.	Total.					
																		For general educatn.	For special educatn.								Aided Colleges.			Government.	Aided.
Bengal . . .	217,331	37,789,430	1	8	8	6	46	127	84	1	32	200	78	987	1,269	257	5	2,596	2,908	1,254	325	19,635	85,414	55	6,168	1,362	972	115,185	74.7	328.	
Bombay . . .	137,743	15,775,113	1	2	3	...	9	191	1,357	61	8	1,626	6	13	23	12	2	56	1,687	364	...	104,178	4,954	1,935	1,193	298	143	113,045	81.6	139.5	
Madras . . .	104,438	28,276,265	1	2	4	1	14	68	14	...	10	106	16	212	971	75	5	1,279	1,391	185	151	8,042	35,205	—	3,109	1,558	616	48,866	75.07	578.6	
N. W. Provs. .	81,378	30,261,641	...	3	2	...	5	2,467	479	78	3,961	4	121	47	68	2	248	4,208	448	...	124,355	16,000	8,981	2,239	423	87	152,533	19.3	198.3		
Punjab . . .	100,406	15,166,157	...	2	...	1	24	82	1,660	296	7	2,096	21	73	2	651	4	751	2,823	31	10	70,277	6,553	6,198	14,243	279	107	97,698	35.5	155.2	
Oude . . .	30,243	8,326,647	...	...	...	...	10	34	264	6	2	316	4	16	38	12	...	70	386	...	...	11,033	3,416	81	327	293	...	15,154	52.4	549.5	
Central Provs.	104,222	8,659,697	...	...	...	...	1	24	658	130	6	819	1	7	249	...	...	257	1,076	...	...	33,751	20,621	3,621	...	144	...	58,137	96.8	148.9	
Brish. Burmah	67,292	2,129,501	...	...	...	...	4	...	...	...	...	4	...	2	238	4	...	244	248	...	...	440	6,658	...	501	...	...	7,599	271.7	280.1	
Hyderabad . .	17,334	1,586,047	...	...	...	...	2	23	122	...	...	147	...	...	...	...	...	147	...	...	...	6,644	...	...	...	...	...	6,644	117.8	238.7	
Mysore . . .	27,003	3,900,735	...	...	...	...	7	8	38	...	2	55	4	8	16	8	...	36	91	...	...	2,974	2,929	...	569	63	...	6,535	296.7	597.6	
Coorg . . .	1,800	118,100	...	...	...	...	1	...	...	...	...	25	...	...	...	...	...	...	25	...	...	946	...	...	...	...	...	946	27.	124.8	



NO. II.—EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS FOR 1866-7 (ELEVEN MONTHS).

CSL

1	2	3		4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11				12		
Presidency or Province.	Expenditure from Imperial Funds.	Expenditure from Local Sources.		Total Expenditure on Education.	Analysis of Expenditure.						Average annual cost to State per Pupil.				Total annual average cost per Pupil under instruction.		
		Local Funds.	Private Expenditure.		Direction and Inspection.	Instruction, including all charges not included in column 5.	Imperial Expenditure in Government Colleges and Schools.	Grants in aid, including payments by results.	Percentage of column 7 on column 2.	Percentage of column 8 on column 2.	Colleges.		Government Schools.	Aided Schools.	To Government.	To other Funds.	Total average cost.
											Government.	Aided.					
	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rps.	Rps.	Rps.	Rps.	Rps.	Rps.	Rps.
Bengal . . .	13,85,762	4,96,708	4,08,221	22,90,691	2,27,010	20,63,681	6,98,844	3,32,183	50.43	23.97	219.9	64.	20.	3.3	12.	7.8	19.8
Bombay . . .	9,16,678	6,01,629	Not given	15,18,307	1,64,105	13,54,202	4,63,572	70,682	50.5	7.7	181.2	...	3.7	3.1	8.1	5.3	13.4
Madras . . .	6,16,074	1,16,090	...	7,32,164	1,23,495	6,08,669	3,10,911	1,21,271	50.4	19.6	236.1	32.08	27.9	2.9	12.6	2.3	14.9
N. W. Provs. .	7,74,009	4,57,286	...	12,31,295	1,78,299	10,52,996	2,51,275	1,36,968	32.4	17.8	311.7	...	1.8	7.4	5.07	3.	8.07
Punjab . . .	5,62,654	2,84,847	1,01,562	9,49,063	2,01,432	7,47,631	2,36,376	1,36,252	42.01	24.2	1211.5	554.6	2.5	6.1	5.7	3.9	9.6
Oude . . .	1,54,678	87,623	Not given	2,42,301	35,408	2,06,893	59,911	41,779	38.7	27.01	...	...	5.2	11.1	10.2	5.7	15.9
Central Provs.	1,56,462	2,34,269	...	3,90,731	70,884	3,19,847	70,030	18,086	44.7	14.1	...	...	1.8	.8	2.6	4.02	6.7
Brish. Burmah					No returns sent in for 1866-67.												
Hyderabad . .	84,246	...	...	84,246	18,579	65,667	65,667	...	77.9	...	...	...	9.8	...	12.6	...	12.6
Mysore . . .	1,20,203	30,610	Not given	1,50,813	25,031	95,172	52,758	28,228	43.8	23.3	...	...	17.3	8.07	18.3	4.7	23.
Coorg . . .	12,276	220	...	12,496	1,100	11,396	11,176	...	91.7	...	...	...	11.8	...	12.9	.2	13.2



By this we find that there are in all India, in the different establishments, colleges, schools, public and half-public and half-private, 622,342 students, not two-thirds of a million, amid an estimated population of one hundred and fifty-one millions, receiving instruction: a small proportion, though it is something to be instructing half a million of people. But the prospect of one hundred and fifty-one millions who want to be educated, and who mainly look to the Government to provide the means, is truly appalling.

The present system dates from the Despatch of 1854, which, besides sketching out the details of the educational establishment since developed, enforces as its main principle the necessity of Government action in aid of voluntary effort. The Court of Directors who were in power in 1857 were indeed somewhat over-sanguine in looking forward "to the time when any general system of education entirely provided by Government may be discontinued with the gradual advance of the system of grants in aid, and when many of the Government institutions, especially those of the higher order, may be safely closed or transferred to the management of local bodies under the control of and aided by the State." And they confidently expected that the introduction of the system of grants in aid would very largely increase the number of schools of a superior order; and that before long sufficient provision might be found to exist in many parts of the country for the education of the middle and higher classes, independent of the Government institutions, which might then be closed. But this expectation was never realized. In the ten years from 1856-7 to 1866-7 the expenditure of the State upon education increased from 195,494*l.*, when the Imperial revenues were 29,702,854*l.*, to 763,230*l.* in 1867, when the Imperial revenues were estimated at 46,752,800*l.* During the past year educational projects were submitted to the supreme Government involving an increased expenditure of 58,544*l.*, although at the commencement of that year an advance of 100,000*l.* was made upon the vote of the previous year; and the



assignment made at the commencement of the current year of the report, 1867-8, shows an increase of 72,000*l.* over the grant of the preceding year.

In the extension of educational efforts, no less than in that of irrigation and other useful public works, it is of course necessary to provide against a lavish expenditure which will only waste the resources of the country, without producing any adequate fruits. We have seen that the late Viceroy was fully alive to the necessity of not undertaking larger irrigation works than there was a fair prospect of carrying out to completion, on the sound principle that when working with borrowed money we ought to be especially careful of extravagance. And it is doubtful whether in some parts of India, if more money was placed at the disposal of the Directors of Education, it could be usefully employed. At least, in the North-West Provinces, I am assured by the energetic Director of Public Instruction, Mr. Kempson, that even if Government were to place more funds at his disposal, it is doubtful if he could find a useful and profitable field for their expenditure. Yet the great outcry from all parts of the country is for more money. The Directors of Public Instruction in Bengal Proper and Bombay demand that two per cent. of the total revenue collected in the two provinces should be the State contribution to education. And, as Mr. Howell very fairly remarks, were these concessions made to these two provinces, they could not reasonably be refused to the other provinces, which, excluding the Hyderabad assigned districts and Mysore, would entail an immediate increase of 244,255*l.* from the Imperial revenues. "In the present state of the finances it is probable that, unless other departments are proportionately reduced, Sir Alexander Grant and Mr. Atkinson, in asking for so large an increase to the Imperial grant, are also asking for increased taxation."¹ It is therefore urged that local agency must be indented upon to supplement the grants from the Imperial funds; but

¹ Note on Education, p. 5.



“local agency” is only another word for taxation, and whether the money be collected by means of a tax imposed by an act of the Legislature, or by municipal bodies, makes very little difference to the people who pay it. There may be in some places less unwillingness to contribute money which it is known will be expended in the immediate neighbourhood, than if it were levied for Imperial purposes; but it must not be forgotten that in either case the results to the tax-payers are the same.

If the wealthier classes could be induced to recognise their duty in this respect, and to acknowledge the obligation of making some sacrifice and some united effort to assist in education, this appeal to local agency might come to mean something very different from what it means now. At present, throughout the greater part of India, it signifies simply a shifting on to local taxation burdens which Imperial taxation is not able to meet.

In countries with which the English reader is mostly familiar a very large proportion of the population will be in no need of any State education at all. Among the upper classes the value, the necessity, of education is so fully recognised, that it is looked upon as one of the ordinary conditions of life, as indispensable almost as food and clothing. But in India the case is totally different. And of the one hundred and fifty-one millions of the population there are few who are not in want of instruction as much as the five or six hundred thousand who are already in the receipt of it. And if we are to go on increasing our expenditure under this head till we meet the demand, we must be content to see the whole resources of the State swallowed up in accomplishing what after all would be but a mere fraction of the whole task, at the sacrifice of every other branch of the administration. It would seem, therefore, that the most prudent course was to proceed cautiously, being content to wait till the results of the education now being imparted to the present generation awaken the desire for a further extension of the



benefits, which they will only then learn to appreciate whose minds have been enlarged by the training they are now receiving. Then, and then only, may we expect to see a voluntary effort, in some degree proportionate to the end to be accomplished, by which alone the gigantic task of educating the millions of India is to be achieved.

The principle of the Despatch of 1854 was sound, inasmuch as it recognised the only course which it is open to pursue, viz. voluntary effort aided by the State; that aid being measured by the extent of the voluntary contributions, an equivalent to which is payable in every case from the Imperial exchequer.

In some parts of India very considerable efforts have, indeed, been spontaneously made by the natives themselves in the cause of education. Thus at Lucknow the talookdars have founded a college, called after Lord Canning, in grateful remembrance of that statesman's services to the country, which is now one of the most successful institutions in Upper India, and an annual grant, equal in amount to the endowment given by the talookdars, is made from the Imperial revenues. The merchants of Bombay have contributed largely to similar institutions, and Sir Jamsetjee Jejeeboy's munificent liberality supplied no less than 200,000*l.* to charitable and educational institutions in his native city. Mr. Rustumjee Jamsetjee has offered 10,000*l.* for the promotion of English education in Guzerat and Bombay, besides, in conjunction with his brother, spending 1,200*l.* on the School of Arts in the presidency town. Mr. Chesetjee Furdinjee has founded a school in Surat; and Mr. Mungaldas Nathabhoy has founded a travelling scholarship for Hindoos in the Bombay University, at a cost of 2,000*l.*, and has endowed a professorship of economic science, as well as provided funds for building the Civil Engineering College at Poona.¹ Nor has Calcutta been behindhand in instances of munificent liberality on the part of wealthy natives.

¹ Mr. Algernon West's "Administration of Sir Charles Wood."



There has been a great deal of discussion lately, both in Parliament and in the press, as to the extent to which the public service of India should be open to the natives. It is obvious that if they are to be expected to qualify themselves for competitive examinations for the Civil and other services, a residence in England is almost a *sine quâ non*. With the view of encouraging the natives to go to England to complete their education, scholarships have recently been established by the Government, worth 200*l.* a year or thereabouts, in addition to an outfit and passage-allowance, for those who qualify themselves. As yet, the number of these scholarships is small; but if the scheme is found to answer, it will no doubt be extended. To complete the design, however, some further step is necessary, in the shape of a college or institution of some kind in the neighbourhood of London itself, where natives of India can reside during their stay in England, and where they can be received and looked after immediately on arrival. It is worth considering whether some scheme might not be designed for an Indian Civil Service College, an institution much required to give the young civilian that special education for an Indian career which, since the abolishment of Haileybury, has been unattainable, and in which the natives of India who come to England to complete their education might be brought up amid the atmosphere of academical associations, and where they would derive that benefit from academical discipline, and a regular system of university training, of which, both in an intellectual and a moral point of view, they are universally acknowledged to be much in need.

The intercourse between the native student and the young civilian could not fail to be most beneficial to both; and under such a system the latter would obtain that which is at present a great desideratum—more acquaintance with the inner life of the better classes of the natives of India, and more insight into their social condition, their habits of thought, and tone of mind. An institution of this



kind would go further than anything else towards levelling the barrier that now exists between the races, at the same time that such a course of education would probably remove most of the objections now not unreasonably urged against the more frequent employment of natives in public offices of trust and responsibility.

The system established by the Despatch of 1854, followed up by a second Despatch in 1859, is thus epitomized by Mr. Howell :—

“ 3. The Indian Educational Code is contained in the despatches of the Home Government of 1854 and 1859. The main object of the former despatch is to divert the efforts of the Government from the education of the higher classes, upon whom they had up to that date been too exclusively directed, and to turn them to the wider diffusion of education among all classes of the people, and especially to the provision of primary instruction for the masses. Such instruction is to be provided by the direct instrumentality of Government, and a compulsory rate, levied under the direct authority of Government, is pointed out as the best means of obtaining funds for the purpose. The system must be extended upwards by the establishment of Government schools as models, to be superseded gradually by schools supported on the grant-in-aid principle. This principle is to be of perfect religious neutrality, defined in regular rules adapted to the circumstances of each province, and clearly and publicly placed before the natives of India. Schools, whether purely Government institutions or aided, in all of which (excepting normal schools) the payment of some fee, however small, is to be the rule, are to be in regular gradation from those which give the humblest elementary instruction to the highest colleges, and the best pupils of one grade are to climb through the other grades by means of scholarships obtained in the lower school and tenable in the higher. To provide masters, normal schools are to be established in each province, and moderate allowances given for the support of those who possess an aptness for teaching, and are willing to devote themselves to the profession of schoolmasters. By this means it is hoped that, at no distant period, institutions may be in operation in all the presidencies, calculated to supply masters for all classes of schools, and thus in time greatly to limit, if not altogether to obviate, the necessity of recruiting the educational service by means of engagements made in England. The medium of education is to be the vernacular languages of India, into which the best elementary treatises in English should be translated. Such translations are to be advertised for, and liberally rewarded by Government as the means of enriching vernacular literature. While, therefore, the vernacular languages are on

no account to be neglected, the English language may be taught where there is a demand for it ; but the English language is not to be substituted for the vernacular dialects of the country. The existing institutions for the study of the classical languages of India are to be maintained, and respect is to be paid to the hereditary veneration which they command. Female education is to receive the frank and cordial support of Government, as by it a far greater proportional impulse is imparted to the educational and moral tone of the people than by the education of men. In addition to the Government and aided colleges and schools for general education, special institutions for imparting special education in law, medicine, engineering art, and agriculture¹ are to receive in every province the direct aid and encouragement of Government. The agency by which this system of education is to be carried out is a Director in each province, assisted by a competent staff of Inspectors, care being taken that the cost of control shall be kept in fair proportion to the cost of direct measures of instruction. To complete the system in each presidency, a university is to be established on the model of the London University at each of the three presidency towns. These universities are not to be themselves places of education, but they are to test the value of the education given elsewhere ; they are to pass every student of ordinary ability who has fairly profited by the curriculum of school and college study which he has passed through, the standard required being such as to command respect without discouraging the efforts of deserving students. Education is to be aided and supported by the principal officials in every district, and is to receive, besides, the direct encouragement of the State by the opening of Government appointments to those who have received a good education, irrespective of the place or manner in which it may have been acquired, and in the lower situations by preferring a man who can read and write, and is equally eligible in other respects, to one who cannot."

Mr. Howell then proceeds to remark upon four striking and noticeable facts in the progress of education which the tables given above disclose. The first is its extraordinary development in the last twelve years, which has given to

¹ Great stress is laid on this point. "We have also perceived with satisfaction that the attention of the Council of Education in Calcutta has been lately directed to the subject of attaching to each zillah school the means of teaching practical agriculture ; . . . for there is, as Dr. Mouat most truly observes, no single advantage that could be afforded to the vast rural population of India that would equal the introduction of an improved system of agriculture."



every province the complete educational agency, and to the older provinces the machinery described above.

The second is the gigantic nature of the task imposed upon the Government by the enormous area and the vast population of the country. Notwithstanding the development of the last twelve years, the remark made in 1854 seems almost equally applicable now, "that the efforts of the State have reached but an insignificant number of those who are of a proper age to receive school instruction."

The third noticeable point to which Mr. Howell draws attention is the limited result of what he calls the "downward filtration of education." The tables given above show that even in the oldest and richest and most advanced province the masses of the people are practically untouched; and this can be no time to propose to limit the action of the State, when in Bengal there is only one institution aided by Government to every 74 square miles, and in Madras only one pupil to every 578 of the population. But this very important portion of the work did not escape the attention of Sir Charles Wood and Lord Stanley. "At a time when there were not 12,000 pupils altogether in the Government colleges and inferior schools for general education in all India, the framers of the Code were of opinion that the efforts of Government had been too exclusively directed theretofore to the higher classes, and that all that then remained for Government to do for these classes was to establish universities to complete the educational machinery in each presidency. After the establishment of universities it is said that the State has done as much as a Government can do to place the benefits of education plainly and practically before the higher classes of India. . . . Our attention should now be directed to a consideration if possible still more important, and one which has been hitherto, we are bound to admit, too much neglected—viz. how useful and practical knowledge suited to every station in life may be best conveyed to the great mass of the people who are utterly incapable of obtaining any



Education worthy of the name by their own unaided efforts ; and we desire to see the active measures of Government more especially directed for the future to this object, for the attainment of which we are ready to sanction a considerable increase of expenditure. Schools whose object should be, not to train highly a few youths, but to provide more opportunities than now exist for the acquisition of such an improved education as will make those who possess it more useful members of society in every condition of life, should exist in every district in India." This principle was further insisted upon in subsequent despatches from the Home Government, in 1863 and 1864. But Mr. Howell concludes from a survey of the whole operations, that, speaking generally, elementary education is one of the points on which full effect has yet to be given to the Educational Code.

With the view of carrying out this portion of the scheme, efforts have been made in all the different provinces, varying according to the circumstances of each, to relieve the burden upon the Imperial exchequer by local cesses levied in different ways and in different proportions. It is obvious that, with the best intentions, the exertions of the Government must be limited by the means available. Schools for the lower classes must be maintained at the expense of the State ; in other words, of taxes, whether imposed in the form of Imperial taxation or by local cesses. But it is a mistake to view the latter in any case as voluntary contributions.

The fourth branch of the subject to which Mr. Howell draws attention is female education. And the review of the results effected here is not, on the whole, satisfactory. It must, however, be recollected that whatever difficulties attend the spread of education in India, they become multiplied tenfold when the system approaches the seclusion of female life. Here we are met, not by dull apathy and indifference, but by a deep-rooted and active prejudice, grounded on a deeper foundation perhaps than many of us



are apt to imagine. It is not the prejudice of caste, nor the influence of religious bigotry, but something that has its root nearer the heart than either of them—the instinct of human nature as it exists in Oriental character—that opposes the introduction of education into the zenana. The fact is, that in the East women fit into their places in the social system of Oriental life so well, that the other sex are slow to see the necessity for any change. A very erroneous notion prevails in England and the West generally with regard to the position and influence of the Eastern women. They so frequently figure in pictures of Indian and other Oriental scenes, carrying earthen water-pots on their heads, that a general notion has arisen that women in the East never do anything else but carry water-pots, or at any rate that they are mere slaves whose lives are spent in menial household drudgery. Among the poorer classes, as in our own country, a vast deal of household drudgery does fall to woman's lot. But in spite of their seclusion—may we not say, perhaps in consequence of it?—the female sex among the upper classes of Hindoos and Mahommedans exercise as much influence in family affairs as among ourselves. In India, whatever may be their condition in other Eastern countries, wives and mothers are certainly not the nonentities they are generally represented by Western writers. As wives and mothers, they are treated with just as much respect and consideration as among the upper classes, certainly, of Englishmen; and the very seclusion of the zenana, so suggestive of intolerable monotony to an Englishwoman, is connected with no such disagreeable association in the East. The bird that is born in a cage is quite content to live and die there, the more so if it has been the habit of its kind for countless generations. But in the family circle and the daily round of domestic duties, interests, and enjoyments the Hindoo woman has a field for her sympathies and her affections which puts her quite on a par with her sisters of the West.

If the education which it is endeavoured to impart to



The gentler sex of India were moral and religious training, there could be no question as to its value ; but it is open to doubt, to say the least, whether a little knowledge of arithmetic and geography will make Indian women better wives and mothers. The notion so generally entertained, the principle on which the advocates of female education in India ride their hobby, is one derived from our own habits and customs, the tendency of Western civilization. To see the women in India occupying the same sphere, and undertaking the same part in social economy, as they do in Europe, is the result at which their efforts at female education are directed ; but people are too apt to forget that nature has formed different races, each on its own model, and that when we aim at modifying the national character of one race in accordance with the ideas of another, we are in reality endeavouring to subvert the laws of Nature herself, and to confound distinctions which, in spite of all our efforts, may turn out to be indelible. There is, indeed, one broad basis upon which all races of mankind may meet, and that is the common ground of our relation to a common Father—the reception of religious truth, the recognition of moral responsibility. But to that ground a State education founded on the essential principle of religious neutrality has no tendency to lead. Until Nature herself has changed the fundamental laws which mark the distinction between the national characteristics of different races, no education in the world will ever assimilate the women of the East to their sisters in the West. And taking the two extremes of woman's lot—the tranquil existence of the Hindoo wife and mother, confined to her circle of home duties, and the innocent enjoyment of domestic love, sharing her husband's confidence, and finding thus a full scope for the play of the purest and holiest of our natural sympathies, on the one hand ; or the restless ambition of the English female, bearding the revising barrister in his court, and clamouring for her suffrage, on the other—it may be allowed to remain an open question, at any rate, which of



the two best fulfils the place Nature has set apart in her economy for the wife, the sister, and the mother.

To zenana missions, as they are called, there has been no allusion in the above remarks. The end and purport of those efforts is to impart an education really worthy of the name ; a moral and religious training, which, if efficient at all, cannot fail to purify, ennoble, and elevate the character. I cannot help thinking that it would be well if all attempts at female education in India were confined to this. But it ought to be managed with the utmost delicacy, judgment, and good taste ; and it is to be feared that, in spite of the plausible reports announced from missionary platforms, and published in missionary reports, the system would hardly bear the sifting which ought to be, but rarely is, accorded to the results of every movement originating in enthusiasm. The natives themselves are most jealous of any breach of the seclusion in which they consider they have a right to veil their domestic affairs. They profess to welcome the visits of the earnest and self-denying ladies who brave the dangers and disagreeables of a terrible climate, and a life cheered with but few enjoyments, in the cause of duty. But there is often much fear of giving offence at the bottom of their apparent willingness to open the door of their zenanas ; and if I can depend on the accounts that reach me, natives speak bitterly to one another of the overflow of Anglo-Saxon energy that will not leave them even their wives and daughters to themselves. If I may say so without giving offence, I should suggest that too great care cannot be taken in the selection of those who are appointed to this delicate duty—a duty in which, if enthusiasm is necessary to reconcile to its performance, sound judgment is quite as indispensable to its success.

These remarks may appear unfair to those who pin their faith to blue-books and reports, which have from time to time set forth a good deal about the apparent heartiness with which the notion of female education was



at first taken up by the natives themselves, especially in the Punjab. But those who have studied India and its people through other media than blue-books know how much of this heartiness is only skin-deep, and put on to gratify some man in power, whose favour may be worth canvassing. The Punjab, for instance, made the first great start in female education in 1862-3, yet it is thus spoken of in the Report for 1867-8 by the inspectors of the Umballa circle: "There is a considerable reduction in female schools. . . . Some of the schools appear to have made a certain amount of progress: amongst others, that at Nizamudeen, under the patronage of Mirza Ilahi Buksh, was visited by Mr. Hutton; he was shown some good specimens of handwriting, and he heard some of the girls read the Khat i Taqdir and the Wakiat i Hind. He remarks, however, that it is difficult for an examiner to speak with any confidence on this point (the progress of the pupils) when all the girls are *parda nishcen* (behind the screen), and it is impossible to tell whether the girls answer the questions or their teachers, or whether they recite by heart what they are supposed to read."

The Umballa circle is that contiguous to the older provinces; at the other extremity of the Lieutenant-Governorship, the inspector of the Frontier circle writes: "All the female schools in the Bunnoo district have been closed, with the exception of one at Moosakhail, in which 18 girls read Gooroomookhi, but are not making much progress."

In the Lahore circle, on the other hand, the number of schools has increased from 129 to 147, and the Rawul Pindee circle has maintained a fair average.

In Bengal, as regards Government agency, it must be confessed, says Mr. Howell, that a beginning only has been made; there being but one normal and one ordinary school. Of the aided schools there were 82 in the Central Division, with 3,183 pupils, the number in the last five years having nearly tripled; but the inspector complains

that the standard of instruction attained is by no means so satisfactory as the numerical increase, owing to the early age at which girls cease to attend school after their betrothal.

The account given by the inspector of the South-East division is still less encouraging. There are 41 schools, with 745 pupils, on the grant-in-aid system, and 27 schools, with 348 pupils, that receive allowance under other rules. We may fear that the account the inspector gives of these schools might be found applicable to other parts of the country besides Bengal. "The female schools which I have seen," he writes, "consist in general of three to six infants sprawling about and inking their fingers in copying letters on strips of leaves. Sometimes one or two could attempt a little reading."

In the North-West division the inspector writes: "I have not encouraged the establishment of girls' schools, because I know that competent teachers for this division are not to be had, and without such teachers schools would be a delusion." In the North-East division of Bengal the deputy-inspector states: "It grieves me much, that, instead of having to record the establishment of some new girls' schools, I have this year the painful duty of noticing the extinction of one at Kurpore. But in relief to this¹ I may mention that the zenana system of teaching is now being carried on more extensively than heretofore, and the notions which the people have been accustomed to entertain in respect of female education are rapidly giving way before the general spread of education. This happy state of things is in a great measure due to the exertions of the pundits, who are ever ready to do their very best to promote the cause of female education. It is no exaggeration to say, that in almost every village where there is a school many a Hindoo lady of respectable family has commenced reading and writing."

In Madras very little seems to have been done at all in

¹ *Sic.*



the matter of female education ; and in the review of the Report of Government the question is hardly noticed at all. "All that the director says about the subject is, that there has been much discussion among the more enlightened Hindoos at the Presidency town, but the results of the year have been rather in words than in acts."

In the North-West there are 595 schools, with 12,000 pupils ; but the movement seems to have languished during the year for want of funds and competent inspection. A step, however, has been taken to remedy the latter defect by providing a lady inspector : the success of the measure remains to be seen.

In the Central Provinces the progress of female education, judging by the returns, has been rapid during the last few years ; but there is nothing to show definitely what real progress has been made. There were 130 schools and 3,621 scholars, with one normal school, and one private one unaided by Government. In British Burmah, Mysore, and Coorg, and the Hyderabad assigned districts, there are no Government institutions at all for the purpose of female education.

The Director of Public Instruction of Bombay seems to have taken a very sound view of the question. He expressed his opinion in 1865-6, "that the public education, properly so called, of women, is incompatible with the system of infant marriages, and with many of the existing prejudices on the most delicate subjects." We believe, however, that the education and civilization of the male portion of the people of India, together with the example of the European community, will inevitably bring on the education of the women in India—but that this result will be very gradual, and subsequent to many important social changes. In his last report he states that Government can hardly be said to have commenced undertaking female education in Western India. Very recently, however, an impetus has been given to it by Miss Carpenter's influence, and the intelligent, enterprising, and



philanthropic native gentry of Bombay have come forward to aid her with their purses and their co-operation in the most liberal and hearty manner. Summing up the general results all over India, Mr. Howell remarks : "On the whole, it would appear that up to the year under review the frank and cordial support of Government to female education, promised in 1854, had not been given, and that only a beginning had been made in some Provinces. But it should be mentioned that the current year has been one of progress in this direction. Miss Carpenter's visit at the close of 1866 gave a stimulus to the movement, which had been warmly taken up in the Punjab four years previously, and the Government of India has since held out promises of liberal assistance and support to an indefinite extent, on the single condition that the genuine co-operation of the native community can be secured. It will belong to the record of another year to show how that offer has been responded to.

"Looking generally at the results which I have recorded, it would appear that the immediate obstacles to progress are the want of trained schoolmistresses and of adequate inspection, and that the greatest degree of success has been achieved in those Provinces where a personal interest in the movement has been evidenced most by the district and educational authorities. It may, perhaps, be considered a matter of congratulation, and a good earnest for the future, that any success at all has been achieved in a few years in a matter which is surrounded by difficulties that spring from the strongest social prejudices of a nation, the most tenacious of all prejudices."

Government has very recently¹ made a fresh grant for the support of normal schools ; and under present circumstances it is worth consideration whether all efforts at female education for the next ten or fifteen years had not better be directed exclusively to the training of competent female teachers.



CHAPTER XVII.

SOCIAL PROGRESS.

Brahmoism—Prospects of Christianity—Caste prejudices—Social intercourse between natives and Europeans—Changes—Great public scandals—Feverish thirst for promotion—Cliqueism—Love of intrigue—Russian system in Asia.

THE history of Indian administration during the last decade would be incomplete without some notice of the general progress and the social condition of the country. No one who has passed twenty consecutive years in India can fail to have observed the great change which attended the transfer of the country to the direct dominion of the Crown. The year of the rebellion, 1857-8, was an epoch in the modern history of India from which future writers will date the commencement of an era of reform. And it is certain that if the administration between 1859 and 1869 has been successful, we ought to be able to trace its results in a general improvement in the condition of the people.

The subject of Indian social progress necessarily resolves itself into two heads: 1st, the condition of native, 2d, that of European society. I shall deal with these two branches as briefly as possible in that order.

Among the classes of the native population which come into contact with European civilization, in consequence of their being located in the Presidency cities and on the great lines of railway, the change during the last ten



years has been very marked. Much of the prejudice and ignorant confidence of Orientals in their own superiority, which has always formed so prominent a feature in their character, has yielded to liberal ideas developed by education, combined with commercial intercourse with European nations. Even the strongholds of Hindoo superstition, so long intact, have been unable to withstand the progress of thought, and the new sect of Brahmos is daily increasing in influence, and gathering converts in all the large cities on the Bengal side. The tenets of this new sect are a sort of compromise between Hindooism and common sense. Brahmoism more nearly approaches the Deism of Europe in the earlier part of the present century than any of the systems of philosophy promulgated in the East. Finding that the fables of the Hindoo mythology (which formed no part of the Hindoo religion as inculcated by the earlier sages) were unable to stand the test of reason, and were rapidly losing their hold upon the minds of the people, and unwilling at the same time to embrace Christianity—which came to them recommended indeed by the preaching of missionaries, but not by the practice of the bulk of the English with whom they came in contact—the founders of this school endeavoured to enunciate a philosophic and religious system grounded on those ideas of natural religion which commend themselves to the reason and instincts of mankind. The Brahmos are in fact deists, but they inculcate the strictest observance of the moral law. As such, it is difficult to perceive, as some writers do, in the present movement any indication of a tendency towards Christianity. On the contrary, it would seem as if the system of State education preserving the strictest neutrality in religious questions is producing exactly the results which might have been anticipated. A Hindoo educated in our schools and colleges finds it impossible to believe, for instance, that the world rests on the back of a tortoise or the horns of a bull. Uninstructed in the Christian faith, he is well acquainted with the history of



modern discovery, and more or less proficient in natural science, having at the same time an innate tendency towards metaphysical speculations. He therefore gladly takes refuge in a system which in its observance of the moral law satisfies the higher aspirations of his mind, and in its speculative tenets on the existence of a divine creator and ruler of the universe is sufficient to fill the void caused by a rejection of the mythological fables which amused him as a child. Practically, for many years, the few thoughtful men among the Hindoos have, I believe, abandoned the superstitions of the Purans; but, fettered by the bonds of caste, and deterred by the bad example of Englishmen from embracing a religion whose followers seemed to ignore the connexion between precept and practice, and unable to find a refuge anywhere, they were content to live and die in the faith of their forefathers, believing as much as they could bring their minds not to reject, and leaving the great riddle to be solved hereafter.

In intellectual acquirements and natural mental capacity, the various classes of natives differ very materially. Christianity has very little present prospect of success among the Hindoos and Mahommedans of our older provinces; but wherever it has been preached among the ruder tribes of the interior, it has generally been received with some enthusiasm. It is of course only natural that the simple minds of the barbarous descendants of the aborigines who are to be met with in mountainous tracts in various parts of the continent of Central India, and in one portion of Rajpootana, in Bengal Proper, and in Burmah, should be more easily impressed with the truths of Christianity than the Hindoo, wedded to a system of philosophy and long inured to the slavery of caste, or than the fanatical Mahommedan; to either, a system of religion whose great principle is that of self-sacrifice is so utterly foreign that we may cease to wonder at the little effect as yet produced by the teaching of our missionaries.



CASTE PREJUDICES.

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Caste prejudices, however, are gradually yielding; natives are beginning to understand the value of co-operation, and to see that an irksome system which has been imposed by general consent may by general consent be shaken off. Quite recently a reformer, whose name deserves to be recorded, Peearee Lall, has by persevering agitation succeeded in getting up meetings at all the large cities in the Upper Provinces, and in inducing a large and influential sect of Brahmins to discontinue the old-established custom of expensive marriages, which has involved so many families in debt and ruin.

In many parts of India the natives now have their societies and associations, which meet at stated periods and discuss questions of social science. At these congresses all the forms used among ourselves at public meetings are strictly observed; the members address the chairman, and the proceedings are duly recorded and published at the expense of the association under the auspices of the secretary. In Oude, the Talookdars' Association has a little more of a political character,¹ as they not unfrequently discuss questions having reference to their rights and privileges.

India is occasionally visited by travellers from the continent of Europe—Frenchmen, Germans, Italians—who in the pursuit of business or pleasure spend a few months rambling over the continent. These observers are always struck most forcibly with what is beyond a doubt one of

¹ This association was mainly got up by a gentleman whose name deserves to be recorded as a public man very far in advance in many things of the rest of his countrymen, Baboo Dukhinarunjun Mookerjee. A highly intellectual mind, well stored with the treasures of English literature and the teachings of history, can hardly be expected to rest content in a condition of political nullity. Baboo Dukhinarunjun Mookerjee, by the expression and inculcation of liberal ideas, has offended many men in power, and is consequently more or less in disgrace among the official classes. Any government less exclusive than that of the Indian would make use of such a man as Mookerjee, instead of forcing him into the opposition.



the strangest features in our position in the country, viz. the utter absence of anything like social intercourse between the races. Englishmen meet natives in business, and there their connexion ceases. After being upwards of a century in the country, we have never penetrated the barrier of reserve in which the native shelters himself from social intercourse with the Englishman. In Bombay, the attempt at amalgamation has been occasionally made, with very indifferent success. It seems as if there was on both sides a deep-rooted antipathy to meeting on an equality in social position which no efforts can overcome.

One reason of this is the existence of habits and customs which preclude Englishmen and natives from eating and drinking together. It is a theory, not grounded on a very exalted view of human life, but it seems as if it were one of the laws of nature, and one of the demarcations between man and the lower order of animals, that social intercourse among the former should be best developed by the process of consuming food in company. Two men dine together, and become friends: two dogs eat out of the same dish, and the chances are that they fight over their food. The Englishman and the Oriental cannot amalgamate socially, because their habits and prejudices entail on them the necessity of taking their meals apart. Community of interest is a weaker bond than similarity of taste and manner. This is a truism, but it is a truism aptly illustrated in the conditions of life in India, where the Englishman and the native, subjects of one sovereign, originally of one race, with common sympathies and unity of interests, may meet one another many times daily, week after week, year after year, in their ordinary avocations, and yet never advance one step towards real intimacy or friendship.

The extension of the cotton trade and the introduction of railways have undoubtedly done much towards stimulating the commercial industry of the people, and inculcating more active habits of life. The advantages of railway travelling are as thoroughly appreciated in India as in any

other country in the world, and may do something in time towards breaking down the great barrier to social progress—caste. There has been a tendency among writers rather to exaggerate the results already attained in this direction, and the reform as yet has reached very little, if at all, below the surface. But social reform in a country where the caste system has been so many centuries in operation, must necessarily be very gradual. Education, and more intimate and more extended intercourse with the Anglo-Saxon, are the most efficient if not the only agents capable of removing the obstructions that now prevent the social amalgamation of the two races.

The changes that followed the transfer of India from the Company to the Crown affected the tone of English society even more than that of the natives. The great influx of fresh regiments, the large number of officers who with their wives were thus brought to India, the breaking up of the old system and social habits of the past generation of Anglo-Indians, the more frequent intercourse between the mother-country and her distant dependency, developed a great improvement in the manners and customs of English residents. Three other causes simultaneously co-operated to infuse a more healthy atmosphere into social life. One was the increasing number of men who had gone out, and in course of time had begun to rise in the official ladder, under the Civil Service competitive system; another was the formation of the High Courts, and the introduction of barristers and legal practitioners into the Mofussil; and the third was the extension of the educational department, which brought out to India many men of intellectual acquirements and refined tastes from our English universities.

The history of the period under review is scarcely complete without a description of several great public scandals, the echo of which, in one or two cases, has been heard in England. These great public scandals are essentially Indian. They are the cancers and gangrenes that are developed from the unhealthy condition of the social consti-

tution. But aptly as they serve to illustrate the condition of society, they are not pleasing subjects to dwell upon. In the first place, it is undesirable to re-open old sores. Men whose names have already been before the public in unhappy notoriety are glad to let their story be forgotten, even if with oblivion comes despair of getting justice. And, on the other hand, as there are two sides to every story, and as in common fairness a writer who tells the story at all ought to set forth both sides, the description of these illustrative scandals would occupy more space than I can afford. During the decade, Indian society has been stirred to its lowest depths by the excitement consequent on the trial of the Rev. Mr. Long for libel, in a matter connected with the great indigo dispute, where a missionary was made the scapegoat for an official delinquent of high position. There was the Oude case, where two classes of officials fought, a newspaper proprietary being the buffer between them, upon which Lord Canning, who was forced to interfere, published an elaborate minute, dealing censure pretty fairly on both parties. There were the Priestley and the Crawley cases, by which a clique hostile to Sir Hugh Rose attempted to bring about his recall. There was the Agra arms case, in which a perfectly innocent man was almost ruined to save the Government from acknowledging they had been misled by their own servants, and which resulted in the triumphant acquittal by a jury in Calcutta of an officer charged with a crime in support of which there was not a particle of really trustworthy evidence. There is the Jervis case, which set all Simla wild for a whole season; and the Nyn Singh case, in which a flagrant abuse of the judicial office called down on the officials of Kumaon a severe reprimand from the judges of the High Court.

These incidents arise, as has been stated, from the unhealthy condition of the Anglo-Indian social body, which the English reader finds a difficulty in comprehending, because there is nothing which he sees around him that the least resembles it. He cannot appreciate the intense spirit



of clanship and partisanship, rising when excited into a passion, to which the peculiar conditions of life in India, perpetuated through at least a century, have given birth. There, society is cut up into circles and sections, the limits of each larger circle being confined to the limits of each branch of the service. The prevailing element in English society—the upper middle classes, consisting of professional, commercial, literary men, those engaged in the superior branches of trade, agriculture, or manufacture, and the clergy—is totally wanting; at least, these classes form so small a body that their influence is *nil*. If it were possible to conceive society in England reduced to the judges and magistrates, clerks of the Treasury, Somerset House, and other Government offices, all belonging to one service and coming from one college; and the officers of the army, with a considerable number of subordinates in each department, who are not sufficiently independent to entertain or express opinions of their own except surreptitiously by anonymous contributions to the press, or among their own circle of friends and associates—if it were possible to conceive English society reduced to these limits, the reader would have no bad counterpart of Indian society as it is everywhere beyond the limits of the Presidency towns. For, although one feature in the picture just presented—viz. the unity of origin of all the members of the Civil Service—may seem hardly to apply to the present time, when Haileybury belongs to the past, yet its influence and traditional associations are still so strong that, as against the outside world, the Civil Service is imbued with just as powerful an element of clanship as if Haileybury were still the only channel through which the Indian Civil Service was supplied. There is, practically, no middle class independent of Government, although by degrees the bar and commerce together are collecting the material out of which, many years hence, such a class may be constructed. There is no aristocracy elevated above the level of the masses, and the interest awakened by a ceaseless struggle for advancement in the



official world. The clergy, unfortunately, are so small a body that their influence is scarcely felt except among the few who preserve something more than the mere outward forms of religious profession. But at the summit of each department, centreing round the head, is a clique of officials who have the ear of the Governor-General, or Governor, or Commander-in-chief, or general, or head of the department, whatever it may be, who bar effectually all approach to the sole source of professional advancement except through themselves. They resolutely combine to maintain the privilege of their order intact, and to hand it down to their successors unimpaired—the privilege of representing everything to their head, with exactly the colouring it may suit their fancies, or prejudices, or interest to impart. To borrow a figure from physiology in illustration of the anatomy of Indian society, the ganglionic system may be said to permeate the whole official world, from the Viceroy down to the smallest moonshee who draws his pay from the State; that is, a system where a succession of centres of action follow one another, each centre of action having its own subordinate administrators, each of whom is a ganglionic centre in his turn, and has his own subordinate administration: in all cases the subordinate administrator being dependent (as a deputy-judge-advocate-general of the army once said in the witness-box he was) on the breath of his superior for his official existence.

To all these elements of the most artificial and unhealthy condition of the body social it is possible to conceive, must be added the important and invariable accompaniment of female agency, the love of power and capacity for intrigue which are natural to every woman, and which the habits and condition of society in India are so well calculated to foster.

But the picture is not yet complete. Few Englishmen have any idea of the enormous amount of patronage at the disposal of the Indian authorities. A residence in the East is not calculated to suppress the *auri sacra fames*

which finds a place in every human breast. On the contrary, the incessant desire to earn a sufficiency to visit England or a competency to retire, the immense expense which the ever-recurring separations of families entail, the education of children brought up away from their parents at expensive schools, and the extravagant habits of Indian life—all these considerations whet the appetite, strong enough in any case, for gold, and stimulate the unflagging energies of the Anglo-Indian official to ever fresh exertions in the race for wealth. And if the struggle is hard, the prizes to be gained are golden ones. Offices, the incomes attached to which would seem to most English professional men princely stipends, are at the disposal of those in power. To win their favour, to make interest with those who are really and literally the dispensers of golden prizes, public functionaries devote themselves with the assiduity of diggers in the Australian and Californian gold-fields, only that the instruments they use are not the pick-axe and the shovel. They are, first and foremost, female influence, which is ever actively and unceasingly at work in the saloons of Simla and Calcutta, Nynsee Tal and Murree, Madras and Bombay, Mahableschwur and Mount Aboo. Next to this, is the genius for display of talent—above all, a ready pen, and a certain undefinable faculty, which some men have naturally and some acquire, of pushing themselves on by making friends with those in power. In these respects—that is, as regards the means employed for getting up the official ladder—there is probably little difference between India and other civilized countries in modern times. Human nature is much the same everywhere, and similar circumstances beget kindred efforts. But there is this peculiarity about India, that there the field is exceedingly narrowed, while the opportunity for securing prizes is in proportion to the number of competitors, immensely magnified. It is the difference between a battle where large forces are arrayed on both sides, and a duel between two, where in the former, owing



to the number engaged and the distance over which the armies extend, there is little or no acquaintance on either side with details on the other, and no such thing as actual combat between individuals. But in a smaller field, where the combatants are few, each sees the other, measures his opponent's capacity for resistance or attack, scrutinizes his weapons, his dress, his physique, and considers how best he shall take him at advantage.

In such a condition of things it is obvious that, unless human nature in India is different from what it is in other parts of the world, the result must be a feverish thirst for promotion, and a terrible temptation to a laxity as to the means by which it is secured. Here and there, of course, are men who rise very far above the average by the force of their genius and a legitimate exercise of it. In India the field for such men is a glorious one, and their rapid elevation to posts of high emolument and great responsibility evinces the truth that real genius, well directed, must assert itself. These are the exceptions. Men so gifted may perhaps scorn the arts and machinations by which less able men climb to power. But below the level, and apart from these few exceptions, the whole official society in India—and it is almost all purely official—is like a mass of some substance in which the process of fermentation is going on, heaving and seething with incessant motion; each atomic molecule, under the operation of natural laws, urging, pressing, pushing its neighbour molecule, either aside, that it may be out of its way, or forward, that it may take its place, or down, that it may rise upon it. And according to the very varying scale in which moral obligations are regarded by different individual molecules, or by the same molecule at different times, are the means employed to make good the advance. Man's nature must be other than it is, if in such a condition of society the basest motives did not occasionally influence actions, or if the struggles towards wealth and power were always consistent with honour and integrity.



Then again, in addition to the ganglionic system above described, the essential tendency of official life is cliqueism. When a struggle so incessant is being maintained by every individual member of the whole body—and to appreciate thoroughly the motive power at work, it must be understood that there is nothing to prevent an ensign from rising to command an army, or an assistant-magistrate from becoming a member of the imperial council or a proconsul—it will be obvious that the molecules may find it of the utmost advantage to secure the assistance of other molecules working in the same direction. Few can hope to succeed in the struggle unaided and alone. Hence arise cliques, connected together by the strongest bond of union, self-interest. Hence springs a firm, united effort, among the officers of a department, to prevent an abuse from transpiring and coming before the public, even if necessary, by crushing the man bold enough to attempt the disclosure. Hence comes a determined struggle to oppose every effort to introduce reform, because reform inevitably sweeps away some privileges. Hence arises a result often seen in India when fresh blood is introduced into a department, and some new-comer, conscientious and enthusiastic, strives by his own exertions to check abuses, of which he is at first horrified to find himself a passive and involuntary supporter. There is perhaps no creature so obnoxious to the ganglionic centres as an enthusiastic reformer. Any subordinate who is unwary enough to adopt that line, rushes on destruction. He is given to understand that he is expected to carry on the system as his predecessors did, and his suggestions will be called for when wanted. Summary ejection from the department, or a mark against his name as unfit for promotion, is the fate which speedily befalls such an one. This probably is also a characteristic not confined to the Indian official world, but it is very strongly developed there; for the whole country, with its inhabitants, native and European, and its system of government, is the hot-bed of conservatism.



No Englishman can possibly understand the extent to which intrigue goes to make up the business of Asiatic life. What Macaulay wrote in 1841 is true enough now: "An Indian Government has only to let it be understood that it wishes a particular man to be ruined, and in twenty-four hours it will be furnished with grave charges, supported by depositions so full and circumstantial, that any person unaccustomed to Asiatic mendacity would regard them as decisive. It is well if the signature of the destined victim is not counterfeited at the foot of some illegal compact, or if some treasonable paper is not dropped into a hiding-place in his house."

The criminal law in India is the usual weapon to which a native resorts when he wants to revenge himself upon an enemy. No one who has not been many years in the country can realize in the faintest degree the facility with which evidence can be suborned, or the frequency with which a man's ruin is sought by means of plotting and intrigue. It is this more than anything else which has given birth to that deep-rooted hatred which the natives everywhere bear to our rule—a hatred which found expression in 1857, and is only kept silent by overpowering physical force. It is this which makes our dominion appear so unfavourably in comparison with that of native states. In the latter, intrigue can be met by intrigue, one clique can oppose another; if there is danger of oppression, or of the law being turned into an engine of private animosity, there is always a chance of escape, which our cast-iron system and our rigid codes of criminal law and police, backed up by physical power, do not allow. And the evil is intensified by the character and constitution of the Government, whose heads turn a deaf ear to all complaints, the stereotyped reply to every petition for redress being, that "they see no reason to interfere." Tools in the hands of cliques themselves, they are not to be reached except through channels that convey only those impressions of each case that are agreeable to the men in power, and consonant



with the views of the very parties against whom the cry for redress is raised.

The Russians have a system of administration very superior to ours in many respects, but one upon which the large number of officials for whom we make a point of finding employ in India would hardly allow us to fall back. When they occupy a new province, they select the leading men among the natives, and place the executive authority in their hands, appointing a Russian officer of rank as commissioner to superintend the whole, with full powers to interfere in any or every branch of the public service. There is thus provided an administration with a court of appeal perfectly independent of the executive, to which any aggrieved person may apply for redress. But of course the two systems, theirs and ours, will not bear comparison, because it has ever been our endeavour, at least till very lately, to employ European agency as much as possible, from the belief that under it the administration of justice will be more pure and free from the defects of Oriental character ; while it is theirs to economize, as far as possible, the European element. Whatever may be the actual result of the two systems in the success or the defects of the executive administration, there is no question that the Russian is the more popular of the two, for with them the defects are the handiwork of the natives themselves, and those who suffer, suffer from the hands of their own countrymen and co-religionists ; while the character in which foreign rule appears is solely that of a restraining, mitigating element, affording redress of grievances and constituting a check upon oppression.



CHAPTER XVIII.

THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATION.

The constitution of the Legislative Council—Act VIII. of 1859—Civil Procedure—The Rent Law, and its effects upon society—The Law of Limitation—Special legislation—The effects of civil war—The Legislature confirms acts done in 1857-8 — Stamp Act — Small Cause Courts—The penal code—Penal consequences of adultery—Criminal procedure—Appeals—Police—Abuses of present system.

IN all countries where the representative element exists in the Government, where the action of the legislature is prompted by the ascertained wants of the community, the history of legislation will afford a very fair index of general progress. In such cases the historian who deals exhaustively with this subject has little else to engage his attention, for public feeling and public morals, commercial prosperity and decline, the interests of the different classes of the community, and the general condition of the country, will be reflected faithfully in the deliberations and the acts of the assembly convened for the purpose of making laws. In a country where the government is constituted as is that of India it is not so. There the whole business of the legislature is mainly in the hands of a small clique of officials, who do, indeed, nominally represent the different presidencies and grand geographical divisions of the country, but who are by position and education, in thought and idea, nearly as far removed from the people they legislate for as the gods in Olympus, in the old mythology, were removed



above the ordinary concerns of mortal men. The independent classes are also nominally represented, but the influence of their representatives is so small, and their privileges so restricted, that in point of fact they are a mere nonentity, and utterly unable to affect in the smallest degree the official tone which pervades the Indian council chamber.

The *modus operandi* is pretty much as follows. A member of the Council conceives an idea. Perhaps it is suggested to him by some official in high position, in one of the minor provinces; perhaps it is developed from the depths of his internal consciousness. At any rate, he turns it over in his thoughts, and convinces himself that such and such a measure is required. He discusses it, perhaps with a colleague; and after the scheme has simmered a little in his mind, he applies for leave to bring in a bill, having given three days' notice to the secretary. If the motion be carried in the affirmative, the member sends the bill to the secretary, with a full statement of objects and reasons, and any other papers which he may consider necessary. The draft bill is then printed with the statement of objects and reasons, and a copy forwarded to each member. A translation of it is also made into the vernacular, for the use of members who cannot read English. After fourteen days have elapsed, the bill may be introduced; and on that day, or any subsequent day to which the discussion may be postponed, the principle of the bill and its general provisions may be discussed. If the Council so decide, the bill is referred to a select committee for report, and, together with the statement of objects and reasons, is published, in English and the vernacular, in the official *Gazette*. But the publication of a bill may be suspended until it has been considered by the select committee and reported to the Council, if the Council at the time of referring it to the select committee shall so order. When three months have elapsed from the publication of a draft in the *Gazette*, or in any



shorter period that the Council may order, the select committee to which the bill has been sent shall write a report thereon. Such report is taken into consideration by the Council as soon as convenient, but not until a week after the report has been furnished to the members. If any member wishes to propose an amendment affecting the principle of a bill as settled by the select committee, he must send the amendment to the secretary at least three days before the meeting of the Council at which the bill is to be considered. An amendment of which notice has not been given previously may, nevertheless, be considered if the president decide that such a measure shall be considered by the Council, at the meeting at which it is proposed, or be deferred to the next following meeting. If no amendment be made by the Council in a bill as settled by the select committee, it may at once be passed. If any amendment be made, the bill shall not be passed till next meeting. Finally, the consent of the Governor-General in Council is required before the bill can become law.

The fecundity of the Indian Legislative Council may well strike dismay into the mind of the man whose business it is to make himself acquainted, in order that he may advise others, with the law of the land. In 1859, twenty-eight bills became law; in 1860, fifty-three; in 1861, thirty-three; 1862, twenty-four; 1863, thirty-two; 1864, twenty-eight; 1865, thirty; 1866, thirty; 1867, thirty-seven; in 1868, twenty-eight: making a total for the ten years of three hundred and twenty-three.

The general character of Indian legislation is well illustrated by two very important Acts passed in 1859. It can easily be understood that a small body of legislators, whose whole career has been passed in official life, would be well qualified to deal with any matter of mere procedure, or mere technical detail; while we should naturally expect to find them at fault in handling broad questions, such as involve rights of property, or the nature of obliga-



tions, or any other rights grounded on general principles, or those difficult complications where statute law has to step in and interfere with, or modify, the custom or common law. I have before spoken of the veil that is thrown over the eyes of the Indian official from the day he lands to the day he sails for England on his return. All this time he sees exactly as much as those about him wish him to see, and no more. But the matters that come before him personally in the transaction of his daily official duties he cannot help seeing. In these he is not to be misled. But test him as to his knowledge of the actual condition of the masses of the people,—of their thoughts, feelings, sympathies, their wants or grievances,—he will be utterly at fault. There is between him and them a barrier which may not be passed over, a barrier of Oriental reserve guarded by the jealous care of the *amla*, or native subordinates, without whom the minutest fraction of official routine cannot be gone through. He cannot write an order for himself: he cannot write a line of one. He cannot read a single petition presented to him. He cannot read one sentence in numbers of documents to which he daily affixes his signature. Accordingly, we are not surprised to find in the two most important Acts of 1859, perhaps of the whole ten years under review,—viz. the Code of Civil Procedure, or Act VIII. of 1859, and the Rent Law, as it is called (though it is in reality much more than a rent law), or Act X. of 1859;—we are not surprised to find in these laws, one an enactment of extreme utility, admirably adapted to facilitate the administration of justice in India, in the other an act which well illustrates Sir Erskine Perry's remark, elsewhere quoted, "That the history of British India is full of examples of the great mischief done by clothing imperfect theories in the rigid garb of law."

The great value of the Civil Procedure Code is, that it affords all the technical safeguards which an efficient administration of the law requires, while at the same time



it is elastic enough to admit a due observance of the principles of equity. An English lawyer may get an idea of its scope by conceiving the courts of law and equity amalgamated into one, with a common code of procedure. It is in force in all the civil courts in India: in the courts established by Royal Charter, viz. the High Courts at Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, and Agra; and the courts constituted by local enactment, which are the ordinary civil courts of the Mofussil in the three Presidencies, including the Punjab, Oude, the Central Provinces, and Jhansie; the courts of Burmah, including the Recorder's, the Chief Court of Lahore, and the Court of the Resident at Aden; as well as the Small Cause Courts, which are established pretty generally in all the largest towns and settlements, such as Simla, and Mussoorie in the hills. The Small Cause Courts of the Presidency towns have a procedure of their own.¹

This Act was supplemented by another, Act XXIII. of 1861, which made a few necessary additions and amendments dictated by experience. In one or two minor points it is still susceptible of improvement.

Act X., or the Rent Law, affecting, as it does, rights in land over a large part of the continent of India, is one of the most important in the whole Statute-book. So far as it deals with procedure, in providing a more efficient machinery for the speedy settlement of claims for rent between landlord and tenant, it is, as we might expect it to be, eminently useful. So far as it deals with general principles, affecting rights to real property, it is, as we might expect it to be, faulty and mischievous.

It starts with providing that every ryot is entitled to receive from the person to whom the rent of the land held or cultivated by him is payable, a lease, showing the quantity of land, and, where fields have been numbered in the Government survey, the number of each field, the amount of annual rent, the instalments in which it is to be

¹ *Vide* Broughton's "Civil Procedure."



paid, and any special condition that may exist. If the rent is shown not to have been changed for twenty years, it is presumed that the land has been held at that rent from the time of the permanent settlement—that is, in the province where there has been a permanent settlement, or Bengal Proper.

One of the theories which our Indian legislature has clothed in the rigid garb of law is, that the rights of the ryots were ever in danger of being overridden, and that it was the especial duty of Government to protect the interests of this class, even to the extent of conferring by law rights in the soil which they never held before. No doubt the principle was advocated in all good faith by the men who held office at the time when new provinces, now old, had just passed under British rule. It was the pet hobby of the orthodox Haileybury school, handed down from father to son, with all the prestige that attaches to traditional policy. To detail the different landed tenures in vogue throughout India would occupy in itself several volumes, of little interest to the casual reader. The general character of such tenures, and the system of revenue settlement in the different provinces and presidencies, may be stated broadly as being, in Bengal Proper, a zemindaree tenure under the permanent settlement which was made in Lord Cornwallis's time; in Madras and Bombay a ryotwarree tenure settlement, being made, when practicable, with ryots or actual cultivators of the soil. In the North-West Provinces and the Punjab the village tenure mostly prevails, settlement being made when practicable with the whole village community under the head man. The revenue system introduced into Oude on the annexation, and modified after the reconquest of the province in 1858, has been elsewhere mentioned. Nothing could be more sweeping than the enactment in 1859, which gave to every ryot who has cultivated or held land for twelve years a right of occupancy in the land so held, so long as he pays his rent. There are exceptions made in the case of land called *khāmār*, *neejjote*, or *seer*. And the

holding of the father or other person from whom the ryot inherits is deemed the holding of the ryot. But this does not apply to a lessee whose tenure is intermediate between that of ryot and landlord, and who therefore acquires no right of occupancy by a twelve years' tenure.¹

A right of occupancy was of course but little worth, unless the ryot was protected from having his rent raised. The Act therefore goes on to provide that the rent may not be enhanced unless the rate is below the prevailing rate payable by the same class of ryot for land of a similar description and with similar advantages in the places adjacent, or unless the value of the productive powers of the land has been increased otherwise than by the agency or at the expense of the ryot, or unless the quantity of land held by the ryot has been proved by measurement to be greater than the quantity for which rent has been previously paid.

This principle, which has coloured the policy of our civil administration ever since we acquired dominion in India, is calculated to extend one of the greatest evils under which the poorer classes in the country labour. Whenever a settlement is made in a province newly handed over to British rule, the instructions given to the settlement officers are to inquire into and to confirm for the time being existing rights, leaving claims not supported by actual possession to be decided afterwards in the civil courts. This is all very well in theory ; but how men's minds may be swayed by pre-existing ideas and a long-established mode of regarding revenue questions, is well shown by the settlement in Oude immediately after the annexation, to which allusion has already been made. If civil officers are determined upon finding "rights," we may depend upon it the rights will be found. And the extent to which an idea can lay hold of the mind and warp the views of even able men, may be seen by the recorded opinions of one or two of our most experienced civil officers in the North-West. Mr.

¹ *Raja Teekum Singh v. Hurlall*; *Sudder Dewanny*, Agra, May 11, 1863.

George Campbell, who has acquired a well-earned reputation in India, writes on the 3d May, 1861, with reference to the Oude land tenure question: "My own impression is, that under all tenures and all systems in all parts of India, at the bottom of all a strong tenant right exists." One would expect, however, in a country like India, where all rights in land are so jealously watched, the existence of tenant right, where it had any existence, would have been susceptible of some more satisfactory proof than the mere impression of a civil officer that it did lie somewhere out of sight, buried under the superincumbent tenures of another character. Another civil officer of great repute in his time, Mr. Martin Gubbins, who was selected to conduct the settlement of Oude on the annexation, had in the earlier stage of his career been deputed to effect the settlement of a large district in the North-West, called Etawah. Here he found, and he honestly recorded the finding, that there were generally no such things as hereditary cultivators—an idea so hideously strange and foreign to the civilian school, that a revenue officer who subsequently took charge of the district, horrified at finding such an opinion recorded, declared that Mr. Martin Gubbins had persuaded the people to abandon their rights. Now, if there is anything a native in India will not abandon, it is a right in land. And the Board of Revenue accepted this explanation, and ruled that the declaration by the cultivators formally recorded at the settlement in open court, that there were no hereditary cultivators, could not affect the indefeasible rights of all who had held the same land for a stated period to be considered, and thereafter treated, as hereditary cultivators. Here there was a case "where the ablest of settlement officers and the most faithful recorder of village customs had found that no tenant right existed. The people themselves declared that they were not hereditary cultivators, but the revenue system required that hereditary cultivators there should be, and accordingly the Board and the revenue officers created them."



Sir C. Wingfield bears witness to the same point, in a despatch dated 15th December, 1862, where he says, at par. 4, that hereditary cultivators and the rights they possessed were unknown in the North-West till we created them.¹

There is nothing more dangerous than legislative interference with rights to real property. In every civilized country in the world, more especially in India, where custom dates back literally to time immemorial, the inhabitants, both landed proprietors and their tenants, or cultivators, will always be found to have among them some well-established and well-recognised principles by which the tenure of land, and the relations of the agricultural community generally towards one another and towards the ruling powers, are regulated. It is true that for many years previous to our acquisition of dominion in India the country had passed through a period of great anarchy. But it is wonderful how little political revolutions in India affect the agricultural classes. The land may be overrun by a conquering army, the landholders may be plundered, the peasantry slaughtered, but the survivors, as soon as the hurricane has swept by, return to their villages, and resume their occupations, regardless of the cares of State, or who wears the crown. This was frequently observable in 1857, when British dominion was for a time trembling in the balance: when troops were marching, and countermarching, and fighting every day, within sound of the cannon of the contending armies the peasant might be seen ploughing up his land, or sowing his crop, as quietly and unconcernedly as if there was nothing unusual going on.

The result of the Rent Law, as it is called, will be to increase what is already the bane of India, a vast pauper population; it will tend to sever the connexion between the peasant and his natural superior, protector, and supporter; to destroy the landed aristocracy, the best safeguard to British rule; and to deteriorate the value of land,

¹ *Vide* a series of articles on tenant right, republished from the *Delhi Gazette* in 1865.



by making it over to a class too poor to improve it, and ever liable, in the event of a bad year, to succumb beneath the pressure of famine. The cultivators themselves do not want the rights thus forced upon them. One of the ablest revenue officers in India is without a doubt Sir William Muir, the present Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces. A civilian of civilians, he is not likely to bear witness unnecessarily to any shortcomings of the class of statesmen to which he belongs. In a minute upon the Oude tenure question, written when he was senior member of the Board of Revenue, North-West Provinces, 29th May, 1863, he says, "I am afraid Act X. of 1859 has not left the question of tenant-right upon a basis on which it can be permanently maintained."

But tenant-rights and rights in land are awkward matters to legislate upon prematurely. A change in the essentials of a law like that of Act X. reaches the lowest stratum of society. If the agricultural population of the country are made to feel that every ten years or so the Legislature, by some new enactment, or some amendment of an old one, will work an agrarian revolution—at one time creating rights in the soil, and at another uprooting them—it is impossible they can have any confidence in the stability or the justice of the Government. There are some errors in administration which it is less mischievous to leave alone than to remedy. Sir William Muir continues: "The law providing a possessory prescription for simple occupancy for twelve years can, of course, only be sustained on the ground that it is required by the custom and practice of the people. Had the recognised custom and practice been clearly to this effect, I should not have sought to re-open the question on any grounds of expediency, because I think that our legislation should be based on the existing status of rights, and the popular feeling and conviction in respect of their acquisition or growth. I do not think that legislation in matters connected with the occupancy of the soil can hope to succeed unless it is built upon the habits and axioms of



the natives. . . . I believe that there is no clear custom on the subject" (*i.e.* of a prescriptive title arising from a twelve years' occupancy), "and that, on the contrary, the sense of the proprietary body is, that if we have not imposed a new custom to their disadvantage, we have at least imposed an old one with a stringency and imperativeness as to its sudden development which was unknown before."

After citing a number of authorities, he says: "I think it has been abundantly shown from the foregoing recapitulation of authorities, that there is no certain evidence in favour of any fixed period as giving a title to prescription."

The general tendency of the enactment is to destroy the power and influence of the landed aristocracy for the sake of the tenant or the ryot. If we could be sure that the position of the latter would be improved in proportion as that of the former deteriorated, there might be some show of reason in a measure which benefited the many at the expense of the few. But whatever may be the experience of other countries as to the system of a peasant proprietary, one result of it in India will be that the cultivators, deprived of the support of their natural protectors the large landed proprietors, will fall into the hands of the money-lenders and corn-dealers, a race whose tender mercies are cruel, whose influence is already far too great, and whose oppression drove into rebellion the Sonthals a few years ago. Nor must we shut our eyes to the results of this system upon ourselves. While the political and moral influence of the cultivating class in India is *nil*, a well-affected landed aristocracy would be the strongest possible support to British dominion. The tendency of our legislation has been to destroy the power of that class altogether. In fact, even now, there is scarcely such a thing as a landed aristocracy in Upper India at all. As time goes on the few remnants now left will disappear. In their place will be a race of pauper cultivators, bound hand and foot to a comparatively few very wealthy money-lenders, usurers, and corn-dealers. Oude, of course, forms an exception. And that province,



which has cost us so much to conquer, will one of these days be one of our strongest and most secure possessions. The feelings of the present generation may be embittered by a recollection of recent strife, but when time has effaced the memory of 1856 and the few succeeding years, and left a landed aristocracy influential and, it is to be hoped, tolerably contented, we shall find, should need arise to rest on any other defence—under Providence—than our own strong right hand, that the system built up by Lord Canning, or restored by him, will form the most powerful support to the British Government.

Another very useful procedure Act was passed in this year, the Limitation Act, or an Act to provide for the limitation of suits. By this legislative measure, suits for the recovery of rights in real or immoveable property must be brought within twelve years, reckoning from the date when the cause of action arose. But the period within which petty debts may be recovered—which, of course, concerns the greatest number of litigants, and affects the bulk of the community—was cut down to three years, instead of six, as it was before and is in England. It is not very easy to understand the object proposed to be gained by this. As a general principle, it is advisable, of course, to narrow the limits within which in point of time claims for ordinary debts may be kept alive. For the interests of the European trading community in India this law was not well adapted, because in that country changes of residence are common; men quit India for years together and at a few days' notice, and there is generally a want of stability about the character of society that interferes with the speedy realization of accounts and collections of debts. Of course, the Act provides for what are called legal disabilities to prosecute a claim; but still, in spite of that provision, I do not think the introduction of the three years' clause was beneficial. In other respects this law, like other acts regulating procedure, is the offspring of official experience; and the matter, being within the scope of the actual observation of



the members of the Legislature, has been on the whole, with the exception of one or two imperfectly expressed clauses, efficiently and practically dealt with.

Another Act passed in this year deserves notice as illustrating that special legislation which is sometimes necessary in India. In a part of the Madras Presidency there are a class of desperate fanatics, called the Moplas, who not unfrequently break out into some wild fits of excitement, under the influence of which they will commit the most shocking outrages, utterly regardless of the consequences to themselves. Accordingly, the preamble of the Act (XX. of 1859) states that in the district of Malabar, in the Presidency of Madras, murderous outrages have been frequently committed by persons of the class called Moplas, the offenders in such outrages intending thereby to sacrifice their lives; and as the general law of the country is not adequate to suppress such outrages, a special enactment follows, containing stringent measures of more than ordinary severity against the perpetrators of these crimes.

This was passed in 1859, specially directed against the Moplas. There is therefore very little force in the argument used in support of the Disarming Act passed in 1860, viz. that it was necessary to avoid special legislation, and that Europeans and Christians could not be exempted in an Act passed to disarm the population generally. If the Moplas were worthy of special legislation on the side of severity, one does not see why the European and Christian community might not have been deemed worthy of a clause exempting them from the operation of so ungrateful a measure as the "Disarming Act."

Several measures of the Legislature in 1860 deserve especial notice. The first in order of time is the Indigo Act, already mentioned. This was in force for six months, and provides for the assembly of a committee of inquiry into the system of indigo culture. Any ryot having received an advance for the cultivation of indigo during the current season, and not cultivating it according to agreement, may

under this Act be summoned before the magistrate, who may assess damages, and order payment or specific performance of the contract, and may attach the land to be cultivated if described in the contract, or in default may order the ryot to be imprisoned, and damages levied on his property. It also provides for the summary punishment of any person intimidating a ryot into breach of contract, or maliciously destroying or damaging indigo crops; and no appeal is to lie from the decision of the magistrate. It was limited to Bengal Proper as regards area, and to six months as regards time. It was another instance of a special Act passed for a special purpose.

It is hardly necessary to notice in detail the Income Tax Bill which was passed in this year, but an important measure received the assent of the Governor-General in August 1860, upon which it is necessary to offer a remark or two. It was an Act (XXXIV. of 1860) to indemnify officers of Government *and other persons* in respect of fines and contributions levied and *acts done* by them during the disturbance.

After the rebellion of 1857 was over there succeeded a reign of terror. The natives certainly learnt a lesson which, for the present generation at least, will not be effaced from their memory. They had played for high stakes and lost. In the hour of their short-lived success they had known no mercy, and they had no right to look for any at the hands of the victors. Great as are the evils of civil war and the miseries it entails, not the least of its bad consequences is the demoralizing effect the spirit of strife produces on the mind, blunting the feelings and kindling evil passions which for the time almost transform human beings into wild beasts; and Lord Canning has been much praised for the calmness he preserved amid a period of general excitement, and for not yielding to the clamour of those who, it is said, were thirsting for wholesale revenge upon the native population. The European community in India were accused by the English press,

and by speakers in the House of Commons, of advocating indiscriminate slaughter, and a general confiscation of property. No doubt at the time, under the excitement which prevailed amid the heat of the conflict, men placed too little restraint upon their desire for revenge; but it may be doubted whether anything so bloodthirsty in its tone as some articles which appeared in the columns of leading London journals was ever published in any Indian paper. But in truth more than half the clamour raised against Lord Canning and his government was not on account of this "clemency" or leniency in dealing with the rebels, so much as the persistence they showed in releasing and rewarding men who ought not to have been rewarded, and punishing men who ought to have been released. Every allowance is to be made for the circumstances under which the Government or its officers had to act, and it might have been difficult at the time to discriminate between the innocent and the guilty. Unhappily, there can be little doubt that out of those who were punished in the rebellion a large proportion were innocent, while the guilty escaped. Thus at Cawnpore, when it was retaken by the column under Neil and Havelock, and Renaud's detachment first marched into the ruined cantonments, when the bodies of the victims that had been thrown down the well were still quivering with the last remnants of vitality, the soldiers were for destroying all the natives they found in the place. The fact was, they were too angry to discriminate at the time, or to understand that all who had been concerned in the rebellion and massacre had fled and concealed themselves. Only those remained who from their sympathy, or their neutrality at least, felt that they could regard the approach of an English army of retribution with confidence. It was the same everywhere. The guilty took care to get out of the way, the innocent were seized and had to suffer.

But another great evil sprang out of the general excitement to which the civil war had given rise. Not only did

the antagonism of race intensify men's passions, but among the natives themselves society was unhinged. No man could trust his fellow, no one's life or property was safe. It was said to be a common thing for debtors to get their creditors hanged by the simple process of charging them with rebellion and murder. Wholesale confiscations followed the restoration of order as a matter of course. And grievous were the errors committed for want of patient and judicial investigation, or inability to find out the truth. It was a grand time for gratifying old animosities, and getting rid of creditors. Witnesses were to be had, as they always are in India, for a few rupees; and if Ram Singh had a grudge against Ely Bux, or owed him more than it was convenient to pay, he had but to go to the Commissioner and denounce him as a rebel, taking care at the same time to have his witnesses ready, and not forgetting to fee well the moonshee or jemadar through whom the Commissioner was in the habit of conducting his private inquiries. If Ram Singh managed properly, he would soon have the satisfaction of seeing Ely Bux either hanged or beggared for life. Again, there were many such cases as the following. There was a family out of which one perhaps joined the rebels, the rest kept aloof. No matter: they dared not come forward to declare their innocence. They preferred beggary to the chance of being hanged. They trusted that, when the excitement had passed over, they might be able to prove their innocence, and recover something from the general wreck. It was not safe to trust to any evidence of non-complicity. The only safe anchorage was the friendship of the native subordinates and *amla* of the commissioners' or the magistrates' court. The injustice and hardship that resulted was wholesale. Nor would the Government deny that such was the case. In a conference with one of the members of Sir John Lawrence's council on this very subject, he admitted that instances of unjust confiscation and spoliation were so numerous that the Government dare not grant redress in one lest it should



be inundated with similar claims. All this was owing to the system on which the Indian Government will persist in carrying on the executive administration. Special commissions were appointed to conduct these inquiries into charges of rebellion. But it was impossible for special commissioners and magistrates, accessible only through native moonshees, clerks, informers, or servants, to find out the truth. Intrigue and corruption ran rampant; and after the thirst for blood had been slaked, and there were no more victims for the gallows, the most reckless system of confiscation of property began, the confiscated property being bestowed upon loyal characters, the main difference between the loyal and disloyal being that the one had managed to play his cards better than the other.

It is true that in 1858 an Act was passed creating a summary method of procedure for the recovery of estates confiscated by mistake, and special commissioners were appointed under it to adjudicate upon all such cases, and by this tribunal some remedy might have been applied, but it was a very inefficient one. Men were afraid, and it actually was not safe for them, to come forward at that time to assert their innocence. They did not know what evidence might not be arrayed against them. If they had landed property, there were next of kin or some harpies ready to pounce upon it, waiting to see the owner hanged or transported in order to take possession. If during the rebellion a zemindar had absconded to escape the violence of either party, his return was at the risk of his life. Some informer would give evidence against him; he would be seized as implicated in the rebellion, and if he had much property, and it was desirable he should be hanged, he would be accused of complicity in the murder of Europeans. Numbers preferred to abandon their estates altogether, with the chance of recovering them when passion had cooled down, rather than run that risk.

A country cannot of course go through the horrors of civil war without suffering for it. An unsuccessful attempt



at insurrection always entails terrible consequences on the vanquished. The swell of the ocean after a storm is in proportion to the strength of the hurricane. And after such a terrible outbreak of national hatred, and long-pent-up broodings over wrongs, it was not to be wondered at that the subsidence of the storm should be attended by much individual suffering, and that in all cases the victors were not able to discriminate very nicely between the innocent and the guilty, or between degrees of guilt. But there was assuredly no necessity to perpetuate errors committed in the hour of excited passion.

Yet it was to stereotype such a condition of affairs that the Act of Indemnity was passed in 1860. It provides, "that all fines, penalties, assessments, and contributions imposed since the 10th May, 1857, in respect of the destruction or injury of Government or other property, or on any other account connected with the late disturbance, shall be deemed to have been duly levied, and all officers of Government are indemnified from liability therefor." The clause adds rather illogically, "provided that nothing in this Act shall authorize the levy of any fine, penalty, assessment or contribution not already levied." The second clause "confirms" and "makes valid" all acts done since the 10th May, 1857, in connexion with the late disturbances, by officers of Government or by persons acting under their authority or otherwise in pursuance of an order of Government.

It was under this Act that the Government, whenever a case was brought to its notice in which some illegal confiscation had been made or unjust sentence passed, took shelter, and declared itself unable to interfere.

So far as the Act of Indemnity went, no one will find fault with the measure. An Act of Indemnity was indeed most necessary. But it was altogether unnecessary at so short a period, that is, when the rights of property were in question, to confirm the confiscations and the grants that followed. If it had not been for this Act numbers of mistakes



that were made through inadvertence or ignorance during the excitement of the rebellion and of the period subsequent to it might have been rectified, and where injustice had been committed a remedy might have been applied, and redress or compensation granted. But it appeared as if the Government had not the courage to look into its own acts, or as if it dared not review the past history of those few years. Like a spendthrift who will not examine his accounts to see how he stands with the world, but closes his books and determines to continue the course he has entered upon, it shut itself out from all possibility of doing justice by giving the sanction of the Legislature to the acts done between 1857 and 1860.

Act XXXIV. of 1860 is a blot upon the Indian statute-book which never could have found a place there had there been an independent member in Council who was practically acquainted with the condition of the country and the feelings of the people. We are not well versed in the history of Russian legislation with respect to Poland, but I doubt whether there is a page in it so black as that which stereotypes in the rigid garb of law, and places it thereby beyond the power of the executive to cancel, acts done and sentences passed in the height of the passion aroused by civil war and the flood-tide of excitement consequent on victory.

From the frequency with which Indian legislators have of late years amended and altered the stamp duties, it would appear as if a member of Council, whenever he had nothing else to propose, suggested a new stamp law to keep his hand in. Changes in stamp duties occasion a great deal of vexation, trouble, and annoyance which ought never to be unnecessarily inflicted on a population like that of India. Yet in 1860 we had a stamp law, No. XXXIV., repealing former provisions, and laying down a new scale of duties altogether. This was passed on the 2d August, and in the following month a second Act amends the former, and makes certain alterations and additions. The amended Act, however, did not remain in favour very long; for in

1862 another (Act X.) repealed it altogether, and laid down an entirely new scale of duties. Again, five years later, we have the old story repeated—"Whereas it is expedient to amend the law relating to stamp duties," &c. This last regulation proved so faulty that it has been found necessary to supersede it by another enactment, noticed further on, and passed in 1868.

In this year, Small Cause Courts, which answer pretty much to the county courts in England, were extended. These courts for the recovery of small debts, from the decrees of which there is no appeal, would undoubtedly be a great convenience if, as in England, efficient judges could be found for them. But the pay is too small in relation to the usual rate of salaries in India, for civilians of any standing to be appointed. For the same reason, no barrister with a tolerable practice would take the office; and the consequence is, that Government has been forced to appoint in many cases, as judges of these courts, clerks and subordinates—any one, in short, who had a little interest, totally irrespective of their fitness to conduct the duties. It is, of course, not so in all cases. In some cities these courts are under the superintendence of most efficient officers, but these are exceptional instances. And the mischief of having inefficient men is aggravated by the constitution of the courts themselves, which allow of no appeal. To decide promptly in suits that come before a Small Cause court in a large town requires no insignificant knowledge of law. A judge must have his law at his fingers' ends, for he has not time to study and to write elaborate judgments. In other courts, from which there is an appeal, a lawsuit in India takes so long in running its course that a judge has time to work up the question, and even if he errs it is not of so much consequence, because the Court of Appeal will set the matter right. It very often happens that a small sum of money is of as much importance to a poor man as a large sum or a landed estate is to a rich one; and to force the poor man who has to recover



a small debt, of great consequence to him, into a court where the decisions are guided frequently neither by law nor common sense, and from which there is no appeal, is to legislate in one way for the rich and in another for the poor. The establishment and extension of these Small Cause Courts has been much belauded as a wise and useful measure. From the mode in which justice is administered in many of them, I know they are a source of the utmost dissatisfaction, and frequently of the grossest injustice. The Government could easily afford to raise the salary of the judge of a Small Cause Court to 1,000*l.* or 1,200*l.* a year, and for that a barrister or a solicitor with a legal education and some aptitude for his work might almost always be obtained.

The English reader must not forget that the course of justice in the Mofussil is not watched, as it is in England, by the press. The papers could not, if they tried, publish reports of all cases; and if they were to, it would be their ruin, for such matters are not to the taste of most Indian readers. There is therefore absolutely no check upon an inefficient and ignorant judge of a court from which there is no appeal. Either efficient judges should be appointed, or the law should be altered, and special appeals on technical points allowed.¹

The most important Act of all, perhaps, that was passed in 1860, was the Indian Penal Code. As a code it is very complete, and the remark is very commonly made that Indian legislation is far in advance of that in England, in that it possesses a complete and exhaustive code of criminal law and procedure. It is very comprehensive, and it has been wittily said of it, that a man, for almost any action of his every-day life, might be brought under one or other of its sections. This is, of course, an exaggeration. But there can be no doubt that it is an effective weapon in the hands of a vindictive man, and it

¹ This, in fact, it has been found necessary to do by an enactment, which will be noticed in its proper place, passed in 1867.



THE PENAL CODE.

XIII.]
has been found to be so. A stringent code of criminal law was, indeed, necessary for India, and we have got it; but the High Courts of Judicature ought to watch its operations very closely, and check any approach to abuse of the formidable power it puts into the hands of police officers and magistrates. It was commenced as long ago as 1833, and completed by the Indian Law Commission, which has numbered among its members some of the ablest and most experienced Indian jurists of the day.

The propriety of making Englishmen in India subject to the criminal law has been the battle-ground for incessant strife between the official and non-official classes for years past. Any attempt to make the European British subject amenable to a native magistrate's court in criminal matters has been resisted hitherto, happily with success. It will be a bad day for English residents should such a procedure ever be adopted; it will be a bad day, indeed, for India altogether, for there is no doubt the attempt would be forcibly resisted. The framers of the Penal Code, and its supplement the Criminal Procedure Code, seem to have intended to make European British subjects amenable to the ordinary courts of the country, when, in Section 25 of the latter Act, they lay down: "No person whatever shall by reason of place of birth, or by reason of descent, be exempt from the rules of criminal procedure contained in this Act. Provided that nothing in the section shall be held to authorize the trial or commitment for trial before any criminal court, of any person who in respect of the offence with which he is charged is not subject to the jurisdiction of that court."

But this is not held to make them amenable to the Mofussil courts, although there was a very general opinion that it did. In introducing the European Vagrancy Bill in 1868, Mr. Maine remarked: "The Code of Criminal Procedure, though it does not apply to European British subjects beyond the Presidency towns, except so far as it

regulates the procedure of the High Court, Agra, and the Chief Court, Lahore, has a certain modified application to Europeans who are not British subjects, and to Americans." And in a very recent case the High Court, Agra, has ruled that, even as respects maintenance of an illegitimate child, the justice of the peace has no power to compel a European British subject to make a payment on that account. Strange as it may seem, there is at the present moment, even after all that the Legislature has done, and the number of cases that have transpired, the greatest uncertainty as to the criminal law to which the European British subject is amenable in the Mofussil, except in cases that come before the High Courts.

An instance of the working of the Code may be mentioned, as it has often been argued that the Englishman in India should not be subjected to pains and penalties to which the English law does not subject him in his own land. The Penal Code makes—and very properly makes—seduction of a married woman a penal offence. No doubt the framers of the law at the time they penned these clauses had in their mind's eye the peculiar constitution of native society. It is possible they may have had also in their mind's eye the character popularly attributed to Anglo-Indian society. However, there the clauses stand, and the Englishman is amenable to them as much as the native. One or two cases have occurred recently in which an Englishman has sued in the Civil Court for damages against the seducer of his wife, and got them, and then afterwards laid a charge against him under the Penal Code, and the unhappy libertine has had to pay for the indulgence of his licentiousness, and to suffer imprisonment besides. Of course, in these cases, the maxim, "*Nemo bis vexari potest*," &c., is always pleaded, but without effect; for there is nothing in the law to prevent the seducer from being amerced in damages in a civil suit, and nothing in the Penal Code to prevent his being tried criminally. At the same time, it cannot be denied that in such a case we have



a distinct instance where a man "*bis vexatur pro unâ et eadem causâ.*"

But the enactment is very salutary. A general and growing open disregard to the laws of morality is one of the most formidable signs of the decay of a nation. In England there is sufficient respect for the moral law, even amid the growing dissoluteness of modern times, to place a restraint upon the commission of this offence.

Among a certain class, and doubtless a large class, the seducer of woman's virtue meets with but little discountenance and discouragement; but everywhere out of the circle of his own associates his conduct is regarded with abhorrence, and called by its right name. In India, unhappily, society has not yet outgrown the evil effects of the laxity and immorality of a former generation. And not only that, but there are growing up in India, like festering sores in the body politic, communities of men and women calling themselves Christian, who in laxity of morals bid fair to surpass the lowest classes of the heathen by whom they are surrounded. A low style of Englishmen, with blunted perceptions of right and wrong, given to habits of intemperance, are intermarrying with native and half-caste women, who have been brought up with no religious instruction, and no attention to those safeguards which the good sense of the community among the better-educated of the same or an equal class in our own country have erected around the decencies and the obligations of domestic life. The glimpses which our criminal courts occasionally afford of the moral condition of these classes is something appalling. Neither the judges of our courts nor the public have an opportunity of seeing into the depth of these abysses of immorality, but those who are compelled occasionally to look behind the scenes can testify to the ugly revelations of depravity and moral laxity which they thus unwillingly obtain. As to this particular offence, withdraw the penal consequence of it, and you withdraw absolutely the only barrier against the breach of the laws of nature—



of human nature at least—and the law of God. If the writers who advocate the non-application of the penal clauses against adultery knew what they were writing about—at least, if they knew anything of the condition in which large masses of the Anglo-Indian and Eurasian community are living—they would be the last to weaken the barrier which the Legislature has most prudently and wisely erected against a prevalent, and an increasing, and most debasing vice.

The year 1861 was not characterised by so many legislative enactments of general importance as its predecessor. The Criminal Procedure Bill was passed this year, which may be said to have completed what was wanting in the Penal Code. The Procedure was the work of the same master-hands that framed the sister code; and although at its first introduction an imperfect acquaintance with its provisions, and a misunderstanding of many of its clauses, on the part mostly of inefficient and indolent magisterial officers and judges, caused a little confusion, it is exceedingly simple and at the same time comprehensive in its character. I think, considering the great inefficiency we often meet with in India in judicial officers, the proneness to become mere tools in the hands of some astute native, and the readiness with which the Code can be used as a weapon of offence and an instrument of vindictiveness, there ought to be an appeal always open to the High Courts, on points of law as well as of fact; such appeals being admitted only when cause is shown, and not as a matter of course in every case. Many cases may be finally disposed of by the lower courts, and when the appeal has been preferred to the district court the resources are exhausted. I am quite alive to the evils inherent in a system that permits incessant appeals, more especially in criminal matters; but as long as the Indian climate is what it is, it will be impossible to provide a sufficient number of qualified revenue and judicial officers to get through the work properly; and as long as this condition of affairs lasts it will be impossible

for officers to devote so much time to the study of law as to make them efficient judges. And if we want to provide India with a sound administration of justice, it is necessary to open out as much as possible channels of appeal to the High Courts, where the law is administered by trained and experienced officers, whose decisions alone are regarded with confidence by the native suitor. And any law, regulation, provision, or order that checks that resort to the only courts in India where a man can be sure of getting justice, is *pro tanto* mischievous and unsalutary.

One of the most difficult questions connected with the administration of criminal law in India is the police. In 1861 the Legislature endeavoured to provide for an efficient police system in Act V.

The old police which existed before the rebellion had been broken up. Its dissolution was attended with no regret on the part of those who had watched the method of its working, and many experienced men hold to the opinion that much of the disaffection which came to a head in 1857 was to be attributed to the extortion, intrigue, and oppression exercised by the police. Since 1857, various systems—at least, modifications of systems—have been tried, and all have proved faulty. The truth is, the establishment of an efficient and trustworthy police in India is one of the most difficult tasks that the Administration encounters. You have no good material to work with. In the first place, the class of men from which you must draw your constabulary are not to be trusted out of sight of their European superiors. The native of India is by nature cruel, unfeeling, avaricious, and an adept at intrigue. I am not trying to run down the native character. I believe that, intellectually, the native of India is as a rule nearly equal to the European. Nor do I wish to draw any unfavourable comparison in point of morals, for I believe that it often happens that one race lays claim to superior morality over another, while all the time the superiority may be accounted for on the principle that we



are all apt to condemn in others those particular faults to which we ourselves have no inclination, while the sins that we "have a mind to" are passed over among our own class leniently. Leaving this question to the ethnologist or the philosopher, I am safe in asserting that the native of India is by nature cruel and unfeeling. He will inflict pain and suffering on other men, as well as inferior animals, without the least remorse. He will take life, when he can do so with impunity, with comparative indifference. At the same time, he will himself undergo pain and suffering, even loss of life, with an amount of patient endurance and stolid apathy which often astonishes the European spectator. He is avaricious, and will undergo great risk for the sake of a probable gain. For love of intrigue there is, I suppose, no race in the world so prone to it as the Asiatic, and among Asiatic nations none in which it forms so prominent a characteristic as the Indian. The native does not regard truth in the same light that we do, nor does he consider that any disgrace attends the being convicted of a falsehood. At the same time he is clever, sharp, and astute at getting up a story, and with it all, very easily intimidated.

With men whose character has been formed in such a mould, it may easily be understood how exceedingly difficult it is to organize an efficient and trustworthy police force. The police officer can never be sure that the case reported to him has not been fabricated to secure some private ends. Vindictiveness forms as prominent a feature in the Indian character as any of the qualities I have mentioned. If a man loses a lawsuit, it is a common thing for him to revenge himself on the successful suitor by advancing a criminal charge. Perhaps he adopts an artifice to which resort is very frequently made, and places opium or some contraband article in the house or on the premises of his adversary, and then goes and gives information to the police. These articles are, of course, discovered where they were placed. What can the house-



holder urge but that he did not put them there himself? He cannot *prove* he did not, and there is the fact of the discovery against him. In such a case, his only course is to give a *douceur* to the native inspector of police, who, if sufficiently well paid, will tell the magistrate that the man bears a good character, that it is a very common trick to put such articles on another man's premises and then inform against him, and the magistrate probably gives the prisoner the benefit of the doubt.

Since the introduction of the Penal Code, and the facilities it offers for bringing charges, the power in the hands of the police in India has increased enormously. When a criminal charge is brought against a native, the very first thing the attention of a legal adviser of the accused is directed to, next to the facts of the case, is the motive and character of the accuser. From what I have seen of the practice of Indian criminal law in subordinate courts, I should never look upon the fact of a conviction being obtained as *per se* any proof of the guilt of the prisoner. Natives themselves do not so regard it. It is simply a game that has been played out, in which the accused party, now the prisoner, has lost. It is very much to be desired that the ticket-of-leave system should be introduced into Indian jails, and prisoners convicted of petty crimes allowed to go out on good behaviour. The fact of their being there is of itself no imputation upon their moral character; and were it the custom to allow them to go out on ticket of leave, society would have a guarantee for their good behaviour, for the fact of their freedom being conditional would be a strong inducement to honesty, and that of their being convicts under sentence would have but little weight with any one who knows how easily criminal charges are got up, and established to the satisfaction of magistrates and sessions judges. The police, as at present constituted, can get any native convicted of almost any crime they like, provided the crime has been committed in the first instance; but even this is not always necessary, for



it is not very difficult for them to instigate the commission of the crime and then discover a criminal.

That such a state of affairs should exist is very appalling, but it is nevertheless true, and any native independent enough to express his opinion freely will corroborate the assertion I have made, extravagant though it may seem in English ears.

A curious instance illustrative of this occurred not long ago at Lahore. A robbery was committed on the premises of the Lieutenant-Governor, the locality selected for the crime having given it a prominence it would not otherwise have enjoyed. Seven men were arrested. The case was "got up," as it is called—that is, prepared—by the inspector of police. Witnesses were brought forward, and the evidence appeared most conclusive. The case was tried before a careful officer, Mr. Aitcheson, of the Civil Service, who was convinced on the evidence adduced of the guilt of the prisoners, and sentenced them to seven years' penal servitude. After they had been a short time in jail, it was discovered that these men were not the criminals at all. They had nothing whatever to do with the robbery. But five other men were apprehended, the crime was brought home to them, and when they found that escape was impossible they confessed. This occurred at Lahore, the head-quarters of a province, one of the centres of European population, within sight of the chief court, and Government-house itself was the scene of the crime. To these accidental circumstances it owes its publicity. How many cases of a like kind would be brought to light were there any means of bringing them to light, all over the country, where men very inferior to Mr. Aitcheson, who is one of the best officers in the service, have to administer the criminal law unchecked by any supervising authority?

One of the most objectionable clauses of the Penal Code enables a magistrate, upon the report of the police-officer, to enter in a list the name of any resident of the town or district who may be represented to be a bad character.

These lists are not confined to the magistrate. Police-officers make them for themselves; and in point of practice it is not the most difficult thing in the world for a native who has a grudge against his neighbour, to get his name entered in this list. A refusal to lend a policeman money, or a determination in a man to keep his wife to himself, will not improbably result in the money-lender or the husband's name going down in the book of bad characters. The consequences it entails are serious, for in practice the procedure usually adopted in the event of a crime being reported is as follows:—Suppose a robbery, for instance, has taken place at a certain village, and is reported to the police-officer. He sends a native inspector out to institute inquiries. What the native inspector does is to seize the persons in the place whose names are down in this list and keep them in custody. Under the present system a police-constable gets credit and promotion in proportion to the number of convictions he obtains. The consequence is that in most cases, after these wretched people have been in the hands of the police a day or two, the constable or inspector reports to his officer that one of them has confessed. What means are used to extort that confession is a dark chapter in our Indian administration. The charge is stoutly denied by all officials, from the governors of provinces downwards, but from the reports that reach me on all sides there is too much reason to fear that in a great majority of cases violence and torture are used to elicit confessions. Sometimes—very rarely—these matters ooze out, and are brought before the public. They do so very rarely, because the easily intimidated native will run the risk of jail and hard labour, and of seeing his family starve, rather than give evidence against the police, whose power is so great that the only thing to which it can be compared is the police system in France under the monarchy, as represented in the pages of Dumas and other romance-writers. It is hardly too much to say that the whole country is absolutely groaning under this oppression, for

the police, in combination with the *amla*, or subordinates of the magistrates' courts, are all-powerful. A general impression, a universally received opinion, a belief entertained by a whole community of people who are of course versed in the customs and practices observed among their own fellow-countrymen, is seldom found to be without foundation. There is but one opinion among the natives. I speak from experience of the North-West and the Punjab only, but there is no reason to suppose the same remark would not apply to other provinces, for a system similarly constituted is calculated to produce similar results in all parts of the country.¹ A case transpired the other day at Hooghly, which is close to Calcutta, where a man was seized by the police, and in order to induce him to confess to a crime of which he had not in reality been guilty, a brass vessel called a *lota*, full of wasps, was fastened on his stomach. The crime was brought home to the perpetrators in this instance, and they were punished. This occurred close to Calcutta, as in the other instance that transpired at Lahore, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, and within sight almost of Government-house, and within the reach, as it were, of the press. What may we not suppose is the condition of the people in villages and places distant from European supervision? In the face of the stout denial with which the assertion is met by every civil and police official almost in India, I can scarcely expect credit for the assertion of the existence of the system without adducing special instances in proof of the charge against the Indian police. There is, however, the universal belief of the people. There are the revelations made by the Madras Torture Commission in former years; and no one,

¹ Even in Bengal, our oldest province, within the jurisdiction of the High Court of Calcutta, and within reach of the press, where education has made the greatest stride among the natives, the Report of the Police Administration for 1867, at p. 122, vol. ii., informs us that 1,570 men in the force were judicially convicted during the year of the crimes of extortion, receiving stolen property, violence, criminal assault, bribery, theft, &c.



I presume, would be found to say that the present system is less calculated than the former was to foster this abuse. It is, on the contrary, calculated to foster it a great deal more. Formerly the police were a semi-organized body, to whom the success in obtaining convictions held out no certain rewards and no particular benefits beyond, perhaps, the favourable notice of the collector and his subordinates, and such contingent advantages as might occasionally follow ; but now it is almost the only road to promotion.¹

The *à priori* arguments for the existence of the system are borne out by the instances that now and again crop out and come before the public, and symptoms of it have appeared with sufficient frequency in cases that have come in appeal before the High Courts, to lead some of the judges, if I am not mistaken, to pretty much the same conclusions as those I have formed myself.

The frequency with which criminal convictions are supported and mainly depend upon the confession of the accused, ought long ago to have put magisterial and judicial officers on their guard. Men do not commit crimes and then go and confess them. Now and again we hear of instances where a criminal who has the burden of some tremendous crime upon his conscience, unable to bear the mental agony which he endures, confesses it ; but it is contrary to our experience of human nature to suppose that in a large majority of instances criminals should confess, especially when their confession is the principal means of bringing the guilt home to them.

To obviate so terrible an evil I should advocate, first of all, the abandonment of the present practice of making so

¹ What promotion in the police means may be exemplified by the instance of one man I knew, who, five or six years ago, was drawing four rupees a month as a common chiprassee, or messenger, and is now, owing to a rapid rise consequent on his getting into the good graces of the magistrate, a wealthy man with landed property, and a terror to the whole district.



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much of prisoners' confessions. Secondly, the more sparing exercise of the powers conferred by the Criminal Code of entering names in the lists of bad characters. Thirdly, the total abandonment of the practice of retaining accused parties in custody, which is constantly done all over the country, in direct opposition to the law. Fourthly, I would visit with much severer penalties than are usually inflicted the crime of illegal detention and the use of violence to extort confession. But above all it is necessary that magisterial officers should set their faces against the system, and let their subordinates understand that they will incur their very severest displeasure and the heaviest penalties if convicted of it. So far from doing this, we generally find that when a charge of illegal action on the part of the police is made, the European officials, from the magistrate down to the lowest grade of police-officer, unite all their efforts to stifle inquiry from a mistaken sense of *esprit de corps*. It is, however, sufficiently notorious to be undisputed by any one who has the least practical acquaintance with the ordinary method of procedure in criminal cases, that illegal detention in custody of suspected persons for days and weeks together is carried on openly over the whole country. Magistrates will not deny it; on the contrary, many of them boldly avow that if it were not for this process they could never apprehend or convict any criminal at all.

What the fate is which the unhappy wretches undergo during the period of this detention, may be guessed from the fact that it generally ends in a confession, which is followed by a conviction of the prisoner and the reward of the police. I annex in a note¹ a list, in English, of a few of

¹ Binding the arms across the back.

Neck and leg torture—fastening the feet to the neck.

Applying venomous insects to the tender parts of the body.

Holding the head over a vapour of chillies.

Burning with red-hot copper coins.

Causing to stand in the sun, or with a heavy stone on the head.

Causing quantities of salt to be eaten.

[Abrading

the tortures common enough in India to have regular names given to them. Most of them are of such a character as to leave no visible marks or impression on the person of the sufferer. Many are unfit for publication.

The police, naturally enough, are much disliked by the native gentry, because they bring the executive power of the law, as it were, to their very doors. Still, it is inconceivable that the feeling against the present system could be so universal, that the testimony of respectable citizens and wealthy men could be so unanimous as to the corruption which exists and the excesses which are committed, unless there were some foundation for it. We might expect to find the evil-disposed, the unruly and disorderly classes of the community—thieves, vagabonds, and swindlers—to be inimical to any system that brought them within reach of the law; but it is not conceivable that the better classes—deputy-magistrates, bankers, merchants, and others—who have everything to gain, and nothing to lose, from a vigorous executive, should bear testimony to the existence of such abuses, if they were not persuaded that they were practised.

A great deal of what is faulty in the present system is undoubtedly owing to a bad class of police-officers. When the Mutiny had left a vast number of military men unemployed, it was thought an excellent opportunity for providing work for many of them to draught them into the police. Now a military officer does not make a good police-officer. He will look after the drill of the men, and take pains with their get-up and equipment; and so far as military organization goes, he is the best man to impart it. But, on the other hand, he will generally be found very jealous of interference, prone to fall into the hands of some clever, designing native, who makes his superior believe he is honest, intelligent, and trustworthy. Still worse is the class

Abrading the skin and applying chillies.

Tying up by the thumbs, by the legs, by the ear, hair, or moustache, &c.

(*Vide* Fallon's "Legal and Commercial Dictionary.")



occasionally employed—private soldiers who have taken or purchased their discharge. Here and there you find an able man fit to be trusted, but, as a rule, they are inefficient. Magistrates, on the other hand, and assistant-magistrates, have no time to attend to police work, having a great deal more than they can do properly in their legitimate field of labour.

The best class to employ are a class generally underrated, but nevertheless possessing qualities that especially adapt them for this kind of duty. I mean men born in the country, of European parentage or mixed descent. Many of them are men well developed physically, and they have many characteristics, both intellectual and physical, which render them peculiarly fitted for Indian police work. There are several in the lower grades of the force already scattered throughout India, but they are, as a rule, kept down, never allowed to rise above the lower grades, merely because the higher appointments, endowed with better pay, are reserved for those who have a claim on the patronage of the Lieutenant-Governor or the Inspector-General. It is the fashion in India to despise the class, to treat them with every slight and indignity, and to regard them with far less consideration than is accorded to the pure natives. There are among them numbers of high-principled, honourable men, wanting perhaps in some of the features of English and American character, but nevertheless well capable of serving the State, and deserving of a great deal more consideration and promotion than they ever get.

Above all, it is necessary that the importance of an efficient police for India be fully recognised. It is one of those institutions that brings the Administration into close contact with the people. It is the coupling-iron that unites the locomotive with the train. Given a perfect judicial system and courts presided over by efficient and well-trained judges; given a good revenue system, fair settlements, and just taxes; given an army that affords just the amount of protection it ought to afford to the

country without interfering with the civil rights of the people; given conscientious and hardworking magisterial officers; given everything that can contribute to the happiness and comfort of a well-governed country: but if the police are corrupt the people are oppressed, and a just and liberal administration is turned into an instrument of tyranny.

As my excuse for dwelling so long upon this subject, I must urge its great importance; for the police, as at present constituted, are not only a source of danger to the State, from the fact of their being an organized body scattered over the whole continent, being readily armed, far removed from effective supervision, with many facilities for communication and co-operation, but the abuses alluded to render them dangerous in another way. It is the British Government and its officers who get the blame of the oppressions exercised by them in the name of the law. They have it in their power to foster disaffection, to organize rebellion, to bring from their own ranks a drilled army one or two hundred thousand strong into the field, and, what is of much more consequence, they could secure the co-operation of the great body of the people.

From what I have said, it will be clear that one-half the power of evil possessed by the Indian police would be removed if the detective element were eliminated from it; for it is in employing men as detectives that so wide a field for oppression and corruption becomes open to them; and it is in attempting the difficult work of detectives that the officers, always untrained and generally inefficient at such duty, become tools in the hands of men who in power of intrigue, astuteness, and cunning are as far superior to the European officer as he is to them in physical development.

At the same time, it is very desirable that there should be a detective police in India; and a body of men for this particular service might be formed under the supervision of some officer of experience. A nucleus for a force of



this kind exists already in the establishment for the suppression of dacoitee, now under Colonel Hervey. The duties of this department are essentially detective, and the system only requires a little modification to render it well adapted for all the purposes for which a detective police in India is required.

Above all, the system of employing paid informers, which exists extensively in many parts of India, should be put down with a strong hand; and as long as there is a debt and credit account kept at the head-quarters of every district of convictions and acquittals, and men and officers are led to believe that their prospects in the service depend on the proportion which the former bears to the latter, so long will means be used to secure conviction which cannot but result in the utmost possible oppression, and the subservience of the law to private ends.



CHAPTER XIX.

THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATION (*continued*).

Amendments in criminal law—Religious endowments—Foreigners—The Whipping Act—Coolie emigration—Trustee Act—Indian Marriage Act—Non-regulation provinces—The Indian Succession Act—The grand jury abolished—Petty juries—Natives on juries—The Parsee Marriage and Succession Acts—Summary procedure on bills of exchange—Indian Joint Stock Companies Act—Partnership Act—Marriage of converts—Patchwork legislation—Small Cause Courts—Summary procedure for the suppression of outrages in the Punjab—Administrator-General's Act—New Stamp Act—The law an engine of private malice—The Municipal Committee Act of 1868—Shams and fictions—Oude Tenancy Act—Punjab Tenancy Act.

THE principal enactments in the year 1862 of general interest were directed to the improvement of the criminal law. In the beginning of this year the new Penal Code and Procedure was introduced, and it became necessary in consequence to repeal previous regulations and laws upon the subject. Some idea may be gained of the extent to which the criminal law of the land was simplified, and its procedure facilitated, from the fact that an Act (No. XVII.) passed on the 1st May, 1862, repealed no less than the enormous number of one hundred and fifty-seven entire enactments of previous years, and portions of seventy-three others. No greater commendation than is implied in the simple statement of this fact can be given to the framers of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure.



This Act was followed by another passed the same day, 1st May, regulating the powers of the High Court of Calcutta in respect of the administration of the criminal law, giving it certain powers of amendment of indictments, and of finding a prisoner charged with a higher offence guilty of a lower one in the same category, regulating the disposal of prisoners, &c.

In the following year a useful enactment was passed amending the existing law with regard to merchant seamen, defining the relations between masters of vessels and their crews, their respective liabilities, &c. And on the 10th March in the same year, 1863, the Indian Government, by Act of Legislature, divested itself of the charge of the management and control of all religious endowments.

Up to this time, the heavy burden had been laid upon Boards of Revenue, who appointed local agents under them in the different large cities. By this Act the Government, for once and for ever, washed its hands of all responsibility on these matters, and made over the endowments to trustees or committees, selected from the residents of the city or neighbourhood professing the religion to which the endowments belonged. The committee is to be formed in accordance, so far as can be ascertained, with the general wishes of those interested in the maintenance of the mosque or temple, or other religious establishment; and in case of any dispute as to the right of disposal of such endowment, the parties are referred to the ordinary court of the district. With these exceptions, the years 1862 and 1863 were not marked by many acts of the Imperial legislature involving any important principles of administration.

Early in the following year, 1864, it was deemed expedient to introduce some sort of control over the residence of foreigners in India. To prevent any unnecessary interference with the resort of foreigners to its shores, the Act (No. III. of 1864) passed on 12th February



contains a clause empowering the Governor-General in Council to put it in operation in any part of India by means of a notification in the *Gazette*, the official medium of communication: foreign ministers and consuls of course being excepted.

By this law, the Government of India, or any local government, is empowered to order a foreigner to "remove himself out of India," as it is rather quaintly expressed; and if the foreigner shall remain on being ordered to remove himself (which, by the way, he *might* be physically incapable of doing), he is liable to be apprehended, detained, or deported, as the authorities may determine. Certain specified officers are empowered to board vessels and ascertain if there are any of the dreaded or obnoxious foreigners on board, or to require commanders to give information.

I have never heard an instance of the Act being put in operation. It is not difficult to conceive circumstances under which the powers conveyed by it might be exercised with salutary effect.

A great deal of discussion in the public papers and private circles preceded the introduction and passing of what is called the Whipping Act, and which became law in the same month, February.

This is a salutary measure authorizing the punishment of whipping for certain offences, or under certain restrictions. Such offences as theft, or extortion by threat, or dishonestly receiving stolen property, are punishable in this way for the first offence; and for the second offence, such crimes as giving false evidence, in certain cases, assaults on women, robbery, dacoitee, &c. There can be no question that the punishment is a most suitable one in many cases. But notwithstanding the restrictions that are laid down, and the obvious intention of the Act, it is occasionally abused by inexperienced or hot-headed magisterial officers, and its application ought to be carefully watched. It is not intended to be used where the

criminals are men of superior position, high caste, and respectability ; for in such instances the disgrace incurred, which it is not the object of the law to inflict, is of far greater consequence than the pain the criminal suffers. A case has unhappily occurred within my own experience, where the punishment has been inflicted on wealthy men, bankers of repute and position, who were, after the completion of the sentence by which they suffered indelible disgrace, shown to be entirely innocent.

It has been the custom in India ever since the establishment of our law courts, for the presiding judge to have the assistance of Mahommedan and Hindoo law officers, as they were called ; in the former case kazees, in the latter pundits. The foundation of the Mahommedan law is to be found in the Koran, the Hindoo in the Institutes of Menu. Both these sources became, of course, enlarged during the long lapse of time that has ensued since the enunciation of the two systems, by the additions of commentators, and collections of rulings, decisions, opinions, and dogmas of the different authorities, of more or less value, in proportion as they were regarded as orthodox teachers and expounders of the law of their respective systems of religion. The existence among the Hindoos of various schools, holding each its own tenets and interpretation of the sacred texts, within certain specified limits, added much to the responsibility and difficulty of giving judicial decisions in cases that are guided by Hindoo law ; and in the earlier days of our Indian administration these questions were deemed so abstruse that it was considered more than could be expected from a judicial officer that he should be competent to decide them, so he was assisted and relieved of the responsibility by the appointment of a Hindoo and Mahommedan law officer attached to the Sudder or chief court, whose opinion might at any time be asked on cases submitted to them by the court. As time went on, and Hindoo and Mahommedan law came to be studied and better known,



and the rulings of the superior courts in India and of the Privy Council had settled so many principles and afforded so many precedents, it was considered unnecessary any longer to retain the Hindoo and Mahommedan law advisers, and they were accordingly, in a brief enactment of this year, abolished. The best proof that they were no longer wanted is found in the fact that since their abolition they have, so far as my experience goes, never been missed.

It seems strange that in a country like India, where there are so many thousands of miles of uncultivated lands lying idle, and where the most barren waste can be turned into fertile fields by the simple process of digging wells and irrigating the thirsty soil, the system of emigration should be found in vogue. We are accustomed to regard emigration as the last resort of an overcrowded population, as the natural means which people adopt when their native country affords no field for labour. Yet in spite of this, emigration of labourers, or coolies as they are called, from India to the West Indies and the Mauritius and other places, went on to such an extent that the Legislature was forced to interfere to prevent those abuses which almost always attend the wholesale emigration of the poorest classes.

Several laws had been passed in former years, regulating the conditions under which coolies were to be shipped off to foreign lands. But in this year, 1864, an Act (XIII.) was passed, consolidating and amending the existing enactments on this subject. The geographical limits within which the emigration was recognised are defined in clause 4, which provides that contracts may be made with natives of India to emigrate to any of the British colonies of Mauritius, Jamaica, British Guiana, Trinidad, St. Vincent, and to the Danish colony of St. Croix. The local governments at those places are empowered to establish their agents at Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, and the local governments at the sea-ports are authorized to appoint for



each of the ports an officer called Protector of Emigrants, whose duties are sufficiently intimated in his official title, and who is assisted by a medical inspector.

Such an office can be no sinecure if the duties are properly performed. But, considering the condition of India itself, the call for labour in many parts of the country, the ignorance and utter inability of the native coolie to take care of himself, the liability of his being ill-treated and starved, and his utter helplessness in a foreign land, it is a question whether Government would not be acting more in accordance with the principles of humanity, and more to the interest of India, were emigration of coolies to be restricted as much as possible instead of encouraged.¹ It is an object, of course, with many colonies to get labour from India ; and in that view there is some safeguard for the protection and humane treatment of the emigrants, for a report of ill-treatment might have the effect of deterring others from following in their footsteps. It is very well to talk of free-trade and the liberty of the subject. But when we consider how easy it is to impose upon an illiterate ignorant native of the lower class of India, and to induce him by golden promises to leave his home and country for a foreign land ; when it is considered that at the best he can never realize what it is he is undertaking, or to what risks he may not be exposed ; it is very doubtful, I think, whether the Legislature ought not to interfere to prevent means being used to persuade the people to emigrate. At any rate, the system which I know is resorted to, of sending agents into the Mofussil and enticing large numbers of men to desert their homes, or repair to the seaport and thence to emigrate, ought to be discouraged or put down. The men, under such circumstances, are not free agents. It is

¹ This subject has recently (1869) engaged the attention of the Legislature. During the discussion on the new Bill, Mr. Gordon Forbes stated that in the last quarter of a century 455,200 adults had emigrated from Calcutta and Madras alone to different colonies ; and he proceeded to show that the proportion of males among these represented the entire adult population of an ordinary Indian district.



absurd to pretend that they know what they are about to do, and whither they are about to go. If it was impossible for them to obtain their living in India by labour, it would be another thing. But the crying want throughout the country, next to capital, is labour; and to drain the land of its resources in this respect, or to allow it to be drained by emigration agents, appears to me to be bad policy, and an unnecessary sacrifice to the principle of free trade.¹

A most beneficial enactment, as regards the European community in India, was passed in this year. It has been found necessary in England to relieve trustees of the heavy burden of responsibility with which they frequently found themselves laden, often without the least knowing the risk to which they were exposed, by accepting some trust imposed on them. In India, the character of society is such that it was next to impossible to find people willing to undertake the office of trustee at all. There, society is ever changing; life is more uncertain than at home, and almost all who can, leave the country as soon as they have acquired a competency, either in the shape of a pension or of money saved. The consequence was, that it was most difficult for a man who possessed any property in India to know what provision to make in the event of death. He could certainly appoint his friends trustees, but there was almost always a certainty that they would leave the country as soon as they were in a position to do so, never to return. There was the great uncertainty of life, and the general unwillingness to accept the responsibility of a trust in a country where among the bulk of the people the rights and liabilities of property are so little understood, and so little confidence placed in the courts of law. Under these circumstances the appointment of an official trustee was a measure of the highest wisdom.

¹ If these emigrants are asked where they are going, they reply "Chin," or China. Whether it is for service in the West Indies, or Mauritius, or elsewhere that they have been engaged, they are always told, and believe, they are to go to "Chin."

A previous enactment of the year 1863 had, indeed, provided for the appointment of an official trustee in certain cases; but the Act No. XVII. of the present year, 1864, extended the benefit to all classes. By this Act the appointment of official trustee rests with the Chief Justice of the Presidency, by whom he may be removed or suspended, as well as appointed. Such official trustee is to be sole trustee; he cannot be appointed to act with another. The great advantage of the arrangement is that the interests of the *cestui que* trust are looked after by a professional man, who knows how to carry out the duties that devolve on him, and who in fact never dies or goes away. For should the existing incumbent pay the debt of nature or leave the country, his office is taken charge of by his successor, under the authority and supervision of the principal judicial officer of the Presidency. The official trustee is remunerated by a percentage. I think the measure ought to be extended, and in every presidency or province where there is a High Court an official trustee, as well as administrator-general, should be appointed, under the supervision of the court. At present this is not the case, but I hope that before long the Legislature will remedy the defect.

In this year the establishment of Small Cause Courts was very much extended, but as I have already noticed this subject there is no necessity to dwell upon it in this place. And an Act, also of this year, entitled "An Act to provide further for the Solemnization of Marriages in India of persons professing the Christian religion," was passed on the 9th April, 1864, to be repealed and superseded by a more comprehensive enactment in February of the following year. The constant repetition of the unsatisfactory process of passing Acts, and then immediately afterwards amending or repealing them, is a symptom of that haste and inconsideration which characterises Indian legislation, and is productive of great public inconvenience and a prolific waste of time. The Indian Statute-book would comprise



a volume of about half its present bulk if it were not for this incessant patchwork, which is undesirable in most things, but especially to be deprecated in legislation.

This Act (V. of 1865), though called the Indian Marriage Act, yet has reference only to Christians. It provides that marriages shall be celebrated by clergymen of the Established, or Roman Catholic Church, or of the Church of Scotland, according to the ceremonies or customs of those Churches, or by a marriage registrar or by any minister of religion who may obtain a licence, and between native Christians by any persons duly licensed to perform such marriage. A clause was added giving validity to marriages which had been solemnized previously by persons not especially ordained. This was necessary to legalize matrimonial connexions which ministers of dissenting denominations located as missionaries in various parts of India had been frequently in the habit of effecting.

Parties who are to be married by a minister of religion not an episcopally ordained clergyman or a clergyman of the Church of Scotland, must give notice according to a form prescribed, stating names and length of residence and the church or chapel in which the ceremony is to be solemnized. Marriage may be performed any time between 6 A.M. and 7 P.M.; and if desired to be held in a private dwelling, notice is to be sent to the marriage registrar, to be affixed in a conspicuous place in his office. But no clergyman of the Church of England may solemnize a marriage in a private dwelling if there is a church at the place, without licence from the bishop. The consent of parents or guardians is necessary in case of a minor, not being a widow or widower; and the person whose consent is necessary may prohibit the marriage. As regards native Christians, the law is somewhat peculiar. Any person, being a Christian, may be licensed by the local government, or the Chief Commissioner of a province, to perform the ceremony, which consists in the parties coming before the person so licensed, or in the presence of two witnesses



repeating the following formula:—"I call upon these persons here present to witness that I, in the presence of Almighty God, and in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, do take thee to be my lawful wedded wife (or husband)," or words to the like effect.

This is almost as simple a process as that which tradition ascribes to ceremonies conducted by the blacksmith of Gretna Green. In these cases the age of the man must be above sixteen, and that of the woman thirteen.

An important power was conferred by the Legislature upon the Governor-General in Council in this year, viz. of extending any of the acts and regulations to what are called non-regulation provinces, or provinces heretofore not under the regularly established law of the land, but under special regulations, and the half military, half civil domination of a Chief Commissioner, who again acts under the direct supervision of the Supreme Government of India.

The non-regulation system is to a certain extent an anomaly. When a province has recently come under British rule, usually by conquest, there are obvious reasons why the new administration imposed upon it should be of a more simple character than that which experience has shown to work the most efficiently in those parts of the empire which have been for years under British rule. After the excitement of war is over and the sword has been sheathed, and a whole province submitted to a conqueror, it is desirable to heal as fast as possible the wounds which have been inflicted by military operations. In the older provinces, where British rule has been long established, the work of administration is necessarily conducted through the ordinary machinery used in all civilized countries. The work of government could not be carried on without. Each branch of the administration must have its own department—law, revenue, finance, police. No longer unsettled by war, the population betake themselves to cultivating the arts of peace; commerce and agriculture thrive, and the conflicting interests which the various circumstances



of life in individual classes and members of the community beget, require the establishment of courts of law and a fixed system of civil and criminal jurisprudence. The theory is, that a province should progress gradually from a condition of semi-barbarism—in which war, if it does not find, at any rate too often leaves it—to a state of civilization, in which an elaborated system of administration under a code of laws is absolutely indispensable. Hence has arisen in India a practice of always subjecting a newly annexed country to a rule whose elements are two-thirds military and one-third civil. A Chief Commissioner is generally appointed at the head of the government, who is assisted by deputy-commissioners in charge of large divisions of the province, under whom a host of assistant-commissioners of various grades conduct the details of the executive. In the Punjab, as is well known, this system was introduced after the conquest in 1849, with this slight modification, that instead of a chief commissioner there was a board of administration appointed, consisting of three officers, two of whom were Sir Henry and Sir John Lawrence. It was found that the board did not work so well as a government, one and undivided, and Sir Henry Lawrence, a military officer, was removed, and the third member of the board otherwise provided for, leaving Sir John (then Mr.) Lawrence, Chief Commissioner. The officers under him were selected, some from the army and some from the civil service, as is generally the case in non-regulation provinces. There is no regular scale laid down to determine the proportion in which the two services contribute to the *matériel* of government. But there is this peculiarity about all non-regulation provinces, which is too often overlooked by those who have not a practical knowledge of our Indian system, viz. that in such provinces the officers are all *selected*. Very many of them are military men; and as the step from military employ and pay to civil is a most advantageous one for them, these appointments are always much coveted: and although they are



occasionally given away on the principle which too often regulates the disposal of patronage in India, viz. favour, yet as a rule the military officers appointed to civil posts are above the average. I do not mean by this remark to cast any slight upon the regimental officers. Great offence was taken some years ago at a passage in the *Edinburgh Review*, where, speaking of the old system in vogue before the Mutiny, the writer laid down the law that "the *élite* of the native army were selected for the staff, and the refuse only left with their regiments." This remark was exceedingly unfair to the regimental officers; for so far from men being selected for genius or ability for the staff, it is well known that no such principle was in reality observed, but that those who were lucky enough to have interest managed to get posts on the staff, and those who were unlucky and had none remained with their corps, going through the drudgery of regimental duty on half or a quarter the pay which their more fortunate comrades were receiving in staff employ. Still the effects of the system were much the same as if a selection had been made. For an officer taken out of his regiment and appointed to any particular special duty, turns his whole attention to that duty. He knows that his prospects in the department to which he has been removed depend upon his efficiency, and that if found inefficient or incapable he will be inevitably remanded to his regiment without a hope of ever having another chance; so that although not selected for any *spécialité* at first, or for any particular genius or ability, he is yet in the same position as if he had been so selected. There is a field for his ambition in which he may rise to the head of his department, and, compared with his less fortunate comrades, with their colours he has many more opportunities for distinguishing himself and bringing himself into notice. This is the secret of the great success which almost always attends the government of a non-regulation province at first. Almost all the principal offices are filled by selected men, by men who



have already more or less distinguished themselves. In the inferior posts, although the selection may not be actually made for any efficiency, yet when a man is once appointed the effect upon his character, so far as stimulating him to exertion and animating him with a praiseworthy spirit of emulation is concerned, is the same as if he had been selected by merit and not by favour. There is a field opened before him full of rich prizes, such as might awaken any man's ambition. And the result is zeal for the public service, which speedily develops itself into *esprit de corps* throughout the whole administration.

Under what is called, in contradistinction, the regular system, on the other hand, there is no such healthy principle at work. There the administration runs on in a groove. Everything goes by rule. It is seldom in the power of the Government to make any selection for particular offices. Seniority claims its due, and an officer who, if he has shown no particular talent, has nevertheless done his duty creditably in the lower branches of the service, is entitled to promotion when it comes to him in the ordinary course of things. This system bears much the same relation to the non-regulation as that of regimental duty does to the staff. There are certain grades, and certain duties required of officers in those grades. So long as an officer does that duty ordinarily well, there is no law or precedent for keeping him out of promotion when it falls to his lot to find it. In the non-regulation provinces, on the other hand, if a man distinguishes himself, he may be advanced to a higher appointment without reference to any rules of the service regulating promotion by seniority. It is obvious that while as an exceptional arrangement the non-regulation system is found to work admirably, it is just because it is an exceptional arrangement that it is capable of being adopted. You could no more introduce the non-regulation system everywhere than you could introduce the practice of promoting junior regimental officers over the heads of their seniors on account of some



gallant conduct in the field, or the display of some peculiar administrative ability in garrison or quarters.

Many writers who have seen the success of the non-regulation principle in new provinces, have become so enamoured of it that nothing will satisfy them but its universal introduction. These men forget its real character altogether, and overlook the fact that its introduction would at once upset all established rules and rights of promotion, and occasion the utmost possible confusion in every department of the service.

But the non-regulation system is not without its faults. At first it is no doubt admirably adapted for a newly-annexed province. It serves to introduce gradually a much more complicated system of revenue and judicial administration than that to which the people have been accustomed; there is more personal communication between the governing and the governed classes than is possible in the regulation provinces, where the machinery of government is more elaborate, where the ordinary routine of departmental labour must be observed. It is a sort of half-way house between the despotic and capricious rule under which the people have lived prior to annexation, and the scarcely less despotic but less capricious government to which they have henceforward to be subject. But beyond a certain time there is little doubt this system, if persisted in, becomes a clog upon the progress of the country. After the first flush is over, there is danger of the non-regulation provinces falling back. Routine asserts its influence over the minds of officials. The men under whom the province first made such rapid strides towards development, retire, and are succeeded by a second generation of officials, who have not the same inducement that their predecessors had to exertion. It is in the essence of zeal to grow cool with lapse of time. When everything was new, it was comparatively easy to work up to a high standard. Upon the unformed mass of clay every effort at design left its impression; when the whole has been



manipulated, and the design complete, it is comparatively dull work maintaining the fabric in the condition to which it has been already brought by the labours of predecessors. In the course of a few years the stimulus given to trade, commerce, and agriculture in a province rich in maiden resources, gives rise to those innumerable complications of rights that eventuate in lawsuits. Property has increased tenfold in value, and claims to it are fought out with efforts proportionate to its value. Intricate questions of law have to be decided in the courts, and the judges are military officers or civilians, who have had little or no training in judicial matters. Every branch of the public service has grown in importance, and accordingly requires greater administrative ability, and more acquaintance with general principles of law, revenue, and police, than the officers, who worked well enough when their task was that of reducing to order a newly-conquered territory, perhaps possess. It is necessary to introduce laws and regulations, codes of procedure, and technical restraints. To work with these new principles grafted upon the old is far more difficult than to carry on the administration in a long-established groove. For these and similar reasons it is not to be wondered at that the non-regulation system, excellent at first, after a while halts : it is well if the progress be not in the wrong direction.

That such is the case will be clear to those who have any practical acquaintance with provinces which have been long under our rule, and for some cause or other not brought under the regulation system. There are several districts in this condition scattered over India, and I am persuaded that it would be advantageous were it the rule in dealing with a newly-annexed province, to bring it, after the lapse of a certain time during which the non-regulation system has been allowed to work, under the regulations. To advocate, as some do, the extension of the former system all over the country is to ignore its essential characteristic, which is the principle of selection.

One most important Act was introduced in 1865—the second contribution to the Indian Statute-book made by the Law Commission. It is intituled “The Indian Succession Act;” but as such a law necessarily interferes with long-established customs, it has been deemed advisable at first to confine its operation to classes other than Hindoos, Mahommedans, or Buddhists. To one accustomed to English law, some of the provisions of this Act seem strange innovations. For instance, it starts by declaring that no person shall by marriage acquire any interest in the property of the person whom he or she marries, nor become incapable of doing any act in respect of his or her own property which she or he could have done if unmarried.¹ Succession to immoveable property is regulated in this enactment by the law of the place where the property is situated, to moveable by the law of the place of domicile. The husband and wife respectively have the same right in regard to the property of the other dying intestate, and this rule applies to a person not domiciled in India marrying in India a person domiciled there. In the matter of construction of wills, the law of legacies, duties of executors, &c. this Act mostly follows the English law. The Act is clear and comprehensive, and forms a valuable addition to the Indian Statute-book.

An Act passed in this year, called “The High Court Criminal Procedure Act,” gave rise to a good deal of discussion at the time, and involves one very important principle. Up to this time the procedure as regards Englishmen in India accused of crimes was much the same as that in vogue in England; that is to say, a bill was submitted to a grand jury before the case was sent up for trial. This Act (No. XIII. of 1865) abolishes the grand jury altogether. Perhaps it was found inconvenient to assemble a grand jury; perhaps it was thought that when High Courts were increased and established in

¹ Since this was written a bill has been introduced into Parliament regarding the rights and property of married women.



certain places in the Mofussil, it would be difficult to find material for grand jury at all. And there is a good deal to be said in support of the second suggestion; it would be difficult to supply a grand and a petty jury at places like Allahabad and Lahore, for instance. It is, however, very necessary that there should be somewhere or other a machinery to effect that for which it is the custom in England, and was the custom in India, to assemble grand juries. A provision is indeed inserted in the Act, which gives the judges of the High Court the power to act in some measure in place of the old grand jury; for it lays down, that if when the charge has been sent up to the High Court it shall appear to be clearly unsustainable, an entry to that effect may be made any time before trial, and such entry shall have the effect of staying proceedings, but shall not operate as an acquittal of the person so charged until after the expiry of three years, during which period no fresh charge shall have been brought forward in the same matter. So that in effect a man in this position who has been committed on insufficient grounds is, as it were, remanded for three years, being at liberty of course, but liable to be apprehended and committed again if anything else turns up to render his committal on the old charge practicable. Such a law is open to great abuse in India, where a criminal charge is under the Penal Code a very common weapon of revenge or animosity, and where, with a police so easily open to corruption, fabricated evidence is not difficult to procure. The court very seldom exercises this power, perhaps for this very reason, deeming it more fair to the accused that he should be tried and acquitted altogether than that he should lie under the ban of a criminal charge for three years in a measure at the mercy of his enemies. I have only known this power exercised once, and that was in a case where the committal was made on most insufficient evidence; in fact the charge was totally unsustainable, but it was palpably made from a vindictive feeling on the part of the committing officer, who

had the satisfaction of causing a man against whom he bore a long-established grudge, to travel two or three hundred miles at much personal inconvenience, and drag a number of witnesses all the way to attend the summons of the High Court. All the satisfaction he got was that he was told he might go back again, and I believe the expenses of the witnesses were defrayed by the State. An old Act passed some years ago protects magistrates or justices of the peace from any penalty for exceeding their duty or making illegal commitments, provided they acted *bonâ fide*, and of course it is next to impossible to show there was not *bona fides* when the person whose action is impugned declares there was. Still, cases of the grossest abuse of power on the part of magistrates constantly occur in India; and it is very common indeed to hear an officer having magisterial powers, under the excitement of anger promise himself revenge for some slight insult or wrong, imaginary or real, by bringing the offender up under some section or other of the Penal Code. Indeed the criminal law has become a great deal too much a weapon of offence instead of what it ought to be, a protection to society.¹

This Act regulates the assembly and constitution of juries before which European prisoners are tried. Here one or two innovations have been made on the English system.

In this Act as well as other Acts regulating the procedure of High Courts, in trials of European British

¹ An amusing instance of the abuse of power has been brought to my notice since this was written. In the neighbourhood of the Hill settlements it is the custom for native sportsmen,—“Shikaries” they are called—to shoot pheasants, partridges, and other game, and sell them to travellers passing by their villages. The Deputy Commissioner of Simla was anxious to introduce some restrictions in the shape of game laws upon the practice of destroying game out of season. One day when he was at a village a few miles from Simla, one of these shikaries brought him a brace of partridges, or a pheasant, either for sale or as a present. He got very angry, abused the man for killing game out of season, and then and there ordered him off to jail.



subjects, it is laid down that out of a jury of twelve the concurrence of nine is sufficient for conviction ; that is to say, provided the judge concurs with the opinion of the nine. If less than nine or more than three vote for acquittal, the prisoner is acquitted. Another innovation upon what would be considered in England, I think, the right of an Englishman under our constitution, is the admission of natives on the juries that try European British subjects. The prisoner may insist that the majority shall be Europeans or Americans, or seven out of the twelve. This, I think, is objectionable. There are many reasons why it is injudicious to put natives upon the jury in such cases. In the first place, it is by no means necessary to do so. In every place where European British subjects are tried there are always plenty of Englishmen to form a jury. The law allows officers or non-commissioned officers of the army to be empannelled when necessary. Now in every large station, certainly wherever there is a High Court established, there will be found quite a sufficiently large community of English or American residents to supply any number of jurors ; and should by any accident these fall short, then there will be at least one regiment of infantry or a battery or two probably of artillery, from which any number almost of jurors may be taken. There can, therefore, never arise a necessity for empannelling natives.

It is not often that out of the Presidency towns we can find natives sufficiently well versed in the English language to act as jurors and adjudicate on cases conducted in English. A very different standard of linguistic knowledge is required to enable a man to understand and follow legal proceedings in a criminal case, the speeches of counsel, the questions and answers of witnesses, and the judge's charge, to that which is usually attained by natives who know enough English to keep accounts and copy letters.

In addition to this, the practice needlessly gives rise to an immense amount of dissatisfaction, for no Englishman



will ever submit except by force to be tried by a jury upon which natives are sitting. And lastly, it is objectionable on principle, not so much on account of distinction of race or colour as of religion. And I am of opinion that no Mahommedan or Hindoo should be allowed to sit in judgment upon a Christian. Were the natives converted even to an outward profession of Christianity, as the blacks for instance of Sierra Leone, who are allowed to sit on juries for the trial of white men, it would be different. As it is, I consider that an Englishman is debarred from that which he has a right to claim certainly in any British colony or dependency, a fair trial, by the practice of allowing Mahommedans and Hindoos, and men of other heathen religions, to sit upon their trial as jurors.

By this Act the High Court may direct the trial of a prisoner to take place in another than the usual place of its sitting, when one of the judges repairs to the spot indicated and holds the trial. And the Government of India, or the governors of the minor Presidencies, may associate with the judge of the High Court a sessions judge or a barrister of upwards of five years' standing, who is called the associate judge; but this power is not extended under the Act to the High Court, North-West Provinces, or the Chief Court, Punjab.¹ I never knew of a case in which the right was exercised.

A special enactment providing a certain class with the luxury of a divorce law, and defining the law of marriage, was passed in this year, at the instance, so it is stated, of the people themselves. It is called the "Parsee Marriage and Divorce Act," and is confined, of course, to the class

¹ As long ago as 1862, the system of trial by native juries was introduced as an experiment in six districts in Bengal Proper. But it has been found not to answer. No sooner are the summonses for the jury issued, than all sorts of efforts are made by the friends of the prisoners awaiting trial to tamper with the jurors. The official reports on the administration of justice complain that it is almost impossible to obtain a conviction before a jury in cases of false evidence and forgery.



indicated. This was followed by a "Parsee Intestate Succession Act;" neither of which, however, call for any special notice in this place, further than to show that the principle of special legislation for particular classes is fully and amply recognised by the Indian legislature whenever any particular class of natives require a special enactment to be passed to suit their views, prejudices, or interests.

Early in the following year, 1866, a bill was passed providing a summary procedure for the recovery of money due on dishonest bills of exchange, &c. ; and the preamble goes on to say, that as inconvenience is felt in consequence of the laws of British India being in some particulars different from those of England in matters of common occurrence in the course of trade, it is intended to remedy that inconvenience by amending the law. Under this Act a defence to a suit upon a bill of exchange or promissory note, not more than six months over-due, may only be made by permission of the judge upon defendant's paying the amount into court and showing a good defence on the merits, and after judgment the court may under special circumstances stay execution. The Act was at first to be in operation within the jurisdiction of the High Court ; but a clause in it permits local governments to extend it to the jurisdiction of the courts within their respective provinces.

The great stimulus given to commerce by the joint-stock system all the world over has been communicated to India perhaps even in a larger proportion than to other countries ; and accordingly we find that the Indian legislature has uniformly followed at a short distance of time the English in regulating the action of joint-stock companies.

The statute of 1844 was followed in India by Act XLIII. of 1850, and the provision of the winding-up Acts of 1848, 1849, also embodied in the Act XLIII. of 1850. Again, the Limited Liability Act of 1855 and 1856 was followed in India by Act XIX. of 1857, which embodied the provisions

contained in the English statute of 1855 and 1856. Act No. X. of the present year, 1866, called the "Indian Companies Act," which was introduced by Mr. Maine in 1865, is a copy of the English Companies Act of 1862, with certain alterations necessary to adapt it to India. The most important of these modifications are,¹ for instance: in the place of an examination of the affairs of a company under the orders of the Board of Trade, in India inspectors are appointed by the local government. The provisions in the Indian Act relating to reference to arbitration are taken from the Railway Companies Arbitration Act, 1859, and the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act of 1845; whereas in the English statute "both these sets of provisions are only introduced by reference." In India, the time within which notice is to be given to the registrar of the consolidation and division of the shares of a company, or of the conversion of its capital into stock, is limited to fifteen days; in the English statute there is no such limit. The provisions in the Indian Act as to annual balance-sheets and audit are compulsory; in the English Act, optional. A penalty is imposed in India on any director, officer, or contributory of a company being wound up who fraudulently secretes books, papers, &c.; this offence is not provided for in the English law. Section 45 of the old Act XIX. of 1857, relating to contracts made on behalf of a company, stating that they may be made under the common seal of the company, or without, merely bearing the signature of a person, or made verbally by one acting under authority, express or implied, of the company, has been reproduced in the present Act, although it is not inserted in the English Companies Act of 1862. And finally, as regards the examination of the affairs of a company by Government inspectors, the Act does away with the distinction made by the statute between banking and other companies having a capital divided into shares. Mr. Whitley Stokes remarks—and I concur with him—

¹ *Vide* "The Indian Companies Act, 1866," by Whitley Stokes.

that it is much to be regretted that the Indian legislature has continued the winding-up jurisdiction conferred by the old Act XIX. of 1857 upon the district courts.

A new Post Office Act was passed this year, which does not call for any particular comment. But this was followed by another, amending the law of partnership, which is of more importance. In this it was enacted that an advance of money by way of loan, under a contract in writing that the lender shall receive a rate of interest varying with the profits, shall not of itself constitute the lender a partner. An explanation was added which perhaps was not unnecessary. If a retiring partner, for instance, is entitled to receive payment of a share in the capital or other proceeds of a business, and after the value of such share has been ascertained he agrees in writing to allow the same to remain or to be used for the purposes of the business, he shall be construed to have made a loan which does not lay upon him the responsibilities of partnership. The same principle is applied to a servant or agent, a widow or child of a partner, the two former of whom may be remunerated by a share in the profits, and the two latter receive an annuity from the profits, without being held to be partners.

In every country where the prevailing religion is a heathen one which allows polygamy, and Christianity is making progress, more or less, a great difficulty has always arisen as to the mode of dealing with a convert who has more than one wife. It is no new difficulty, for it beset the earliest preachers of Christianity even so far back as the times of the Apostles. Dr. Colenso proposed to overcome one phase of it by permitting the Christian convert who was a polygamist before conversion to retain the privilege after baptism. This plan, however, which rather yielded to than overcame the difficulty, did not meet with approval, and the crisis became one of such frequent occurrence in India that, after a great deal of discussion, the Legislature of that country resolved upon making an



endeavour to meet it. Accordingly, Act XXI. of 1866 provides that, if a native husband becomes a convert to Christianity, and in consequence of this his wife, being a native, deserts or repudiates him for the space of six months, he may sue her for conjugal society, and similarly if the wife be the convert. But a somewhat peculiar construction is given by the Act to the word "native;" a native husband or wife shall be held to mean a man or woman domiciled in British India who shall not be a Christian, a *Mahommedan*, or a *Jew*. "Native law," in like manner, means any law or custom having the force of law of a person domiciled in India other than the three classes mentioned. No appeal lies against the order of the court, which, if it be not the High Court, must be the principal court of the district. By the Act, cohabitation as man and wife is to be held presumptive evidence of marriage, and refusal to cohabit proof of desertion, and of its being in consequence of change of religion. If either party be under age, the suit may be dismissed, but may be revived again within twelve months. If the desertion is found to be the result of cruelty or adultery, the suit is to be dismissed; and when a male petitioner has two or more wives, the suit is to be dismissed if he is cohabiting with either of them. In the procedure under the Act, the Legislature seems to have followed the model of the French divorce law. Thus, when both parties are before the court, the judge interrogates the respondent as to whether he or she refuses to cohabit with the petitioner; and if the respondent be the woman, and she refuses, the judge may order the case to be adjourned a year, directing that in the interim the parties shall see one another at a time and place fixed by the judge, and in the presence of any one he likes to permit to be present, with the view of ascertaining whether or not the respondent freely and voluntarily persists in the refusal. At the expiration of this period the petitioner appears again in court, and shows that the desertion or repudiation has continued,



upon which the respondent is again interrogated by the judge, and if she still refuse to cohabit with the petitioner the judge shall dissolve the marriage. If the petitioner is the wife, the husband is interrogated, and on his refusal to cohabit the case is adjourned for a year, as before, but no provision is made for the meeting of the parties unless at the wish of the wife. At the expiration of the year the marriage is to be dissolved if the respondent still refuse to take his wife back.

When this Act was before Council, there was a considerable amount of excitement and agitation regarding it. The Mahommedans were the first to take alarm at what they considered an infringement on their religious privileges and social customs having the sanction of their religion. They held meetings and got up petitions praying to be exempted from the operation of the Act, and their prayer was granted, as it is stated that the Mahommedans are not affected. When the Hindoos saw that the Mahommedans had gained the point, they also began to agitate. They held meetings at many of the principal cities in Upper India, and petitioned Council, but without effect ; the Government being of opinion that they only moved in the matter because they were encouraged by the success which attended the Mahommedan agitation, and the Hindoos declaring that the Legislature exempted the Mahommedans because we were afraid of them, but did not regard the prayer of the Hindoos because they are a less formidable body politically ; and I am inclined to think that the Hindoos were not far from the truth.

Since the Act became law, I have not heard of any discontent or dissatisfaction expressed with regard to its operation, and the excitement on the subject, so far as one can see, has subsided.

Another very important measure of this year was an enactment conferring on the High Court much the same powers as those exercised by the Court of Chancery in England with reference to property vested in trustees, the



operation of the Act being confined to cases to which the English law is applicable.

The legislation of 1867 was essentially patchwork legislation. Out of thirty-seven Acts passed this year, with the exception of nine or ten, all were amendments of former laws, or measures passed to supplement something which had been omitted by neglect or a hasty oversight. Thus, Act IV. was passed to define the meaning of the word "offence" in the Penal Code, and to indicate how certain sections of the code were to be construed. The next, Act V., extends the Penal Code to the Straits Settlements. Act VIII. exempts horse-racing from the operation of a previous enactment of 1848 for avoiding wagers, but places the limit at which a subscription or contribution to a purse shall be recoverable at law at 50*l*. The next Act makes "further provision" for suits by and against the "Comptoir D'Escompte" of Paris. Again, we have the Small Cause Courts patched up in Act X. of 1867, by an enactment which provides that in a suit for a sum above 50*l*., if a point of law arises the judge must refer it to the High Court. If this is acted upon, it must entail a great deal of work upon the judges both of the Small Cause Courts and High Courts. It is an obvious makeshift to supply the place of an appeal. The great principle of the Small Cause Court, so much belauded, was that there was to be no appeal from it. I have pointed out how injudicious such a measure is in India, and so we find in 1867 that the Legislature, fully aware of the injustice which is often perpetrated by ignorant judges of these courts, though it will not cancel that part of the court's constitution which precludes appeal from obstinate adherence to a false principle, goes a roundabout way to secure the advantages of some sort of supervision by enacting that in all cases for above 50*l*. where a point of law arises, it must be referred to the High Court. It is difficult to see the superiority of this measure over the old practice of allowing an appeal when the parties who must be



the best judges of their own interests are desirous of appealing.

Then we have an Act XII., amending the law relating to the custody of prisoners ; an Act to remove doubt as to the legality of certain judicial appointments ; another patching up of the Licence Tax Act passed three months previously ; another amending the Currency Act of 1861, and empowering the Governor-General to transfer, for currency purposes, any town from one presidency to another. Act XXXI. supplies an omission in the Railway Act and Penal Code, and makes railway *employés* public servants. Act XXXIII. amends the law levying fines for smuggling. Act XXXV. enables the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab to appoint an additional financial commissioner. The reason of this was, that the arrears of work in the Financial Commissioner's office had accumulated to such an extent that there was no prospect of the single commissioner being able to get through it, and the consequence was grievous injustice to the suitors, who could not get a decision without ruinous delay. The only peculiar circumstance about it was the fact that most of the arrears accumulated under Sir Donald MacLeod, the Lieutenant-Governor's, own tenure of office as Financial Commissioner. The object of Act XXXVI. was to remedy "an error" in a former enactment—"Whereas the said Section number 'XII.' is an error, and it is expedient to correct the same, it is briefly enacted as follows," &c.

In addition to this patchwork legislation, one or two measures were passed this year which require especial notice. Five fiscal enactments may be dismissed without discussion: the Moulmein and Bassein Port dues ; the Pandhari Tax, a native licence-tax of two per cent. upon incomes ; the Customs duties ; and the Licence Tax and drawbacks on transshipment Acts.

In Act XXIII. of 1867 we have another instance of that special legislation which I have shown is at times necessary in India, but the principle of which is always scouted



whenever any special legislation is solicited for the European community. The frequency of assassination in the Punjab, and the insufficiency of the existing machinery to suppress the practice, showed the necessity of some more stringent measures than the ordinary operation of the law. This enactment sanctions more summary procedure: forfeiture of all property belonging to the fanatics (a very useless provision, seeing that the only property this class of men are usually possessed of is the knife with which they take their victim's life, and a few rags to cover their nakedness), and disposal of their bodies as the Commissioner shall direct, which refers, of course, to the burning of the bodies of Mahommedan fanatics. Execution immediately follows sentence, and no confirmation is required as necessary under the ordinary procedure.

The objection to Act XXIV. of 1867, or the Administrator-General's Act, is that it appoints only one officer for the whole of the Bengal Presidency, whose head-quarters are of course in Calcutta; the consequence of which is an overpress of work, which leads to all sorts of ruinous delays, and an utter inability for persons in the Mofussil, concerned in estates which fall into the hands of the Administrator-General, to get their business attended to. They are helpless in the hands of the subordinate clerks of an enormous office, who may, by postponing their business, ruin them. Unless some change is made in a few years' time, the abuses arising from delays and disappointments in this branch of the public service will rival those of the English Courts of Chancery in former years, before the besom of reform swept out the dust which had accumulated in the holes and corners of our system. There is a High Court for the North-West Provinces and a Chief Court for the Punjab; why should not these large and important provinces have their own Administrator-General? The limits of the Presidency of Bengal are now merely nominal. The North-West Provinces is as much a separate Presidency as Bombay or Madras, only the use of that word "Presi-



deney"—a foolish and unmeaning term at any time—has served to perpetuate the results of conditions which no longer exist. The appointing of one Administrator-General only for Bengal, the North-West Provinces and the Punjab, Oude and Central Provinces, in order that the profits from the whole field may be swept into the coffers of one office, is a job which could only occur under a government like that of India.

The only other act of general importance passed in 1867 was the Stamp Act. I have before alluded to the frequency with which the stamp duties in India have been altered within the last few years. The Stamp Act of 1867, which relates only to fees on suits, and legal processes, is of very questionable advantage. It is highly unpopular, and very much disapproved of by certainly one-half the officials, who, from their connexion with the judicial bench, are able to judge of its effect. The stamp required on institution of suits is so enormously high that it has had the effect already of suppressing litigation in a very marked and a most dangerous degree—dangerous, because in a country like India, where the people are in many parts just emerging from a state of semi-barbarism to one of civilization, there is always a tendency to recur to the wild and lawless habits of their predecessors, and to settle disputes by the arbitrament of the club and the sword, rather than by that of the law. More especially is this the case with regard to agrarian differences; and the dues levied by the new Stamp Act upon suits for lands are peculiarly heavy.

A discussion took place upon this Stamp Act in Council, on the 20th March, 1868, when the Licence Tax was under debate, and some valuable opinions were expressed with reference to remarks which fell from Mr. Massey during his budget statement for 1867-8, which I shall briefly detail, both because they are a concise embodiment of my own views, and because, coming from men who have passed most of their lives in an official career, they will



naturally carry more weight than might be accorded to a simple exposition of my own sentiments. Mr. Massey had stated that the new stamp duties on legal processes were calculated to yield £680,000 to the revenue. But he added that the committee appointed to draw up the scale of duties gave a very different opinion as to the estimated revenue to be derived from this source, and admitted that the result was doubtful. The proceeds of the new scale of duties realized £400,000 only. Alluding to this, the Hon. Mr. Minchin, whose official career has been passed in the Madras Presidency, remarked that the stamp law weighed with peculiar severity upon two classes, the rich—or, he should rather say, those who had contingent claims to great wealth—and the very poor. With reference to the first class our old stamp law was very moderate: there was a limit to the initiatory fee, which could in no case exceed two hundred pounds. At present the initiatory fee was practically without limit.¹ He had heard of a case which had occurred in Calcutta since he had been there the last few months. A suit was brought for the inheritance of valuable property; the suit was dismissed on a point of law, not fact, viz. that a certain person through whom the claimants inherited their rights was found not to be in existence, and the right had not devolved in the way that was claimed. That person was in existence, and was desirous to come forward and give the necessary right, but the case could not be re-opened without the payment of a

¹ When the property the subject of the suit exceeds 2,000*l.* and does not exceed 10,000*l.*, the initiatory stamp is 10*s.* plus one rupee per cent. on the difference between 2,000*l.* and the amount of value sued for. When the value of the property exceeds 10,000*l.* the rate increases at eight annas or half a rupee per cent.

In suits for immoveable property the amount of duty is to be computed according to the market value of the property in suit. In suits for immoveable property paying revenue, when the settlement is temporary, eight times the revenue is payable, and when the settlement is permanent, ten times; and in suits for immoveable property not paying revenue, twenty times the annual net profits of the property shall be taken to be the market value.



second initiatory fee of £8,000, which the parties could not afford to pay. In another case, in Burmah, a suitor had paid £1,250 as an initiatory fee, and the suit was dismissed on the ground of no jurisdiction." Mr. Minchin added that he supposed he should not be far wrong in estimating the diminution of suits under the new Act at 25 per cent. "In ordinary commercial affairs this would be an excellent stroke of business, but when we consider that the article of which we had sold less and for which we had charged more was presumed to be justice, he did not think it was a matter for unmixed congratulation."

Another objectionable feature in this Act was the extending of stamp duties on all ordinary petitions and on petitions in criminal proceedings. In Madras, as Mr. Minchin shows, "the first would have struck at the root of our whole system of administration, and it had to be got rid of by an order which the Government then passed, an order ruling that all petitions connected with the land revenue should come under the exemption for petitions relating to matters connected with a settlement pending its formation. Such an order was absolutely necessary for the due transaction of the revenue work in that Presidency, unless it was intended to employ revenue officers solely as machines for collecting eight-anna stamps." The stamp on petitions in criminal proceedings was justified by Mr. Maine on the ground of acting as a safeguard against false and vexatious criminal complaints; and here, I think the impost of a small duty a salutary measure. "Bengal Proper was the great litigating province of British India, and it was established that the result of taking the stamp off complaints in criminal cases was that out of 177,000 persons charged with offences in the single year 1864, 105,000 were never brought to trial and more than half the rest were acquitted. Mr. Justice Hobhouse (Calcutta High Court) had explained to the Council last year how these 105,000 cases never came to be tried. There was a quarrel in the village;



an angry villager went to the court, paid one of the persons hanging about there a few pice (copper coins) to write a complaint in which the name of his bitterest enemy was put down as defendant to a criminal charge, while the persons whom he hated with an only moderate hatred were named as witnesses. The defendant and witnesses were thereupon summoned by the police: the complainant never appeared, and the charge was dismissed. But the defendant and his witnesses went home, having lost two or three days' work, and labouring for life under the discredit (which it was honourable to the Bengalese to consider a discredit) of having been brought up before the court on a criminal charge."¹

The reconsideration of this Stamp Act was after some discussion postponed till next year, 1868.

The practice of employing the law courts as an engine of private malice in India is very common indeed. The intense dislike which every respectable native has to be summoned to a court; the fear of being insulted by the police and subordinates, perhaps of meeting with discourteous reception from the overworked officer presiding; the delay; the distance to be traversed there and back, and consequent waste of time; the hatred that all well-bred natives have for the *amla* of the courts—who are, generally speaking, men belonging to the lowest station of society, who have improved their worldly position and raised themselves in life perhaps by successful intrigues, by interest, by accident, by superior education at Government colleges—all combine to make forced attendance at court what it ought not to be, in spite of Mr. Maine's assertion, a degradation. Too often European officers avail themselves of this to make some man who has perhaps defied their authority or rendered himself obnoxious in some way, smart for his independence. Much more frequently do the members of the *amla* avail themselves of it. There is therefore, every reason why a petition of complaint

¹ *Gazette of India* (official), March 28, 1868.



involving the attendance of persons either as defendants or witnesses, should bear some charge. And in an extreme case, or cases where real poverty might prevent a complainant from presenting a petition, a verbal representation can always be made to the magistrate.

Of the legislative enactments passed in 1868, there are but few that require any detailed notice. Several of them are of a mere technical character, others relate to local matters, while two or three of more general interest, and of a more important nature, have already been noticed in previous chapters. The first bill passed during the year was for "Shortening the Language used in Acts of the Governor-General in Council, and for other purposes." The "other purposes" relate to matters of detail, and are of no interest to the general reader. The second Act of the year was on the subject of duty leviable on Cochin pepper; the third authorized the Local Government of the Punjab to invest petty officers with certain powers; the fourth had reference to certain villages in the Bombay Presidency belonging to certain chiefs, exempting them from the operation of the regulations in force in that Presidency; and the fifth authorized the Local Government to delegate certain powers to the Commissioner of Sind.

Act VI. of 1868 is also of a local character, affecting only the North-West Provinces. Those provinces, however, contain thirty millions of inhabitants; and the enactment, therefore, which is called "The Municipal Improvement Act," and involves some weighty principles, is of too great importance to be passed over without notice. The main principle it enunciates is to render the municipal organization compulsory. Up to that time the voluntary system had been maintained; that is to say, municipal committees were imposed on those towns only which intimated a desire to be placed under their authority. By the present measure the Lieutenant-Governor has power to extend the provisions of the Act, by a notification in the local Government Gazette, to any



town in the territories under his government. The Lieutenant-Governor appoints the members. It is, indeed, provided that he may direct these appointments by election; but in India, where no machinery exists for any kind of representation of the people, this privilege of election is a mere dead letter, and in effect the members of the committee are nominees of the Lieutenant-Governor. He also appoints the official members, who are not to be more than one-third of the whole; he appoints the president and vice-president; and the shadowy fragment of independent action alone is left to the committee, who are allowed to select their secretary! Indeed, as Mr. Massey remarked in the debate on the bill, the committee, "so far as it professed to assume the status of an independent body, was a phantom and a fiction." In its executive character, however, the committee is by no means a phantom, for it wields the formidable power of defining the persons and property to be taxed, and the amount and rate of taxes to be imposed. After all that has been said and written lately about the duty of teaching the natives the art of self-government, it might be supposed, perhaps, that the engine of taxation would in some measure be under the control of the people, or that they would have some voice in the matter, and something to say to the mode in which the money is expended. Such a principle, while it accords well with the theory of Indian government, as represented to the English reader in official minutes, ministerial journals, and the speeches of Secretaries of State, is totally opposed to the practice. The Lieutenant-Governor appoints the committee, the Lieutenant-Governor nominates the president and vice-president, the committee impose the taxes, and the Lieutenant-Governor sanctions them. The whole Act, which was framed on the model of another Act of a similar character for the Punjab, passed the year before as an experimental measure, is in effect nothing but a machine to invest the head of the local government with



powers he would not otherwise possess, and by the fiction of a sham committee lessen the responsibility which would otherwise rest upon him alone.

These municipal committees, which are now in operation pretty well all over India, are—except in Presidency towns, and in a few exceptionally situated settlements in the Punjab, where the official element is weak and the independent European element abnormally strong—the merest fiction it is possible to conceive. The collector, magistrate, or commissioner, or one of his subordinates, attends the meetings, and signifies his wishes, to which the native members bow acquiescence. Should there happen to be a non-official European member present, he is immediately out-voted if his views in any way differ from those of the official president; and finding himself a mere dummy, if he is a wise man, or a busy one, he does not waste valuable time by attending a second meeting. Entertaining very crude notions of political economy, these committees wield, often with fatal power as regards the interests of trade, the tremendous machinery of taxation with which the Legislature has armed them. The octroi system, condemned universally by every political economist, has been introduced into almost every town in Mofussil India, and by its extension in the shape of transit duties has perpetuated in our own provinces the mischievous system which British officials are so eager to condemn in native States. The money wrung from the poorer classes—for it is they who suffer mostly from octroi duties levied on the necessities of life—is often spent in useless ornaments, the construction of elaborate municipal commission offices, and other buildings adapted to Western tastes and Anglo-Saxon ideas of municipal requirements, but very little appreciated by poor natives who have to stint their families of food and clothing in proportion to the impost levied on their daily food. Sir William Mansfield, in the course of the debate, described his visit to a “town of some ten thousand inhabitants, in which there



was a beautiful new market-place, a handsome dispensary, a new square, and a cross erected at the meeting of certain roads," all out of the public funds. In other towns some scientific member of a municipal committee will exhibit with pride a museum full of stuffed birds or animals, prepared at the expense of the stomachs of the poorer classes, who must have sacrificed, it is certain, some portion of their daily food to provide the wherewithal to stuff specimens for the museum which a chance visitor may go to see once in six months, and write his name in a book. Woe betide the poorer classes of the towns and cities whose collector or magistrate has a taste for ornamental building, gardening, or the collection of curiosities! Here and there the funds produced by the octroi, in the hands of a thrifty official of sound judgment and some knowledge of engineering, of physics, and of the principles of sanitation, are well spent in measures really adapted to the wants of the citizens. The roads are kept in repair, order and cleanliness preserved in the streets; but too often—such is the infirmity of human nature—the tendency is to the square, the market-place, and crosses Sir William Mansfield speaks of, which catch the eye of a Lieutenant-Governor on a tour of inspection, and secure the rapid promotion of the energetic district officer who has evinced so much public spirit.

Of course, strictly speaking, the octroi duty should be leviable neither on articles in transit nor on those which have already paid duty, such as import duty, elsewhere. But in many places the transit duty is avoided only by the greatest possible inconvenience—timber, for instance, being taxed if it is allowed to remain in the neighbourhood of a town more than a few hours, although it is merely lodged there temporarily *en route*. Cotton and piece goods are with equal difficulty, inconvenience, and expense cleared without having to pay a duty, and in some places are not allowed to escape at any cost. The whole business of a town in the North-West was ruined in a few months by



the tax upon cotton in transit, which used to be taken to the place for screwing and forwarding by rail. The cotton agents and screwers left the spot, and set up their screws elsewhere, and the tide of commerce was regularly turned aside into artificial channels. Such abuses, of course, could not exist in England, or in any country where the voice of public opinion could make itself heard; but in official-ridden India, unless some English resident, or travelling cotton-speculator, or merchant should happen by chance to have his attention drawn to the matter, there is no hope for the native, who could not get his complaint heard even if he had the courage to prefer it. The official members of these municipal committees attend the meetings, put resolutions to the "vote," and gravely record the proceedings, as if they were not conscious of the ludicrous burlesque they were enacting. The whole thing is regarded as a laughable farce, a matter for unceasing amusement to all outside the walls of the Commissioners' office, who watch the solemnity with which the fiction is kept up;—except indeed to the poor, who can provide a few rags the less for their wives and children in the biting cold of the winter months of Upper India, a few sticks the less to cook their scanty meals, and who have to stint their half-filled stomachs daily of one anna's worth of grain, ghee, and sugar cut off by the octroi duty.

Undoubtedly improvements have been effected in most of the towns where this system has been in operation for some time—improvements, that is, which strike the eye of the visitor. The new market-place, and the square, and the museum are improvements, present a pleasing appearance, and convey a favourable impression to the traveller on the look-out for objects of external interest. But there is no record of the cost at which these improvements have been effected—cost, not in money, but in the sufferings of the poverty-stricken classes who form the bulk of the population in every native town. The whole system is far in advance of the times; it is a crude and premature effort to



engraft the ideas of Western civilization, and the habits of advanced communities of people born and bred under free institutions, upon the dry and withered branch of Oriental pauperism, not only of substance, but of public spirit. Half a century hence, if English capitalists were encouraged to invest and settle in the country, and teach the people to think and act for themselves, municipal institutions might not be out of place. At present they are a fiction and a sham, and fictions and shams never yet answered any useful purpose.

Act VII. had reference to procedure in the Chief Court of the Punjab. VIII. repealed former enactments now out of date, to the extent—such is the fecundity of Indian legislation—of 296 entire Acts, and portions of almost as many more. Act IX. was the Licence Tax, which has been noticed elsewhere. Act X. related to the refund of certain customs duties. XI. exempted timber from impost dues. XII. amended the law of military courts of requests. XIII. exempted the King of Oude from the jurisdiction of the civil courts; a measure of very doubtful expediency, inasmuch as no one living within the limits of British territory ought to be exempt from the jurisdiction of the courts. XIV., called “The Indian Contagious Diseases Act,” placed brothels under wholesome restrictions and regulations. XV. had reference to stamps and fees in the High Court; XVI. to the appointment of subordinate native judicial officers. XVII. appointed the commission to inquire into the affairs of the Bank of Bombay, and empowered them to take evidence on oath. XVIII. related to Small Cause Courts in the Neilgherry hills in Madras; and XIX. was the famous Oude Tenancy Bill.

The most important feature of this enactment was the provision for compensation for tenants’ improvements. By these provisions, a tenant who has made improvements on his holding may not be ousted, nor have his rent raised till he or his representatives have been compensated by money, or the grant of a beneficial lease, or by both, for such



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improvements ; provided the expenditure for improvements has been made within thirty years of the date of such proposed enhancement of rent or ejection. This, of course, applies also to any one from whom the tenant has inherited. It is an important question, what are improvements ? and they are defined to be such works as increase the annual "letting value" of the land : "the construction of works for the storage of water, or the supply of water for agricultural purposes, for drainage, and for protection against floods ; the construction of wells, the reclaiming and clearing of waste lands, and *other works of like nature.*" In case a landlord tenders to a tenant a twenty years' lease of the land in occupation, at the annual rent then paid by the tenant, or at such other annual rent as may be agreed upon, such tenders, if accepted, will bar any claim to compensation. A tenant, with right of occupancy, is defined as one who within thirty years of the 13th February, 1856, has been in possession as proprietor in a village or estate ; in such case the tenant has a heritable, *but not a transferable, right* in the land which he cultivated or held in such village or estate on the 29th August, 1866, provided that such land has not come into his occupation for the first time since the 13th Feb. 1856 ; and provided also that no such tenant shall have a right of occupancy in any land in which he or any co-sharer with him possesses any underproprietary right. No tenant having a right of occupancy can have his rent increased, except on the ground that the rate is below that usually paid by the same class of tenants for land of a similar description in the same village ; or that the rate paid is more than $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. below that of rent usually paid by tenants of the same class not having a right of occupancy for land of a similar description in the same village ; or that the quantity of land held by him exceeds the quantity for which he has previously paid rent. Tenants-at-will, of course, must pay according to agreement, or, if there is no agreement, according to the rate paid the previous year.

The part of the Act which gave much dissatisfaction to the talookdars and landlords was that relating to distress for arrears of rent, the provisions of which section of the Act are deemed too favourable to the tenant.

The six following enactments were of a local character.

Act XXVI. empowers municipalities to provide Lock hospitals within their jurisdiction; and Act XXVII. exempts certain instruments from the provisions of the Registration Act. The next, No. XXVIII., was the only other important legislative measure of the year, entitled the "Punjab Tenancy Bill." This defines a tenant having a right of occupancy as one who has paid no rent or service in respect of his holding, and whose father and grandfather, uncle and grand-uncle, have occupied the same holding free of rent or service; or as one who has involuntarily parted with proprietary rights otherwise than by forfeiture, and who has continuously occupied such land from the time of parting with his right in it; or as one who is the representative of a person settled as a cultivator in the village in which the land occupied by such tenant is situate, along with the founders of the village; or as one who is, or has been, a jageerdar of the village, or any part of it, in which the land occupied by him as tenant is situated, and who has continuously occupied such land for twenty years. It adds the important provision, therein differing from the most objectionable features of Act X. of 1859, that no tenant by mere lapse of time shall acquire a right of occupancy. The provisions relating to compensation for improvements of the tenant are the same as in the Oude Law. The Act confers important powers of alienation upon tenants with occupancy rights, that power being limited only by the landlord's right of pre-emption, a right which is open to him for a month only.

The agitation that was caused by the discussion on these bills has been alluded to in a previous chapter.¹ There is

¹ Chapter XIII.



a Society at Lahore, consisting of the leading and influential native gentlemen of the Punjab, who meet at stated intervals, read papers, and discuss questions of public interest, and their proceedings are published in a journal, or sort of magazine. The following paragraphs, extracted from a resolution or memorial which the society drew up and forwarded to Mr. Brandreth, who brought in the first Punjab Tenancy Bill, contains matter well worthy of perusal. The evil noticed by the memorialists lies at the root of the whole present system of Indian legislation :—

“4. We would respectfully desire to state that in our opinion no propositions can be more unfounded than those lately advanced : *firstly*, that there was no such thing as property in land in the Punjab in former days ; and *secondly*, that there were no recognised customs affecting the relations between landlord and tenant. We affirm that such customs are clear and generally recognised by the people, and that property in land has always existed in the Punjab. The report will show that, in our opinion, there are no such customs as to give to a tenant adverse rights of occupancy against a landlord.

“5. We would, with the utmost confidence in the generosity and benevolence of His Excellency and the Legislative Council, beg to recall the words of Her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, in her Proclamation of the 1st November, 1858, and to point out that in accordance with her gracious promise, our ancient rights, usages, and customs should be duly regarded :—

“‘We know and respect the feelings of attachment with which the natives of India regard the lands inherited by them from their ancestors, and we desire to protect them in all rights connected therewith, subject to the equitable demands of the State ; and we will, that *generally in framing and administering the law due regard be paid to the ancient rights, usages, and customs of India.*’

“6. In conclusion we would desire to observe, that, on this and on other occasions, great injury has threatened to fall on the people of this province, from important measures being passed or introduced in Council without the feeling of the people having been sought or ascertained : we would respectfully request that no measure affecting materially the social relations of the people, or their ancient rights, usages, and customs, be introduced into the Legislative Council before the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab has been empowered to call together a Local Council, and has thus ascertained the opinion of the people and the facts of the case.

“We deprecate, however, all and any legislation which disturbs ‘ancient rights, usages, and customs.’”

Several other very important bills were introduced into Council at the latter end of 1868 which will probably become law during 1869: such as the new Law of Evidence, a draft drawn up by the Indian Law Commission; a new Stamp Act, most urgently required, although there have been so many alterations in the stamp law of late years; the Land Improvement Bill for the North-West Provinces, introduced by the Hon. John Strachey, with reference especially to a recent ruling of the High Court, Agra, to the effect that a tenant under Act X. of 1859, and in accordance with local custom, is liable to be ejected for digging a temporary well or planting trees without permission of the landlord—a ruling which to the socialist legislators of India seems to be unjust in the extreme, whereas it is not only in accordance with law and custom, but with equity too; for if a tenant may dig one well without permission of his landlord, he may dig ten or twenty till he has drained the circumjacent land and rendered it hopelessly barren. But these measures at the close of 1868, being in embryo, do not call for discussion in a chapter on Legislation, which might not inaptly have concluded with the last sentence of the resolution of the “Anjooman” or Debating Society of the Punjab, so far as it has reference to real property: “We deprecate, however, all and any legislation which disturbs ‘ancient rights, usages, and customs.’”



CHAPTER XX.

FINANCE.

Mr. Wilson's policy — Extravagant expenditure — Retrenchment — Loans — Mr. Wilson's review of Lord Canning's war policy — The tariff modified—Income Tax—Salt Tax—The opium revenue —Mr. Laing's budget—Disappearance of the deficit—Failure of Mr. Wilson's measures.

THE history of Indian Finance, as a system, may be said to have commenced with Mr. Wilson's appointment as Finance Member of Council, or Finance Minister, as the post should, properly speaking, be called. The year previous to that, indeed, Lord Canning had published the budget statement for the first time, thus showing that he was the first of Viceroys to recognise the existence of the governed class as an element in the commonwealth. But Mr. Wilson was the first to reduce the financial administration of India to a system. He laid the foundation upon which his successors raised the walls of the edifice.

It would serve no purpose, in reviewing the history of the past ten years, to dwell upon the details of the annual budgets as they came out, each correcting the errors of the preceding one as the regular estimate tested the accuracy of the budget estimate. Still less would it be worth our while to enter into a discussion of the difference which has frequently arisen between the accounts as presented to the Indian public, and as laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State. But it may not be uninteresting or uninstrucive to glance at the general features



of Indian financial administration, tracing the absorption of the enormous deficit Mr. Wilson found on his arrival, and pointing out briefly the principal method by which the accounts were reduced to their present condition of average equilibrium, reviewing as we go on the main features in the policy of the different administrators who have successively tried their hand at the difficult subject of Indian finance.

The difficulty of the task that lay before Mr. Wilson has been very much overrated, and in reality the deficit was reduced to equilibrium more by simple retrenchment than by any elaborate system of finance. In the earlier part of the period under review, that is to say in the year 1860-1 and 1861-2, the course which the Chancellor of the Indian Exchequer had to pursue was very plainly marked out indeed. India was in the condition of a country gentleman who had for years neglected to look after his affairs, or if he had looked after them he had done so in such a slipshod and unpractical manner that he had failed to realize the extent to which he was involved. So long as he had a balance at his banker's available for current expenses, he cared not to inquire how his account was kept at credit. Whether the money was realized by loans or mortgages on his property he never paused to inquire, nor until he called in the aid of a man of business was he aware of the extent to which he had been living beyond his income, mainly in consequence of the extravagance of the establishment his steward kept up. To the enormous deficit that awaited Mr. Wilson's consideration there was but one remedy—retrenchment.

The finances were burdened with large, overgrown, useless institutions, on which public money was being squandered in a way that can only be pronounced reckless. Costly military and naval establishments were devouring the resources of the empire. The superfluous part of the one was an actual source of danger to the State; the advantage derived from the other was wholly out of proportion to its



cost. The great benefit that India derived from the appointment of a financier straight from home was that when he set to work vigorously to use the shears in cutting down expenditure, there was no influence in the country strong enough to oppose him. Aware, as the Indian Government must have been, of the necessity for retrenchment, it is doubtful if it would have had the strength of purpose and the energy to deal effectively and summarily with vested interests. It would indeed have used the shears here and there, cut down expenses in this department and that, but its measures of reform would have lacked that energy and vigour which a financier enjoying the confidence of the Government at home, and backed up by public opinion, could freely exercise. The labours of the Military Finance Commission, to which Mr. Laing alludes in the most flattering terms in his budget speech for 1861-2, must not be overlooked. But the Military Finance Commission, with a Wilson or a Laing to back it up, could do a great deal more than if it had to wage the war against vested interests, aided only by the countenance and support of Indian civilian statesmen.

Mr. Laing thus alludes to the services performed by this commission: "If the future historian of India should have occasion to mention that in the year 1861 India was saved from a great financial danger, that history will be very imperfectly written if it omits the names of Colonel Balfour and his colleagues Mr. R. Temple and Colonel Simpson. Nor would I willingly omit to mention the name of Captain Rennie, to whom, in conjunction with the civil and military finance commission, it is mainly owing that we have been able to effect important reduction in the navy and marine."

Without in the least seeking to undervalue the services rendered by these officers, it would be affectation to pretend not to see that of all duties that can fall to the lot of public men in office, that of cutting down expenditure and reducing establishments *on paper* is about the easiest. They

have no responsibility, because the onus of carrying out their recommendation for reduction does not fall on them. Their duty, in fact, is limited to looking through the list of establishments and recording their opinion as to what may, with the least sacrifice of efficiency, be struck out.

There was not much room for hesitation in 1860-1. During the campaign that succeeded the breaking up of the old Bengal native army in 1857, an untold number of native troops were enlisted. In spite of the patent fact that we had very nearly lost India altogether in consequence of the disproportionate strength of our native army when compared with our European, not two years had passed before we had a much larger native force on the rolls than before the Mutiny.

In April 1857, or immediately before the Mutiny, the total strength of the Indian army, including the Queen's troops, was—Europeans, 45,522; natives, 266,852; maintained at a cost of 11,500,000*l.* a year in India, besides 1,250,000*l.* in England: but this was below the proper cost, as this limit was only attained by allowing the effective European force to remain dangerously below its established strength. The real cost should have been about 12,000,000*l.* in India, and 1,500,000*l.* in England. In 1858-9 this item alone rose to 21,000,000*l.* in India and 3,750,000*l.* in England, showing a total increase of 11,000,000*l.*, to which must be added a million more for military police. Meantime, another million a year was being thrown into the sea by the maintenance of the Indian navy, an establishment than which probably none more utterly useless was to be found within the limits of the British Empire and its dependencies. To say that the native army as it stood in 1858-9 was useless is only to state half the truth. It was a positive evil, not only eating up the resources of the country, but a real source of danger. We had hordes of undisciplined levies recruited from the lowest classes, draughted into corps of police and told off in regiments,



and officered with some of the numerous remnants of the commissioned ranks of the old Bengal army, who were drifting about after the general wreck in search of employment. The rabble, after being drilled for a short time, and armed and dressed in "Khakee rung" (as their uniform, a dust clay-coloured dress, was called), were marched off to occupy stations formerly garrisoned by the old Bengal sepoys, or despatched when they could be trusted in the field in pursuit of some remnant of the rebel army seeking cover in the jungle. What with disbanded native soldiers, the old army which had mutinied, and new levies and police, the country was overrun with military of all sorts.

In one sense, the second native army may be said almost to have grown up of itself. During the height of the storm, when amid the strife of elements the captain's voice could not be heard nor could any gain access to him, each man was constrained to do his best to confront the danger that immediately beset him. And this is where the individual character of the officers belonging to the Indian services, both the army and the civil service, come out so strongly. On a sudden, struck by the shock of a great emergency, men who had before shown no genius for command, still less for diplomacy, evinced all the qualities of experienced leaders and prudent statesmen. Thus numbers of officers all over the country raised bands of men of greater or less strength, either on their own authority, or with that of their immediate superiors, depending for eventual confirmation by the Government of an act which the emergency alone could justify. The Government did confirm all such measures, and not only confirmed, but kept on the men so raised in the pay of the State. The bodies of troops, however, so got together were far more efficient than the levies raised *en masse* by Lord Canning's order, who were for years afterwards the greatest rabble, probably, that ever appeared on a regimental parade-ground.

The purpose these levies were intended to serve is very doubtful, unless the opportunity for giving employ to a

number of unemployed officers could be regarded as a justification for the expenditure. Weeded, and worked up into something like military organization, these levies eventually formed the nucleus of the bulk of the present native army.

Of a different class altogether were the Goorkha, Sikh, and Pathan regiments, raised by several old Punjabee officers, who, from the extraordinary influence they possessed over the natives with whom they came in contact, were enabled to inspire their men with daring intrepidity and almost servile attachment. Men of these races commanded by really good officers are worth any number of the Hindoostanees, who can never be depended upon. The history of India is full of instances of battles lost and dynasties overthrown by the treachery of Hindoostanee soldiers; and if we had studied history to any purpose, we should not have been taken by surprise in 1857.

But the increase in the cost of our military establishment was not confined to the Bengal Presidency. Mr. Wilson, speaking in February 1860, says: "If I compare the increase of military charges alone in the three Presidencies at the present moment as compared with 1856-7, the increase in Madras and Bombay is as great as it is in Bengal. And if I compare the number of troops, according to a return recently furnished to me, in 1857 and at the close of 1859 in the different Presidencies, I find the increase in Bengal barely five per cent.; in Madras it is fifty per cent., and in Bombay thirty per cent. But these returns do not include the military police, the civil corps, and new levies in Bengal, nor the new police in Madras; they are confined to the troops under the Commander-in-chief of each of the three Presidencies."

This army consisted in 1859, including military police, of 353,783 men, being an increase of 60,000 upon the native army of 1857.

To reduce this enormous military establishment within reasonable limits was a most salutary, indeed a necessary measure of reform, but it is absurd to contend that it



called for any great financial skill. It was simply cutting down the weeds which had sprung up during the abnormal condition of the country in 1857 and 1858. It is likely enough that the operation was performed far more effectually and speedily under the supervision of the new financial member of Council, than it would have been without his aid and support. Without the stimulus imparted by the energy and independence of men straight from England, the bureaucratic and clique-beridden Government of India might have played with the task, and lingered over it for years. The disbanding of corps and reduction of establishments necessarily entailed loss of emoluments to commanding officers and others, each of whom would have set in motion the complex machinery which in a government like that of India controls the disposal of patronage. To save this regiment and that levy from the shears of the Financial Commissioner, the powerful influence which at times is exerted with so much effect in Calcutta and Simla drawing-rooms would have been directed to spare this tree and that from the axe of the woodman. With men like Mr. Wilson and Mr. Samuel Laing at the Governor-General's right hand, men who were held responsible by the Government and people of England for the state of the Indian finance, the work of wholesale reduction was carried on without interruption. The reduction, however, it is fair to add, had been commenced before Mr. Wilson's arrival. In 1859-60 the military expenditure in India was brought down to 17,750,000*l.*, and in England to 2,750,000*l.*, making a saving of 4,250,000*l.* In 1860-1, under Mr. Wilson's supervision, a further saving of 2,500,000*l.* was effected, and in the following year a further reduction of 3,220,000*l.*

It was on the 18th of February, 1860, that Mr. Wilson put forward his statement, which was looked for most anxiously by the whole European community of India, and that section of the English public who felt any interest in the condition of our Eastern empire. After



alluding briefly but eloquently to the recent disturbances and the subsequent military successes, Mr. Wilson prefaced his statement with the following remarks :—

“ Severe as was the storm, and numerous as were the wrecks strewed over the land, it is now restored to complete tranquillity, and the Indian political atmosphere was probably never at any former time so settled and clear. But though this is undoubtedly the case, though by the power of our arms and the courage of our civil administration a well-founded feeling of greater security pervades India than at any former time, yet it is unfortunately no State secret that an evil of the greatest magnitude is corroding the very heart of our political existence. Sir, if we have surmounted one class of difficulties, we have still to grapple with another class, which, if not so exciting and alarming, is still of the most pressing and urgent character. It would be in vain that we could boast of the success of our arms, of the restoration of peace and tranquillity, if we could see no end to that financial disorder which so notoriously prevails at this moment. That our situation is serious, that it is even worse than I expected, I am bound to admit.”

On the 1st August, 1859, the Secretary of State had told the House of Commons, that the deficiency of income, as against expenditure, for the year ending 30th April, 1860, would be 10,250,000 £ . In the following month, another statement, drawn up in India, showed a deficit, including the Home charges, of 6,499,981 £ . This rapid decrease in the amount of the deficit was hailed as a good omen; and it was said in England that the neck of Indian financial difficulties was broken. Mr. Wilson then proceeds to dispel this illusion. He shows that whereas the income of the year was 37,706,209 £ , the charges, including the value of stores from England, was 41,770,008 £ , leaving a deficiency of 4,063,809 £ , which, however, was reduced by the net profits of railway receipts to 3,783,109 £ . In addition to this there was a



sum due on Home charges of 5,507,020*l.*, raising the whole deficit to 9,290,129*l.* This was an improvement, however, upon the former year, for the deficit on the 30th April was upwards of 13,000,000*l.* In the three years dating from the commencement of the Mutiny, the net deficiency of income as compared with expenditure was upwards of 30,000,000*l.*, which added to the deficit of 1860-1, after making allowance for reduction of expenditure, and increase of revenue by the fiscal measures then sanctioned, amounted to 38,410,755*l.*; and this, as Mr. Wilson takes care to impress upon the attention of his hearers and the country at large, is the sum to be debited to India on account of the Mutiny.

The ruinous system of loans by which it had been the practice to supplement the deficiencies of the Indian exchequer had resulted in burdening the country with a debt of no less than 97,851,807*l.* involving an annual charge for interest of about four millions and a half. Of this system Mr. Wilson speaks as follows :—"Our deficiencies have been supplied by loans in England and in India, and what has been the result? And here I claim the special attention of every one, native and European, who feels a real interest in India. What was the state of our debt before the Mutiny, and what is it now? and let us ask, what will it soon be if we are to resort to the miserable, the disreputable expediency of continuing to borrow in time of peace? Loans may be justified in time of war, and, as the consequences of war, for a year after; but even then they should not be exclusively relied upon." In another place, he adds that by returns furnished to Parliament the last Session, out of fifty-nine years which elapsed, in the present century, in no fewer than forty-four of those years have considerable, often large, additions been made to the Indian debt, while in fifteen only have diminutions taken place; so that the normal state of Indian finance may be said to be deficiency of income and addition to debt.

No one will, of course, for a moment think of disputing



the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's opinion condemnatory of the system of incessantly resorting to loans. But there is one argument in favour of Indian State loans which cannot apply to other countries, and it is that the wealthy classes among the natives, the independent chiefs and others, are thereby induced to give a guarantee for their fidelity to the British Government. By investing largely in Government securities, they become personally interested in the preservation of peace and the maintenance of British power. The ideal of British dominion in India is that of the power paramount standing like some lofty building in the midst of a cluster of minor edifices, each in proportion to its size and strength contributing to the solidity and the ornament of the whole design. The connexion between the grand central structure and its outworks is such, that although they add to its beauty and stability, acting as bulwarks to protect it from the effects of weather, the violence of floods and winds, political agitation from within and danger from without, yet their strength and durability, though they contribute to the solidity of the whole building, is not necessary to its existence. On the other hand, the massive centre-piece is indispensable to the existence of the cluster of minor structures which, without their mainstay and support, would fall together and crumble into ruin. Anything which serves to cement this union between British dominion and the independent states should be fostered and encouraged. Were that union solid and complete, the British Indian Empire would contain such an element of stability that it might defy the influence of internal discord, or the power of external foes. And the more the rulers and the people of these states feel that their interests are bound up with those of the British Government, the firmer will be this union. I know no better means of cementing it than for the British Government to borrow largely from these states. There are no friends and well-wishers like creditors. It is astonishing how interested they are in the welfare of the debtor who is involved to an immense amount, but who



will, there is no doubt, if he only retain his health and flourish in his business, pay his interest regularly, and liquidate his liabilities in full eventually. Under such circumstances a creditor becomes almost as attentive and sympathising as a lover. There is perhaps no power in the world—at any rate, there is none in Europe—situated as the British Indian Government is in respect to the native states. And it is not to be wondered at that a statesman just from England, accustomed to deal with questions of European politics only, should have overlooked this unique feature in our situation in India, and when condemning the system of resorting to loans to meet current liabilities, even in time of peace, should have overlooked the fact that there is one strong argument in favour of the system in India which does not hold elsewhere.

This exceptional advantage, however, which results from the practice of resorting to loans in India, is contingent and accessory merely. It was not, probably, with any such object in view that the different Governors-general have adopted this idle and easy method of avoiding financial difficulties. The practice is in itself pernicious and unstatesmanlike. And Mr. Wilson's wholesale condemnation of the habit of perpetually resorting to loans in time of peace was founded on the most commonly received axioms of political economy. But in reckoning the expense incurred by the war of 1858-9 as a deficit, he seems to have overlooked the fact that war expenses are in no country and under no system of financial administration charged to revenue. There is not a government in the world that does not consider itself justified in saddling posterity with a share, at any rate, of the burden incurred by war. And the principle is essentially a just one when the war is forced upon a people by necessity, and the expenditure is incurred in purely defensive measures.

It may be interesting to note briefly the comparison instituted by Mr. Wilson between the expenditure incurred in former wars and that of 1858-9. Lord Amherst, who



came out shortly after the conclusion of the Nepal and Mahratta wars, had to meet an accumulated deficiency, during nine years, of three millions. Lord William Bentinck, who came out in 1828, after the first Burmese war, had to cope with a deficiency during five years of fourteen millions. Even the Affghan, Sind, and Gwalior wars, together with the two Sikh wars, covering a period of eleven years, left only an accumulated deficit of fifteen millions and a half. During the four years from 1849 to 1853 there was a surplus of 1,700,000 $\frac{1}{2}$. But the four years preceding 1861 left a deficit of thirty-seven millions. "In making these comparisons we cannot help being struck," says Mr. Wilson, "with the greatly increased cost of the recent occasion. In one respect," he adds, alluding in terms of high commendation to Lord Canning, "I must own that I found in this, one of the redeeming points to reconcile us to the financial difficulty in which we now find ourselves. The future historian of India, when recording the occurrence of the last three years, if he be a man of fine discrimination, will dwell with pride upon the fact, that at that moment India was governed by an English nobleman, who in the midst of the greatest peril never for an instant allowed his judgment to be swayed by passion, or his fine sense of honour and justice to be tarnished by even a passing feeling of revenge. For perhaps the first time in any Asiatic war, Lord Canning adopted throughout the whole of this campaign the most scrupulous principle of integrity. Whatever service was performed, whatever provisions were supplied, were strictly paid for: and when under the vigorous administration of the Punjab, money contributions were exacted, the obligations have been all acknowledged and faithfully repaid. Sir, rely upon it, however much such a mode of conducting a campaign may add to present expenses, the statesman who pursues it is far more than repaid in the permanent stability which he thus gives to an empire; and I cannot avoid the opportunity of saying, that however



much some may have differed with the policy which the Governor-General pursued, yet that the time is not very distant when even they, and I am sure the public at large, will do justice to the calm and dispassionate, but truly courageous discrimination which the noble Earl has exhibited throughout these trying occurrences; and I cannot but believe that we are already reaping the benefit of it in the great repose which has now spread itself over India, and which, I am convinced, will enable me the more effectually to deal with our present financial difficulties."

Without wishing to qualify the eulogy which Mr. Wilson in these words passes upon Lord Canning's policy, justice to the past generation of administrators demands that we should bear in mind that this has ever been the policy of the British Government in India in all its wars. We have never adopted the plan of supporting our armies at the expense of the people with whose rulers we were at war.

There were other sources of confidence besides this. Railway traffic receipts bade fair to increase beyond the most sanguine expectations; the renewal of peace was followed by a reaction of commercial impulse; the people seemed awakened from a state of lethargy to one of unprecedented activity. Since 1834 the total value of exports and imports together had increased progressively from 13,847,289*l.* in 1833-4 to 60,219,660*l.* in 1858-9. The demand for country produce had stimulated the energies of the cultivators of the soil. The arrears of land revenue, which in 1834 amounted to four millions, had dwindled down to an almost nominal sum. The increased demand for labour had caused the rate of wages to rise in many districts twofold, in some threefold, within the few preceding years;¹ and, in spite of the desolating wars of 1858-9, Mr. Wilson could hazard the remark, that every class of the community was in a condition of unparalleled prosperity.

One of the first things Mr. Wilson had to do was to correct a grave error into which Lord Canning's govern-

¹ This was not the case, however, with agricultural labourers.



ment had fallen just previous to his arrival, from want of acquaintance with, or in consequence of disregarding, the very first principles of political economy. An excessive impost always results in the repression of trade. How Lord Canning could have fallen into so great a mistake as to raise the tariff upon certain imposts from five to twenty per cent. at one swoop, it is difficult to understand. The enormous increase had the effect of checking trade to such an extent that the revenue derived from the duty on these articles, instead of rising to four times the amount, fell at once to nearly one-half. Mr. Wilson at once rectified this by reducing the tariff to ten per cent. from twenty. At the same time, with the view of encouraging as much as possible the development of country produce, he remitted the export duty altogether on certain articles—wool, hides, hemp, jute, flax, tea, and the import duty on books, maps, prints, &c., which remission in the aggregate would, it was calculated, entail a loss of 82,000*l*. The duty on saltpetre it was proposed to raise to 5*l*. 10*s*. a ton. The quantity exported from Calcutta was about 800,000 maunds of eighty pounds, and from Bombay about 100,000 maunds, and the duty was expected to realize 180,000*l*.

For the eleven months ending with the conclusion of 1859 the export of cotton-piece goods to India had reached the large amount of 11,041,000*l*. against 8,497,000*l*. of the previous year. The export to India of cotton yarn in the same period had amounted to 2,306,000*l*. against 1,763,000*l*. of the previous twelve months. The duty on the manufactured article was ten per cent., and Mr. Wilson now proposed to fix a similar duty on the raw material, cotton yarn and twist, which was expected to give an addition of 67,461*l*. to the revenue. A revised system of valuation of duties was expected to realize an increase of 150,000*l*. or 200,000*l*.

The income-tax, together with a licence-tax (which, however, was not passed), was the next measure proposed. The former was to extend to incomes of 200 rupees a year.



Incomes from 200 to 500 rupees a year were taxed two per cent.; above that the rate was four per cent., of which it was intended to expend one per cent. in local improvements.

As regards the zemindars of Bengal, in behalf of whom it was urged that they ought to be wholly exempt from the income-tax, Mr. Wilson, overruling the arguments adduced in support of their position, decided that it would be a fair rate to assess this class at one-half the rent they paid to Government as their profits in respect of land. All who paid less than 400 rupees became thus exempt.

We have now to see how far these measures were successful. The income-tax was expected to produce about 2,500,000*l.*, which was to have been supplemented by the proceeds of the licence-tax to the extent of 1,000,000*l.* The latter, as we have seen, never became law; and the income-tax only realized 1,400,000*l.*

Mr. Laing's financial statement for 1861-2 was delivered on the 27th April, 1861. His figures represent a deficit of 6,000,000*l.* The actual deficit at the end of the previous year 1861, according to the regular estimate drawn up in February 1861, was 6,678,000*l.* It will be recollected that Mr. Wilson's statement showed a deficit of about nine millions when he first took office. His prospective deficit for 1860-1, estimated at six millions and a half, was not far wrong. This he had proposed to meet partly by reductions and partly by drawing on his cash balances, which were then unusually large, owing to the success of recent loans. Unfortunately, of these anticipations the last only was realized. The actual deficit of 1860-1 was 6,678,000*l.*, and it was partly met by a corresponding reduction of the cash balances in India and England, which on the 30th April, 1860, stood together at 19,000,000*l.*, and on the 30th April, 1861, about 14,500,000*l.*¹

The deficit, therefore, not having been met by Mr.

¹ *Vide* Financial Statement by the Hon. Samuel Laing, 27th April, 1861.



Wilson's measures, stood over for his successor to deal with; and the first thing to which Mr. Laing had recourse was reduction in military expenditure.¹ By this alone a saving was effected of 3,220,000*l.* The net annual profit of the income-tax he rated at 1,400,000*l.* The increased duty on cotton yarn, which Mr. Wilson calculated to produce 67,000*l.*, only realized half that amount, and the duty was reduced again to five per cent.

It is remarkable that all throughout what may be called the financial experiments of the last ten years, the tendency has been to undo the work of the previous government, and to return to the old system, which long experience had taught Antediluvian² administrators to be the best for practical purposes.

In 1869 a slight increase had been made in the salt-tax, which had realized 1,000,000*l.*, or two-thirds as much as the income-tax, without, as Mr. Laing said, being felt by any one. The increase in duty, it was shown, had had no effect whatever upon the consumption; indeed, owing to the general progress of the country and the rise in the rate of wages, an increase of consumption had gone on concurrently with the increase in duty. Encouraged by this fact, Mr. Laing proposed a trifling increase in this impost (which already, in 1860-1, brought to the revenue 3,391,630*l.*, and in 1861-2, 3,980,000*l.*), calculated to give an increase of 598,370*l.*

The condition of the Indian opium trade, and the system by which so large a revenue is derived from it, has for

¹ It must be recollected in justice to Mr. Wilson, that the reductions instituted under his auspices had not begun to produce any sensible effect when his lamented death carried him away from the scene of his labours.

² The era of the rebellion, 1857-8, often goes by the name of "the Deluge" in India. All before was "Antediluvian." And indeed the storm swept away so many antiquated systems, and wrought such a complete revolution in others, that those who have known India for the last twenty years can see many features which render the simile a not inapt one.



years been a hackneyed subject with crude writers and maudlin sentimentalists. We have heard the system denounced as iniquitous, shameful, discreditable ; while, on the other hand, we have been assured over and over again that as a source of revenue it is most precarious, and that it is dangerous for the Indian financier to depend upon it. Mr. Laing and Sir Charles Trevelyan both went into the subject, and laboured hard to show that the opium trade was not a precarious source of revenue, nor immoral in itself.

Opium eating and smoking are practices, or vices when carried to extremes, to which Englishmen are not in the least addicted. The cold climate of our more northern latitude awakens no desire for this peculiar drug, which is a stimulant at one time, and a narcotic when taken to excess. And in accordance with the national tendency of Englishmen to condemn those practices in others to which they themselves are not addicted, overlooking their own peccadilloes, or dealing very tenderly with them, we find thousands who hold in the utmost abhorrence the Oriental habit of opium-eating. There are no statistics from which any safe conclusions may be formed, and it must rest therefore merely on individual opinion, derived from what I myself and others who have travelled and resided both in the East and West have seen ; but I have no doubt in my own mind that if a comparative statement of the mischievous results following the consumption of opium and of that of spirituous liquors were drawn up, the conclusion would be very much in favour of the former. Mr. Laing remarks most truly, in his budget speech of 1862-3, "that every civilized or semi-civilized race of mankind affects some peculiar form of nervous stimulant, and as the natives of Northern Europe take to alcohol, so the Chinese take to opium. Possibly in each case the craving is for something to supply an innate want. The Englishman, the Dane, the German, and the Russian resort to that the specific effect of which is to raise the spirits and produce temporary exhilaration. The Chinese, whose greatest deficiency, as

shown by the whole history, religion, and the literature of the race, is in the imaginative faculties, resorts to that which stimulates the imagination, and makes his sluggish brain see visions and dream dreams.

"Be this as it may, the fact is certain that under all circumstances and in all climates, as the Englishman is a drinker of beer, so is the Chinaman a smoker of opium.

"We have therefore at the bottom of our opium revenue one of those great natural instincts of a large population, upon which the English Chancellors of the Exchequer confidently rely for half their revenue.

"It is of course theoretically possible in the case of gin, whisky, rum, and tobacco, that the exhortations of the temperance advocates in the former case, and of the ladies in the latter, might at any moment so far prevail as to induce the population generally to abstain from habits which are in many cases pernicious and in many more wasteful and disagreeable.

"Should they so prevail, the finances of England, and indeed of almost every country of the civilized world, would collapse far more suddenly and hopelessly than ours would in India by the failure of opium.

"But, as I have said, an English Chancellor of the Exchequer goes on with equanimity, relying on a taxation of 400 or 500 per cent. *ad valorem* on spirits and tobacco for 20,000,000% of his revenue; and while this is the case I can see nothing in any general consideration as to opium to prevent us from doing the same."

Without following Mr. Laing in his flight towards the region of metaphysics, where he seems to hint at conclusions many will be inclined to dispute, and confining ourselves for the present to a question of facts and figures, the reader will at once perceive that Mr. Laing is right in his general conclusions, but incorrect in his method of stating them. There is no reason for supposing that the Chinese will suddenly leave off eating and smoking opium, any more than for anticipating an analogous change of



habit among Englishmen, Irishmen, and Scotchmen, as regards brandy, beer, and whisky. But there is this great difference between the relative position of opium and spirits as regards the revenue, viz. that our revenue from opium is derived not so much from a tax upon it as from the sale of it. The Indian opium holds somewhat the same position in the China market that American cotton did in the European market. Supposing the American Government had had a monopoly of the cotton trade, and carried to the credit side of their revenue all the receipts on account of the sale of cotton, they might have regarded the item as a precarious source of revenue, just as we regard opium. The moment a cheaper or a better article came into competition the sale would fall off. So far there is a great difference between a revenue derived from the sale of a drug which depends upon the superior quality of the Indian product, and the revenue derived from the excise upon spirits. There is, it is true, no reasonable ground for anticipating that the use of spirituous liquors will be abandoned in England any more than that the use of opium will be abandoned in China. But it is obvious that, if the Chinese could get their opium cheaper and better elsewhere than from India, they would do so; and in that case the Indian revenue might be the loser to the extent of about seven or eight millions per annum.

Sir Charles Trevelyan remarks on this subject, "that we have gone on calling the opium revenue precarious long after the contrary has been demonstrated by actual experience. It is anomalous, but it is not precarious. It rests upon precisely the same basis as the excise upon spirits in England—with this difference, that the spirits are consumed by her Majesty's subjects, while the opium is consumed by the subjects of the Emperor of China; but the Chinese will no more go without opium than, it is feared, certain classes of our fellow-subjects will forego the use of spirits." Here we find Sir Charles Trevelyan making the same mistake as his predecessor. The opium revenue does *not*

rest upon the same basis as the excise upon spirits in England at all. There is an affinity between the two inasmuch as they both depend upon the habit of consuming intoxicating and stimulating articles, which, as Mr. Laing says, all races have in one form or another; but the one is a revenue derived from a tax upon, and the other a profit that accrues from the sale of, an article of general consumption.

Sir Charles Trevelyan, however, goes on to remark: "The idea of the Chinese becoming independent of us by growing their own opium is a mere chimera. The cultivation has been permitted in China for several years, with the result that the demand upon India for opium has been continually increasing. India has been bountifully dealt with in the great division of labour established by nature. She has an advantage over all the world in producing indigo, saltpetre, opium, and some other things; the Chinese on their part are more likely to increase their cultivation of tea and silk than of opium. Even if the quantity grown in China was largely increased, Bengal opium is so much better than the native products, that it could still be sold as an article of luxury like Manilla and Havanna cigars."¹

The analogy between the Indian opium trade and the South American cotton trade seems to me to be complete, except that the latter was not a Government monopoly. Sir C. Trevelyan goes on to admit that the cultivation of opium in China would increase if the market were not supplied with a sufficient quantity of Indian opium. Of course it would. And so we found with regard to the South American cotton trade, which used to supply pretty nearly the whole world with raw material; but when owing to the war the supply dropped off, attention in other countries was turned to its cultivation, and it seems at present doubtful, to say the least, whether the South American cotton trade would ever altogether recover the position it formerly held, even

¹ *Vide* Sir C. Trevelyan's Budget Statement for the year 1863-4.



if there were no difficulty in procuring slave labour in the Southern States.

It is difficult, again, to follow Mr. Laing and Sir Charles Trevelyan in their conclusions on what they call the moral justification of the opium revenue. The latter says, "The moral justification of the opium revenue also follows the parallel of the Home Excise upon spirits." Mr. Laing puts it upon other grounds: "This is not the place," he says, "to go into any lengthened arguments as to the moral bearings of the question. I have heard the most contradictory opinions advanced in perfect good faith by respectable men who had been in China; some denouncing opium as a deliberate poisoning of the Chinese for the sake of filthy lucre, others contending that it had produced a most beneficial effect, by substituting a comparatively tranquil stimulus for the wilder excitement of intoxicating drinks which led to bloodshed and crimes of violence."

There is something almost ludicrous in the application of such arguments to the maintenance of a source of revenue.

All attempts to obscure the darker shades of the picture by laying on light colours fail most significantly. There is no analogy between the revenue derived from the growth, manufacture, and sale of opium, as a Government monopoly, and the revenue derived from the excise upon spirits; for the one is an open, avowed, and direct encouragement of the consumption, and the other is just the opposite, unless indeed it be contended that people consume spirituous liquors in proportion to the duty levied on them. The one promotes, the other is manifestly calculated if anything to suppress the consumption. When Mr. Laing goes on to say, as he does in his budget statement for 1862-3, that "opium is neither very much better nor very much worse than gin," he is much nearer the truth. Whether it is, or is not, as injurious as gin, is a mere matter of opinion. What is certain is, that the English exchequer



does not derive a revenue from the manufacture and sale of gin, while the Indian does from the manufacture and sale of opium.

So long as the East India Company held the country, there was, in theory at any rate, enough of the commercial element in their tenure left to justify, perhaps, the continuance of the opium trade as a source of revenue. But now that the Government of India is an Imperial Government, there is something truly anomalous, as Sir Charles Trevelyan says, in the condition of this traffic. I do not mean to imply that the anomaly is a sufficient reason for abandoning it, but it may be fairly taken into consideration whether the opium trade might not be thrown altogether over to private enterprise, and the Government be content to lay a tolerably heavy duty upon it. There would be a loss, of course, but it would be a much more legitimate mode of extracting a revenue from opium; and it is by no means impossible, on the other hand, that if all restrictions on its cultivation were withdrawn all over India, the increase of production and consumption would be so great that the export duty might in the course of time almost equal the amount at present realized from the sale.

As regards the objection on the grounds of morality to any steps that may have the effect of increasing the cultivation and sale of opium, we need not have many scruples on this score. Like many other good things, and like all stimulants, opium when used in moderation is, under certain conditions of life, valuable. It has its uses, and it may be abused. Like wine and cigars, it is a luxury; and if one may venture an opinion upon such a subject without practical experience, I should say a great many more people in the world shortened their lives by the habitual use of what is sold and drunk as sherry and port wine, than by the use of good opium.

But all this is beside the question. It may be undignified for an Imperial Government to add to its revenue by



the sale of a drug, but there can be nothing criminal in cultivating, or encouraging the cultivation, of one of the most valuable natural products of the soil, or the manufacture of one of the best gifts of nature to the sons of toil, of sorrow, and of pain.

Mr. Laing shows from a table indicating the quantity of Indian opium consumed by the Chinese for ten years from 1852, and the prices paid upon it, that there has been a progressively increasing demand which has not been met with a corresponding increase in the supply. The consequence was, of course, a rise in the price of the Indian opium, and the production of an inferior sort in China to supplement the want of the Indian. Thus, the average price of the drug per chest during the first five of these years was 885 rupees, during the last five, 1,593, or very nearly double; while the amount realized annually during the latter period from China averaged no less than eleven million pounds.

So that the small section of the Chinese empire with which we are acquainted, and which is within the reach of our trade, is ready to spend from 12,000,000*l.* to 15,000,000*l.* annually on Indian opium. No doubt the interior of this vast continent is supplied by an inferior article grown in the country itself. The opening out of the interior of China to our trade is, however, only a matter of time; and as there is no reason whatever for supposing that the opium traffic would, if freed from monopoly, not grow in proportion as our trade connexion with the interior advances, there is scarcely any limit to the expansion of this profitable source of income. I would not use this as an argument for increasing the cultivation under the present system, but rather as an argument for Government gradually parting its connexion with it altogether, throwing it into the hands of private enterprise, and contenting itself with export duty. As regards the precarious nature of the opium revenue, it is not precarious so long as India has no rival in the production. If the Chinese could grow opium

as good as the Indian, there can be no doubt, as Sir Charles Trevelyan says, they would have done so long ago; but Nature seems to have given India some special aptitude for the production of the drug, just as she has to China a soil and climate adapted to tea, and to South America cotton.

With reference to the subject of the opium revenue, it must be remembered that there are two systems in vogue in India by which this revenue is obtained. The Bengal opium trade is a direct monopoly of Government, which makes advances to cultivators to grow the poppy, and by its own officers superintends the manufacture of the drug. On the other side of India there is also a large trade in what is called the Malwa opium, but there the poppy is grown by cultivators in native states on their own account; the drug is prepared by them and transmitted to Bombay for shipment to China—the British Government taking 600 rupees per chest of 120lbs. as duty.

The latter system, of course, is a legitimate source of revenue as excise. But the value of the trade which can bear so enormous a duty as 60% upon a chest of 120lbs. is obvious. And this is not all, for a further duty lies in some cases to be paid to the sovereigns of independent states.

But to return to the condition of the finance as explained by Mr. Laing's budget of 1861-2. The deficit was 5,868,718*l.* This was met by reductions to the extent of 3,590,750*l.*; improved revenue chiefly from salt, the income-tax, and stamps, &c. yielded 2,008,864*l.*; and 500,000*l.* was deducted from the sum originally allotted to public works, and the governments of minor Presidencies were told to raise it as they could by local taxation, and to expend it on local roads and canals.

The cash balances in India on the 1st of May, 1861, were calculated at 12,850,000*l.*, which was higher than was expected, partly because the receipts from opium had been



large, and partly because the recent reductions had begun to take effect.

After allowing for the payment of 950,000*l.* for prize money and 500,000*l.* per month for railways, it was estimated that the cash balance on the 1st May, 1862, would be 14,264,302*l.*

It will be obvious that in the whole period from 1859-60 to 1868-9 the greatest financial difficulties had to be encountered in the first two or first three years. Mr. Laing's first budget opened with a deficit of six millions, very nearly the same as that with which Mr. Wilson had to deal. The second budget commenced with a much more favourable condition of affairs—a condition so favourable, indeed, that the announcement of it was received in some quarters with incredulity. Nor was Mr. Laing himself less surprised than the public at the rapid and unexpected disappearance of difficulties. He says:¹ "After finding myself struggling in January with an apparently hopeless deficit, I was able in April, to my own great surprise, and I believe that of every one else, to produce a budget in equilibrium. If," he adds, "the feeling here was one of astonishment, in England it amounted almost to incredulity."

This is how the Finance Minister spoke in April 1862. In January of that year, if we understand him rightly, he contemplated having to provide for an apparently hopeless deficiency.

This rapid change is put down to the elasticity of the Indian resources; and they are truly called elastic. But the very fact of this elasticity necessarily detracts somewhat from the amount of credit due to the Finance Minister. And exactly in proportion as that credit is deteriorated by the recognition of the elastic nature of these resources, is our wonder increased that former statesmen, who ought to have been aware of this elasticity long before, were nevertheless either ignorant of or indifferent to it, or neglected to avail themselves of it. Elastic the revenues

¹ *Vide* Financial Statement for 1862-3, by Hon. Samuel Laing.

are in both ways. The expenditure could be contracted, and the revenue increased by a government absolutely despotic to any extent it pleased: it was an iron-gloved hand upon an india-rubber ball. There was no House of Commons to be appeased, no force of public opinion to be influenced or cajoled. The minister simply had his estimate of expenditure before him. So much wasteful squandering of public money on useless establishments was to be cut off; so much revenue to be raised by additional duties upon salt, upon stamps, or by new taxes. If the equilibrium was not restored by this, another squeeze—more useless expenditure curtailed, and more taxes levied. A complacent Viceroy and a subservient Council ratified every measure laid before them, and the thing was done. So that, much as India may be indebted to Mr. Wilson and Mr. Laing, their work was very plain sailing after all.

It may be asked how it was that Mr. Wilson's measures failed to produce the equilibrium which his successor, Mr. Laing, succeeded in obtaining two years later.

Mr. Wilson proposed to meet a deficit of six millions and a half, partly by new taxes, partly by reduction. In reality he did neither. The taxes failed to produce what they were calculated to produce, and the reductions had not had time to take effect when his death deprived the country of his services, and Mr. Laing succeeded him. He of course reaped the results of his predecessor's measures. But there was another item, overlooked in Mr. Wilson's calculation, and that was the home expenditure for debt, railways, and army. The reduction of expenditure was over-estimated by a million and a half, and the increase by new taxes was also over-calculated to the same extent; no allowance was made for the temporary nature of some of the items to the credit-side, such as the Punjab trade tax and stores. All these items put together made up five millions, and the real result of Mr. Wilson's budget of 1860-61 was a deficit of five millions and a half, after credit-



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ing it with a full year's proceeds of all the new taxes, which produced, as we have seen, much less than was contemplated, and one of which, the licence-tax, was not sanctioned at all till long afterwards. To meet his expenses Mr. Wilson drew on the cash balances, which, as has already been stated, were unusually large.



CHAPTER XXI.

FINANCE (*continued*).

Mr. Laing's policy--Indian political economy--Caste--The Income Tax a failure--Sir C. Trevelyan's fiscal measures--Mr. Massey's Licence Tax--The independent member in Council--Principles of taxation--Want of economy.

THE extinguishment of the great deficit which had so unnecessarily alarmed the public during the second year of Mr. Laing's tenure of office, cleared away the main obstacles to an efficient and enlightened system of Indian financial administration. For many reasons it is much to be regretted that Mr. Laing's Indian career terminated so soon. His ability is too well known to need comment, and there was a hearty English tone about him that rendered him popular with the European community, who felt that their interests were safe in his hands; while it is clear from the whole character of his policy, and the tenor of his speeches, that the interests of the native community would have been equally protected. He had, perhaps, too little reverence for that divinity that doth hedge the Indian Legislative Council and a Secretary of State, to please men in high office in England. How he maintained his own opinion against the opposition of Sir Charles Wood is well known, and the gravity of the Council must have been a little moved as Mr. Laing's lively imagination pictured to them the deficit under characters almost as numerous and diversified as the representations of a showman. First of

all it was a "yawning pit, deep and wide," on the edge of which "there was no chance of craning, no time to look to the right or left, for the exhausted cash balances, hungry and inexorable, were howling in their rear. To stick the spurs well in and go straight at it was the only plan."¹ Then his metaphor takes a leap wider even than across the chasm, and five minutes afterwards the deficit is represented as a pugilist. "After having fought so many, and I fear such weary rounds with the huge bully Deficit, we shall not let him claim a cross, or call it a drawn battle. If so, in the language of the ring, let us go in and finish." Another touch of the wand, and in deference to the audience, who were more accustomed to tiger-shooting than the "language of the ring," the deficit is a "tremendous tiger," which had given them "such a fright." "Let us pour a parting shot into his carcase, and so finish him off effectually." Another wave of the magic wand, and he is at a game of chess with the yawning chasm, the big bully, and the tiger; and he asks, "Is it to be a drawn battle after all, or a stalemate, when we thought the next move would win the game?" Again the scene changes, and we have the yawning chasm, the big bully, the tiger, and the chess-player represented as a dangerous headland stretching out into the sea, beaten with surging waves, and the Finance Minister wants but half a million "to weather it and get into smooth water." And lastly, the changing Proteus assumes the form of a hobgoblin sitting on the shoulders of the Council, and the speaker rejoices in having conjured away "the spectre which rode upon them like the grim nightmare or hag of the old Norse saga."

Whether however as a yawning chasm, a prize-fighter, a tiger, a chess-player, a headland, or a spectre, the deficit had practically ceased to exist when Mr. Laing returned to

¹ All quotations and extracts on the subject of Finance have been made from the "Official Record of the Financial Statements from the 18th February, 1860, to the 14th March, 1868;" second edition, corrected and revised.



England, thanks to measures of economy principally, and wholesale reduction of wasteful expenditure, and Sir Charles Trevelyan had comparatively an easy task before him ; for it is always more difficult to work up to a certain standard than to maintain it when reached. And after all, the only new principle of taxation introduced was a very questionable one, and one which Sir Charles Trevelyan had from the first consistently opposed.

The Indian revenue increased steadily from 36,000,000*l.* in 1858-9 to 48,250,000*l.* in 1868-9, or twelve millions and a quarter in ten years, and the statesman must be of a very desponding temperament indeed who loses heart in the face of such a cheering condition of affairs. But they who set about the administration of India on principles of political economy recognised in Europe, without any attempt to modify those principles in accordance with the different conditions they find in existence in the former country, will ever be at fault. Yet Indian administrators are perpetually quoting John Stuart Mill, and endeavouring to steer their course in exact accordance with the chart laid down by that great authority. It is as if a mariner were to take a chart mapped out for the navigation of the Pacific to guide him across the Indian Ocean or the Atlantic.

The physical conditions of India and its climate do not differ from those of Europe nearly as much as do the habits, the modes of thought, and the whole social economy of the people from those we meet with in Western countries. In England and America you may always be pretty sure that in dealing with the ordinary principles of trade and commerce certain conditions will be attended with certain results. You may calculate with tolerable accuracy beforehand that such and such causes will be followed by such and such effects. If you look for similar results in India, the chances are you will be disappointed. What is more simple, for instance, than laying a tax on income ? The professional man, the trader, the merchant, will have



invested his savings in the funds or some public securities, and you may find out the exact place in the schedule which he ought to fill. But how do you set about taxing the income of a man who has half a million of money which he buries in the ground? You take off your protective duties and institute free trade, feeling confident that the demand will stimulate the supply, because capital is pretty sure to find its way into an open field where profits are secure; and if one man will not take advantage of an opportunity afforded by a great demand, you are sure another will. But in India you are met at every turn by a system which assumes quite as many and as terrible forms as Mr. Laing's deficit, and which is ubiquitous, turning up at every moment to falsify all your preconceived conclusions grounded on the best and most commonly received principles of political economy, and setting at nought all your calculations on the connexion between cause and effect: and this is caste. And as the cramping, crushing nature of this terrible curse to a country is not the least realized in England, and realized very faintly by the most experienced administrators in India, it is always forgotten that caste means combination. A little of the effect of trade combination has been of late years seen in England. Let any one multiply trade combinations till the principle has been carried into every minor detail of commercial and social life, add to it the tremendous force of religious sanction operating upon a superstitious people, and he will gain a slight idea of what caste is doing in India, and has been doing for the last thousand years. One result of this is that we meet constantly with conditions and anomalies so contrary to all our preconceived ideas of commercial principles as to baffle the acutest statesman. In Orissa, in the height of the famine, corn and rice dealers were actually exporting the staple commodity of food.¹ In the autumn (September) of 1868, when wheat was selling at 19 seers the rupee at a place called Allyghur, distant three hours by rail only

¹ *Friend of India.*

from Delhi, the market rate at the latter place was 12.¹ In Europe and America the prosperity of a people may be measured by the wealth that trade brings with it. The money which flows into the hands of capitalists and merchants finds its way through the medium of investments to a thousand channels, whence it spreads its fertilizing influence over the whole country. In India it is absorbed and disappears, no one can say where or how. Silver and gold are melted up into bangles or ornaments, or if retained in the shape of coin, buried in the ground. Professional men among the natives, who draw an income of two or three thousand rupees a month—fully equal to one of eight or ten thousand pounds a year to an Englishman or an American in his own country, when the circumstances of life are taken into consideration—live in the same style, to all appearance, as the clerk on a monthly salary of six pounds. Their linen or cotton clothes cost them next to nothing, and two or three changes suffice. They keep no carriages or horses, live in houses that are rented for perhaps 10*l.* or 20*l.* a year, and the only display they ever make of wealth is on the occasion of a marriage festival in their families, when perhaps they will squander upon dancing girls and fees to idol temples and priests, three, four, or five hundred pounds. Traditional ideas handed down through countless generations have taught them to have no confidence in the stability of government, and they live as if they were every day contemplating the chance of an invasion by some Nadir Shah.

If a fact is wanted to illustrate these views, nothing can more fully substantiate them than the net profits of an income-tax of four per cent. upon incomes above 50*l.* a year on the whole of India, yielding but 1,900,000*l.* including cost of collection; and "I have told you frankly," says Mr. Laing in 1861, "that, financially speaking, I think the

¹ The Indian weights and measures are unfamiliar to the English reader; but as they are only mentioned for purposes of comparison, this will not signify.



Income-tax has been a failure." Why was it a failure? No one denies the soundness of the principle that income and capital should bear a fair portion of the public burden. And as to the other great tax introduced by late financiers, the licence-tax, Mr. Laing calculated that to raise 600,000*l.* by it, the tax-gatherer would have to be sent to 4,000,000 doors, or, in other words, that it must affect 20,000,000 of the population. Yet on all recognised fiscal principles the licence-tax is as fair an impost as can be levied.

The same rule will be found to apply to almost every other branch of the administration, as well as to systems of finance. Many of our barrister judges, whose experience and reading have been confined to English and American jurisprudence and procedure, have expressed their surprise in no ambiguous terms at what appears to them the very undue weight given in India to documentary evidence over parole. Mr. Justice Phear, of the Calcutta High Court, especially, has on several occasions in public given utterance to very strong views on the subject. They cannot understand why the truth should not be elicited, as it is in other countries, by oral examination, or why an Indian judge should lay more stress upon a single authentic document than upon the verbal testimony of a score of witnesses. Here, again, ordinary principles that are recognised in Europe and America are utterly at fault in India. The practice of a whole country, the firm and deep-rooted belief of a whole people, and customs which have been developed by centuries of growth, do not spring from nothing. We have introduced marvellously little change into India below the mere surface of society; all beyond is much as we found it a century ago, and the practice of giving weight in judicial decisions to authentic documentary evidence has arisen from a well-founded conviction, not confined to the English official, but firmly rooted in the native mind, that oral evidence is comparatively worthless. So it would be in England if it were not



for the practice of cross-examination, and that with a few exceptions is in India practically unknown.

These deep-rooted convictions, these ideas and notions and habits of thought which are the growth of centuries, it is the custom of our rulers a great deal too much to ignore. If India is always to be treated as a conquered country, to be kept in subjection by an armed force, we may be prepared indeed to retain it, and our tenure of it may be all the stronger from our never relaxing our hold on the *ultima ratio* of all diplomacy, physical force. But if our administrators are as desirous as they profess to be of giving the country a position among the foremost in progress and general advancement, their attention must be paid to these deep-rooted convictions, these long-established habits, and the stereotyped principles of the political economist must be moulded and modified to meet conditions never contemplated by the writers who enunciated those principles. In other words, and adopting Mr. Laing's expression, "we must give India what it has never yet had, political life."¹

There were no very important principles ventilated during Sir Charles Trevelyan's administration, which lasted from 1863 to 1866, until the last of his budgets, which may be said to have been thrown after him with contempt as he sailed down the Hooghly, and was returned by the Secretary of State as disapproved. The measure of Sir

¹ The whole passage is so true, and so illustrative of Mr. Laing's enthusiastic views with regard to India, that I give the entire passage from his budget speech of 1861 :—

"I have a vision of an India—when the science of the West has removed impediments to communication; when the consequent increase of trade has diffused material prosperity; when English energy and capital stimulate improvement in every district, and when the native population with expanding ideas and improving intelligence are taught by education of schools and of events, and of books and of railways, to know us, and to know one another; and are gradually trained in the management of their own local affairs for those of a wider area; so that India may at length have what it has never yet had, a political life, and at length be, what it has never yet been—a nation."

Charles Trevelyan's offending was that he touched the interests of a class powerful enough to be formidable to any Secretary of State, the Manchester and Liverpool merchants. So long as an act of policy was disapproved of by the Calcutta European community alone, the heathen might rage as furiously as they pleased, but the Government took no notice. But when the injury complained of was of such a nature that it reached the Manchester and Liverpool merchants through their corresponding firms in India, then there was a check at once applied. The Calcutta people raged furiously at the licence-tax, but the sound of their voice awakened no echo in Liverpool, Manchester, or London, for the impost did not in the least affect their corresponding firms, and the licence-tax became law in spite of them. But Sir Charles Trevelyan ventured on a measure which struck a sympathetic chord in Calcutta and Manchester, and he might have been recalled if he had not meantime retired. His offence was taxing exports; and as his policy has on this point been loudly condemned, it will be but fair to let him speak for himself.

"The old policy of the East India Company," he says, starting with an unhappy illustration, "was to levy low rates of duty upon exports and imports. However contrary the practice may have been to some received maxims of political economy, it was suited to the circumstances of the country; for, owing partly to the abundance and richness of the productions of India, and partly to the simple habits of the people, the exports of merchandise have always greatly exceeded the imports, and our Indian exports have in general such a hold upon foreign markets that they can bear some duty without being seriously checked.

"This policy has of late years been departed from to a certain extent. Under the financial pressure caused by the Mutiny, the 5 per cent. import duties were raised to 10 per cent., and in some cases to 20 per cent., but they were last year reduced to 7½ per cent., while the year before



the duty upon iron was nearly nominal. On the other hand, the duty upon several staples of the export trade was entirely omitted in 1860 with the exception of the duty upon saltpetre, which was raised to a rate inconsistent with the prosperity of the trade, and it has lately been reduced by one-half.

"So far as India possesses the monopoly of the foreign market, or a decided superiority over all other countries taken together, our export duty must be paid by the consumer. So far as exported articles are met by an effectual competition in the foreign market, the duty must be paid by the producer. But there never was a time when Indian producers were so well able to bear a moderate charge. While the assessment of the land revenue has been diminished, the price of agricultural produce has risen, and persons of every class connected with the cultivation of the land enjoy unusual prosperity. It must also be borne in mind that the heaviest expenditure in public works is for the construction of roads to facilitate the conveyance of exportable commodities to the coast."¹

He proposed on the principle thus enunciated to lay a duty of 3 per cent. on the export of jute, wool, tea and coffee; 2 per cent. on hides, sugar, and milk; an extra three-halfpence a maund (80 lbs.) on rice and other grain; and, on the other hand, to reduce the import duty on hops from $7\frac{1}{2}$ to 1 per cent., to encourage the Indian brewer. The Indian tea, coffee, and salt trade, especially the first and last, were just beginning to sprout, and needed all the fostering aid that could be given them. The export duty upon these articles, even on the ground that the public revenue was indented upon to construct roads to enable the producers to carry their stock to the sea-coast, seems hardly consistent with a desire to encourage new branches of industry.

His second great measure, borrowing to carry out public works of permanent benefit, has long since been admitted

¹ Sir Charles Trevelyan's Speech on the Budget, 1st April, 1865.



to be sound. At the time, however, Sir Charles Trevelyan was much blamed for this, his detractors and the press generally in India exclaiming against him for putting aside the income-tax with one hand while he stretched out the other for a loan.

We have seen that Sir Charles Trevelyan laid aside the income-tax, as he expressed it, "on the shelf, complete in all its gear, ready to be re-imposed in case of any new emergency." It was not re-imposed by Mr. Massey, but he substituted for it the licence-tax, which was passed into law, as related in a previous chapter, with such unprecedented rapidity as to call forth the indignation of the public. As it first stood, it had much that was objectionable: a distasteful impost under any circumstances, but, passed as it was, with inconsiderate and indecent haste, it could be nothing but a crude and unsatisfactory measure. The second year it was much modified, and, as if ashamed of their hurry and precipitation on the previous occasion, the Council now gave the Bill the thought and discussion it deserved. This debate was famous for advancing the development of the constitution of the Legislative Council of India, another step towards perfection. In that august body, as is well known, the unhappy non-official member is in such a minority always, that it must really require no little moral courage to set himself up as a target for every other member of the Council to aim at. Indeed, under the recent development of the constitution of the Council, it is difficult to see of what use the non-official members are at all. On this occasion, owing to the opposition of one of the independent members, the Hon. Mr. Skinner—who said he could not see the necessity for any licence-tax at all, and proposed to throw out the Bill then before the Council, and repeal that still in force—the following principles were laid down, determining the relative position of the members to the Government. First, that no official member could oppose any Bill brought forward by Government; he might advise, but was on no account to do more:



and secondly, that no non-official member could move an amendment to a bill brought forward by Government. As if these two principles were not enough to fetter all real discussion, Mr. Massey took the unprecedented step of endeavouring to silence Mr. Skinner at the outset of the discussion by threatening that, if his budget and his Bill were not passed, he would resign at once: he would not be a party to the construction of a new budget. To this Mr. Skinner replied at the next meeting, with well-pointed irony, that, "if every other argument against him failed, it could hardly have been expected that he should successfully contend against the threat which the Right Hon. Mr. Massey had thought it right to hold out of the consequences that would follow from the adoption of his (Mr. Skinner's) views—a threat in which he must assume to consist the principal defence on which the measure rested."

To an independent thinker, Mr. Skinner's argument against this Bill appears fair and reasonable enough. All he said was, if Government were resolved to impose a burden of this sort on the country, upon what principle was it that particular classes were singled out and fastened upon to bear that burden? Why levy a tax upon enterprise, and leave property untouched? Why should the landed and funded interests be exempted from contributions to an impost from the application of which they derived at least equal benefit. In a conclave of rational men, met together to make laws and regulations for a large empire, we might have expected that arguments as reasonable as these would have been answered in some other way than by a threat of Mr. Massey's resignation if opposition was successful. The incident serves to illustrate well the constitution of the Indian Government, and the temper of the official towards the independent classes in public matters. The wonder is that any independent man should sacrifice valuable time to sit in a council where he is made to feel that his position is that of a "dummy."

It has been my object throughout to avoid as much



as possible offering "suggestions on Indian administration," with which the public have been supplied by successive authors *usque ad nauseam*. Every *dilettante* writer on Indian affairs deems himself capable of conducting the government of that country much better than those to whom the onerous duty has been entrusted by the State. In so far as I have been tempted occasionally, from the nature of the subject, to offer suggestions, I have strayed from the legitimate purpose of this work, and must crave my readers' pardon. It has been my object to give a history of the period, and, by exposure of errors where they are palpable, of shortcomings and defects, to imply the necessity rather than to suggest the method of amendment. The question of taxation is one upon which every man living thinks himself much better informed than his neighbour, though it is not often that his neighbour makes the concession to his judgment which Mr. Massey did to Mr. Skinner, when, instead of confuting his arguments, he endeavoured to silence him with a threat. While this discussion, or rather the torturing of the independent member, was going on in Council, of course the matter was debated out of doors, and the Calcutta Chamber of Commerce addressed the Council, representing their views and suggesting three methods of raising money by taxation which they considered better adapted to the state of the country than the licence-tax. Mr. Massey, in his introductory speech upon the budget, briefly replied to these representations, and stated the points wherein he differed from the authors of the memorial. It is worth while to refer to them, because it may be taken for granted that the Chamber of Commerce would represent the opinion of the independent European community in Calcutta at any rate; and if there had been any measures capable of being suggested better than the present one, it was probable that it would not have escaped their notice. They suggested three courses, either of which they said was preferable to the present one: 1st, an addition to the salt-tax;



2d, a succession-tax ; 3d, a tobacco-tax. Space will not allow of a discussion of the merits of these three measures, which would occupy a volume. Suffice it to say that they were rejected : the salt-tax on the ground that that indispensable commodity is already so heavily taxed in India ; the tobacco-tax because the poorer classes, who would be the most affected by it, already paid their share of the public burden in the shape of a salt-tax, and it would be so extremely difficult of collection ; the succession-tax mainly because it was a tax on capital and not on income.

With two remarks, I shall dismiss this subject. One is, that there must be some defect in principle, when an impost like a licence-tax, which is professedly designed to tax income and not capital, only realizes half a million from the whole of India, and when an income of 2,500% per annum pays 40%. And the second is, that no fiscal measures in any country can be successful unless designed upon principles of political economy that have been modified and adapted to conditions that are peculiar to that country and not to be met with elsewhere. In other words, the principles which are safe guides in Europe and America are not so in Asia. The Chamber of Commerce and the Legislative Council, in order to devise schemes of taxation for India, studied the history of modern Europe instead of the existing condition of India ; they applied principles they found in vogue in Europe and the West to conditions totally distinct from any they could discover there, or they expected by the force of a legal enactment to modify the character, and change the habits of thought and action, and remodel the social system of a hundred millions of the most conservative races in the world.

While there is every reason to congratulate ourselves upon the condition of the finances of India, whose revenue has increased twelve millions in ten years, with an income as large as that of Austria, far larger than that of Prussia, and not much inferior to Russia,¹ it is patent to every one

¹ Mr. Massey's speech on the budget of 1868-9.



outside the pale of the official world that the most wanton extravagance exists in many Government departments. This, of course, is strenuously denied by the officers of the departments within which the extravagance goes on, and it is to them the Government apply for information if ever they take notice of the allegation. Every independent member of the European community in India who has lived in the country ten years, and been in a position where he could obtain information, believes that in the department of public works alone there is a useless waste of about twenty-five per cent. of the money spent. How the money is spent, the subordinate officers of the department know well enough; and there are officials in the higher ranks of this branch of the service, who, having made the matter a study, could if they chose point out the exact places where these leaks in the treasure-chest are to be found. Extravagant expenditure prevails, from the smallest item in barrack charges to the largest account for the construction of buildings that cost lacs. If a single nail is hammered into a soldier's cot, ten annas, or one shilling and threepence, is paid for it, because it must be done on a certain system, and must be entered under a certain head in the schedule of petty repairs. And every man who has ever built a house in India—and in the old days it was rare to meet an officer of the Indian army who had not—knows that Government pays for building material from ten to twenty per cent. above the market rate.

The old pagoda-tree, indigenous in the East, is popularly believed to flourish there still. Large profits are to be realized by public contracts, and where there is profit on one side there must be loss on the other.¹ There are many things which are matters of public notoriety in India, which

¹ There was a contract for sleepers. The rate the railway company paid was five rupees or ten shillings per sleeper. The contract was underlet again and again, till the supplier paid one rupee and a half, or three shillings. I fail to trace it further, and the sleepers probably cost from twelve annas to a rupee—eighteenpence to two shillings.



THE ADMINISTRATION OF INDIA.

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in England would be investigated, or thoroughly ventilated in Parliament or by the press. But public opinion is resultless in India, because there is no power, as there is in England, to support it. The ganglionic system of official life totally prevents the Executive from acting under any impulse communicated from the outside world, and, as the feelers of a sea-anemone all contract simultaneously and co-operate to resist the aggressor when you touch any one part of it with your finger, so the different departments of the Indian Government, when any one of them is attacked, all combine to silence or to crush the assailant. The most flagrant abuses flourish under the very eyes of those whose duty it ought to be to check them; and, if brought to the notice of Government, the very officials themselves who, if the allegations are true, are the persons to blame, are deputed to make inquiry. If there were two or three Joseph Humes in India, with an executive power to back them up, a saving of twenty-five per cent. in one at least of the public departments might be effected, and in others proportionately. But in India, the interests of the public are not represented anywhere, and human nature must be other than what we know it to be, if under such a system there was not ample room for reform.



CHAPTER XXII.

THE INDIAN ARMY.

State of the army in 1858—Feeling of the officers—The Henley clause—Royal warrants and despatches—Measures of amalgamation—The local and staff corps—Addiscombe abolished—Cadets—Present system—Innumerable references—The birth of grievances—Redress refused—Lord Cranworth's commission—Classification of grievances—Inconsistency of the commission—Complaints remedied—Despatch No. 194, and Royal Warrant 15th June, 1864—Sir Charles Wood's averages—Another royal commission—Their recommendations—Lord Cranborne's despatch—Measures of redress—The Bonus despatch—General results—Total failure—Effects on the army itself—The Indian medical service.

CONSEQUENT on the mutiny of the Bengal army and the subsequent transfer of India to the Crown, it became necessary to take early measures to provide for the future military tenure of the country, and also to dispose of the numerous body of officers whose regiments had either mutinied or been subsequently disbanded.

During the Mutiny seventy-two Bengal native regiments had disappeared; in Madras twelve, and in Bombay three native regiments were reduced, making a total of eighty-seven regiments officered on the old plan. The officers of these regiments were for the most part thrown out of employment; no one of these for a moment thought that he should find his position in every way unaltered by the impending changes, nor did any question the right of Government to act as it might think fit; their homage to



the Company was about to be transferred to the Crown direct, and they doubted not it would be the wish and intention of her Majesty's Government to act in the same liberal spirit towards them as the Company would have acted. When, however, persons of the highest authority in England began to talk of such sweeping and wholesale changes as putting the whole of the officers of the mutinied and reduced regiments on half-pay, in accordance with the system in the British army, they naturally became rather anxious about their future fate, and not having the same knowledge of the temper of their new masters as they had of the Company, they thought it advisable to be provided with some basis on which they, on the one part, might take their stand, and from which Government, on the other, should not have power to remove them. Such a standing-point was given to the Indian army by Parliament in the clause inserted on the motion of Mr. Henley, the member for Oxfordshire, in Act XXI. and XXII. Vict. cap. 106, and XXIII. and XXIV. Vict. cap. 100, passed on the 2d August, 1858, entitled "An Act for the better Government of India." This just concession, frequently cavilled at and an eyesore at the India Office, has stood the test of some years now, and should remain the palladium of justice to the last Indian officer.

To give a full and succinct enumeration of the contents of the despatches and orders to which the measures for the amalgamation of the Indian and Royal armies gave birth, would occupy too much time and space, extending as they do from 1858, the year of the transfer to the Crown, up to the present time. The royal warrants are for the most part short and concise: not so the despatches from the India Office, especially those penned by Sir Charles Wood, who had not the faculty of simply announcing the measures he had decided to adopt for redressing grievances, and restricting his official remarks to the words requisite to give them practical effect. His measures, if they were in truth his, appear to require an unusual amount of gilding



to make them palatable; certainly his tone and language were so pleasantly chosen, even when perpetrating a fresh grievance, that his very victim reading the despatch was half persuaded that his wrong had little in it to be remedied, and that the grievances of others were altogether mythical. In fact civilians generally, and all who would not be at the pains of mastering a difficult and complex subject, took the view that the officers of the old Indian army had no real cause of complaint, and ought to consider themselves fortunate in not all being put on half-pay.

It is purposed to give, firstly, a sketch of the various measures adopted to effect the amalgamation; to notice, secondly, the grievances that spring therefrom; thirdly, the mode of their redress; and fourthly, the results to Government and the Indian army generally.

The report of the Royal Commission appointed in 1859-60 to inquire into the organization of the Indian army, and the experience gained by the recent Mutiny, showed the danger of maintaining an overgrown native force, so the Government of India in 1859¹ struck off the strength of the Bengal establishment ten native cavalry, and fifty-nine native infantry regiments. It was also determined to do away with a separate European local force. During 1859 a large portion of the local European army had mutinously claimed a bounty or their discharge, on the ground that they had been transferred without their consent from the service of the Company to that of the Crown. Government allowed those who wished it to take their discharge,² except the 5th European regiment of infantry, whose conduct was under inquiry;³ those who eventually did not take their discharge under the order above, were granted the boon of two years' service to count towards their time for future discharge.⁴

It was determined to re-organize the whole native army on the irregular system.

¹ G.G.O. No. 1,277 of 1859.

³ G.G.O. No. 883 of 1859.

² See above, Chap. III.

⁴ G.G.O. No. 884 of 1859.



The formation of a Staff corps was also determined upon. This measure had frequently been mooted in former years, when the evils attending the absence of so many officers from their regiments on staff employ made themselves particularly prominent.

It was also determined to do away, as far as possible, with all distinctions between the officers of her Majesty's British service and the Indian army, and to form them into one united body, retaining for the Indian officers such advantages as were peculiar to their service. To effect these measures her Majesty's Warrant for the formation of a Staff corps in each Presidency, together with Despatches Nos. 27 to 31 from the Secretary of State for India (Sir C. Wood), announcing her Majesty's gracious intentions regarding the officers and men of her Indian forces, were published for general information. By these the option of volunteering for general service was given to native cavalry officers and men of the artillery, cavalry, and infantry of the three Presidencies, with a bounty on certain conditions and rates; and they were allowed to choose whether their pensions should be reckoned according to the regulations of the British service, or according to those of the Indian army.

Those of the artillery who volunteered (and they did so almost *en masse*) were formed into new troops and batteries, forming fourteen brigades under the same conditions as those of the Royal Artillery; the remainder were formed into a local company, for duty in Fort William. Those of the cavalry were formed into the 19th, 20th, and 21st Hussars. The three oldest Bengal European regiments, three Madras, and three Bombay were brought on the strength of the British army and numbered 101 to 109; the designation of Royal being conferred on the "101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers," "102d Royal Madras Fusiliers," "103d Royal Bombay Fusiliers." As in the case of the artillery and cavalry, the men of the infantry volunteered

¹ Staff Corps Warrant, 16 Jan. 1861.



almost to a man; they found themselves in the same regiment, retaining their rank and standing, only the name and condition of the regiment was altered: the men of the 4th and 6th European Bengal regiments volunteered into the three new line regiments of their Presidency; those of the infantry who did not volunteer for general service were formed into a local company, the annals of which, none of the brightest, are chronicled in the Fort Adjutant's office in Fort William.

Further to carry out the amalgamation, every officer of H. M. Indian forces was to receive a royal commission under the sign manual, conferring rank and command in her Majesty's army in any part of the world. Artillery officers holding certain staff appointments were seconded, and promotions made in their places. Under the Royal Artillery organization colonels' allowance is drawn by colonels commandant, and their number was reduced under the new organization from 12 to 7 in Bengal, 7 to 4 in Madras, 5 to 3 in Bombay. Paragraphs 33 to 35 of G.G.O. No. 332 of 1861 point out the mode in which the Indian Artillery is gradually to be absorbed into the Royal Artillery: in the same manner, pars. 36 to 45 of the same Order point out the manner in which officers of the Indian Engineers who elect for general service are to be dealt with until all are absorbed into the Royal Engineers.

As the officers of the European cavalry, infantry, and artillery had their regiments to go to when they elected for general service, and the Engineers had their appointments, whether they remained local or entered the British service, the question of how far the amalgamation affected their interests and future prospects need not be discussed. There were a few artillery officers who never volunteered, and their services were transferred against their will from the Company to the Crown; and in the case of several of the officers who went into the twelve new line regiments, the option was, owing to peculiar circumstances in each case, in reality no option at all, but the step was practically



as much forced upon them as if they had been transferred by an order from the Commander-in-chief. But it is totally impossible in a work of this kind to state the circumstances attending the case of each individual officer whose prospects have been injuriously affected by the so-called amalgamation measures. There can be no question that, in many of these instances, rights have been summarily overridden, for which, had the victims of arbitrary power the means to seek redress in a court of law, there is little doubt about the issue.¹

Leaving these cases, we come to those paragraphs of G.G.O. No. 332 of 1861 which concern the officers of the native regiments, and the general and field officers of the Indian army. By paragraph 46, the "gradation lists of general and other officers of the three Presidencies, and their promotions thereon, were to remain exactly as at present: the promotion of field-officers of cavalry and infantry to go on as usual in separate regimental gradation lists of major, lieutenant-colonel, and colonel; but a gradual reduction to be made of those of the last grade entitled to colonels' allowance, by filling only three for every four vacancies. Regimental promotion to major to continue in cadres. All the officers of cavalry and infantry to be placed on two general lists respectively for each Presidency, those below lieutenant-colonel being retained on the cadres for promotion as above; from these two general lists officers will be invited to volunteer for general service to the number required for the new line regiments. The names of all officers who volunteer for general service, or elect for the Staff corps, shall continue to be borne, in italics, on the cadres of their former regiments, in order to regulate the promotion of those remaining local; but the name of a Staff corps officer borne on the cadre of an Indian regiment, exchanging from the Staff corps with an officer of a British regiment other than the twelve new line regiments, to give an effective step in the cadre of his former regiment. In

¹ G.G.O. No. 332 of 1861, par. 89.



the regimental gradation lists of field-officers, the names of officers of the Staff corps or new line regiments, as they are promoted in their cadres, to be placed in italics, in the same position they would have held had they not joined the Staff corps, or volunteered for general service.

“The whole of the native cavalry and infantry regiments of the three Presidencies to be officered on the irregular system, with a complement of six European officers besides the doctor: these officers will eventually be drawn from the Staff corps.

“The present and prospective advantages which officers now in the service derive from the military and orphan funds to be secured to them; and the retiring pensions under the Indian regulations will be scrupulously preserved.”

The Staff Corps Warrant and Despatch No. 27 appended to this General Order (No. 332 of 1861) details the organization and regulations of the Staff corps to be formed in each Presidency. “Officers of the British and Indian armies *now* on staff employ in India, not having the substantive rank of colonel, are eligible for admission. Officers of either service under the rank of field-officer not now on the staff, may now or hereafter become candidates. Officers who may within the *last three years* have been on any *permanent* staff employ, and make application within the next six months, will be considered eligible to join the Staff corps: those whose tenure of appointments at the time of transfer to the Staff corps shall have exceeded one year will not be subjected to probation or any test. The option of joining the Staff corps will be open to those officers only *who may be considered* by the Government to be in all respects fit for the Staff corps. Officers of the *British* army, when transferred to the Staff corps, *will be removed* from the strength of the regiment to which they belonged; the promotion of Staff corps officers to be as under, viz.: 12 years' service, including 4 years in Staff corps, to captain; 20 years' service, including 6 in Staff

corps, to major; 26 years' service, including 8 in Staff corps, to lieutenant-colonel; 5 years in the Staff corps as lieutenant-colonel, to brevet-colonel.

"Officers *now* in staff employ will be allowed to count, to the extent laid down in the preceding paragraph, their past service towards promotion as if it had been performed in the Staff corps. One step of rank will be given to every officer whose period of service would qualify him for it according to the above rules: an interval of two years must intervene between each succeeding step. Officers not now on the staff will also be allowed this privilege, should they *be permitted to join the Staff corps*. The officers of the Staff corps will be under the new furlough rules of 1854; a certain proportion of the senior officers of the Staff corps will receive colonels' allowance; eventually the number will be fixed in the proportion of one for every thirty officers on the Staff corps: the necessity for a qualifying term of service (twelve years a substantive lieutenant-colonel) to cease when the proposed establishment, one in thirty, is completed; officers then to succeed by seniority as vacancies occur."

There are altogether 106 paragraphs in G.G.O. No. 332, and 99 paragraphs in Sir C. Wood's five despatches which accompanied it: enough has been extracted to show the working of the Order.

Further, to obliterate as much as possible the distinctions between officers of H.M. British service and Indian forces, officers of the latter who preferred the conditions of general service are given an opportunity by G.G.O. No. 558 of 1861 of obtaining a position in the British army; for every vacancy caused in a line regiment by the transfer of an officer to the Staff corps, a transfer of an officer of the Indian army of corresponding rank may be made to the regiment in which the vacancy takes place. These transfers are not to be made in India even provisionally; the Commander-in-chief in India will submit for the consideration of the Horse Guards the name, rank,



date of commissions, and previous services of the officer whom the Commander-in-chief may recommend for each vacancy. Officers so transferred will enter H.M. line regiments as juniors of their rank, and be in all respects on the same footing as officers of H.M. British regiments.

In order to get rid of the burden of surplus of officers which was already beginning to be felt, a bonus pension of £50 a year in addition to the pension of their rank was offered to those who should retire on or before the 1st Oct. 1861; and again, Despatch No. 320 of 1861, acknowledging the receipt of the third report of the Calcutta commission, and the proposal contained therein for inducing a large number of the senior officers of the Indian army to retire, offers to the regimental field-officers of the three Presidencies annuities graduated from £550 to £150, in addition to any pension they may be entitled to, such retirements to date from 31st Dec. 1861. A certain number of captains of 25 years' service and upwards were also offered additional pensions of £120, should all the field-officers to the number of 300 not accept the pension. Some 35 captains availed themselves of this offer. But in consideration of the very liberal terms offered to these officers to retire, "the names of all the lieutenant-colonels so retiring *will be retained in italics upon the list of lieutenant-colonels* to regulate the succession to colonel and colonels' allowances. Promotion in succession to these lieutenant-colonels who retire shall be made in the proportion of one to two of such retirements, so that one colonel's allowance will eventually be struck off for each retired lieutenant-colonel who would have attained it had he remained on the effective list." This despatch winds up by declining to admit any claim, although very strongly recommended by the Calcutta commission, on account of compensation for the extinction of the old "regimental retiring bonus."

Despatch No. 467 of 1861 gives Sir C. Wood's definite orders with regard to the succession to colonels' allowance. The substance of the first seven paragraphs has already



appeared. Par. 8 lays down the law that Staff corps officers succeeding to colonels' allowances must vacate their appointments—being, however, eligible for re-appointment, if they have interest enough. The next paragraph shows the anomalous position a Staff corps officer may hold, viz. that of a captain in the Staff corps and major-general in the army. But, however favoured by fortune, whether for his actions in the field or by a little favour at Court, Sir C. Wood brings him up with a round turn in this despatch; the captain must count six years' actual service as field-officer to entitle himself to the unemployed pay of a major-general. A little balm is added, however, the above six years being inclusive of any time (how long?) he shall have been obliged to pass upon half-pay in consequence of ill-health contracted in the service, or of wounds received in action.

The Royal Warrant 1st Jan. 1862, prescribes the mode in which the amalgamation of the general and field officers of the Indian and British armies, and the promotion of the officers to higher rank, shall be carried into effect. This warrant is too long for insertion here; it is only necessary to state that the provisions of it gave great dissatisfaction, and it was cancelled in 1864, except clauses 9 and 10, which provide that on the transfer of the twelve new line regiments to the British service, a like number of general officers shall be taken off the Indian establishment, and be transferred to the list of general officers (British service)—three more being added to make up the proportion (fifteen) due to the number of officers of the transferred regiments.

Sir C. Wood's despatch, No. 494 of 1861, confirms the view he took in a former despatch, No. 296 of 1861, that the benefit of retiring under the rules of 1796, on pension of rank, is not to apply to Staff corps officers, the 9th paragraph of the Staff Corps Warrant notwithstanding, which states, "Officers of H.M. Indian forces joining the Staff corps will be entitled to pensions under the regulations of the Indian service." This wordy despatch allows those



who joined the Staff corps under the wrong impression that they were to get a step or two of substantive rank by so doing and then retiring on the pension of that rank, to reconsider their decision. Some twenty officers of standing availed themselves of this option, and withdrew from the Staff corps.

To chronicle further changes, Indian allowances to colonels who may hereafter attain colonels' allowances, and who are not required to reside in India, will be discontinued;¹ such officers will receive, in addition to colonels' allowances, the full rate of regimental pay only as long as they may be unemployed, wherever they may be permitted to reside: Indian allowances will, however, be passed to them for six months from date of promotion to colonels' allowances, or for any *shorter period* during which they may be resident in India. An unemployed major-general of the Staff corps, not having succeeded to colonels' allowances, is permitted to remain in England on twenty-five shillings a day!

Again, it having been represented to the Secretary of State by the Government in India that none of the lieutenant-colonels who retired in 1861 on the enhanced pensions could by any possibility give a step to their juniors unless by their death, their names *being retained on the list*, Sir C. Wood enters into a prolix defence for retaining the names, and finishes the despatch by allowing colonels' allowances to all lieutenant-colonels of date prior to 1st January, 1862, when they have served twelve years in the grade of lieutenant-colonel: this was another in the long list of grievances to be redressed hereafter.

Among the many measures, and the last that need be mentioned, involving a total change in the future of the Indian army, was the abolition of Addiscombe and the cessation of the long line of Indian cadets. As far back as December 1858, the India Office, in anticipation of coming events, had decided that all future appointments

¹ G.G.O. No. 663 of 1862.



of cadets should be subject to any alteration that might be decided on; so those appointed after that date have nothing to complain of. The last cadet's appointment bears date 4th March, 1862. As, perhaps, many fathers of families, on the look-out for a provision for their sons, have not the means of a ready reference to General Orders, the following memorandum may be of service:—

NOTICE.

“INDIA OFFICE, 5th June, 1862.

“Cadetships having ceased, a limited number of commissions shall be given annually to persons selected by her Majesty's Secretary of State from among the sons of civil and military officers who have served in India. These cadets will be required to pass through Sandhurst; the expense of the education, board, washing, and medical attendance will be borne by the Secretary of State for India in Council: the number of such cadets allowed to be borne on the establishment of the college is twenty.

“Persons entitled to apply for these appointments should address the Under-Secretary of State, India Office.”

And now, after so many despatches reflecting but little credit on the sense of justice of those from whom they emanated, the following abrupt communication comes upon us with startling effect:—“The contingency specified in the deeds constituting Lord Clive's Fund, that the sum of sicca rupees five lacs should be returned to the heirs of Lord Clive, having occurred by the passing of Acts XXI. and XXII. Vict. cap. 106, you are in future to admit all persons who would have been entitled to pension from that fund to an equivalent rate of pension, without reference to the name of Lord Clive.”¹

An immense amount of questions and references followed the general order (332 of 1861), and the despatches just noticed. They poured into the Military Department,

¹ Despatch No. 218 of 1863: Lord Clive's Fund.



and were published afterwards in the official Gazette, the columns of which were filled with them, for general information. But they had to be referred to Sir C. Wood for confirmation, and consequently there was much delay, and not unfrequently a good deal of confusion, for the answers given by the Government of India were not always confirmed by the Secretary of State, or were so much modified as to beget doubt and uncertainty where all ought to have been precision and exactitude; as, for instance, in the following Question 96, G.G.O. No. 125 of 1862:—

Q. "An officer leaves England in consequence of the Mutiny, having ten months of his leave unexpired; can he, if he joins the Staff corps, take this balance of furlough without losing his appointment?"

Ans. by Government of India. "Yes, he would be allowed the balance of his furlough, *retaining his appointment.*"

Ans. by Sir C. Wood. "Approved, but add the words, *to the Staff corps!*"

Once having joined the Staff corps, where was the poor wight to go? how could he but *retain his appointment to the Staff corps?* the Staff corps being nevertheless no appointment, but his only regiment.

By the foregoing measures, these changes were effected:

1. The transfer of *nearly* all the officers and men of the European cavalry and infantry of the Indian army, with their own consent, to her Majesty's general service.

2. The assimilation of the Indian Artillery and Engineers with that of the Royal Artillery and Engineers.

3. The re-organization of the reduced Native army as irregulars.

4. The formation of the three Staff corps of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay.

By the General Order No. 332 of 1861, the option was given to all officers, first, of joining the Staff corps; secondly, of electing for general service; thirdly, of remaining in the locals. Three optional courses appeared to be

open to all officers at a first glance; but an officer to be eligible for the Staff corps must be under the rank of substantive colonel, must have been on permanent staff employment within three years of the date of this order, and must be considered by Government to be in all respects fit for the Staff corps: *i.e.* the same amount of interest that was previously required to obtain a staff appointment was now required to get entrance into the Staff corps. To elect for general service was out of the question to officers of many years' standing, or those with families, most of whom probably also had the option of joining the British army when they first contemplated a military career; for such men to start afresh in a British regiment, to learn all the innumerable details and internal economy and working of the British service, and eventually to take a turn of home service on English pay in their old age, was simply impossible. So that the great body of officers were virtually excluded from this alternative also, and there remained for them nothing but to choose the "locals," and take their chance; no hardship, one might think, with the parliamentary guarantee, and the promise of Government, that all their rights should remain intact. But the working of Sir C. Wood's measures, and his subsequent policy in refusing any redress until wrung from him by the reports of the Royal Commissioners, point out pretty clearly what would have been the fate of the "locals" if there had been no parliamentary guarantee in the first instance.

These extensive changes could not be effected without altering in some measure the position of every officer in the Indian army, and no officer for a moment expected otherwise; but it behoved the India Office that instituted these changes to take special care, keeping the parliamentary guarantee in view, that the position of any officer should not be altered for the worse. The question was not unattended with difficulty, but it was assuredly not in London that a series of measures requiring so much special



knowledge and such careful handling was likely to be efficiently decided. Sir Charles Wood thought otherwise; and he and the other officials who must be held responsible for the deplorable failure of the amalgamation and the ruinous expense in which it has involved the country, instead of empowering the Indian local government carefully to draw out a scheme from the materials at their disposal, by the advice of the able and experienced officers whom they might have summoned to their assistance, placed themselves under the guidance principally of one officer who had risen rapidly to one of the highest military staff appointments in India. He was remarkable for possessing a most wonderful memory. He could quote chapter and verse for every order that had issued from the Adjutant-General's office for the last twenty years or more; and, as an office-man, of course was invaluable to the commander-in-chief of an army like that of British India. But the gift of a wonderfully retentive memory is not by any means necessarily accompanied by the faculty of organization, and to arrange the innumerable differences that were inseparable from an amalgamation of the Royal and the Company's services required the power of organization in the very highest degree. Here the framers of the amalgamation scheme totally failed, and one result of their first measures was that in 1863 almost every officer had a grievance of some sort; and though but a section of these sent in petitions, a Royal Commission was appointed under the Presidency of Lord Cranworth, consisting of the Earl of Ellenborough, Lord Hotham, Mr. Henley, Sir C. Yorke, General Clarke, Sir P. Melvill, "to inquire into the complaints made in certain memorials from officers of the late Indian armies." The composition of this court did not altogether please the memorialists: whilst retaining grateful recollections of Lord Ellenborough and Mr. Henley, they were afraid of the preponderance of the legal element. This commission, with a mass of oral and written evidence before them, yet exhibited in their decisions on various

points connected with the military system of India the utmost ignorance of details. The Commissioners classed the grievances under the following heads; those negatived we shall take first in order:—

1. Retention of the names of officers who joined the Staff corps, on the cadres of their regiments.

2. Retention of names upon their old cadres of officers who joined the new line regiments from the European regiments.

3. Retardation of promotion by Staff corps officers whose names are still borne on the cadres, they being engaged in service attended with less risk.

4. Retardation of promotion by new line officers whose names are still borne on the cadres, they being employed many of them in England.

5. Arrangements for regulating future colonels' allowances in the Ordnance corps.

6. The effect produced by the late measures in preventing the purchasing out of senior regimental officers.

7. Officers in receipt of colonels' allowances, precluded from receiving Indian allowances while residing unemployed in India.

8. The G.G.O. No. 1,070, 23d July, 1859, revoking so much of the G.G.O. No. 1,238 of 1858 as related to the antedating the commissions of certain lieutenant-colonels of artillery and engineers.

The Commissioners decided that all the above eight complaints were not infringements of the parliamentary guarantee, and they dismissed them accordingly.

The three following subjects of complaint the Commissioners considered to be well founded:—

1. Supersession of locals in army rank by Staff corps officers under the promotion rules of the Staff corps.

2. Retention of names on the native cadres, of officers who joined the new line regiments from those cadres.

3. Arrangements in the Royal Warrant 1st January, 1862, for the future promotion of officers of the Indian



army of date subsequent to the 17th February, 1861, to the rank of general officer, as far as they affect officers of cavalry and infantry.

With regard to these two following they express a doubt, namely :—

1. The arrangements for regulating future colonels' allowances in cavalry and infantry. On this head the Commissioners stated : "The new rule is, however, not to affect lieutenant-colonels who attained that rank before the date of the new system, and so the question whether twelve years is a fair average for the future, for the three Presidencies, will be tested by the time at which these lieutenant-colonels will succeed to the allowances in question. If it should be found that they attain them generally in less than twelve years, we consider that, unless the shorter average period be adopted, the guarantee will not have been strictly adhered to."

2. Reducing the number of regimental lieutenant-colonels by filling up only half the vacancies of those lieutenant-colonels who took the special annuity in 1861. On this point the Commissioners stated : "We are unable to calculate the loss or the advantages, varying as they do, which may have fallen to the lot of the different regiments; but we think that where loss can be ascertained to have taken place, there the guarantee has not been adhered to."

Before noticing Sir C. Wood's measures for the redress of the three subjects of complaint considered by the Commissioners as well founded, it would be well to ask, why the Commissioners did not give the Indian army, instead of Sir C. Wood, the benefit of the doubt on the two last questions? Of the twelve years' period of service for colonels' allowances (first doubtful point) the Commissioners also stated : "It appears by information which we have received from the India Office that the average in Bengal is 10.2 years, in Madras 11.8, and in Bombay 10.9; so that twelve years is just more than a year beyond what has been the average for the three Presidencies; but it is

very nearly two years above the average in Bengal, of which the army constituted nearly one-half of the whole army of India." If there is a doubt, it is as much as two to one in favour of the Indian army. Again, on what principle did the Commission find the guarantee infringed by retaining on the *native* cadres the names of officers transferred to the new line regiments? And why did not the same principle hold good in the case of officers transferred from the *European* cadres, and of Staff corps officers whose names were still retained on their old regimental cadres? If the guarantee was infringed in one case, it was infringed in all three. A writer in the *Examiner*, whose review of a later commission is particularly concise and clear, states with regard to the retention of Staff corps officers' names on the cadres: "Lord Cranworth's commission was not only singularly weak in its composition, but was most unfairly prevented from receiving evidence which Captain Jervis offered to produce through witnesses whose names he gave. Still there was one member, an officer of the Indian army, serving on the Commission, who ought to have prevented his colleagues from falling into error, as to the removal of Staff corps officers' names from regiments necessarily occasioning an undue extent of promotion. That officer was Major-General Sir P. Melvill, who had long been secretary in the Military Department at Bombay: he, having served on Lord Hotham's commission, ought to have been fully aware of the groundless nature of the plea thus urged for withholding from the officers that justice which they had a right by military usage (and the parliamentary guarantee) to expect."

Sir C. Wood, by his Despatch No. 194 of 1864, proceeded to meet and rectify the evils complained of in the three grievances which the Commissioners thought were infringements of the guarantee, in the following manner. "Although," he writes, "the views of her Majesty's Government may not be changed, they are,



nevertheless, prepared to accept the opinion of the Commissioners."

1st point: the supersession in army rank of regimental officers by the promotion of their brother officers under the Staff corps rules, he rectifies by a scheme of *brevet* promotion—giving, in fact, to all local officers brevet rank as an equivalent for the substantive or regimental rank of their brother officers in the Staff corps: after twelve years' service, to brevet captain; twenty years' service, to brevet major; twenty-six years' service, to brevet lieutenant-colonel. "Instead of striking out the names of officers who have joined the several Staff corps and new line regiments from their former cadres, Government have determined to strike out the names of all such officers upon their coming on the list of regimental lieutenant-colonels, promotion being made in their places up to the establishment laid down in a succeeding paragraph."

2d point: the retention on the cadres of native regiments of the names of officers transferred to the new line regiments. This was rectified by the removal from the cadres of native regiments, the 4th and 5th European cavalry, and the 4th, 5th, and 6th European infantry cadres, of all officers appointed from them to the new line regiments, and by making promotions in their places; the promotions to date from 18th February, 1861.

3d point: the arrangements laid down in the Royal Warrant 1st January, 1862, as far as they affect the officers of cavalry and infantry of the Indian army, for regulating the promotion of colonels of date subsequent to the 17th February, 1861, to the rank of general officer. This point the despatch rectifies thus: "No promotions have yet been made under that Warrant, and there is no difficulty in altering the arrangement; the Royal Warrant 1st January, 1862, is cancelled except clauses 9 and 10 (previously noticed) by Royal Warrant 15th June, 1864, which accompanies this despatch." This sets forth that the whole of the officers of cavalry and infantry of H.M.

Indian army shall remain on the Indian general list as before the Warrant of 1862, and shall rise in that list to the rank of general officer; the establishment of general officers of the Indian army being from time to time reduced as provided for in the Warrant. Each branch of the Ordnance corps in India is provided with a separate establishment of general officers calculated in the same proportion as that of the Royal Ordnance corps: all colonels of these corps of date prior to 18th February, 1861, will continue to rise on the general list of the Indian army: the absorption of the Indian Ordnance corps into the Royal corps is provided for. The field-officers of the Staff corps to be brought hereafter on to the general list of the British army; their promotion then, and the mode in which the whole of the officers of the several Staff corps shall be transferred to the list of the British army, is also shown; as also the manner in which the establishment of general officers of the Indian army shall be gradually reduced.

The question of the twelve years' period of service as lieutenant-colonel for the colonel's allowances, is one on which the Commission, although doubtful, expressed a very decided opinion in favour of the Indian army under certain contingencies. Sir C. Wood, taking the benefit of the doubt to himself, quietly ignored any cause of complaint on this head, and took no measures in his despatch to remedy it; stating in so many words "that by his measures officers will attain colonels' allowances in a shorter time than was ever before known," although the memorandum furnished from his own office says on this matter: "The period of twelve years was taken as a fair average, being somewhat *more* than the time recently taken to pass through the colonel's grade in *Bengal and Bombay*, but less than that in Madras. It is possible that the promotion of some of the older lieutenant-colonels, in the year 1862, in the two former Presidencies may be *slightly retarded*, but such retardation cannot be material. It is obvious, moreover, that some such retardation must have followed any



reduction, however effected, in the number of colonels." Sir C. Wood's dictum, that an officer *may* attain his colonel's allowance in a shorter time than heretofore, from his first entrance into the service, cannot affect the question of twelve years in the grade of lieutenant-colonel not being too long, an officer's promotion up to lieutenant-colonel being uncertain and dependent on his luck in his individual regiment. As to Sir C. Wood's idea of average, it must be remembered that Bengal and Bombay together represent $\frac{7}{10}$ ths of the whole Indian army.

The second point considered doubtful by the Commission was the reduction of the number of regimental lieutenant-colonels by filling up only half the vacancies caused by those who retired in 1861. The Commissioners' remarks already quoted on this grievance, and their further arguments in pars. 54, 55 of their report, show them to have totally misunderstood the cause of complaint, which was, not whether the Government could or could not reduce so many regiments, but simply whether it was not contrary to the rules of the service, and an infringement of the guarantee, not to make promotions in the room of all officers who retired, however such retirements might have been brought about. Sir C. Wood orders additional promotions to be made from *the date of receipt of his despatch* (16th July, 1864), namely, for Madras five lieutenant-colonels, and three for Bombay; but he entirely loses sight of the real cause of grievance, and dilates on the prerogative of Government to make reductions—which no one questioned—and attempts to justify his plan of reduction by only filling up half the vacancies; ending this memorable despatch by asserting, "With these measures the arrangements as regards the officers of the Indian armies will be closed;"—rather a rash assertion for a man who might at any moment by a change of Ministry have given place to a more liberal successor.

Captain Jervis' motion for a commission to inquire into the grievances of the officers of the Indian army was



carried on the 2d May, 1865, by a majority of the House of Commons, in spite of the opposition and vote of Sir C. Wood; and in June 1865 a Royal Commission, consisting of Sir T. Aitchison, Sir R. Napier, Sir Sydney Cotton, General Eyre, General C. A. Brown, General Russel, and Sir W. Coghlan, was ordered to assemble to inquire and report "whether the measures adopted to remove the grievances which Lord Cranworth's commission had reported well founded, had been effectual and sufficient."

The Commissioners arranged the points for their consideration in the following order :—

First, the retention on the cadres of native regiments of the names of officers transferred to the new line regiments. They reported that the measure adopted upon this point had been effectual and sufficient.

Second, arrangements for promotion to general officer. The warrant of 1862 had been modified, and a revised warrant substituted: this measure reported effectual and sufficient.

Third, the filling up of only half the vacancies of the lieutenant-colonels who retired in 1861. Upon this point the Commissioners were of opinion that if certain promotions to lieutenant-colonel were made *from 1st January, 1862*, to complete the reduced establishment, no loss will have been sustained either by regiments or by officers, and no grievance will remain under this head.

Fourth, the rule fixing twelve years' service as lieutenant-colonel for colonel's allowances. The Commissioners reported that, "in regard to lieutenant-colonels of rank prior to 1st January, 1862, the term of twelve years was two years in excess of a fair period; as regards lieutenant-colonels promoted after 1st January, 1862, the twelve years' rule may not be in excess: but we may here observe, that the periods of service of officers in the grades of major and captain are in numerous instances much longer than is generally supposed, so that with all the advantage of accelerated promotion, they will for the



greater part reach to forty or more years' service before promotion to regimental colonel. There are, for example, many officers, now regimental captains, who have already completed more than twenty-five years' service. We therefore submit that it might be for the advantage of the public service to provide a means of relieving the Indian army from old and worn-out officers; such a means might perhaps be afforded by an extension of the existing Indian regulations (of 1837), under which graduated pensions are granted for length of service, irrespective of rank."

Fifth, the supersession of regimental officers by officers of the Staff corps. The Commissioners on this point reported that the brevet adopted in Sir C. Wood's despatch to remedy the above grievance "not only failed fully to do so, but created a new and continually increasing class of grievances, thus aggravating instead of removing the original cause of complaint. We have given our most earnest and anxious consideration to this very difficult and complicated question, and we consider that we should not fulfil the duty imposed on us if we fail to submit our opinion that the measure adopted by your Majesty's Government upon this point has not been effectual and sufficient to remove the grievance originally complained of: the main ground of that grievance we consider to be—the regimental connexion between the local line and the Staff corps, by the retention of the names of Staff corps officers on the cadres of regiments, and also by the retention on the old European regimental cadres of the names of those officers who have been transferred to the new line regiments. The measure adopted by your Majesty's Government therefore falls short of what is required, inasmuch as it has not removed the cause of grievance, whilst the grievance itself has been aggravated by the disturbing effect of the brevet. The removal of Staff corps officers from regimental cadres might not prevent supersession either of the local line officers by those of the Staff corps, or of



Staff corps officers by those of the local line ; but belonging, as they would then do, to entirely distinct cadres, each body having its own distinct terms of service, such individual supersession would constitute no invasion of principle." And the Commissioners concluded their report by saying, "It appears to us perfectly practicable to remove all just ground for complaint of the infraction of any real and established right in connexion with the particular points referred to us for report."¹

With this strong recommendation as to the best method of removing all cause of complaint under this head, the India Office, it would be imagined, would have readily complied, and removed Staff corps officers from the cadres ; but such a plan would have been directly opposed to the principles of those who originally devised the great amalgamation muddle, and in February 1866, when this recommendation of the Commission found its way to Calcutta, it was at once affirmed in military circles that it would never be carried out.

On the accession of Lord Derby's government in 1864, Lord Cranborne became Secretary of State for India. A new man, and not bound in any way to recognise the faulty one-sided views of the India Office as carried out by Sir C. Wood, it was expected that he would have been guided by the recommendations of the Commission of experienced officers then before him. But Lord Cranborne, in his despatch No. 159 of August 1866, showed very clearly that he was not able to escape the pitfall into which his predecessor had been precipitated. Fifteen paragraphs of this despatch are devoted to a review of the report of Lord Cranworth's commission, and the measures adopted by Sir Charles Wood thereon. Lord Cranborne enters into an elaborate commendation of the views taken by that Commission, although those views and the measures adopted by Sir C. Wood had been judged, and to a great extent found wanting, by a later Royal Commission ordered to assemble

¹ Report, dated 14th Sept. 1865.



for the express purpose of passing sentence on the Cranworth commission; yet Lord Cranborne, ignoring the object with which Sir T. Aitchison's commission had been ordered to assemble, says, "He has determined to adopt, as far as practicable, those recommendations of Sir T. Aitchison's commission which *are not inconsistent with the opinions expressed by the former commission.*"

The third, fourth, and fifth points which Sir T. Aitchison's commission considered remained still to be remedied, were disposed of by Lord Cranborne in the following manner:—

Third point: the filling up of only half the vacancies occasioned by the retirement of lieutenant-colonels in 1861, which the Commission thought would be remedied by making some few promotions, *dating them from 1st Jan. 1862.*—Lord Cranborne orders that "without delay, the promotions in Madras and Bombay, made under paragraphs 52 and 80 of Sir C. Wood's despatch, No. 194 of 1864, and those in succession to them, should have retrospective effect from the 1st January, 1862." Lord Cranborne is quick enough—*vide* his despatch, paragraphs 20 to 23—in retorting on the Commission for its oversight in recommending the promotion of two lieutenant-colonels short of the number who had already been promoted by Sir C. Wood's despatch—an unaccountable oversight certainly; but why lay so much stress on a simple oversight, which even the India Office could not take advantage of, when the real question was the antedating these promotions some two and a half years? Was it that the persistent opposition of Sir C. Wood to the interests of the Indian army had descended, together with his office, on Lord Cranborne? The tenor of this despatch looked very much like it.

Fourth point: the rule fixing twelve years' service as lieutenant-colonel for colonel's allowances. Lord Cranborne adopted the views of the Commission, and ordered that "all officers of cavalry and infantry of the Indian army who attained the rank of lieutenant-colonel (regi-

mental) prior to 1st January, 1862, and all officers of the several Staff corps who had attained the rank of regimental lieutenant-colonel prior to the formation of those corps (18th February, 1861), shall hereafter, upon the completion of ten years in that grade, be placed in receipt of the colonel's allowances, in the event of their not having already attained to that allowance in ordinary succession under the operation of the system laid down in Sir C. Wood's despatch, No. 340, dated 10th August, 1861, paragraph 18. Under this point also the military retiring regulations of 1837 will be extended by the addition of the two following rates of pension: after thirty-five years' service, 600*l.* per annum; after thirty-eight years' service, 750*l.* per annum. All officers now in the several Staff corps, and all who may join them under the terms of this despatch, will be entitled to the colonel's allowances after twelve years' service in the grade of substantive lieutenant-colonel, without reference to any fixed establishment of colonels with colonels' allowances; the brevet rank of lieutenant-colonel attained to under the regulations published in general order by your Government, No. 632 of 4th August, 1864, being however considered a substantive rank for this purpose, and being allowed to count towards the above period."

Lord Cranborne says: "It will be seen that the Commission appointed by her Majesty, on this occasion have not confined themselves strictly to the questions submitted for their consideration. They have suggested in one instance a measure—viz. the introduction of additional rates of retiring pension—which has no reference to the complaints brought under the consideration of Lord Cranworth's commission." This is rather hard on the Commission, who in good faith, and for the advantage of the public service, made this suggestion to Government as a means, perhaps, of getting rid of old and worn-out officers. Lord Cranborne, however, jumps at the suggestion; it would be regarded as an additional boon by the public in



England; but how many officers have availed themselves of it up to the present time?

Fifth point: the supersession of regimental officers by officers in the Staff corps. On this last point Lord Cranborne says: "The Commission have recorded their opinion against an important feature in the scheme for the re-organization of the Indian army, which the former Commission had pronounced to be no breach of the parliamentary guarantee, and which therefore did not come within the scope of their inquiry. I allude to the retention of the names of officers of the Staff corps on the cadres of their former regiments." It is only necessary to refer to the report of the Commission¹ on this point, and their opinion that Sir C. Wood's general "brevet" increased instead of remedying the grievance, which was of course caused by retaining Staff corps officers on cadres of regiments to which they no longer belonged. [Sir C. Wood said emphatically to Staff corps officers that the Staff corps was their only regiment.] These were not two separate grievances, but cause and effect; the cause was retaining the names on the local cadres, the effect was supersession of the local officers thereby. It was undoubtedly within the scope of inquiry of Sir T. Aitchison's commission to ascertain the direct *cause* of any grievance which the former Commission had allowed to be a breach of the guarantee. If Lord Cranworth's commission purposely or ignorantly ranged *the cause* into a separate grievance, and so disposed of it in the interest of the India Office, it was all the more incumbent on Sir T. Aitchison's commission to repair the error or expose the trick, and they did so, suggesting the only remedy; but Lord Cranborne, preferring a course of his own, the result of which will be shown hereafter, directs that "From and after the receipt of this despatch, the qualifying period of service in the Staff corps, laid down in second paragraph of the Royal Warrant, 16th January, 1861, will be dispensed with, so far as concerns officers now in

¹ *Vide infra*.

the Staff corps and those of the Indian army who may join any one of those corps under the terms of this despatch. Officers of the Staff corps who may be entitled to promotion to a higher substantive rank under the modification of the existing rule, will receive such promotion from the date of receipt of this despatch. All officers of the cavalry and infantry of the Indian army, with the exception of those who entered upon the new conditions of service and are borne upon a general list, will be allowed to enter the Staff corps of their respective Presidencies upon the conditions above laid down, from the date of receipt of this despatch, without being subjected to previous examination."

This despatch appeared to be a throwing open of the Staff corps under the terms of its first constitution to all officers of the Indian army who were qualified. No class would be more likely to jump at the redress thus held within their reach than the officers of the twelve new line regiments and artillery, who had been transferred under a system called voluntary, but which was in reality not so, to the Royal service. They were, however, informed that they came under the somewhat ambiguous reservation "of those who had entered upon the new conditions of service," and being no longer officers of the Indian army, were not entitled to the benefit of measures designed to remedy the prospects of that body.

Lord Cranborne's despatch No. 160, 8th August, 1866, called "the Bonus despatch," needs little comment.

The East India Company permitted officers to buy out their regimental seniors, and rather encouraged this mode of getting rid of old officers, and it was very good policy on their part: the measures adopted since 1860 broke up regimental promotion, and the system of buying-out majors and senior captains went with it. The usual bonus for a major's step was 3,000*l.*, for senior captain 1,800*l.* to 2,500*l.* from the officers below them, each paying his quota: the money value of the step decreased by every



step the major got towards his lieutenant-colonelcy. The loss of the opportunity, through the measures of the India Office, of getting from 1,800*l.* to 3,000*l.* on retirement, was not considered by Lord Cranworth's commission *a legal cause of complaint*; all they could say was, "that the Crown would observe the same passive state which had existed on the part of the Company, in the matter:" but what analogy can there be between the Crown or India Office, which broke up the whole system, and the late Honourable Company who fostered it? Will the passiveness of the Crown give officers the bonus on retirement which they had always calculated upon receiving, and which a great number of officers had borrowed largely to ensure? However rapid, according to the India Office, an officer's promotion may have become in consequence of the new order of things, and his prospects in every way brightened, this fact remains, and no amount of arguments from Sir C. Wood, or any other India Office official, can gainsay it, that the comfortable little sum of 3,000*l.* is lost to every Indian major and his heirs for ever.

Lord Cranborne's intentions, as displayed in the preamble of this despatch, are much to be commended; but the amount of restrictions in the details imposed by the India Office render the whole despatch little better than a dead letter.

The result of the before-noticed measures, both to Government and to the Indian army, obtrudes itself in certain hard facts which may be gleaned from the Indian army list. Taking the Bengal army list, corrected to 1st October, 1868, it will be found that the Staff corps of that Presidency consisted on that date of the following officers:—Lieutenant-colonels 226, majors 263, captains 331, lieutenants 229; total, 1,049 officers. Calculating the promotion of these officers by the rules laid down, the following tabular statement will show the result five years hence, and on the 1st October of each year.

Rank.	No. 1869.	No. 1870.	No. 1871.	No. 1872.	No. 1873.
Lieutenant-Colonels.	273	313	375	416	451
Majors	258	258	237	230	219
Captains	357	376	385	370	367
Lieutenants	161	102	52	33	12
Totals.	1049	1049	1049	1049	1049

There are at present (Oct. 1868) 73 probationers to be added; but as these have accrued since 1866, it gives a yearly average of only twenty-four admissions to the Staff corps: this, it will be seen, does not keep pace with the promotions, and as there are no retirements, only time is required to render the corps like some huge tadpole—all head and very little tail—a regiment of field-officers.

The amount which will have to be paid for colonels' allowances will in a few years be so large that the Indian tax-payers, if they had any voice in the matter, might be only too glad to make some present composition with their future creditors. To ascertain the amount of colonels' allowances for any one year, take the number of lieutenant-colonels in any column of the tabular statement; to these add 7 local cavalry and 59 local infantry lieutenant-colonels, and multiply that amount by 1000, the product will give the amount of colonels' allowances in pounds sterling; to the year at the top of the column add 12, which will show the year from which that amount will be payable. Take the year $1872 + 12 = 1884$; in that year the sum will amount for Bengal alone to—

Lieutenant-Colonels	416
Local Infantry Lieut.-Colonels	59
Local Cavalry Lieut.-Colonels	7
Total Lieut.-Colonels	482
	1,000£
Total per Annum	£482,000



No casualties except those by death are likely to occur, for no inducement to retire is held out by Government: the loss of the 3,000*l.* on retirement as major is producing its speedy result; so also, in a measure, is the disallowing the rule of 1796, by which officers could retire on the pension of their rank. No allowance has been made for casualties by death in the tabular statement; let any one do so, taking off ten, twenty, or even fifty per cent. according to his calculation,—even then there remains an enormous yearly expenditure on this head: to which must be added that for Madras and Bombay, and the officers of the present pension and retired lists who may be living fifteen years hence. Several schemes for pensioning off the older officers have been proposed, but the Secretary of State has stated in the House that he does not intend to take any steps in that direction.

Another mistake, which may be classed under this head, is beginning to tell seriously against the Government. It arose out of Lord Cranborne's hasty endeavour to patch up and amend the admission to the Staff corps, by allowing all cavalry and infantry officers on the cadres of regiments in 1866 to enter the Staff corps, instead of taking the advice of such experienced officers as those on Sir T. Aitchison's commission, and removing the Staff corps officers from the cadres; but this latter mode would have been contrary to the views of Sir C. Wood and the advisers by whom he was led.

This, however, is the result. Although most of the locals availed themselves of Lord Cranborne's order, still a number did not. The Bengal army list for October 1868 shows there are still: Local majors—cavalry, 6; infantry, 3. Local captains—cavalry, 38; infantry, 51. Local lieutenants—cavalry, 3; infantry, 31. Total, 132.

On the infantry regimental majors' list of 80 majors, all but three are Staff corps officers, who by the rules are struck off on promotion to lieutenant-colonel and promotions made in their places, so that three casualties

among the general officers or local lieutenant-colonels will give eighty line steps to the cadres. One local has already become a substantive lieutenant-colonel, after seventeen years' total service, so that by the twelve years' rule he will be entitled to colonel's allowances in twenty-nine instead of thirty-eight years' total service. Major Chalmers will be entitled to his after only twenty-eight years' service, and there are several captains of ten, eleven, and twelve years' service who must almost immediately become majors, and a month or two afterwards lieutenant-colonels. No one can seriously suppose that Government contemplated paying colonels' allowances to a host of young men; such, however, is one of the results of Lord Cranborne's despatch: Madras and Bombay will also contribute their quotas to this phalanx of youthful veterans. By a system of double shuffling, resulting from the measures of the trio before-mentioned, and Lord Cranborne's amendments, the "locals" have now left the Staff corps behind in substantive promotion.

Letting all officers enter the Staff corps in 1866, besides being a mistake, was a slight on those officers who had taken the trouble of qualifying themselves for the Staff corps by passing in the languages. Those who had not passed had no claim whatever to seek admission; they could not hold appointments and draw the pay, however great their interest might be; and while the option of another election was given to all local officers, the same option of re-election ought to have been extended to those officers of the Staff corps who wished to withdraw from it.

"Doing general duty" is an order which, like the "Exalted Star of India," has sprung from the exigencies of the times; it is the last—though not the least—blunder which need be mentioned as having sprung from the incongruous measures hatched under the name of the Amalgamation. In considering the enormous prospective liability of the Indian tax-payers in the matter of colonels' allowances, it was said that, if they had any

voice in the matter, their common sense might suggest a present composition with those future creditors. Another glance at last October's Army List (Bengal) will show that, in thus taking thought for the morrow, the tax-payers would be receiving a double return for their present outlay. Let the Army List speak for itself. On the 1st October, 1868, the following officers in the Bengal Presidency were in excess of the requirements of the service, unemployed, "doing general duty," in fact:—

	No.	Per Month.	Total.
		Rs. a. p.	Rs. a. p.
Staff Corps Lieut.-Colonels .	27	827 14 0	22,352 10 0
„ Majors	24	640 14 0	15,381 0 0
Local Lieut.-Colonels . . .	21	1,032 4 0	21,677 4 0
Cavalry Lieut.-Colonels . . .	3	1,157 0 0	3,471 0 0
„ Majors	4	929 6 4	3,717 9 4
„ Brevet Majors	1	563 0 4	563 0 4
Infantry Brevet Majors . . .	3	415 6 0	1,246 2 0
Total Officers	83	Total Monthly	68,408 9 8

Or, in English money, 6,840*l.* 17*s.* 2½*d.* a month: multiply by 12, and the product will show the very comfortable yearly expenditure of 82,090*l.* 6*s.* 6*d.* Madras and Bombay have also their number of unemployed field-officers to swell the amount of this heavy liability, which, moreover, increases monthly. So much for this last result of ill-advised measures, taken in a monetary aspect. The cruel injustice of keeping a large number of old officers "doing general duty" in a climate like India, in which the first *sine quâ non* for preserving health and life is action and employment, is not likely to touch the hearts of those who decline taking any measures to further retirement, although such a course would be the annual saving of a large and ever-increasing sum to the State. The number of field-officers is greatly in excess of the requirements of the service. Although 111 field-officers of that corps



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from Bengal alone were, on October 1, 1868, on leave in Europe, there was still the number mentioned on the last page unemployed; and every promotion increases a state of things which even Sir C. Wood wished particularly to guard against. In his Despatch No. 318 of 1861, he says, "So that the revenues of India may not be charged for more unemployed officers than is inevitable under the circumstances of the time." And on the 30th April, 1863, he says again, "His Royal Highness concurs in the opinion I have expressed as to the inexpediency of multiplying the number of unemployed field-officers of the Staff corps." Has even the echo of such sentiments died away in the India Office, that nothing is done to remedy an error which is a sore burden on the resources of India, and a sorry way of treating a large number of old officers; the only excuse being, that the measures adopted for the amalgamation of the services have thrown them out of employment?

It must be apparent, one would think, to every one by this time, even to those who originally devised the amalgamation scheme, that it has proved a total failure. And the result is, that the country is burdened with a huge Frankensteinian monster, in the shape of an army of highly-paid field-officers for whom no employment can be found. The evil, it is true, is not one which will be perpetuated for ever. The Local Service will die out in time, and the excess of expenditure for the Staff corps will, as calculated by General Hannington, culminate in 1896, from which year a rapid diminution in the number of colonels will continue till the corps falls into its normal state.

Several propositions for increased pension and bonus, as an inducement to officers to retire, have recently been laid before Government, but they have each been rejected for reasons stated in some detail in a despatch from the Duke of Argyll, dated March 11, 1869, which, although it deals with this question from a point of view adopted at a period subsequent to that which is embraced in these



pages, yet treats of so many points of interest in connexion with the Indian army, that I have thought it best to insert it in the Appendix.

Hitherto I have dwelt, briefly indeed but exclusively, on the mode in which the amalgamation has affected the commissioned ranks of the army. The summary of results would not be complete without a few words upon the state to which the army itself has been reduced by this wretched disregard of the law of cause and effect.

Under the old system that prevailed before the Mutiny, when the Bengal native army was shown to be—what Sir Charles Napier declared it—more dangerous to its friends than its foes, the Bombay and Madras native armies had much to recommend them. Under the present system, all that was good in the systems of Bombay and Madras has been carefully eliminated; and every faulty, vicious principle which the Mutiny brought out in bold relief, has been carefully engrafted on them. The cry before the Mutiny was, that there were too few European officers with native regiments; now the number has been considerably reduced by the introduction of what is called the irregular system—a system, more properly speaking, of selection, which of course loses its essential characteristic directly it is made general, and selection is no longer feasible. The complaint was that, before the Mutiny, officers did not take that interest in their men, or their regiments, that an efficient discharge of duty required. Under the new system, by which officers are perpetually being changed about from one corps to another, it is next to impossible for them to take any interest, almost impossible for them even to know their men. One beneficial reform was introduced, and that was, that much larger powers were entrusted to commanding officers than under the old *régime*. These, however, have been taken away from them by the new Articles of War recently passed. The men are discontented, the officers are dissatisfied; there are no common interests to link them



together, there is no *esprit de corps*, no bond of union. The condition in which so many officers are forced to pass their time, month after month, year after year—vegetating at small stations, or living at larger ones at the club, where the only call to duty that ever varies the monotony of their indolent existence is a court-martial perhaps once a month, or a tour of duty as field-officer of the week every ten days—has been attended with its inevitable results, the habit of confirmed idleness. The amalgamation has been not only the professional but the moral ruin of hundreds, who, with their experience of India, might have been made valuable servants of the State. The native infantry regiments are in many cases inefficiently drilled, while the whole continent of India swarms with a semi-drilled, semi-armed police, enlisted from the worst and most turbulent classes, isolated in localities where no supervision can be exercised over them except by their native superiors, and where, should a second rebellion be planned, they have every facility for extending, unchecked, the network of a deadly conspiracy over the whole surface of the country.

Another effect of the amalgamation was to do away with a local European force. The consequence of that is, that the country is put to an enormous expense by incessant reliefs. The men of old local European regiments were inured¹ to the climate, accustomed to the country, and maintained among themselves a sort of traditional system, which every new comer speedily caught up, and in a wonderfully short space of time adapted himself to the exigencies of the climate and the altered circumstances of his condition. A new regiment takes nearly five years, or half its term of service, to learn all these things, and the experience is frequently only pur-

¹ I use the expression, "inured to the climate," not as indicating "acclimatization," for there is in reality no such thing, but as signifying a certain hardihood of constitution which old soldiers enjoy, simply from having learnt not to defy, but to guard against, the effects of the climate.



chased at the price we are accustomed to pay for that precious article. In the royal regiments generally, Indian service is so distasteful as almost to counteract the efforts of the recruiting sergeant; and after the first two years scarcely an officer is left with the new corps who has the means to exchange and maintain himself at home; while the officers of the twelve new line regiments, now that their time of home service has actually commenced, are dismayed at the prospect of having to support themselves and their families on English pay. The system of promotion is so cumbrous that a Staff corps officer who has brevet rank has to receive and pay for three commissions for each grade he attains; while the promotions necessarily ensuing upon two vacancies, moving as they do through the whole army, fill five columns of a newspaper the size of the *Times*, in the smallest print; and as these promotions have to be gazetted after confirmation in England, ten large newspaper columns will be occupied by the results of two army steps, while the system of promotion is so extremely complicated that it is doubtful if there is any one who thoroughly understands it.

It remains to add a few words with regard to the Indian medical service, the amalgamation of which with the Royal medical service was, after much consideration and delay, wisely abandoned. The present status of the Indian medical service will be perhaps better understood after a brief reference to its condition under the Honourable East India Company. At that time the service was divided into assistant-surgeons, surgeons, and senior surgeons, with an administrative staff consisting of a liberal number of divisional superintending surgeons, and a controlling board composed of three members. All the administrative appointments had special salaries attached to them, and these were without exception in excess of the pay of their corresponding army rank, and also of the emoluments granted to corresponding grades of the medical service under the *present organisation*. Under the Company it

was, moreover, the rule to bestow upon all military officers, medical being included in the term, an addition to their pay, under the name of "staff allowance," varying in amount with the responsibilities, or presumed responsibilities, of their charge. In addition to this, those in military employ drew "head money," and also in certain cases "palkee allowance." When military medical officers were made over for duty in the civil department, in addition to the consolidated salary of the appointment, the civil medical officer could always count upon an increase of income from various other sources. Such offices as superintendent of dispensaries, or asylums, registrarships of deeds, and postmasterships, were almost invariably conferred upon the civil surgeon, each carrying with it an augmentation to the monthly salary. At that time also, few medical men, other than those in Government employ, were to be found in India, and hence as a necessary consequence emoluments from private practice were greater than they are now, which in most localities may be represented by a cypher. As regards furlough pay and privileges the army medical staff were placed on exactly the same footing as military officers of corresponding rank!¹ The pensions also were essentially computed with reference to army rank.² Although the relative rank assigned was admittedly too low, yet, such as it was, it carried with it all privileges of the grade. All these causes combined to render the Indian medical service, and especially the civil branch, exceedingly popular and attractive. Each assistant-surgeoncy was in the gift of a director of the Honourable East India Company. No director was ever without candidates on his list. Such an occurrence, so often known more recently, of an assistant-surgeoncy "going begging," never happened. Neither can it be stated that the social or professional status of the older men was inferior to

¹ *Vide* old Furlough Rules, par. 32, *et seq.*

² G.O.G.G. No. 122, 14th April, 1844.

that enjoyed by officers who have more recently entered the service under the so-called competition system.

In November 1858 the government of British India was transferred to the Crown, and about this period a Royal Medical Warrant appeared for the Queen's service, in which an official acknowledgment was made that the relative rank assigned to army medical officers was insufficient.¹ Accordingly, the warrant increased the relative rank, with pay and pension, of Queen's officers: but those of the Indian service were not benefited in any way. Two years after, in March 1860,² another Royal Medical Warrant was issued for India, being almost a counterpart of the one for the British service of 1858, *excepting as regards pay and pension*. Although the increase of relative rank was given, neither of the vitally important points above mentioned was touched upon; and the Indian service therefore presented the anomaly of officers ranking relatively as major and lieutenant-colonel, &c., and being expected to subscribe to funds as such, though receiving the pay of the lower grades. In other respects also there was an invidious distinction between the Indian and the British service. In the latter an assistant-surgeon might for distinguished service be promoted *substantively*, in the former by *brevet* only.³ According to the Queen's British Warrant the rank of surgeon-major⁴ (corresponding with that of lieutenant-colonel) was attained after twenty years in the service, all recognised leave included; while by the Queen's Indian Warrant twenty years' actual service in India were required to attain such rank.

On the 20th June, 1864,⁵ a despatch appeared, signed by the Secretary of State, which professed to supply for the Indian service the deficiencies of the Warrant of 1860.

¹ Warrant dated 1st October, 1868. Paragraph referred to, No. 16.

² G.O.G.G. No. 353, *Calcutta Gazette*, 30th March, 1860.

³ *Vide* par. 6 of each Warrant.

⁴ *Vide* par. 8 of each Warrant.

⁵ *Government Gazette*, 20th June, 1864.



It authorized a readjustment of the numbers of assistant-surgeons and surgeons, and thus to some extent rectified the slowness of promotion which had kept officers for seventeen years in the junior grade. It permitted recognised leave to count as time for the rank of surgeon-major, and it granted to Indian medical officers the Home rates of the pay of their rank, as laid down in the British Medical Warrant of 1858. It also sanctioned a full and half batta scale of pay for India, but *abolished staff and extra allowances*, with one solitary exception, viz. in the case of assistant-surgeons in actual charge of British regiments or brigades of artillery. As, however, neither of these ever were assistant-surgeons' charges, and as the charge of British troops was soon after taken from Indian medical officers, it is difficult to understand the motive inducing the insertion of this clause in the Warrant. And an after order,¹ nullifying paragraph 15 of the despatch, was subsequently published, by which the scale of invaliding pensions granted in 1858 to British medical officers compelled to leave the service from ill-health or wounds, was denied to officers of the Indian service.

But the despatch of 1864 professed only to deal with military charges, and left all civil appointments and non-regimental charges as before. In some cases, owing to the recent increase, the pay of rank was found to be greater than the emoluments of the civil appointment. Under these circumstances many medical officers applied to be permitted to draw the pay of their rank, the pay they were entitled to on leave, but an after order² in the Financial department stated, that in the event of any medical officer wishing to draw the military pay of his rank, he must first obtain a certificate from the local government stating that his services could not be dispensed with. If he could not

¹ No. 292, dated 23d September, 1864, Secretary of State to Right Hon. the Governor-General.

² G.O.G.G. No. 252, 1865.



obtain this certificate, he was still kept at his duty and denied the pay ordered by the Secretary of State.

A document compiled by the Financial department proves that the relative pay and allowances drawn by medical officers in various situations under the old rules, were in very many instances more than those ordered by the Secretary of State's despatch of 16th May, 1864. Members being also obliged to subscribe to the service funds at the rate of the higher relative rank, the actual receipts were still further practically curtailed.

On the 14th December, 1864, a second despatch was received, which in some measure rectified the omissions of the previous one. It granted to assistant-surgeons promotion after a definite period of service. It bestowed additional pensions on inspectors and deputy-inspectors-general, and it slightly increased the rate of retiring pensions for the whole service. It also entirely separated the Indian from the British service, reducing the administrative staff of the former, and increasing that of the latter; consequent on which the charge of European troops ceased to be a duty of Indian medical officers.

Upwards of two years now elapsed, during which period the majority of the members of the Indian medical service were confined to pay of rank irrespective of the appointment held. On the 4th of April, 1867,² a third despatch was published, laying down a revised scale of salary for civil appointments. In this the principle of staff allowance is acknowledged. While some few positions, as that of Secretary to the Inspector-General and Principal of the Presidency medical colleges, have fair staff salaries attached, other appointments afford but little increase to the pay of rank, and a third class actually entail reduction. As pointed out at the time,³ district and

¹ Vide "A Sketch of the Past and Present Condition of the Bengal Medical Service," p. 18.

² No. 370 of 1867.

³ *Indian Medical Gazette*, June 1, 1867.



Presidency surgeons, the chemical examiner to Government, N. W. P. garrison surgeons, &c. receive, if of fifteen years' standing, only Rs. 24. 4. 7 more, and if surgeon-majors, Rs. 6. 9. 7 to Rs. 43. 2 less, than they are entitled to when unemployed. The same absurdity is even more striking in the case of second class civil surgeons, comprising nine-tenths of the whole. A surgeon of ten years' service receives Rs. 49. 3, and one of fifteen years' service Rs. 75. 11. 5, *less* for one of these charges than he would if on leave. All extra or staff allowances attaching to civil surgeoncies were merged in the consolidated pay laid down in the despatch, excepting for the administrative superintendency of colleges, jails, and asylums, &c., for which an additional allowance is sanctioned, varying from Rs. 25 to Rs. 150. The value, therefore, of those civil surgeoncies to which such extra posts attach, is on the average about equal to the charge of a regiment; those without such extra posts less remunerative. Although the prospects of the Indian medical service have during recent years (particularly as regards the pay of the junior ranks) been certainly improved, there still appears to be just grounds for at least a portion of the dissatisfaction which exists. Many are disposed to consider the reductions in the administrative ranks, consequent on the transfer of all charge of British troops to the Queen's service, as a breach of faith. This, however, cannot be admitted. Rightly or wrongly, it was decided that the Indian medical officer is not "the style of officer contemplated" by the existing organization of the medical department of the British army,¹ and the reduction of the administrative branch followed as a natural and inevitable consequence of much work being given over to a larger body of executive and administrative Queen's officers. Even Mr. Henley's clause in the Act of Parliament transferring India to the Crown, guaranteeing the rights and privileges of Indian

¹ *Vide* pars. 1, 2, 3, of Secretary of State's Despatch, 7th November, 1864.



officers, cannot be fairly twisted into a promise that injury to the prospects of Indian officers should not occur from reduction of establishment. But Mr. Henley's clause most certainly guaranteed to Indian officers of every class that all legal rights and privileges should be observed intact. Of these rights, staff allowance was one. That has been withdrawn from the Indian medical service as a body, though continued to every other class. It has already been demonstrated that the rank and pay of Indian officers was fixed by the Queen's Warrant of 1861, and by the Secretary of State's despatch dated June 1864. Yet the issue of the pay consequent on the increase, or rather the admission, of relative rank, was made the opportunity of the reduction, or rather withdrawal, of staff allowances.

There are two principal causes of complaint of the old Indian medical services : 1. The withdrawal of staff allowances ; 2. The non-issue of pay of rank. Whatever may be advanced in defence of the former, the latter is an extraordinary and absurd anomaly. One order lays down the pay of rank to which all are entitled even on leave, another order lays down the pay of nine-tenths of the civil appointments at less than the pay of rank ; so that many medical officers now draw less for doing their duty than they do on leave.

As regards the new Indian medical service, there are grievances peculiar to the class. The regulations under which assistant-surgeons enter, supplied to them by the India Office at home, state without reservation that there are two scales of pay, one of which will be received when the officer is employed and the other when unemployed. This is clear and distinct, and printed in as plain language as pure Anglo-Saxon admits. But when the medical officer arrives in India he finds his pay is not as stated above. First, he is not permitted to draw "employed pay" until he has passed an examination in the languages. Secondly, he is subject to deductions of pay when "acting" in any appointment.

It is not of course intended to underrate the advantages to the medical officer of acquaintance with the vernacular, but it is a decided injustice that a young assistant-surgeon should be told in England that he will receive so many rupees a month in India, and find out when he gets there that he only draws half the amount.

As regards the junior ranks of the Royal medical service, it must be admitted that they are shabbily treated. They get no staff pay for the duties they perform. Their allowance ought to be assimilated to the corresponding grade of the Indian service. But even the British army assistant-surgeons are better off than many Indian surgeons. They at all events receive the pay of their rank, which, as already shown, many Indian surgeons are not permitted to draw.

It must be recollected that medical men enter on public duties after having learned their profession at the cost of much money and time, while other classes acquire their experience after entering the public service; and the conclusion is unavoidable, that, in comparison with other skilled labour, the medical art is undervalued in the Indian market.



CHAPTER XXIII.

HYGIENE AND SANITATION.

Progress of sanitation — Publications — Camps — Cantonments — Sanitary commission—Conservancy—European colonization of India—Cholera—Cinchona—The Delhi sore—Sanitary arrangements for emigrants—Indian Jails—Leprosy—Malarious fever—Medical schools—The medical service—Meteorology—The rainfall on mountainous ranges—Rural sanitation—Space in barracks, &c. —Salt—Sanitaria—Scurvy—Snake-bites—Condition of European soldiers—Wives and children—Transport service—Vaccination—Vegetables—Venereal disease—Water.

SYSTEMATIC sanitation in India can scarcely be said to have commenced with the decade now closed. It was not, indeed, until after the publication of the voluminous blue books in 1863 of the Royal Commission appointed under the presidency of Lord Herbert, to inquire into the sanitary condition of the Anglo-Indian army, that the urgent necessity of considerable pecuniary outlay on sanitation was admitted. But since that period, whatever may have been former shortcomings, want of attention to sanitary matters can neither be urged against the local government, nor imputed to the Secretary of State. Sir Stafford Northcote himself, in one of his last budget speeches, while admitting that much remains to be done, stated: "We have now established a sanitary department in our office, and are in communication" (on sanitary subjects) "with the Government of India." The share taken by the latter in the good work will, though perhaps imperfectly, be shown in the following pages. Subordinate officials are

still to be found, who, unacquainted with the subject, in the pride of youth, health, ignorance, and little brief authority, or with the obstinacy of senility, regard sanitation with contemptuous indifference, and who, as a consequence, do not act according to the spirit of the orders of Government ; but, as a general rule, the reverse is now the case. And although we cannot yet congratulate ourselves on the perfection of a system of State medicine and hygiene, there is sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that, making allowance for unalterable differences of climate, what has been effected in other countries will be the eventual result in India. It can never be forgotten, that one hundred years ago the diseases of tropical climates, scurvy, dysentery, and malarious fevers, prevailed in London and throughout England generally, pretty much as they do now in the principal Indian cities. About that period, and during previous years, jail fever occurred epidemically in most of the prisons of Great Britain, often spreading to judge, jury, and witnesses assembled together, or to the inhabitants of the country towns. From maladies similar to those above mentioned, barracks were little better than pest-houses, while ships of the Royal Navy were floating homes of pestilence and disease. All this, however, is now altered. Sanitation has nearly banished scurvy, malarious fevers, dysentery, and allied disease throughout the length and breadth of the United Kingdom. Jail fever is unknown in English jails. The mortality among soldiers in England scarcely exceeds that of classes of the same age among the general public. And the career of a sailor in her Majesty's vessels of war, apart from the accidents and perils of a seafaring life, presents as good a chance of longevity as the great majority of laborious occupations. As an example of both the neglect and application of sanitary measures, we have only to refer to the condition of the Crimean army before and after the necessity of such precautions was acknowledged. In the earlier period of the war our regiments were decimated by



preventible maladies. Before the capture of Sebastopol they presented bills of health scarcely inferior to those of battalions serving in the United Kingdom. Again, during the China war, which immediately followed, the sanitary condition of the army was regarded as secondary only to success in the field; as a consequence, the health of the troops, although passing rapidly from the temperature of a torrid to that of an arctic zone, was more favourable than had ever happened in similar operations. Similarly, the rapid despatch of numerous troops in 1861-2 to the snows of Canada, and the recent Abyssinian campaign, both effected without loss from epidemic disease, may be regarded as furnishing illustration of the value of sanitation. Thus, whether inferences are drawn from military or civil life, from tropical or temperate climates, the power we possess to prevent disease is abundantly manifest.

In order to present a brief but clear view of what has been effected in India during recent years, it will be necessary to remark on a variety of subjects. Their nature being so varied and distinct, an arrangement approximating to the alphabetical is adopted, as better suited than any other to the desired purpose.

BOOKS.

The principal publications during the decade on sanitary subjects, with especial reference to India, are as follow:—

1. The British Soldier in India. By Julius Jeffreys, Esq. Surgeon, Retired List, Bengal Army, 1859.
2. The Sanitary Condition of Indian Jails. By Dr. Joseph Ewart, Professor of Physiology, Calcutta Medical College, 1860.
3. Vital Statistics of the Anglo-Indian Armies. By Dr. Joseph Ewart, Professor of Physiology, Calcutta Medical College, 1860.
4. Hygiene of the Army in India. By Stewart Clarke, Esq. Inspector-General of Jails, North-West Provinces.



5. Health in the Tropics; or, Sanitary Acts applied to Europeans in India. By Dr. W. J. Moore, Surgeon, Rajpootana Political Agency, 1862.

6. Army Hygiene. By Dr. Gordon, Deputy-Inspector-General of Hospitals, Bengal, 1863.

7. On the Condition of Seamen in the Port of Calcutta. By Dr. Chevers, Principal, Calcutta Medical College, 1865.

8. Report of the Royal Sanitary Commission appointed to inquire into the Condition of the Anglo-Indian Army, 1862.

9. Army Statistical Sanitary and Medical Reports, 1859 to 1865.

10. Sanitary Reports of the Commissioners for Bengal, Madras, and Bombay, for the years 1864—1866.

11. Treatises on Vaccination, for distribution among the People. By Dr. Thompson, Madras; Dr. Shortt, Madras; Dr. Plumptree, Bombay; Dr. Moore, Rajpootana; Dr. Pearson, North-West Provinces.

CAMPS.

With the view of securing the health of men in camps, it is now ordered,¹ that trenches for the burial of refuse are to be dug in echelon on the flanks—being so placed that the prevailing winds cannot carry effluvia to the tents. The position of these trenches to be marked by a flag: they are to be thoroughly filled in before the rear-guard leaves the ground. The commanding officer is desired to place himself in communication with native local authorities, and arrange that effectual measures are adopted for cleansing the ground immediately it is vacated. Particular attention is to be directed to the water supply previous to the arrival of the troops. Before leaving the camping ground, and sometimes during the march, soldiers are now invariably supplied with tea or coffee.

¹ *Vide* G.O., 30th January, 1863.

In the neighbourhood of all cantonments, sites are fixed upon for the encampment of the men in case of cholera breaking out.¹ It is also ordered that such sites are to be ploughed up after occupation.² Except when unavoidable, cholera-encampments after being ploughed up are not to be occupied within twelve months.³

CANTONMENTS.

There is evidence of a desire to institute some amount of sanitary measures in Indian cantonments long before they were considered essential in neighbouring towns and villages. Thus, the necessity of keeping down rank vegetation was early acknowledged and provided for, while cantonment funds under the direction of committees were instituted.⁴ The position of bazaars was also regulated,⁵ and rules, including sanitary regulations for their management, laid down.⁶ Public latrines were generally instituted about the year 1850, but owing to the wet system of conservancy they were very frequently nuisances, and in some places were abandoned. Station burial-grounds,⁷ roads,⁸ and slaughter-houses,⁹ were also subjects of regulation. By the Army Medical Regulations of 1859, the senior medical officer at any station was constituted *ex officio* sanitary officer,¹⁰ while the general sanitary condition was to be carefully inquired into by the Deputy-Inspector-General of the division on his periodical tour of inspection.

In 1864 an Act¹¹ was passed for the better administration

¹ G.O.C.C., dated 7th April, 1862.

² G.G.O. No. 554, 1st October, 1867, Bombay.

³ G.G.O. No. 688, 2d December, 1867.

⁴ Code P.W.D., chap. i. sect. 5, par. 15.

⁵ Op. cit., chap. v. pars. 6—8.

⁶ Bengal Military Regulations, sect. 6.

⁷ P.W. Code, chap. xx. sect. 4, par. 4.

⁸ Op. cit. chap. v. sect. 3, par 1.

¹⁰ Par. 22, page 81.

⁹ Op. cit.

¹¹ No. 22 of 1864.



of military cantonments, providing for the conduct of civil and criminal justice; for police, conservancy, sale of liquors, and general sanitation. A standing sanitary committee or local board of health has also been established in every cantonment;¹ while, by a more recent order, the senior medical officer of either British or Indian troops is *ex officio* sanitary adviser² to the commanding officer regarding all matters affecting the different branches of the service.³ Executive medical officers are, moreover, required to submit through their administrative superiors monthly sanitary reports, afterwards forwarded through the Quartermaster-General for the information of the Commander-in-chief. Standing orders of the Public Works department still provide for roads and drains.⁴ With regard to the sanitation of cantonments, it may be stated that if all the rules and regulations laid down by Government and the military authorities are effectively carried out, everything will be done to secure the public health which can at present be attempted.

COMMISSION, SANITARY.

Perhaps the most important sanitary step taken during the decade was the formation of sanitary commissions for the three Presidencies, in accordance with the suggestion of the Royal Sanitary Commission appointed in 1859 to inquire into the condition of the army. The Commission for Bengal—consisting of four members, a president, and secretary—were nominated in February 1864,⁵ and shortly afterwards for the Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. These commissions were to afford advice and assistance in all matters relating to the health of the army,

¹ Sect. xix. Act XXII. of 1864.² G.G.O. No. 442, 1867.³ G.G.O. No. 268 of 1867.⁴ P.W.D. No. 662 of 1865.⁵ G.G.O. No. 87, 2d February, 1864.



and to supervise the gradual introduction of sanitary improvements in barracks, hospitals, and stations, as well as in towns in proximity to military stations. The president and secretary were required to devote their whole time to the work ; but the members were to serve in addition to other duties.

In 1866, however, the constitution of the various sanitary commissions was modified.¹ The duties have since been carried on by a commissioner and secretary. But it was ordered that, when desirable, officers civil, military, or medical, best acquainted with the subject, should be associated with the sanitary commissioner in any part of the country where it might be deemed necessary to assemble a committee.

Up to August 1868, three annual reports have been published by the commissions, or commissioners, of each of the Presidencies. All contain a vast mass of valuable information, both regarding military and civil hygiene. At the present time, plans for military buildings, as barracks and hospitals, are referred before final sanction to the sanitary commissioner, as also all questions connected with the condition of jails and with sanitation generally.

CONSERVANCY.

Another of the most important sanitary changes which have recently been effected is the adoption of the dry earth, or the so-called "Moule's system" of conservancy. In 1864,² this system was reported upon, after experiment in the Allipore jail, and the abolition of lime, charcoal, ashes, or other substances in favour of dry earth, was strongly recommended. But this dry-earth conservancy can scarcely be regarded as a novel conception of Mr. Moule. A very similar method had been introduced into the Punjab jails

¹ G.G.O. No. 196, 28th February, 1866.

² *Gazette of India*, May 7th, 1864.

years previously, by Dr. Hathaway.¹ In the latter province the use of water had not only been prohibited, but it had been pointed out that lime, coming in contact with urine, results in the formation of uric acid, and the evolution of offensive ammoniacal gases. The deodorizing powers of earth have indeed been long recognised.² Such properties have been employed by the Italians for ages.³ But there is an immense difference between a deodorizer and a disinfectant. There is reason to believe that earth does not act with any great certainty in the latter capacity. Some soils, as clay and aluminous earths, retain organic matter for a lengthened period undecomposed. It is on record that maladies, such as cholera and small-pox, have appeared immediately on the opening up of earth in which the bodies of those dying from such diseases had been years since interred.⁴ As mentioned below in the remarks on cholera, this disease, as also typhoid fever, small-pox, and several varieties of the entozoa affecting man,⁵ belong to the group of diseases affecting, or capable of being preserved in, the ground. And if this is the case, the wholesale burial of human ordure now going on, under Moule's system of conservancy, is probably a storing of epidemic poisons to be turned up hereafter.⁶ The destruction of such material requires exposure to the

¹ Reports on Punjab Jails.

² Moore's "Health in the Tropics," p. 159.

³ *Medical Times*, Jan. 4, 1868.

⁴ Cholera appeared among workpeople employed in cutting into an old cholera graveyard. (*Madras Medical Journal*, 1862.) Dr. Gibb refers to an epidemic of small-pox following the opening up of an old small-pox cemetery at Quebec. (*Sanitary Review*, No. 2: vide also an article on "Sealed-up Poisons," *Medical Times*, 1868.) The vitality of epidemic poisons is also proved by the length of time—10 years—vaccine lymph has been preserved. When it is recollected that seeds from Pharaoh's pyramids have germinated, and that there are forms of infusoria preserving vitality in boiling water, the preservation of poisonous germs in the earth can scarcely be a matter of surprise.

⁵ Cobbold "On Human Entozoa."

⁶ Vide "Remarks on the Dry System of Conservancy," by Dr. Moore, *Indian Medical Gazette*, April 1868.



atmosphere. Animal charcoal, one of the best disinfectants known, acts by condensing putrid vapours within its pores, so as to cause rapid union with oxygen, or slow combustion, or *cremation*. To effect this, however, there must be free access of atmospheric air. By burial deep in the earth, the contact of oxygen is reduced to a minimum. Deodorization may take place, but destruction or *cremation* is less possible. Could we be certain no diseased faecal material was ever buried, this would not much signify. But as this cannot be assured, combustion in furnaces rather than burial in the ground appears the better plan.

COLONIZATION.

Nothing has been attempted during recent years towards colonization. It may be indeed regarded as decided that the Indian plains cannot be colonized by Europeans.¹ But with regard to the Hills, the question must be looked upon as still *sub judice*. Even on the elevated regions, *military* colonization by pensioners, as proposed again and again since the time of Sir Thomas Munroe, can scarcely be expected to prove successful. For the labour of a colonist, the young, strong, and healthy are required. Personally, I

¹ The statistical tables of the Royal Sanitary Commission prove that sickness and mortality increase every year with length of residence in India, at a much greater rate than is explainable by age alone. The natives of temperate zones degenerate in the tropics, as the Esquimaux or negroes do when removed to temperate climates. As Henry Marshall long since pointed out, even inferior animals, as cows, dogs, and sheep, deteriorate in the tropics. All authorities agree, that not one pure descendant of the Portuguese is to be found in India. Sir Ranald Martin (Evidence before the Royal Sanitary Commission), Moorhead (Clinical Researches on Diseases of India), Chevers (Indian Annals of Medical Science), Moore (Health in the Tropics), and other writers, all express opinions, more or less decided, against the possibility of colonization of the plains. If Europeans ever inhabit the plains of India, otherwise than as sojourners for a period, they must first pass into the country during centuries, and alter in characteristics as the Hindoos did.



believe colonization even of the Hills would be a failure, but many hold different opinions.¹ It is therefore desirable the matter were authoritatively decided by a practical experiment. This, however, could only result after generations had passed away, the initiation merely of any such movement being in our hands.

The question whether settlers on the Hills could find sufficient remunerative occupation is one apart from the purely sanitary query. But the prospect of an affirmative answer to the former appears as doubtful as to the latter.

CHOLERA.

A great step in the prevention of this malady has been made during recent years. The communicability of the disease has been admitted, and consequently removal and isolation have been adopted as the means of staying epidemics. Whether the germs of cholera are in the air, in

¹ The question whether a healthy and vigorous European stock can be maintained in the mountain climates of India, has certainly never yet received authoritative answer from experience. But the opinions of those best qualified to judge are unfavourable. Sir Ranald Martin, in his answers before the Committee on Indian Colonization (1854), gives the guarded opinion that "it might be the case to a certain extent, not yet determined." Beattie, before the same board, had no doubt a race of persons well off in life would be continued on the Hills, but whether they would deteriorate under the most favourable circumstances was a question nothing but time could solve. Dr. Moore writes: "Whether European progeny would retain their characteristics, if obliged to undergo the exposure and labour consequent on tilling the ground of even hill ranges, can only be determined by time and experiment: with constant infusion of new blood, and due attention to sanitary principles, such might be the result." Dr. Chevers remarks: "To become enterprising colonists on the slopes of the ghauts and of the Himalayas, they must be a robust, vigorous, intelligent race, capable of maintaining our wealth and our empire equally by commercial industry and by force of arms." Reared as exotics on the summit of the mountains, apart from the great world, we can scarcely expect colonists would retain these characteristics: neither could we look for such qualities in a mixed race.

the water, or in food, or in all, it is now sufficiently proved that isolation and removal from the infected locality is the one great means of arresting the disease. This is not the place to review the different theories of cholera, but it may be remarked that the spread and course of the malady, and the means of prevention now adopted, are consonant with the views first promulgated by Pettenkofer¹ and Thiersch,² viz. that the cholera germ is contained, like that of typhoid or intestinal fever, in the diseased excretions. This fact has since been more or less fully admitted by many independent observers, as Acland,³ Snow,⁴ Carpenter,⁵ Allison,⁶ Routh,⁷ Sutherland,⁸ Bidie,⁹ Parkes,¹⁰ Moore,¹¹ Simon,¹² Budd,¹³ the two latter of whom state, "Cholera is one of the group of diseases which affect the ground."

In consequence of the growing belief, based on accumulated facts, of the communicability of cholera, medical men had for some time urged the removal and isolation of troops when attacked by this disease.¹⁴ In 1861, want of action at Meean Meer was followed by lamentable mortality. The Meean Meer catastrophe doubtless hastened the publication of the famous standing order of Sir Hugh Rose, dated April 1862. The fourth paragraph of these regulations states: "As soon as any case of cholera is reported in the station, the troops will be moved into camp, and no unfavourable condition of the weather is to prevent this movement being carried out."

¹ Mode de Propagation du Choléra, 1854.

² Infectionsversuche an Thieren, mit dem Inhal des Cholera dermes, 1856.

³ Memoir of Cholera in Oxford, 1856.

⁴ On the Mode of Communication of Cholera.

⁵ *British Med. and Surg. Association Journal*, Oct. 1854.

⁶ On Cholera: *Edin. Med. Journal*, 1854.

⁷ On Fermenting Alvine Evacuations: *San. Review*, No. 6.

⁸ Report on Cholera: Blue Book, 1855.

⁹ Etiology of Cholera: *Madras Med. Journal*, No. 1.

¹⁰ Practical Hygiene, p. 431. ¹¹ Health in the Tropics, p. 178.

¹² *The Times*, July 17, 1861. ¹³ *The Lancet*, July 23, 1859.

¹⁴ Moore, Health in the Tropics, p. 183.



Since that period to the present time, the practice has been pursued whenever epidemic cholera appeared. The results, as regards the Upper Provinces, have been latterly reported by Inspector-General Dr. Murray,¹ than whom no man in India is, either in experience or attention to the subject, better qualified to speak authoritatively. In seven epidemics coming under Dr. Murray's observation or direction, removal of the affected was adopted with good results. During 1867 alone there were eighty removals of European and native troops, or prisoners, in the North-West. In thirty-four of these, no fresh cases appeared after removal. In eleven, cholera returned only on the first and second day. In thirty-five instances, it appeared after the second day. And in addition to the benefit conferred on those removed, all left behind in cantonments were freed from an imminent source of danger. The objections to removal and encampment of troops are three; the probability of suffering from sun-stroke, or from fever, and the expense. Dr. Murray points out that in many instances the health of the men actually improved under canvas, showing a smaller sick list than from those left behind. "When a regiment arrives at the encamping ground before tents have been prepared, in the hot season, or is pitched in low marshy ground, in the rains, makes too long marches, or commits excess, extraordinary sickness may be expected to ensue. To infer that an increase of sickness was solely owing to the removal, is to ignore these facts and the after-effects of cholera." A comparison of the loss of life before and after the system of removal came into operation shows that the mortality is now diminished one-half, the saving of life in a pecuniary point of view amply compensating for the outlay. Practically it has been found necessary only to remove and encamp the particular body of men from that barrack in which cholera occurs, and this is now the standing order.²

¹ On Removal of Troops in Attacks of Epidemic Cholera, 1868.

² G.O.G.G. No. 418, 22d April, 1868.



As before mentioned, cholera prevailed at Meean Meer in 1861, and, also, generally throughout the North-West. This led to the appointment of a commission, with Mr. Strachey as president. After considerable delay, owing to differences of opinion among the members, a report was presented, the third section of which is printed and issued "by authority."¹ Removal, isolation, and the destruction of diseased discharges, are the three great measures of prevention recommended.

In 1866, the report of the Cholera Commission assembled at Constantinople, in which India was represented by Dr. Goodeve, appeared. With one or two exceptions, the members of this committee arrived at the following conclusions. That India is the birthplace of cholera, and its permanent home. That since 1817, that country has been the focus from which the disease has radiated. That cholera is propagated by man, with a swiftness in proportion to the rapidity of his movements. That no fact has been brought forward to prove that cholera is spread by the atmosphere alone. That water and certain *ingesta* may serve as vehicles for the introduction of the cholera germ into the system. That in India the movements of pilgrims are the most powerful of all causes tending to the development and propagation of the malady.

Reasoning on these and some less important conclusions, the Constantinople Commission proposed a huge system of quarantine through Russia, Persia, Arabia, and the Red Sea, in order to prevent the passage of the disease westwards. They also suggested a more systematic supervision over pilgrims and fairs in India. Recollecting that want predisposes to cholera, it was also recommended that each person, before starting on a pilgrimage, should obtain a licence, showing he was in the possession of the necessary means to defray the expenses of his journey. The inferences drawn at Constantinople cannot, however, be adopted *in toto*. The doctrine of a disease being able

¹ Measures for the Prevention of Cholera among European Troops.



to disseminate itself in any climate, while originating only in one, is opposed to the etiology of other maladies.¹ As cholera had once an origin, so its *de novo* birth, under favourable circumstances, can scarcely be doubted. If it be admitted that Asiatic cholera "is never developed spontaneously, has never been observed as an endemic disease in Europe, but that it has always entered from without," a theory very dangerous to public health in European countries will be adopted. Under such a belief, internal sanitary arrangements would soon be regarded as unnecessary. Instead of trusting to home sanitation, an impracticable system of quarantine would be the reed on which public health would lean; and, under such circumstances, cholera, when it did appear, would prove terribly fatal.

In accordance with the suggestions of the Constantinople Commission, the Sanitary Commissioner of Bengal, local administrations, and civil surgeons have been called upon for reports and opinions regarding any practical action which can be taken towards preventing the dissemination of cholera by pilgrims. The difficulties surrounding this subject are, however, great. The prevention of the assembly of multitudes, often insufficiently fed, fatigued by long journeying, and excited or depressed by a pseudo-religious enthusiasm, would strike at the root of the evil. But at the present period such a procedure in India is manifestly impracticable. The most that can be attempted, therefore, is the provision of proper sanitary arrangements at all large fairs and festivals, and the greatest practicable amount of supervision over pilgrims and others proceeding to and from these gatherings. Owing to sanitary measures, epidemics of cholera originating at fairs and festivals during recent years have been less numerous than in former periods. At Punderpoor, for instance, where the disease was generally expected to break out during the

¹ The existence of *typhoid* and *typhus* fever in India is now admitted, but no one doubts their *de novo* origin.

last three years, no extraordinary sickness has occurred. The experience,¹ however, gained in 1867 at Hurdwar demonstrates that, although no possible amount of sanitary regulation will *secure* immunity, yet comparative safety may be readily ensured.²

With regard to pilgrims proceeding to Mecca, it has been proposed that no ship bound for the Red Sea should leave an Indian port without a clean bill of health.³ The authorities at Jeddah report that pilgrims arrive in a state of nudity and utter destitution, particularly those annually conveyed to the Hedjaz at the expense of his Highness the Nizam of Hyderabad.⁴ The consul at Jeddah also points out that the Koran expressly forbids true believers to undertake the pilgrimage, unless provided with adequate means for its performance.

Still more recently, the Ottoman Sanitary Commission of the Hedjaz recommend surveillance and inspection of vessels at Perim.⁵ This commission consists of five Musulman and four Christian members, the majority being medical officers stationed at the various Turkish ports of the Red Sea.

CINCHONA.

If the views at present held by the great majority of the medical profession are correct, the cultivation of the cin-

¹ *Vide* Hurdwar Festival Report of *Gazette of India*, 1867, p. 1027.

² From the 3d to the 12th of April, 1867, a mass of people, as numerous as the population of Scotland, converging from the whole Hindoo world, arrived on a bare plain at Hurdwar on the banks of the Ganges. Under the excellent sanitary arrangements enforced, no disease occurred until after the bathing on the 12th. Then cholera appeared, and the people dispersing carried the disease, as Inspector-General Murray shows, from 300 to 700 miles in all directions. (Report on the Hurdwar Cholera of 1867. See above, ch. xii. Vol. I.)

³ Proceedings, Bombay Government, No. 2083, Dec. 1867.

⁴ Proceedings of Sanitary Commissioner, 1868, p. 71.

⁵ Proceedings, Bombay Government, General Department, No. 853 7th May, 1868.



cinchona tree in India must be counted as one of the most important operations now in progress which will in the future affect the public health, and therefore the welfare and progress, of the country. It is now scarcely ten years since cinchona plants were conveyed in Wardian cases from their homes in the Cordilleras to the slopes of the Neilgherries.¹ It was fondly hoped that before this period the cinchona grown on the latter elevated regions would have supplied multitudes in India with the presumed great antidote to malarious fevers, the all-powerful alkaloid, quinine. How this anticipation has been fulfilled I shall now proceed to show.

The reports published at intervals, particularly from the Government plantations on the Neilgherries, undoubtedly demonstrate that several varieties of cinchona will grow in India; but there are many localities, in which it was supposed the plant would flourish, not at all adapted for the purpose. Thus the mountain tracts of Pegu, Tenasserim, and Martaban are described as scarcely possessing sufficient elevation.² In a communication of Mr. Markham³ to the Secretary of State, the Shevaroy and Tinnevely hills, Mahableshtar and the Himalayas, were mentioned as unfavourable for the cultivation of cinchona. The cinchona being an essentially intertropical plant, requiring a very peculiar atmosphere, the variations of temperature on the Himalayas were found to be too great, while the Mahableshtar range and other hills men-

¹ The practicability of cultivating cinchona in India was first pointed out by the late Dr. Royle. In 1852 a number of plants were despatched from Kew, five only reaching Calcutta alive, and all dying in transport to Darjeeling. In April 1859 Mr. Clements Markham was despatched for cinchona plants to Peru, and in October 1860 reached Ootacamund with a number of plants, all of which eventually perished. About this time, fifteen cases and a large number of seeds were brought by Mr. Cross from Kew, of which a large proportion germinated. In December 1861 Dr. Anderson brought a number of healthy plants from Java.

² Brandis, *Calcutta Gazette*, Supplement, Aug. 31, 1861.

³ *Calcutta Gazette*, Aug. 31, 1861.



tioned were either too dry at certain seasons, or the elevation was not sufficient.

In Netherlands India, similar difficulties induced the Government to put a stop to the cultivation of certain varieties of cinchona, which from the report of scientific chemists in Holland proved to be worthless. The British Government, on learning this failure, decided to discontinue the growth of the same species which had been commenced at Darjeeling.¹ Other varieties are, however, flourishing near the latter place, where three Government cinchona plantations exist.²

Mr. McIvor, the superintendent on the Neilgherries, has despatched periodical samples of bark to England. Thus in 1863, specimens of growth in all stages, from one month to fifteen, were thus forwarded.³ Some of this bark is mentioned by Mr. Howard as "a very promising earnest of much that is to follow;" while Mr. McIvor enthusiastically states, "The average price of Peruvian bark produced by the best species may be estimated at from five to six shillings per pound, while, judging from the progress our plants have made here, the cost of the production of this quantity of bark cannot possibly exceed threepence."

In 1864, Mr. Howard mentions that *leaves* of Indian-grown cinchona will not supply the material for the extraction of quinine, but that the red *bark* forwarded yielded six per cent. of *quinoidine*. This result was sufficiently encouraging to induce many persons to apply to the Government gardens for cinchona plants; and accordingly in 1863 no less than sixty-seven persons were supplied with 9,125 plants;⁴ while in 1864, 39,034 were issued. It was,

¹ *Calcutta Gazette*, April 8, 1863.

² The different varieties of cinchona require a somewhat different climate, and it will probably be found eventually that certain species must be grown in particular localities. The general climate required is excessive moisture of atmosphere and equability of temperature. Good drainage is also a *sine quâ non*.

³ *Calcutta Gazette*, Supplement, p. 205, 1863.

⁴ *Government Gazette*, April 9, 1864.

however, mentioned about this period that the yield from plantations established in Coorg was inferior to that of the Neilgherries. In 1865,¹ another favourable report of the latter gardens was issued; and in this Mr. McIvor, the superintendent, takes opportunity to argue,² that the destruction of forest land on the Neilgherry hills to make room for cinchona planting is not detrimental to either the highland or lowland country. In 1866 the plantations had so increased as to admit of the distribution of 83,676 young trees.³ In 1867 the report of an analysis of five remittances of bark was received from England. These were "more encouraging" than any former samples, but no good quinine was produced. The red bark, however, sold in the English market at 2s. and 1s. 9d. per pound, while some later samples of the same species yielded as much as three per cent. of quinine.⁴ In 1868 the yield from the sixth remittance sent was described as "still improved," but containing a large proportion of *quinoidine*, cinchonidine, and other inferior alkaloids. It is, however, stated⁵ that a decoction of the bark has proved efficacious in malarious fevers; and if this be indeed the case, the value even of the present growth can scarcely be over-estimated, in a country where almost all require an antidote to such disease constantly at hand.

While much credit is due to the energy with which cinchona cultivation has been pursued, it must be confessed that the results are as yet small. Sir Gaspard Le Marchant has pointed out a possible reason why the Neilgherry-grown cinchonas do not yield more quinine. Reasoning on what he had observed at the Cape, that the imported vines growing most luxuriantly were not the best for wine,

¹ *Government Gazette*, April 8, 1865.

² Referred to in the paragraph on Forests.

³ *Gazette*; April 1866.

⁴ *Gazette of India*, Supplement, 1867, p. 973.

⁵ I believe a committee of Madras medical officers investigated and reported on this subject.



Sir Gaspard opines that Mr. McIvor's moss and straw appliances have forced the growth, and thus rendered the bark of the cinchona plant comparatively valueless. One great fact, however, remains—the plant is naturalized. And although, as with other matters, it is now seen that fortunes will not be made by its cultivation, prospects of an essential supply of Indian quinine are not altogether unsatisfactory.

Recently Mr. Broughton,¹ at the instance of the Madras Government, has been engaged in an investigation into the capabilities of the surrounding country or markets to supply the materials necessary for the chemical process of quinine manufacture, as lime, soda, pearl-ash, acids, alcohol, or their substitutes.

Before leaving this subject, however, it should be mentioned, there appears a growing feeling among the medical profession that quinine is not the certain preventive and cure of malarious fevers which it has been asserted to be.²

¹ *Gazette of India*, Supplement, May 30, 1868.

² Quinine probably owes much of its celebrity to the *vis medicatrix naturæ*. M. de Chambers used to cure his fever patients with water labelled *protoxide of hydrogen*. (*Bulletin Gén. de Thérapeutique*, May 1861.) Mr. Lowe of Madras, speaking of Bangalore fever, remarks, "In many hands quinine has neither proved prophylactic nor anti-periodic." (*Madras Quarterly Journal of Medical Science*, 1866.) Dr. Livingstone states that the men of his party were equally subject to fever, whether they took quinine or not. (Narrative of Expedition to the Zambesi, p. 78.) The American surgeon Woodward also doubts the power of quinine, especially as a prophylactic. (Diseases of United States Army, 1863.) Dr. Rogers, surgeon to the Panama Railways, has not a high opinion of its efficacy. (*American Medical Times*, August 1862.) Dr. Moore remarks, "As with many other febrifuges of reputed efficacy, I believe the celebrity of quinine is as much due to the spontaneous decline of febrile attacks as to any other cause." (*Indian Annals of Medical Science*, No. 21.) Dr. Beattie of Bombay has lost all confidence in quinine. (Paper read at Meeting of Bombay Medical and Physiological Society, April 1868.) Experiments of Dr. Binz, of Bonn, show quinine has a less powerful preventive action on fermentation and putrescence than arsenic. (*Lancet*, 1868.) Dr. Juggo Bando Bose states his faith in quinine is shaken. (*Ind. Med. Gazette*, 1868.) Waring asserts continued use of quinine in certain states is injurious (Tropical Resident at Home).

I have not space for a consideration of this matter ; but it appears strange that, as yet, no authoritative trial of the presumed virtues of quinine has been made. Medical men in all countries have acted on their belief in the powers of this remedy. But so it was formerly with regard to mercury, blood-letting, and other pharmacopœial agents, now happily consigned to oblivion.

DELHI SORE.

As mentioned in the remarks below on the cultivation of vegetables, there is reason to suppose the origin of this peculiar sore may exist in a latent scorbutic taint.¹ It has been known to the inhabitants of Delhi for ages under the name of "Aurungzebe," and is therefore by no means confined to Europeans, although the latter suffer severely from the affection. The number of men thus attacked, previous to 1864, led to the appointment of a committee, of which Inspector-General Murray was president, for the purpose of investigating the whole subject. The result of this inquiry tended to prove that the malady, once established, acquires a contagious character, and is capable of being transferred from one person to another. The general opinion, however, still prevails, that the so-called Delhi sore depends altogether on a peculiar degeneration of system, in which the scorbutic diathesis plays the principal part, and that it is simply a variety of the ulcer prevalent at other places, as in Scinde, Aden, Gwalior, and in many localities in Rajpootana.

EMIGRATION.

There are few subjects which have been more carefully legislated for than the requirements of emigrants from India to British, French, and other colonies. The mortality

¹ Cheyers, *Ind. Annals Med. Science*; Moore's Health in the Tropics.

which has so frequently prevailed on board vessels crowded with emigrants early attracted attention to the matter, and the rules now in force are pre-eminently distinguished for humanity and sound sanitary principles. Under the persuasions of employed agents, labourers have long been taken from India to other semi-tropical possessions, but it was not until 1860 that emigration to French possessions was authorized by the Government of India. In 1861, an Act¹ was passed securing a proper supply of water in all emigrant ships, and lessening the amount to be stored in tanks, provided the ships were supplied with a distilling apparatus. During the year 1861-2, thirty ships left Calcutta or Madras bound for the West Indies, conveying 19,850 emigrants. From these shipments some valuable statistics were gleaned. In vessels not carrying either a surgeon or a distilling apparatus the mortality was 7.07 per cent.; in vessels with distilling apparatus, only 5.60; in vessels with both a surgeon and apparatus, 3.36.² During the year 1863 the good effect of the Emigration Sanitary Regulations was exemplified in the voyage of the *Alnwick Castle* to Trinidad, during which the health of all on board remained excellent. In 1864, however, H.M. Consul at Réunion called attention to the fact that the mortality among coolies, both on the voyage and after arrival, was still very high;³ and shortly afterwards an Act to consolidate and amend laws in relation to emigration of native labourers was passed. In addition to former general sanitary regulations, this Act provided for the appointment of a Protector of Emigrants at Calcutta, for the establishment of dépôts, for the appointment of surgeons, of a colonial emigration agent, and of a medical inspector; for whose guidance rules were afterwards promulgated.⁴ In the same year, 1865, regulations for observance in the

¹ No. 49 of 1860. See above, ch. xix.

² Vide *Calcutta Gazette*, Dec. 17, 1862.

³ *Government Gazette*, Supplement, April 9, 1864.

⁴ *Gazette of India*, April 1, 1868.

operations connected with recruiting and despatch of emigrants to French and British colonies from the port of Madras appeared,¹ while rules with relation to the Emigration Act were applied to Bombay.² In 1866-7 additions were made to the dietary scale.³

JAILS.

Since the publication of Dr. Ewart's work⁴ in 1860, demonstrating the great mortality (58 per 1,000) in Indian jails, much attention has been paid to these institutions. In 1862 the unsatisfactory condition of certain prisons in the Bombay Presidency induced Sir B. Frere to despatch Dr. Wiehe, the Inspector-General, on a tour of inspection to the jails of other Presidencies. From this officer's report it was found that Madras afforded the only example of a prison on the Pentonville model for Europeans, and of a central prison constructed on the cellular system for natives. The European prison at Ootacamund was suited to the climate. The jails of Bengal were only remarkable for successful financial working. In the Punjab Dr. Hathaway's system of dry conservancy was then at work. As a conclusion from his tour, the Inspector-General recommended that session judges should be relieved of all duties in connexion with jails, which should be made over to Civil surgeons, a suggestion which has generally been adopted.

In 1863 a Bill for the better regulation of jails in Bengal was read, providing among other changes for the appointment of an inspector.⁵ In June 1863 Mr. Walker,⁶ the inspector for the North-West, published some very comprehensive sanitary rules for the prevention of cholera, hospital gangrene, typhoid, and scurvy. In the same year the

¹ *Gazette of India*, May 13, 1865.

² *Ibid.* July 8, 1865.

³ *Ibid.* p. 867, 1867.

⁴ Sanitary Condition of Indian Jails.

⁵ *Government Gazette*, Nov. 1863.

⁶ Circular 84, June 1863.

purchase and storing of food in bulk was proposed, on the plea of resulting economy and improved quality.¹ A valuable table, prepared by Dr. Forbes Watson, was also published, showing the proportions in which the different Indian grains should be combined in order to secure the most nutritious dietary.² In 1864, in consequence of a continued high death ratio (being in Bengal 70 per 1,000 for 1863³), a committee was appointed, under the presidency of Mr. Roberts, to report on the present state of jail discipline and management.⁴

Notwithstanding the attention which has been bestowed on the internal economy of Indian jails, there is great room for improvement. Since 1860, a peculiar disease resembling the famine or relapsing fever of temperate zones has prevailed in many of our prisons. In 1860 it invaded Agra, Meerut, Allahabad, and Lucknow jails. In 1861 it appeared at Meerut, Umballa, Loodiana, and some other places. In 1862 and 1863 it was still present. In 1864 its deadly influence was more extended. Four hundred persons died from this disease in the Lahore Central Prison alone, while one-third of the whole mortality in Bengal was caused by this malady. In 1865 it appeared at Jeypore; in 1866 at Joudpoor; and since that period in other places. Some of the Bombay jails have also been attacked, but it is uncertain if this sickness has yet occurred in Madras. The Bengal Sanitary Commissioner believes this fever to be a "peculiar contagious malady introduced from without."⁵ In the first Bengal Sanitary report the disease was, however, mentioned as typhus fever, and it is also admitted that it "resembles the famine fever of Europe in many important particulars." In two able articles on the subject, Dr. David B. Smith⁶ has proved that there is at least grave suspicion

¹ *Gazette of India*, Supplement, 1863, p. 288.

² *Ibid.* Sanitary Report, Bengal, 1865.

³ *Gazette of India*, March 9, 1864.

⁴ Annual Sanitary Reports for Bengal, 1865-6.

⁵ *Indian Medical Gazette*, February and March 1868.

that the real origin of this disease is due to a defective dietary scale. And the jail reports for 1867 which have recently appeared, evidencing a decreasing ratio of this peculiar fever concomitant with comparative cheapness of food, appear to support Dr. Smith's views.

LEPROSY.

In 1862, at the instance of the Duke of Newcastle, a report on the prevalence of leprosy in British possessions, including India, was called for. The volume containing the result was published in 1867. From this it appears that one or other variety of leprosy is known in most countries, irrespective of climate. It is, however, in the tropics, especially in India, that leprosy is more common and virulent. Most reporters recognise three varieties: the anæsthetic, the tubercular, and the mixed. There is almost unanimity in the statement that this disease is scarcely ever benefited by medical agents. Similarly, nearly all the hundreds of medical men to whom questions were submitted, declare the malady to be intimately connected with defective sanitary arrangements, and insufficient, deficient, or monotonous diet. By a change for the better of such circumstances the disease generally improves, and sufferers have been even known to recover. The report referred to may probably lead to better arrangements than now exist for the welfare of the numbers in India afflicted with the malady. While the eradication of leprosy can only be hoped for with the gradual improvement of the sanitary and general conditions of the masses, the care of those labouring under the disease becomes daily more necessary. In former times it was the custom in many parts of India to bury alive every person affected with leprosy:¹ a father would bury his son, and a son his father. In some of the native states of Rajpootana, as Serohee for instance,² the

¹ Report on Leprosy, p. 165.

² Gazette of India, 1868.

inhuman practice is still continued. In British territory it has of course been long since stopped ; hence probably the increased number of lepers now seen, and the impression prevailing that the malady is more common during recent years. A larger number of leper hospitals or asylums than now exist in India are required for the reception of sufferers from this lingering and loathsome complaint.

MALARIOUS FEVERS, INFLUENCE OF THE MOON ON.

The want of reliable evidence in support or refutation of the presumed influence of the moon on malarious fevers having attracted the attention of Sir W. Mansfield, when Commander-in-chief at Bombay, his Excellency directed that, with a view to determine the question, records of paroxysmal fever should be kept in every medical charge in the Presidency. On the termination of a year, the reports were confided to Dr. Geraud for analysis. The conclusions arrived at by this gentleman are altogether opposed to the prevalent idea of the moon influencing the maladies named. It was, however, objected that some of the hospital returns were only records of primary and more severe recurrent attacks. Also, that no allowance had been made for the exhibition of quinine, at that time generally given to men liable to fever, about the spring. Also, that the period mentioned as the spring, viz. five days, was too extended. The whole question must therefore be regarded as an open one. What is yet asserted, and what has not been disproved, is that an impression having once been made on the nervous system by malarious poison, paroxysmal returns of fever are apt to recur, in apparent relation to the phases of the moon. It is not, indeed, supposed that the moon directly influences the fever. But notwithstanding the opinions of certain astronomers (as Arago) to the contrary, there is reason to believe that as the moon influences the tides so it may exert a power over the



atmosphere, resulting in changes sufficient to re-excite paroxysmal maladies in the malarious subject. That exposure to cold and wet will often do so we are fully aware; and it appears probable that more subtle atmospheric alterations act in a similar manner. A repetition of experiment is required to decide the question. All disturbing elements should, however, be scrupulously avoided, and secondary attacks of fever or decided malaise only recorded. The statistics of one regiment, carefully kept, would amply suffice.

MEDICAL SCHOOLS.

During the last ten years several of these institutions have been established; one at Lahore, one in the Central Provinces, while another has been proposed for Rajpootana. Vernacular classes have also been instituted during the decade in one at least of the Presidency Medical Colleges.¹ Notwithstanding all endeavours of metropolitan and Mofussil schools, there is employment for a larger number of well-educated native doctors than is yet forthcoming. Besides the Government service, there is a wide field for this class of men in native states, on railways, and on tea plantations. Doubtless in the course of time they will also be in requisition as private Mofussil practitioners.

MEDICAL SERVICE.

The most important matters connected with the Medical Service especially affecting State medicine and public hygiene, occurring during the decade, are three in number. First, the failure of the attempt to amalgamate the Indian and British services; secondly, the regulation rendering it incumbent on all young medical officers to attend a course of instruction at Netley, previous to entering on an Indian

¹ Vernacular classes existed in the other Presidency colleges before the commencement of the decade.

career ; thirdly, the order under which medical officers pass an examination before promotion to the rank of surgeon.

After the assumption of the government of India by the Crown, the amalgamation of the two medical services was confidently expected. But it appears Earl de Grey, the then Secretary of State for War, differed from Sir Charles Wood regarding the advisability of the measure. Accordingly we find the latter, in a despatch dated November 1864,¹ offering Earl de Grey's reasons for the decision then promulgated, that there were still to be two medical departments in India. It was argued that the employment of medical officers in civil capacities would interfere with the continuous training required for military duties ; that officers so occupied would have no experience in the treatment of the diseases of Europeans, and that in civil employ they would acquire habits of independence unfitting them for the subordination required from regimental officers of inferior rank. Accordingly all European charges were taken from Indian medical officers and given over to surgeons belonging to the British service, a larger number of whom were ordered out to India for that purpose. As an inevitable result, an increase to the administrative staff of the latter department, and a decrease in the same grades of Indian service, also took place.

The regulation now existing, by which all medical officers, after obtaining their commissions, pass through a six months' course at Netley, is one which secures an amount of special information on sanitary subjects to every surgeon entering the public service, which could not be obtained in any other manner. During his term at the Army Medical School at Netley, the young medical officer receives additional instruction to that which he obtains at the Civil schools, where he is fitted to enter the portal of his profession by examination for a diploma. At Netley young army surgeons, whether destined for the British or Indian services, may learn *all that is known* respecting

¹ G.O.G.G. No. 1060, 23d December, 1864.



hygiene generally, and particularly regarding the preservation of the soldiers' health. Diet, clothing, education, habits, peculiar duties in times of peace, situation and circumstances in time of war, principles of ventilation, warming, draining, conservancy, architectural arrangements, influence of geological formations, epidemics and their causes, camp diseases, form only a small portion of the special knowledge now conveyed to the young medical officer. In short, he is fortified, at his entrance into the service, with that special information which others before him only acquired after years of experience and research, and is thus rendered capable, at the outset of his career, of advising on all sanitary subjects. The peculiar knowledge thus imparted, and actually necessary for the application of sanitary principles to communities, pertains, as Lord Herbert so truly observed, "to the special qualifications of the physician, physiologist, geologist, meteorologist, topographer, chemist, engineer, and mechanic."

The examination to be passed, previous to promotion to the rank of surgeon,¹ is security that the acquirements of earlier periods will be increased rather than diminished by the progress of time. As demonstrating the truth of certain observations prefacing this review of the progress of sanitation in India; also as showing both the increased estimation in which the special acquirements of medical officers are held, and the desire of military officials to benefit by such peculiar attainments, the following occurrences may be compared.

Sir Ranald Martin² states, that when serving in one of the most pestilential countries known in India, he made certain recommendations tending to prevent epidemic disease, which was apprehended, the answer from the commanding officer being, "I'll be d—— if I do." Again, when landed at Rangoon during the first Burmese war,

¹ G.O.G.C. No. 1060, 23d Dec. 1864, par. 41.

² Influence of Tropical Climates on the European Constitution, p. 109.



the chief medical authority warned the general that certain precautions against scurvy would be necessary, in return for which he was snubbed by the reply, "Medical opinions are very good, sir, when they are called for." "Now here," says Sir Ranald, "were no blundering subalterns, but in the one case a field-officer (whose neglect cost him his own life), and in the other a grey-headed general of reputation (who received much honour and profit, after his army had perished miserably)."

During the present year, Dr. Murray, Inspector-General of Hospitals, published a report, "On the Removal of Troops in Attacks of Epidemic Cholera." It is here stated that, when this malady attacked the troops in Agra, General Showers thus replied to the recommendations made, "It is a medical question which you understand better than I do. Point out what ought to be done, and it shall be carried out; but bear in mind, the responsibility rests with you." Again in 1867 at Umballa, as Dr. Murray mentions, the recommendations of the medical staff were most efficiently carried out by the military authorities. And this, it is believed, is now the rule, and not, as in former times, the exception, throughout India.

METEOROLOGY.

In former days meteorological observations, as far as regards the direction of the wind and the amount of rainfall, were made at most regimental and civil hospitals. But the duty, being entrusted to native subordinates, was frequently inefficiently performed, and the results were characterised as worthless by the Royal Sanitary Commission appointed under the presidency of Lord Herbert. Since the commission in 1863 issued the result of their labours, observatories provided with paid officials have been established in various parts; those in the North-West being presided over by an accomplished meteorologist, Dr. Murray Thompson of Roorkee. Too much gratis and

officio work still, however, appears to be expected. If performed faithfully, such duty will demand constant, almost hourly attention; yet the application soliciting extra pay for extra work has not always been successful. Under these circumstances it can scarcely be expected that many of the present meteorological observations will be more reliable than those formerly submitted. Almost the only meteorological observations of interest published during the last ten years are Dr. Cook's reports of the registration of ozone in 15 stations of the Bombay Presidency during 1863-4, and a report of the rainfall of mountainous regions in the same Presidency, referred to under a different heading. By the former papers it appears that ozone is more fully developed in August, September, and October than at other periods. Dr. Cook endeavours, fruitlessly as I think, to establish a connexion between ozone and cholera. In the Bombay Presidency during the periods in question the two were certainly concomitant in some localities, but in others not so. Schultze, Voltotine, Lamont, the Society of Medicine at Königsburg, and many others, deny any such connexion. Enough, however, has been demonstrated to establish a practical deduction, that, when the question of moving troops on account of cholera is on the *tapis*, the absence of ozone in the atmosphere would justify a greater amount of caution.

MOUNTAIN REGIONS, RAINFALL ON.

In 1864, the Bombay Government published a report on this subject. The fall on the mountain ranges varies greatly in different parts of the same hills. On the *Paunchgunny* range, at one station, 190 inches generally fall; at another, 21. On the *Muhableshtar* range, the variation is from 252 to 51 inches; on the *Mulla* hills, from 337 to 76. The fall rapidly decreases from the parallel of the Western Ghats eastwards. The influence of local position is exemplified thus: at Mulla, latitude $17^{\circ} 16'$,



337 inches fell; and at Malcolm Perth, $17^{\circ} 57'$, 252 inches. From the Mahableshwar returns, extending over 30 years, it appears there is a periodical excess and deficit every five years, a fact which might be taken advantage of by cultivators, into whose tanks and fields the waters flow. The rainfall on the Himalayas is generally less than on the intertropical ranges; but in some localities, as at Nynee Tal, 100 inches have been measured.¹ On the Neilgherries, the average fall differs very materially in localities. On Mount Aboo the average during the last eight years is 70 inches.

MOUNTAIN-RANGES, DISAFFORESTMENT OF.

The alleged diminution of the rainfall from the destruction of the forests and jungle of mountainous regions has received considerable attention. In 1864 Dr. Anderson² was requested to report as to the past and present condition of forests about Darjeeling, with a view to determine if recent clearances had affected the climate and water. In 1865 Mr. McIvor³ combats the opinion that Cinchona clearances on the Neilgherries had disturbed the climate. He remarks that it is the height and cold which condenses moisture, but admits that trees increase the rainfall by offering a large evaporating surface. In dry weather, however, a different agency is at work. Trees then draw the moisture they evaporate from the soil, and it is calculated that in 150 dry days one million and a half gallons of water are dissipated by an acre of forest. Mr. McIvor asserts, that streams rising in and flowing through valleys destitute of trees maintain their flow much better than when passing through wooded valleys. "If the Neilgherries were destitute of trees, twice as much water would flow

¹ Report on the Extent and Nature of the Sanitary Establishments for European Troops.

² *Gazette of India*, June 25, 1864.

³ *Op. cit.*, April 1865.

into the low country during the dry season." These arguments, however, contain fallacies, as Mr. Bowring, Commissioner of Coorg,¹ points out. Although the height of mountains will always attract and condense moisture, the rain, without the innumerable impediments offered by root-fibres, would run off to the low country immediately, leaving the hills dry, and *becoming soon absorbed* or evaporated by the earth and heat of the plains. Again, although trees dissipate the amount of moisture mentioned above, not one-tenth part is absorbed by the roots. During the greater part of the year, the atmosphere of mountain ranges is moist at night, and at such periods trees absorb and do not exhale. Moreover, in the absence of trees, the waters would not convey to the lowlands that fertilizing material composed of decaying rock and the *débris* of vegetation, which, when deposited, becomes an alluvial stratum. Baker² points out that the difference of colour between the Blue and White Nile depends upon the alluvial material which the tributaries of the former bring from the highlands of Abyssinia. This, partially deposited in Egypt, is the source of wealth to the Pashalic. Were the Abyssinian woods all destroyed, Egypt would become altogether desert. In other countries, the connexion between disafforestation and sterility is unfortunately practically manifest, as in some parts of America, in Greece,³ in Tartary,⁴ in the Mauritius,⁵ in Barbadoes and Jamaica.⁶

Similarly, the influence and value of forest trees on the lowlands is unquestionable. Kirk attributed the dryness, and consequent sterility, of the country west of the Aravallis to the absence of trees; while Balfour long since demon-

¹ *Gazette of India*, June 13, 1868.

² The principal streams joining the Lower Nile are *Bahr el Ark* or Blue Nile and the Atbara, both rising in the Abyssinian mountains. (The Nile Tributaries of Abyssinia, by Sir Samuel Baker.)

³ *Builder*, 1864.

⁴ Huc's *Travels in Tartary*, vol. i. p. 11.

⁵ *Delhi Gazette*, June 1868.

⁶ Chevers, *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. xii.

strated how a country might be ruined or enriched by the presence or absence of horticulture.¹ As Colonel Sleeman observes,² hot and dry countries, denuded of their trees, and by that means deprived of a great portion of the moisture to which they have been accustomed, soon become dreary, arid wastes. The lighter particles of soil blow away, leaving only the heavy arenaceous portions; thence those sandy deserts in which are often to be found signs of a population once dense. Whatever may have been former shortcomings, there is sufficient evidence that existing forests will be preserved and tree-planting encouraged. Thus, during recent periods, Government has issued rules for the preservation of the Namba,³ the Darjeeling,⁴ the Barmil,⁵ the Central Provinces,⁶ the Coorg,⁷ Sikkim,⁸ and other forests. In 1865 an Act was also passed⁹ to give effect to the rules for the management and preservation of forests. Tree-planting has been encouraged on the west coast of Madras,¹⁰ on Chettisgurrh,¹¹ and other localities. The mahogany-tree has also been introduced into Bengal.¹²

MOFUSSIL SANITATION.

During the decade under review, several parts of India have been ravaged by a peculiar fever, evidently of a *typhoid* character, aggravated by the malarious, and probably scorbutic taints, so common in India. The districts in which this disease has appeared are Baraset, Hooghly, Nuddea, in 1863;¹³ some parts of Rajpootana in 1862-3;

¹ Balfour, On the Influence of Trees on Climate: *Madras Journal of Science*, No. 36.

² Rambles in India, vol. ii. p. 198.

³ *Calcutta Gazette*, 1862, p. 2070.

⁴ *Gazette of India*, Sup. June 25, 1864.

⁵ Ibid. August 2, 1865.

⁶ Ibid. Supplement, 1865, p. 26.

⁷ Ibid. 1865, p. 16.

⁸ Ibid. 1866, p. 17.

⁹ No. VII. of 1865.

¹⁰ *Gaz. of India*, Sup. 1867, p. 630.

¹¹ *Gaz. of India*, 1866, p. 637.

¹² Ibid. 1867.

¹³ Vide *Calcutta Gazette*, Supplement, 1863, p. 157.

North Canara in 1863,¹ and Guzerat in 1865. Dr. Elliot, who reported on the malady in the first-mentioned provinces, states that the fever chiefly showed itself on the banks of the Hooghly, where dense jungle, decaying vegetation, no drains, dirty tanks, and total want of conservancy, are the characteristics. Some villages were totally depopulated, and it is calculated that during the six years ending 1863, some 12,000 persons must have died. Great difficulty was experienced in inducing the natives to adopt even ordinary sanitary measures. The most wealthy were the least willing to aid. The commissioner, Mr. Schalch, reported, "I have spoken to the inhabitants, and urged the necessity of their immediately undertaking sanitary measures, but my appeal has met with no response." And it has recently been stated that a similar disease prevails near the Hooghly to this day.

In some of the native states of Rajpootana, notably in Serohee and Marwar, after the heavy rains of 1862, a somewhat similar malady presented itself. This declined spontaneously during the next hot season.

The epidemic in Canara was reported on by Dr. Leith of Bombay, who found a want of ordinary sanitation prevailing scarcely less melancholy than the condition of the Hooghly villages. The prevailing disease was essentially the same typhoid remitting fever, with its sequelæ of spleen disease and dropsical effusions.

In 1865 a rumour originated that a malady similar to the Palee Plague (which in 1856 and succeeding years spread from Kutch to the Himalayas) had broken out in Palanphoor and the north of Guzerat. Dr. Martin, of the Bombay service, who investigated the subject, reported the malady to be simply the typhoid bilious type of malarious fever.

Notwithstanding the issue of various appeals to the people, and the promulgation of sanitary regulations,² the

¹ Vide *Calcutta Gazette*, Supplement, 1863, p. 294.

² Bengal Sanitary Report, 1865, p. 102.



Sanitary Commissioner for Bengal states, in one of his recent reports,¹ that, "although in the chief towns some progress has been effected, on the villages and people little impression has been made." And the same statements apply to other Presidencies. But outbreaks of epidemic fever in the Mofussil fully prove that there is a certain limit of sanitary neglect incompatible with human existence, and it would therefore appear desirable that simple ordinary sanitary precautions should be rendered compulsory in every village throughout the land.

OFFICERS, SANITARY MEASURES FOR.

Although so much has been accomplished to secure the health and welfare of the rank and file, but little has been directly attempted for the benefit of the officers. The advisability of establishing hospitals for the officers at the Presidency towns and sanatoria has been often mooted; also the provision of good nurses.² In 1861³ something of the kind was attempted in Calcutta. At a later period, in 1863,⁴ an old Peninsular and Oriental Company's ship, the *Bentinck*, was converted into a floating invalid depôt, with some small accommodation for officers. Both these establishments have, however, it is believed, been discontinued. Shortly after Sir William Mansfield became Commander-in-chief in India, he proposed a plan to secure better house accommodation for military officers in cantonments. This had been already rejected by the Government of Bombay, and unfortunately appears to have met with almost similar treatment from the Government of India. The proposal was, briefly, that land in cantonments should be sold, the proceeds forming a fund by which houses now occupied might be purchased and new quarters

¹ Bengal Sanitary Report, 1866, p. 61.

² Moore, *Health in the Tropics*, p. 147.

³ G.O.G.G., No. 252 of 1861.

⁴ *Government Gazette*, 1863, p. 80.



built, Government thus becoming eventually the landlord of all officers.

The fact that some plan is really necessary in order to afford officers better accommodation than the miserable bungalows so frequently inhabited, has been partially acknowledged. G.O.G.G. 984 of 1867 allows officers to borrow from Government, according to a certain scale, money for the erection of houses in cantonments where suitable accommodation is not available. In India, so much of the time of Europeans is passed indoors, and effectual shelter from vicissitudes of weather is so necessary, that the sanitary value of better residences for military officers can scarcely be over-estimated.

PUBLIC BUILDINGS, SPACE IN.

Formerly, in most public buildings a degree of overcrowding was the rule rather than the exception. When, some fifteen years ago, attention became more particularly directed to this subject, a certain amount of cubic space was regarded as the great requisite. Hence various narrow high barracks were constructed without any respect to superficial space. Such edifices are, however, now confessed to be a mistake.

The most recent regulations of the Public Works Department lay down the following as the minimum amount of cubic and superficial feet :—

Barracks for Europeans on the plains:—90 superficial feet per man ; 1,800 cubic feet per man.

Barracks for Europeans on hill-stations:—77 superficial feet per man ; 1,232 to 1,408 cubic feet per man ; according to altitude.

Hospitals for Europeans on the plains:—120 superficial feet per inmate ; 2,400 cubic feet per inmate.

Hospitals for Europeans on hill-stations:—102 superficial feet per inmate ; 1,632 to 1,836 cubic feet per inmate ; according to altitude.



masses. I have not space to prove the assertion, but it will be readily admitted that in India, among a people many of whom exist on vegetable diet, salt is a necessary of life. The policy, therefore, of the increased duty on salt imported by sea and land into the Bombay Presidency, imposed in 1861,¹ is questionable. Without entering into the great subject of the salt-tax, it may be remarked that the above and other regulations of British provinces and adjacent native states deprive the inhabitants of large tracts in India of the full advantage of salt at the cheapest possible rate. There are salt-producing districts in Rajpootana, the great Sambhur Salt Lake, situate between Jey-poor and Marwar, and the salt springs of Putchbudra, also in Marwar, from which the supply of salt is practically unlimited. But owing to vexatious imposts, to oppressions of the Brinjarree carriers, to the want of roads, and to the injustice of durbar officials, salt, which at the great Sambhur lake² costs $1\frac{1}{2}d.$ per maund (80 lbs.), costs at Agra half a guinea.³ It is evident, therefore, that the resources we have at hand for the supply of salt are not yet fully available.

Having referred to salt as a sanitary want, it must be mentioned that in 1863 this substance was brought forward as a preventive of cholera.⁴ Scouting the idea of any special prophylactic agency, I should not have mentioned this subject, had not the names in connexion with the suggestion arrested attention. Dr. Beaman, a London physician of repute, has long advocated the use of salt as a cholera prophylactic. Dr. Beaman, jun., of the Bengal service, when civil surgeon at Hoshungabad, pursued the plan in the jail at that place. Captain Wood, deputy-commissioner, reported the method to Colonel Meade, who

¹ Act VII. of 1861.

² For a description of the Sambhur Salt Lake *vide* "Marwar, the Land of Death," by Dr. Moore: *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. xx.

³ *Friend of India*, April 1867.

⁴ *Calcutta Gazette*, May 20, 1863.



communicated it for the information of Government. A pice weight of salt is to be given with each meal. Salt cooked with the food loses, it is stated, the peculiar virtue.

SANITARIA, HILL.

"A Report on the Extent and Nature of the Sanitary Establishments for European Troops in India"¹ was published by authority in 1862. In this volume may be found accounts of upwards of sixty localities, only six, however, of which were then occupied by Europeans. In the Bombay Presidency, the principal military sanitaria, then as now, were Poorundhur and Mount Aboo; and in Madras, Ootacamund, or rather Wellington, on the Neilgherries. In both Presidencies small sanitary stations have been more recently established; as, for instance, the one on the mountain known as "Salabut Khan's tomb," in the Deccan, and "Taraghur," near Nusseerabad in Rajpootana. These latter, however, can scarcely be regarded as more than affording refuge from intense heats in the summer seasons. During the decade, no hill-station has been added to the number of those permanently occupied by European troops as a military cantonment, in which healthy men might reside. The fact is scarcely yet sufficiently acknowledged that the climates of elevated regions in India are more adapted for the prevention than the cure of disease. The Royal Sanitary Commissioners recommended that at least one-third of the Anglo-Indian army should be located on the hill-ranges. And this number, it is thought, might certainly leave the plains without denuding those stations of troops where, from political or strategic reasons, the presence of Europeans is required. But it is the expressed opinion of those better qualified to judge, that corps fresh from Europe should be sent to the hills, taking their tour of duty on the plains.

¹ The title of this volume should be "Sanitary Establishments in Bengal," those of Madras and Bombay not being included.



afterwards. Both theory and experience teach that change to the hills, after a prolonged sojourn on the lowlands, is frequently followed by increase of sickness and mortality.

SANITARIA, MARINE.

The acknowledged fact that numerous diseases are not removed, or even ameliorated, by the climates of the hills has led to the establishment of various sea-side sanatoria, as Ghizree near Kurrachee, and Bulsar in Guzerat. Other places have also been proposed, as Callagouk or Curlew Island. It was thought, and rightly too, that the peculiarities of climate of the sea-coast, arising from the physical properties of land and water; the slightly lowered temperature—the consequence of air in daily motion from the land and sea breeze; the peculiar atmosphere, impregnated with saline particles, iodine, and moisture; the opportunity of a fish diet; even the sight and smell of the ocean, would prove beneficial to invalids from the arid burning districts of the interior. Hence also the establishment of the *Bentinck* as a floating sanitarium, referred to under a different heading.

SERAIS.

Sanitary rules regarding these places for the accommodation of native travellers were published in 1867.¹

SNAKE-BITES.

Of the 219 varieties of snakes described by Professor Gmelin, forty-three are said to inhabit India, of which about one-fourth are poisonous to man and large animals. For years past, under directions from Government, destructive war has been waged on these reptiles. In Scinde, for instance, some years ago, 10,000 snakes were killed in

¹ *Gazette of India*, 1867, p. 26.



three months. But with regard to the discovery of the nature of the serpent-poison and the antidote, nothing has been authoritatively attempted. This, as with most matters pertaining to medical science, has been left to private and individual research.

Some years back, in 1861, by order of the Bombay Government, rules for the treatment of snake-bite, recommended by Drs. Beattie and Wyllie, both of the Bombay service, were published. The former gentleman advised the immediate application of a ligature above the bitten part, scarifications, suction, and stimulants internally. The latter officer recommended thirty or forty drops of liquor ammoniæ every ten or fifteen minutes. The chief of the medical department wisely combined these two methods of treatment. There is nothing, however, very novel in them: all had been previously suggested.¹

Although little encouragement has been afforded by Government, recent independent investigations have not been wanting. Thus, the impression that the mongoose is proof against the poison of snakes has been proved erroneous by Dr. Francis.² Hence the non-existence of the mysterious antidotal herb the mongoose was supposed to eat may be presumed. The same author has also shown that one cobra cannot hurt another, and the question immediately suggests itself, may not the body of the snake contain an antidote to the poison? Dr. Fayrer³ has called attention to the fact that carbolic acid is repulsive and poisonous to snakes. Dr. Shortt,⁴ of Madras, has investigated the serpent-venom chemically and microscopically. Dr. Cookson⁵ remarks, that both cats and sharp terrier dogs are

¹ Vide *Lancet*, *Mirror*, 1852; and writings of Dr. Boaz, Malte Brun, Pennant, Russell, and Forbes.

² Experiments with the Poison of the Cobra: *Medical Times*, May 16, 1868.

³ Experiments on the Cobra Poison: *Ind. Med. Gazette*, June 1868.

⁴ Experiments on the Poison of the Cobra: *Medical Times*, May 1868.

⁵ *Ind. Med. Gazette*, May 1867.



useful in preventing the entrance of snakes into houses, and discovering them when there. Waring¹ has investigated the claims of certain herbs, and pronounced all useless. Interesting experiments have also been made in Melbourne by Professor Halford.²

The grant of a few thousand rupees, and the appointment of a practical and scientific committee to investigate the whole subject, is much to be desired. Such an inquiry would probably terminate in the laying down of more certain methods of treatment than those now practised; possibly even in the discovery of an antidote.

Those who are aware of the useless nostrums used by the natives in cases of snake-bite, and the great loss of life resulting therefrom, will confess the magnitude of such a boon.

SOLDIERS, EMPLOYMENT OF.

In 1860 Sir Hugh Rose, as Commander-in-chief, called for a report on the means of instruction, recreation, and employment for soldiers, with a view to place such means on a permanent footing. By various succeeding regulations this was accomplished, and at the present period the workshops, reading-rooms, and other methods of employing spare hours, at the command of every soldier, amply testify that in this respect little is wanting which could fairly be desired.

The employment of soldiers on public works, such as road-making and building, has frequently been recommended. It was, however, too much the custom to regard soldiers as mere machines for military duty, and to supply them by native agency with everything they require. French soldiers in Algeria, in a climate assimilating to that of our

¹ *Madras Quart. Journ. Med. Science*, Jan. 1862.

² *Medical Times*, August 3, 1867. This author (Professor Halford) described peculiar appearances in the bodies of animals bitten, but other writers fail in finding similar conditions: *Ind. Med. Gazette*, August 1868.



hill-stations, build their own residences, and do not necessarily deteriorate either in *physique* or discipline. And experience has now amply demonstrated that soldiers may be similarly employed in India. The head-quarter wing, 56th Foot, at Sinchal, effected extensive repairs to their barracks when workmen were not procurable. Men of H.M. 33d Regiment, at Asseerghur, were utilized on public works; also, more recently, the soldiers of the 56th, on Aboo.

A standing order now exists in the Public Works Department, dated 13th April, 1864, that at all stations where there are European troops, the executive engineer, on receiving sanction for a work, shall invite a tender from such troops, which, if favourable, is to be accepted.

It was not, however, until 1866 that soldiers were utilized in the construction of roads. In April of that year, men from the 3d battalion Rifle Brigade, and 79th Highlanders, to the number of 648, commenced operations on the Murree and Abbotabad road, in the Himalayas: thirty-seven miles of road were completed at a cost of 62,644 rupees. This, on account of hutting and commissariat expenses, was estimated to exceed the value of the work done by 18,165 rupees. But, as Colonel Maclagan remarks, the gain in health and welfare of the men has a money value much higher than the expenditure. They were contented, enjoyed the work, were peculiarly benefited, and acquired renewed physical health and vigour. Politically, also, the effect of so many Europeans, and a wide road in the mountains, must be good. There is yet work for many more seasons. Hutting soldiers on the mountains, cost 30 rupees, barracks on the plains 900 rupees, per man. The question therefore is worth consideration, if a large number of men might not be constantly located in the Himalayas and engaged in road-making. During the summer of 1868, working-parties of the 38th Regiment were employed on the same road, but, instead of receiving a daily payment, were remunerated by contract—a method



more profitable to Government, and, it is also stated, more pleasing to the men.

SOLDIERS, VITAL STATISTICS OF.

Those conversant with military statistics are well aware of the difficulties of obtaining results at once brief and exact. Even the Annual Blue Books recently published, examples of labour and research as they are, have scarcely, excepting perhaps the latest reports issued, reached statistical perfection. Hence, it must be confessed, the materials on which conclusions are now drawn may not be all that could be desired. It is impossible to collect and tabulate the annual statistics of the British army—the safeguard of an empire on which the sun never sets—until *years* have elapsed. But a reference to the Report of the Royal Sanitary Commissioners appointed in 1858 to inquire into the sanitary state of the Anglo-Indian army, abundantly demonstrates that the mortality among soldiers, from our first occupation of the country to the year 1856, oscillated round the high figures of 69 per 1,000 annually. And in thus quoting the death-ratio among Europeans in India, the Royal Commissioners simply reiterated the statistical conclusions of Sir A. Tulloch, Colonel Sykes, Drs. Chevers and Ewart.¹ There is, however, ample evidence in the

¹ When the report of the Royal Sanitary Commission was published in 1862, the statements made were received at home with astonishment and indignation. The *Times* commented on the "appalling mortality now brought to light," and the cue was followed by most of the other journals. Sir Charles Wood in the House of Commons, on the 14th July, 1863, stated that the report of the Commission "had brought to light a rate of mortality which, before its publication, no one believed to exist." Yet the sanitary condition of the British troops in India had been previously thoroughly investigated by several Indian officers, from whose published works the amount of disease prevailing should have been well known; of these latter may be mentioned, Tulloch's "Statistical Tables;" Sykes, *Statistical Society's Journal*, vol. x.; Chevers, "On the Means of preserving the Health of European Soldiers in India:" *Indian Annals of Medical Science*,

Commissioners' own tables, that the rate of mortality steadily diminished throughout the period from 1800 to 1856. The following table, compiled from Statement No. 10 of the Report of the Royal Sanitary Commissioners, shows the gradual decrease of mortality during the first half of the present century.

Years.	Ratio of Mortality per 1,000 in			
	India.	Bengal.	Madras.	Bombay.
1800—1810. . . .	73.70	91.50	54.80	84.50
1810—1820. . . .	84.80	68.70	97.00	99.60
1820—1830. . . .	90.70	84.50	95.20	97.90
1830—1840. . . .	55.70	60.10	55.50	46.30
1840—1850. . . .	65.40	79.50	43.50	68.30
1850—1856. . . .	50.70	67.80	44.30	31.10

We thus find the mortality among British troops in India had sunk, for the quinquennial period ending 1856, to less than 51 per 1,000 of strength. There is also evidence that in after years the death-ratio, particularly in the Bombay and Madras Presidencies, had still further diminished. Even including the Mutiny years, the mortality among Bombay troops, up to 1860, averaged only 27 per 1,000. But owing to the greater disturbing causes during the last half of the decennial period from 1850 to 1860, the mortality from the first half, or from 1850 to 1856 may be most fairly taken for purposes of comparison. And this mortality we have already seen, by the Royal Sanitary Commissioners' own showing, to have been something over 50 per 1,000.

This gradual diminution of mortality occurring during the first half of the century may be attributed to several causes. First, as facilities for doing so became available, a

No. xi. *et seq.*; Ewart, "Vital Statistics of the Anglo-Indian Armies," Sir Ranald Martin, "Influence of Tropical Climates;" Waring, *Indian Annals of Medical Science*, vol. vi.; Moore, "Health in the Tropics, or Sanitary Art applied to European Soldiers in India," &c. &c.



greater number of men were invalided towards the termination of that period. Secondly, better habits of life gradually prevailed. There was more attention paid to personal hygiene. With the introduction of malt liquor, less spirits were consumed; and intemperance, as at home, became less common. Thirdly, the system of medical treatment underwent a radical change. Instead of the bleedings *ad deliquium*, the purgatives, and the salivations of former days—a practice well designated by Ewart¹ *spoliative*—a comparatively stimulating, or rather supporting treatment, with the use of quinine, was generally adopted. With regard to fevers, the author just mentioned demonstrates by statistical evidence that the mortality from this class of diseases alone is not one-fourth of what it reached in former years.

Now it was not until after the mutinies that what may be denominated the sanitary era was inaugurated in India. Previous to that period, although attention had been drawn to the subject by various medical officers, the sanitary regulations in force were comparatively few in number, and certainly not based on scientific principles. In comparison with the magnificent barracks of the present day, troops were ill lodged; the diet rolls were less cared for; a minimum of attention was bestowed on the dress of the army as regards sanitary requirements; less care was paid to the enlistment of recruits for Indian service; the length of service in the country was greater; and from the day of their landing men were exposed to various sources of disease, from which immunity has been attempted, if not secured, by recent sanitary regulations. Yet, notwithstanding this, we see the mortality, under the influence of the causes previously mentioned, declining to 50 per 1,000 of strength annually.

But to find the *total loss* to the service occasioned by disease, the amount of invaliding must be added to the above figures. This, during the second quarter of the

¹ Review of the Treatment of Tropical Diseases; *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. xiv.



century, appears from the best authority—viz. Colonel Sykes' tables—to have averaged 29 per 1,000. The latter figures, added to 50.70, give 79.70 per 1,000 as the *total loss* to the service from disease during the period in question.

Leaving the Mutiny years out of the account, as seasons of extraordinary trials and sickness, and dating the commencement of army sanitation in India from 1860, the year for which Indian Army Vital Statistics first appeared in the statistical, sanitary, and medical reports, we turn to the latter blue-books for information regarding the great diminution of mortality which might reasonably be expected from sanitary regulations. And the results are contained in the following table:—

INDIA.				BENGAL.			
Years.	Average Strength.	Ratio per 1,000 of Strength.		Years.	Average Strength.	Ratio per 1,000 of Strength.	
		Sick.	Died.			Sick.	Died.
1860 . .	64,455	2,279	35.21	1860 . .	42,371	2,023	39.37
1861 . .	57,082*	1,768	36.74	1861 . .	37,483	1,954	45.57
1862 . .	63,713	1,736	25.68	1862 . .	39,312	1,851	27.55
1863 . .	67,525	1,634	23.64	1863 . .	42,575	1,759	22.26
1864 . .	65,002	1,530	21.93	1864 . .	39,936	1,557	22.56
1865 . .	62,589	1,476	28.14	1865 . .	37,631	1,548	26.65
			28.55				30.66

* Exclusive of Hon. Company's troops.

Now, although these figures undoubtedly show the mortality during more recent years, they do not by any means give the *total loss* to the service caused by disease in India. *Invaliding*, which has very properly been carried to a much greater extent during recent years, renders the total loss to the service in India more nearly approaching that of the period previous to the sanitary era. Since 1859 the number of European soldiers annually invalided, either for discharge from the service or for change of climate, has gradually increased, and of late has amounted in Bengal

to the high figure of 40.04 per 1,000¹ of strength, and in Bombay to 60.6 per *mille*.²

Therefore, to arrive at the total loss to the service from disease during the period taken for comparison, the average amount of invaliding, as shown in the following table, must be added to the 28.20 per 1,000 deaths.

INDIA.			BENGAL.		
Years.	Strength.	Ratio per 1,000 invalided.	Years.	Strength.	Ratio per 1,000 invalided.
1860 . .	64,455*	†	1860 . .	42,371	†
1861 . .	57,082*	31.68	1861 . .	37,483	28.09
1862 . .	63,713	28.17	1862 . .	39,312	31.50
1863 . .	67,527	35.00	1863 . .	42,575	34.97
1864 . .	65,002	44.10	1864 . .	39,936	36.75
1865 . .	62,589	38.27	1865 . .	37,631	46.87
1866 . .		‡	1866 . .	35,013	49.04§
		35.44			37.87

* Exclusive of Hon. Company's troops.

† The total amount of invaliding for 1860 is not available from the Blue Books.

‡ Not yet published (1868).

§ *Vide* Third Bengal Sanitary Report.

The total loss, therefore, during the periods in question, 1860—1865, is for the Bengal Presidency 68.53, and for India 63.64. The latter numbers, deducted from the total loss during the period ending 1856, give the *apparent gain* from recent sanitary regulations, which for the whole of India amounts to 16.06.³

¹ Third Annual Sanitary Report for Bengal, p. 25.

² Report of the Sanitary Commissioner for Bombay for 1867.

³ If the statistics of the Bengal army for the last two years for which they are available, namely 1865-6 only, are compared, the gain, in consequence of the great amount of invaliding during those years, will be seen to be much less, thus:

Total loss to the service from invaliding and mortality from 1850 to 1856	} 79.70 per 1,000.
Ditto in Bengal army during 1865-6	
Gain	6.15.

[Since



Of course the whole of those invalided home do not die ; but in the absence of statistics showing the mortality among this class, and knowing that soldiers are not sent home for any trifling ailments, it may be assumed that few, if any, ever again return to duty. The great majority are invalided for discharge from the service ; the minority for change of climate. The former class are as much lost to the service as though dead, while the progress of tropical disease must eventually kill many of the latter. Moreover, before the true value of local sanitary arrangements can be estimated, other conditions, tending to reduce mortality, must be considered. There are the Ten Years' Enlistment Act, and the number of Queen's troops now in the country. It is a well-authenticated fact, supported by physiological arguments and experience,¹ and demonstrated by numerous statistical tables,² that the mortality of Europeans in the tropics increases with length of service. Acclimatization of the inhabitants of temperate zones to the widely different circumstances of the tropics has never yet been accomplished. As the negro³ and Esquimaux⁴ sicken and die when removed to temperate regions, so the European degenerates, and ultimately succumbs, when transported near the equator. Could the Anglo-Saxon race be introduced into India in successive waves and through centuries of time, as were the Aryan Hindoos during their gradual passage from the Hindoo Koosh, it is certainly probable that acclimatization—involving, however, certain physical and mental changes—would take place. But all experience

Since the above was written, the Report of the Sanitary Commission for Bombay for 1867 has been issued. During that year the loss in the Bombay Presidency amounted to 60.6 per *mille* invalided, and 15.6 died: total 76.2. This, deducted from the total loss in former years, as above, gives only 3.5 as the gain.

¹ Moorhead, *Clinical Researches*, p. 13; and Moore, *Health in the Tropics*, p. 274.

² Report of Royal Sanitary Commission, p. 528.

³ Davies, *Statistics of New York Medical Times*, 1865.

⁴ Hall, *Life among the Esquimaux*.

forbids any hope of sudden acclimatization. As a rule, Europeans enjoy the best health during their first years of residence in India. Now, as so many soldiers go home under the Ten Years' Enlistment Act, after having served but a comparatively short period in India, and as others whose ten years are not expired often leave with their regiments in the usual course of reliefs, it follows that some reduction of mortality must occur from these causes alone. And we have the means of estimating the increase of mortality consequent on age and prolonged residence. Table 10 of the Royal Sanitary Commissioners' Report gives the average annual mortality at certain periods of service. From this statement it is found that, whereas the death-rate was 47 per 1,000 among men of from 5 to 10 years' service, it increased gradually until it amounted to 62.5 per 1,000 among men of 20 years' service and upwards. The difference between the figures named is 15; only 1 below the 16.06 per 1,000 mentioned as the *apparent gain* from sanitary regulations.

The actual amount of sickness, as shown by the number of admissions into hospital, has been considerably lessened. The returns compiled by Sir Alexander Tulloch show that the attacks of illness among soldiers formerly ranged from 988 to 3,225 per 1,000 annually. A battalion of 1,000 men sent yearly, on an average, 2,045 cases to the hospital, each soldier thus being exposed to two attacks of illness in the year. This is stated to have been the proportion during the ten years ending 1854, before the introduction of the sanitary rules now in force.¹ For the six years ending 1865, the number of admissions into hospital per 1,000 of strength averaged 1,767.² Here, then, is indisputable evidence of a diminution of sickness, to the extent of 278 per 1,000. Local sanitation cannot, however, be altogether credited with this improvement. Short periods of service and increase of invaliding, the latter relieving the hospitals

¹ Royal Sanitary Commissioners' Report, p. xvi.

² *Vide* former tables; also Royal Sanitary Commissioners' Report.



of the classes most frequenting them, must be taken into consideration. With such facts before us, it is evident that too much importance may be attached to local sanitation as the means by which the total loss to the service has been reduced. It is demonstrable that other causes have aided in inducing beneficial results. Could we be furnished with separate statistics, showing the number of attacks of *primary* disease, we should be better able to estimate the advantages of sanitation, as now practised in India. If the number of primary attacks, making due allowance for length of service and age, approached the ratio of former years, the effects of climate and the meagre results achieved by our system of sanitation would be more evident. When the statistics for the current quinquennial period are published, it is feared that the continued increase of invaliding, while perhaps diminishing the death-ratio, will give an average of total loss greater than for the five years for which figures are now available.

SOLDIERS' WIVES AND CHILDREN, VITAL STATISTICS OF.

Notwithstanding the reduction of sickness and mortality among the men, the death-ratio among European women, as soldiers' wives, remains pretty much as it was twenty years ago. According to the best authority,¹ European females died in barracks, in former years, at the rate of 44.4 per 1,000 in Bengal, and at a reduced rate in the other Presidencies; but giving a mean for the whole of India of 35.47 per 1,000. Up to the year 1866, the mortality in Bengal never fell below 42.² Among children in 1865 the death-rate in Bengal is stated to have been 83 per 1,000,³ and in 1866, 75.11 per 1,000.⁴ Ten or

¹ Chevers, *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. xii.

² Second Bengal Sanitary Report, p. 26. In 1866, in Bengal, the mortality of the women fell to 26 per 1,000; but however favourable this appears, it cannot yet be accepted as the average rate.

³ *Op. cit.* p. 26.

⁴ Third Bengal Sanitary Report, p. 100.



twelve years back, the ratio was almost the same, viz. 84 per 1,000 in the Presidency¹ last named, and 70.7 in Bombay. Now it is certain that if sanitary regulations, as adopted in our military cantonments, had been altogether instrumental in reducing the mortality of the men, so would the chances of life of the women and children be increased by such measures. But this is shown not to have been the case. The mortality among females and children has not diminished from the ratio it attained in former years; and the explanation of this would appear to be, that women and children are seldom invalidated. Even in the usual course of reliefs, comparatively few women and children return to England. It is the married man who generally prefers remaining in India. Hence, length of residence, notwithstanding all sanitary arrangements, tells on the European female. No less authority than Mr. Simon has observed that "a high local mortality among children must always necessarily denote a high local prevalence of those causes which determine degeneration of race." That such influence has not yet been eradicated from India by sanitary reform, must be painfully apparent.

It is well to face the facts bravely, and admit that some penalty, in the shape of sickness and mortality, must be paid as the price of tropical possessions. The Army Statistical Blue Books incontrovertibly demonstrate that loss of service from sickness and death increases as the military stations stand south-east of Great Britain, until the acme is reached in India or China. We therefore do not entertain the Utopian idea that Europeans on the plains of India, under any system of sanitation, will ever enjoy the robust health characteristic of similar classes in Great Britain; either a heavy mortality or a long invaliding list must be accepted. We have now to a great extent removed the money loss consequent on a soldier's death, to the expenditure under the head of

¹ Chevers, *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*.

invaliding; *plus* the expense of maintaining as ineffective, for an indefinite period, either from military or civil sources, all those who ultimately die, or who are discharged with broken health from the service. It has been shown that the mortality among the men during the first period of the sanitary era, or to 1865, was 28.55 per 1,000, being a reduction of 22.15 from the 50.70 for the period ending 1856. This, however satisfactory, falls far short of the mortality, 8 per 1,000, among the rank and file at home. In order still more to assimilate home and Indian sickness and death-rates, greater advantage must be taken of the climates of elevated regions. Hill stations are indeed, more than ever, State necessities.

SOLDIERS' WIVES AND CHILDREN, CONDITION OF.

Although the mortality of these classes is not, as previously demonstrated, materially reduced, their position has been considerably improved. European families do not now, as was formerly too often the case, lodge in one room, "with no other separation than the curtains drawn round the bed."¹ At present twelve per cent. of strength are permitted to marry, and it is remarked, that in the majority of corps this number is scarcely attained. Formerly, the State allowed each European wife five rupees, and each woman of country birth two and a half rupees per mensem. For each child, half the subsistence-money of the mother was passed. These rates, as regards the women, have recently been increased to eight rupees per month.

By G.O. No. 509 of 1860,² preserved milk was allowed to nursing women and children on board ship. More recently, half and quarter rations for women and children were sanctioned, in addition to ordinary subsistence allowance, when the exigencies of the service require the

¹ *Vide Evidence before Royal Sanitary Commissioners.*

² *Calcutta Gazette*, 1860, p. 1070.

separation of the men from their families.¹ Subsistence was also granted to the families of soldiers, volunteering from regiments going home, and who might be in excess of the prescribed twelve per cent.,²—an order which one may well wonder had never been issued before.

Subsistence money and barrack accommodation have also been allowed, for a period of six months, to all soldiers' families who, from any cause, find, on their arrival in India, they have no claim to the ordinary provision;³ while in case of death of the husband on foreign service, the period for which the family claims subsistence dates to the time of intimation of the event to the party concerned.⁴ Before leaving this subject, I may remark, that there is scarcely any more difficult subject to deal with than marriage in the army. Both morally and medically, there can be little doubt of the desirability of a large number of married men among the rank and file. There can be no question that marriage opposes a barrier to immorality of a certain nature, and consequently to disease. Sir John Lawrence himself stated: "I believe a great deal of the unhealthiness (among soldiers) arises from their being unmarried. I have always observed myself, among Europeans, that those who were married were better and more steady fellows, more manageable, and less likely to get into scrapes and mischiefs than the unmarried men."⁵ Some, urging that the public service, or rather the Government, has no right to debar its servants from matrimony, propose that the percentage shall, at least, be increased from twelve to twenty-five. Few, however, of the experienced officers who were examined before the Royal Sanitary Commission were disposed to add to the former number. Colonel Durand remarked, "However much one's feelings might go in favour of

¹ *Gazette of India*, 1864, p. 49.

² *Ibid.* 1864, p. 538.

³ *Calcutta Gazette*, 1860, p. 2,302.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Evidence before the Royal Sanitary Commissioners, Blue Book, vol. i.



extending the permission to marry in India, I must say I am not at all clear that it would be an advisable thing." Colonel Campbell, when asked if it would be well to increase the proportion to twenty-five per cent., replied, "Certainly not." Brigadier-General Russell would have no objection to a slight increase under "certain restrictions." Colonel Greathead, while admitting that an increase would in many respects be advantageous, discerns almost "fatal objections." The whole matter is, however, simply a question of finance. As with many other desirable objects, the condition of the public revenue will long, probably ever, forbid the spectacle of a standing army of married men, either in England or India. So long as sufficient means are not available, the mere affording greater facilities for the contraction of matrimony would be an evil rather than an advantage. It has been proposed to limit the term of military service to very short periods, as six years, under the idea that men would then leave the service, get married, and become the better citizens from their previous military training. The policy of such a step is, however, questionable.

TRANSPORTS.

In 1864, under instructions from the Secretary of State, the Admiralty scale of provisions was ordered to be adopted in all troop-ships leaving India.¹ At a later period, some modifications were made; the chief being an addition to the amount of limejuice issued, and the replacement of the weight lost by salt meat during cooking.² But the most important change connected with the subject is the establishment of the Government Overland Transport Service, through the medium of the magnificent vessels recently built for the purpose. The long-cherished idea,

¹ G.O.G.G., No. 772 of 1864.

² G.O.G.G., No. 1011 of 1867.



that the voyage round the Cape acts as a kind of preparation or acclimatization on men proceeding from one zone to another, is now confessed to be erroneous. Neither does rapid change to a temperate climate from the tropics prove injurious, provided ordinary precautions are taken, excepting in the case of certain maladies which any medical officer is able to define.

The magnitude and importance of the Transport service in a sanitary sense are obvious. Invalids may be transported to a different climate within the space of a few days; and the very knowledge of being on the homeward route is to many a more powerful stimulus than any medicine. The physiological effects of the rapid changes of climate will probably prove a powerful therapeutic agent; and when the hospital at Suez is complete, the necessity for conveying all sick from the heat of the tropics to the cold of England will not exist. Healthy men, again, will be landed fresh from Europe on the shores of India, and therefore in the possession of the maximum of vital and physical energy.

VACCINATION.

There are, I believe, no British provinces without a staff of paid vaccinators, presided over by a European superintendent. But although tens of thousands are thus vaccinated annually, existing establishments are scarcely adequate to the duties which should be performed; yet the State can scarcely be expected to vaccinate all gratuitously. In European countries, it is only the poorer classes who are thus favoured; those able to pay for the performance of the operation would, as a rule, decline even this eleemosynary aid from the hands of the parish or dispensary doctor. In India, however, it is different; not one native in a thousand will willingly pay for prevention of disease, although the majority are ready to promise liberally for cure. Moreover, in many parts of India there



is an objection based on religious grounds, against interfering with the course of smallpox; vaccination, in fact, is considered as little short of sacrilege. "Seetla" and "Mata" are regarded as goddesses, to whom old and young, rich and poor, are bound to pay homage. An attack of smallpox is actually in some districts esteemed a favour; particularly when the disease passes off lightly.¹ Festivals in the honour of these deities are held all over India; near many villages is a holy spot called "Mata Ka Than" (the place of Mata). It was but a year or two ago that H.H. the Maharaja Scindiah, G.C.S.I., on the seizure of a member of his family by smallpox, spent several lacs of rupees in feeding Brahmans, in paying for the beating of gongs and the blowing of shells, in order to propitiate the mythical deity who is supposed to reign over this disease.

The practice of *inoculation* is, however, the great means by which smallpox is disseminated in India. Every fresh case produced by inoculation becomes a centre of infection. When a person afflicted with smallpox either naturally, or artificially by inoculation, comes in contact with the unprotected and uninfected, the latter are almost certain to contract the disease; and this goes on daily, from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas. In Great Britain and most European countries, vaccination is now *compulsory*; if there are objections to such a law for India, there should certainly be none to the prohibition of the spread of a loathsome disease by *inoculation*, and by the exposure of infected persons in public places.

As regards vaccine operations, until comparatively recent periods, a too general mistake has been committed. Blame and praise have been too often meted out according as vaccination showed a large or small number submitted to the operation; hence, probably, many of the false returns so frequently complained of as submitted by native assis-

¹ Moore, Marwar, the Land of Death: *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. xx.

stants. It would be better thoroughly to vaccinate a village community or district, and thereby to let the people see the true value of the prophylactic. Sir J. Y. Simpson¹ of Edinburgh has latterly stated his deliberate opinion that it is quite possible to "stamp out" smallpox altogether by vaccination and isolation of the sick. If the experiment were thoroughly tried in localities where Hindoo prejudices in favour of "Mata" and "Seetla" least abound, the result would demonstrate (as it has often previously done) that careful vaccination is the certain preventive of smallpox. Did space permit, the relative liability of vaccinated and unvaccinated to smallpox might be shown to be highly in favour of the former;² while the rapid decline of the malady in Great Britain since vaccination was adopted, and especially since compulsory vaccination became the law, might also be adduced. But to secure the full value of vaccination, the operation must be carefully performed by competent persons, the lymph must be chosen, taken, and preserved as skill and experience dictate, and above all, both the subject selected from which lymph is secured, and those to which it is conveyed, should possess at least ordinarily robust constitutions and health. Vaccination cannot be regarded as a purely mechanical duty; and the better educated the men employed as vaccinators may be, the more likely is their practice to prove successful.

The only alterations of importance which have been instituted in the Vaccination Department during recent periods are the revision of certain establishments, the appointment of European medical officers as superintendents-general for various provinces, and the introduction of the system of vaccinating from lymph preserved in glass tubes instead of from the crust, where circumstances do not admit of the actual conveyance of the lymph from person to person.

¹ *Medical Times*, Feb. 1, 1868.

² *Vide* Ballard on Vaccination, its Value and alleged Dangers: 1868.



VEGETABLES, CULTIVATION OF.

A very important point connected with the diet of Europeans in India, and especially of soldiers, is a due supply of fresh vegetable food. The Scorbatic diathesis is a very prevalent condition among both Europeans and natives, and there are extensive tracts, particularly in Western India, where scurvy may be said to be endemic. It cannot be too frequently insisted upon, that there is in most Anglo-Indian constitutions an underlying scorbutic taint, to which the term "latent scurvy"¹ has been applied. This condition may scarcely afford even obscure evidence of its presence until the individual becomes affected with one or other of the maladies of the tropics, or until some other exciting cause is applied. For instance, the diathesis exists among the men of a regiment, European or native, but the death-ratio and sickness is small. The regiment moves, perhaps on active service, when the attendant fatigue and privations induce the development of scurvy. From precisely similar causes, the malady frequently develops among pilgrims travelling long distances to the famous Indian shrines. In this manner, the latter are debilitated, and therefore incur a further predisposition to the cholera, from which they so frequently suffer. Latent scurvy, moreover, predisposes the system to malarious diseases and dysentery, aggravating them when present. The union of scorbutic, malarious, and syphilitic cachexia, so often seen among both Europeans and natives in India, is one of the most intractable maladies the physician can be called upon to treat. There is reason to suppose the Delhi boil, Aden ulcer, Scinde boil, and other local maladies of similar nature, are but manifestations of a hidden scorbutic taint.² Dr. Parkes³ truly observes, "If scurvy were prevented, every other war-

¹ Moore, *Health in the Tropics*, p. 227.

² Chevers, *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. xii.

³ *Practical Hygiene*, p. 595.



disease would be comparatively trifling." Happily, attacks of scurvy afflicting whole regiments and ships' companies are now rare. During recent years, however, scurvy in an epidemic form has appeared among Europeans in India, evidencing that, as regards vegetable antiscorbutic diet, very little neglect will cause the development of disease. As a rule, people in India insensibly acquire a habit of consuming less antiscorbutic vegetable material than is actually necessary, and than Europeans habitually use in Europe. This partly arises from scarcity of fresh vegetables of the desired species, and partly from the loss of appetite experienced during the hot weather. The diet of natives, also, even when vegetable, does not comprise a just proportion of fresh antiscorbutic material.

During the last ten years, various attempts have been made to secure a better supply of vegetables for the troops. In 1860, with the view of encouraging soldiers' gardens, station-committees were appointed to fix the price to be paid to the men for vegetables.¹ But, notwithstanding different orders on the subject, and much encouragement, soldiers' gardens do not (and cannot be expected to) supply sufficient vegetables for the consumption of the army. Every regiment, indeed, will not become a gardening regiment. Hence the barrack-tables are yet dependent on contractors, who in many places find difficulty in producing the requisite amount and quality. And so it must be until the natives take to cultivating European vegetables, especially the potato, for their own consumption. And to this, on sanitary grounds, they should be encouraged by civil officers.

Among all edible vegetables, the potato is that possessing the nutritive and antiscorbutic properties to the greatest extent. In Ireland, the labouring classes have for upwards of a century been constantly fed on potatoes, and all must admit the general *physique* of the "finest peasantry in the world." Buckle² traces the proverbial debasement and

¹ *Calcutta Gaz.*, 1860, p. 1925.

² *Hist. of Civilization*, vol. i. p. 108.



want of physical energy of the Hindoo principally to the food he eats. Rice, although one of the most nutritious of cereals, is deficient in nitrogenous elements. To render this grain equal in nutritive properties to bread, ninety-two per cent. of grain, or chunna, is required.¹ The reproductive power of the potato is also enormous. One acre of average land planted with this tuber will support twice as many persons as the same space sown with wheat. No skill, and little irrigation, is required for its cultivation. The root can be carried about without the edible portion coming in contact with anything unclean, can be easily cooked, and therefore appears in every respect peculiarly fitted for the food either of Mahomedans or Brahmans. By the cultivation of the potato, the natives would gain an article of diet possessing great nutritive and acknowledged antiscorbutic properties, while Europeans would be able to purchase in the markets, where at the present time, in many districts, the potato is never seen for sale. In 1864² some attempts were made to raise potatoes from New Zealand and English seed, but the yield, at most of the places where the experiment was tried, was not satisfactory. There are, however, innumerable localities where the soil and climate are well fitted for the cultivation of this and other European vegetables.

The great scarcity of such necessities in many stations (particularly in Western India) occupied by European troops has resulted in a proposal to supply, in lieu, a proportion of European compressed preserved vegetables.³

VENEREAL DISEASE, PREVENTION OF.

As we are unable to apply the means of preventing prostitution, viz. universal morality and marriage, it is now pretty generally admitted that endeavours to lessen or

¹ *Vide* table composed by Dr. Forbes Watson.

² *Gazette of India*, May 14, 1864.

³ No. 318 Circular, P. I. G. Med. Depart. Bombay, 1867.

mitigate resulting disease are justifiable. Until the character of our soldiery and populace generally may be elevated above the instinctive frailty of humanity, there can be no doubt of the propriety of instituting a well-regulated prophylaxis to syphilis. The following table, showing the prevalence of the disease during recent years (from 1861 to 1865) as compared with a former period (the ten years ending 1856), abundantly demonstrates that not only has there been no very decided diminution of syphilis among European soldiers in India, but also the necessity of lessening, by any lawful means, the loss to the service entailed by this malady.

PERIODS.	BENGAL.		MADRAS.		BOMBAY.		INDIA.	
	Ratio per 1,000.		Ratio per 1,000.		Ratio per 1,000.		Ratio per 1,000.	
	Admitd.	Died.	Admitd.	Died.	Admitd.	Died.	Admitd.	Died.
Ten years ending 1856 . .	209.2	0.44	329.0	0.49	267.2	0.22	268.4	0.38
1861	361.4	0.37	259.6	0.37	342.6	0.57	321.2	0.49
1862	307.7	0.30	294.2	0.24	302.1	0.42	301.3	0.32
1863	272.8	0.28	253.6	0.40	262.4	0.16	266.6	0.28
1864	241.5	0.33	271.9	0.62	243.7	0.41	249.0	0.45
1865	216.9	0.27	223.4	0.23	191.8	0.25	210.0	0.25

From the figures given in the Army Blue Books it may also be ascertained that the proportion during the quinquennium ending 1855, invalided on account of venereal disease, amounts to nearly 80 per 1,000 of the whole number invalided. And although the actual death-ratio attributed to syphilitic affections bears but a small ratio to the total mortality, it must be recollected that many cases of so-called debility and rheumatism are in fact cases of *syphilitic cachexia*, or syphilitic rheumatism, aggravated by malarial degeneration. The condition of system resulting from the union of two or all of the undermentioned blood deteriorations—syphilitic, malarial, scorbutic—constitutes one of the most intractable forms of disease afflicting the



human race. Each one present aggravates the other; the syphilitic cachexia rendering the frame more susceptible to both malaria and scurvy.

The desirability of measures for the prevention of venereal disease early attracted attention, and in 1795 Lock Hospitals were established in certain stations in Bengal. But an outcry was raised against them on account of their supposed demoralizing tendency, and, although statistical evidence proved their beneficial effect, they were abolished in 1830 by order of Lord William Bentinck.

Still, however, in most military cantonments some little supervision was exercised over public prostitutes by the bazaar authorities. But it was not until 1864 that, by the new Cantonment Magistrates Act,¹ the prevention of all matters affecting public health, safety, and convenience was legalized. According to the provisions of this Statute, measures for the prevention of venereal disease having been framed and approved by local governments,² are now acted on in most cantonments. These consist, with local modifications, in the registration of public prostitutes, the prohibition of public prostitution by unregistered women, the adoption of means for the detection of venereal disease among registered women, the establishment of Lock Hospitals for the treatment and detention of women suffering from such malady.

In 1867, the surgeon of H.M. ship *Octavia* brought to notice the great prevalence of syphilis among sailors, and suggested that the Act known as the "Contagious Diseases Act" should be enforced at Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta, as at Malta and other British possessions, where its introduction has been followed by very beneficial results. The commodore commanding Indian stations also urged the matter on the attention of Government. Accordingly the Contagious Diseases Act was brought before the Supreme

¹ Act XXII. of 1864.

² Bengal Second Annual Sanitary Report.



Council and passed during 1868¹—from which much good may be expected.

WATER.

The Royal Sanitary Commissioners, in their report several times referred to, state the unsatisfactory condition of the water supply to be one of the cardinal defects at Indian stations, and they recommend a comprehensive system of analysis, and measures for the constant supply of pure filtered water to all public buildings. As there is no doubt certain diseases, as cholera, typhoid or intestinal fever, dracunculus, malarious fever, &c., may be conveyed into the system through the medium of water,² any

¹ *Gazette of India*, Supplement, 1868, p. 479.

² That diseases of various kinds are conveyed into the system by water we have convincing evidence. As regards *Cholera*: In 1849 Dr. Snow first pointed out the probability of cholera germs being conveyed into the Metropolitan, Horselydown, and Wandsworth districts through the medium of the water supply. In 1854 occurred the celebrated instance of the Broad Street pump. The spread of cholera in Russia has also been traced to the use of melted snow, on which cholera evacuations had been thrown. *Diarrhœa*.—Organic or inorganic matter suspended in water will alike induce diarrhœa. Most people who have drunk the water of Aden, Nusseerabad, or Marwar, will admit this. Mr. Cox (*Sanitary Review*, No. 1) gives some striking instances of diarrhœa from impure water; also *vide* "Report on the West Coast of Africa:" *Army Stat. San. Med. Report*, 1863: also "Evidence before the Royal Sanitary Commissions," vol. i. p. 475. *Dysentery*.—*Vide Madras Med. Journal*, No. x. p. 354; "Practical Hygiene" by Dr. Parkes, p. 63. *Guinea-worm*.—*Vide* Carter, *Bomb. Med. Phys. Soc.*, 1853; Moore, "Manual of Diseases of India," p. 192. *Tapeworms and other Entozoa*.—*Vide* Dr. Knocks, *Lancet*, January 25, 1862; Parkes, "Practical Hygiene;" Aikin, "Practice of Medicine," vol. ii. p. 125. *Leeches*.—Parkes, "Practical Hygiene," p. 44; *Army Stat. San. Med. Report*, 1863. *Yellow fever*.—*Vide* "Papers respecting the Origin of Yellow Fever in Bermuda." *Malarious fever*.—Hippocrates and Rhazes held the opinion that malarious fevers and spleen affections arise from bad water. So do the Singhalese (Marshall, "Medical Topography of Ceylon," p. 52); also the inhabitants of Hungary and Holland, when obliged to drink marsh water, always mix spirits (Parkes, "Practical Hygiene," p. 52). The inhabitants of the Eusufye attribute



one recollecting the condition of the sources of supply in former years, or even in some localities at the present time, must admit that the Royal Commissioners could scarcely be too severe in their remarks. The open wells, the too frequent faecal contamination of surrounding localities, the mode (still practised) of conveying the water for house use, the dirty tanks, from which so many draw their supply, and the total absence of analysis, were among the chief subjects of complaint; the majority of which, in British cantonments at least, have been wholly or partially removed.

Shortly after the organization of the Indian Sanitary Commissions, the Bengal Board proposed, in accordance with the previous recommendation of the British Commission, a comprehensive analysis of all waters used in the cantonments of the Bengal Presidency. Medical officers were detached for the purpose of receiving practical instructions in the art of analysing water, and a report on the subject has been recently published.

In order to render tank water, used by the inhabitants of so many villages, drinkable, Mr. Campbell,¹ Inspector of Police in North Canara, recommended double baskets with charcoal between to be placed in the water, which filtering through appears clear and limpid inside. Of course

fever to impure water (Lyell, *Ind. Ann. Med. Science*, vol. iii.). In Albania it is the same (Marsden, *Edin. Med. Journal*, Feb. 1862). The inhabitants of the Shevaroy Hills believe the water of the plains produces fever (Cornish, *Madras Med. Journal*, October 1861). The waters of nullahs have been supposed to cause fevers (Bombay Gov. Records, No. 20). Instances of malarious fever following the use of impure water are also on record; *vide* Moore, "Health in the Tropics," pp. 164, 165. Parkes, "Practical Hygiene," p. 53, mentions several places in India and Europe where *ague* ceased after good wells were constructed. Nothing can be stronger than both the positive and negative evidence of the connexion between malarious fevers and impure water. Other maladies conveyed by the medium of this fluid are stone in the bladder, goitre, paralysis (from lead impregnation), dyspepsia, gout.

¹ Papers relating to the North Canara Epidemic: *Calcutta Gazette*, 1863.



such structures might be made of more durable material than basket-work. It does not appear that this plan, although so simple and efficacious, was adopted, but the suggestion deserves to be generally known and acted upon.

Another proposal is that of digging holes in the immediate neighbourhood of tanks, into which comparatively clear water filters.¹

The question also of the purification or deterioration of water by the presence and action of aquatic plants and animal life has received much attention.² By direction of Government in 1865-6 upwards of 100 officers, 27 of whom were medical men, were consulted on this subject; the result being a decision that both animal and vegetable life are requisite for the due oxygenation and purification of water.³

In 1867, opinions were called for regarding the best means of purifying or filtering water for drinking purposes. The result of this inquiry has not, however, at the period of writing, been made public.

The preceding review, although confessedly imperfect, of the progress of sanitation in India, while showing that very much has been effected or attempted, also proves the absence of certain requirements, without which further improvement cannot be confidently expected. The aim of all State medicine and hygiene is the welfare and conse-

¹ Memorandum by Dr. Arnott, Inspector-General of Hospitals, Bombay, Nov. 1865.

² If vegetable and animal life exist together in certain proportions, stagnant water need not necessarily be bad, as carbonic acid and oxygen are given off in compensatory ratio. If the equilibrium is destroyed, the water becomes bad or putrid.

³ When Sir Charles Napier was Commander-in-chief, he observed native soldiers drawing water from a foul cooking tank, covered with a slimy greenish weed. This was ordered to be cleared away, the result being, that the water soon turned putrid; not becoming wholesome until a fresh crop of the weed had been produced.



CONCLUSION.

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quent happiness, the longevity and resulting increase in the productive power, of the people. It may, indeed, be asserted that the country in which the most careful attention is paid to such matters will, *cæteris paribus*, become the greatest and most powerful. In India, indeed, there is an additional incentive to sanitation in the broadest sense of the term. The manner in which we must consent to hold this country is now clearly apparent. The economical possession of Hindostan by the British rests mainly on sanitary art; for without the strong arm the sword is as nothing. The expectation of brilliant and rapid fortunes, formerly so alluring to Anglo-Indian adventurers, does not now exist: hence the greater necessity of rendering the country more tolerable and habitable than it even now is for Europeans. It cannot be too frequently repeated that, with certain allowance for climatic peculiarities, health in India is to be promoted by similar means, and by the same considerations, as regulate sanitary matters in other countries. As, however, was the case in Europe, so in India, time is required to improve, consolidate, conciliate, and teach.

The more urgent necessities at present existing, are perhaps as follows:—For the benefit of those few officials, civil or military, juvenile or senile, mentioned in the introduction to these remarks, who still passively or actively ignore sanitation, an authoritative intimation of the imperative necessity of acting according to the spirit of the orders of Government; for the health, and comfort, and increased value of life of the European soldier, a more extended occupation of the mountain ranges and elevated regions of India; for the public benefit, an Act rendering the exposure of persons affected with contagious diseases punishable. This should include the conveyance of persons suffering from cholera, or smallpox, in railway carriages; to prevent which no laws at present exist. Inoculation with smallpox matter should also be made penal, and the spread of vaccination encouraged by some more certain

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means than are now employed. The passage of persons infected with any contagious disease into British territory should be authoritatively interdicted, and the native princes should be requested to institute efficient sanitary measures within their own dominions. For, situated as the independent states now are—in many instances altogether surrounded by British territory—we can scarcely expect to maintain the latter free from epidemic malady, while disease may be imported daily from the former. Mofussil (or rural) sanitation is also a *sine quâ non*. As already remarked, experience proves that there is a limit beyond which neglect of sanitation is incompatible with human existence. Villagers should be compelled by law to institute and carry out ordinary sanitary regulations in their localities. And in this nothing impracticable is involved. Ordinary sanitation and common cleanliness are almost synonymous in meaning; and it does not appear too much to expect this proportion of duty towards his neighbour from every member of a community. No man should be permitted to endanger the health and life of his fellows by measures, or by neglect, tending to disseminate epidemic disease, any more than by the discharge of fire-arms, or by the infliction of grievous injury or bodily hurt in other ways. Lastly, there are the questions of a better vegetable supply, of an improved method of conveying water for household use, of the disafforestation of mountains and lowlands now going on, of the requirements of cinchona planting, of the measures for prevention of contagious diseases, with many other matters urgently requiring prolonged attention from the sanitarian.



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APPENDIX.

Despatch from the Secretary of State to the Governor-General of India, dated March 11, 1869, relative to the proposal to provide inducements, in the shape of increased Pension and Bonus, for Officers of the Indian Army to retire.

INDIA OFFICE, LONDON, *March 11, 1869.*

MY LORD,—

Par. 1. I have very carefully considered in Council your Despatch, No. 443, dated November 7, 1868, forwarding certain papers relating to the present condition and future prospects of the several Staff corps, and proposing a scheme for inducing a limited number of the senior officers to retire at once, and for the prevention of an undue growth of the class of field-officers in future by certain modifications in the present retiring rules.

2. After reviewing the several opinions expressed on this subject by Sir W. Mansfield, Sir R. Temple, and Colonel Norman, and referring to the statements and calculations given in a memorandum by the Controller-General of Military Expenditure, your Government state that, having given this important question due consideration, and carefully weighed the several suggestions contained in the Minutes above referred to, you feel bound to record your opinion that some remedial measures are indispensably necessary, especially to meet the present exceptional increasing excess of field-officers, and generally to counteract the permanent tendency to an undue proportion of the higher grades, and to an extravagant number of recipients of the colonel's allowance.

3. With reference also to the existence of a considerable number of unemployed officers, many of them of the higher grades, who are either unfitted for or unwilling to accept employment, your Government recommend the following measures:—

1st. That, within a limit of 200, any substantive lieutenant-colonels in the Indian Staff corps or Indian army, who are entitled to a retiring pension, may be allowed to retire with an addition of 150% per annum to whatever pension they may be entitled to, together with a bonus of 1,000%, provided they do so within a given date from the issue of the order sanctioning the measure, such date not to be less than six or more than twelve months distant; the senior applicants to have the first claims. 2d. That, as regards those officers who may retire subsequent to that date, the period entitling them to the lieutenant-colonel's pension of 365% per annum may be twenty-five instead of twenty-eight years as heretofore, including three years' furlough; and the period entitling to the colonel's pension thirty instead of thirty-two years, including four years' furlough. Further, that the colonel's pension may be increased from 456% 5s. to 500% per annum. 3d. That it may be notified that, from the date fixed as the limit for retirement with the additional pension and bonus, the system of appointing field-officers to perform general or station duty will cease, and all those who may be holding no appointment, civil or military, permanent or officiating, will be placed on an unemployed list. 4th. That such as remain continuously unemployed for a period of three years, will, after that period, be restricted to the English pay of their rank without any Indian allowances, but will be allowed to reside wherever they may elect, either in India, or in Europe; and that, when they may have been continuously out of employ for a total period of five years, they will be placed on the retired list, with the pension to which they may then be entitled. Lastly. That all officers who may be considered by Government and the Commander-in-chief as unfit for either civil or military employment suitable to their rank, will be transferred to the retired list, if entitled to pension, or to the half-pay list, if not so entitled.

4. I have perused these papers, and considered your proposals with much care and attention, and have now to inform your Excellency of the reasons which have led her Majesty's Government to dissent from the conclusions at which you have arrived, and to withhold their sanction from the several measures submitted by your Government with a view to facilitating retirement among the senior officers of the Indian service.



5. The grounds upon which your proposals are based on the present occasion are mainly financial.

6. You apprehend an alarming increase of expenditure on account of officers in receipt of the colonel's allowance, as a result of the strong inducement to remain in the service held out to them at the present time, in the certainty of attaining that great prize within a given period ; and you hope, by the measures now proposed, to prevent the evil which you thus anticipate, and further to remove, in a great degree, the present burden of unemployed officers. You seem to entertain some apprehension, also, of administrative difficulties arising from an undue proportion of field-officers in the several Staff corps.

7. The apprehension expressed in these papers of future embarrassment arising from the organization and present condition of the several Staff corps appears to me excessive, and in a great measure unfounded.

8. In the allusion so frequently made to the large number of field-officers in these corps, there is a too great tendency to measure their organization by the conventional standard of a British regiment, to which they bear no analogy.

9. On the creation of these corps as substitutes for the bodies of British officers in the Indian service previously borne on regimental lists, an entirely new system of promotion was introduced, after much deliberation ; a system under which the maintenance of a fixed proportion between the several grades was given up as unnecessary in a body formed for staff employment only.

10. The object aimed at was to render service in these corps attractive by the certainty of regular promotion in the army ; and it cannot be affirmed that under this system the promotion of officers destined to pass the best years of their lives in India is unreasonably rapid.

11. The effect of it, however, will of necessity be to increase the proportion of officers of the higher grades ; an effect which will be the more marked, inasmuch as, of the twelve years' service in the grade of subaltern required for promotion to the rank of captain, at the least two, and in practice more than two, will be passed in a line regiment ; and thus very few officers will be borne on the rolls of the Staff corps in the grade of subaltern for more than eight or nine years.

12. And I must remind your Excellency that the employment of the officers of an Indian Staff corps is practically, and has been authoritatively declared to be, independent of their military rank. I need hardly point out, indeed, that an officer's fitness for a staff situation, whether in a civil or military department, does not depend on his army rank, but upon his moral, physical, and intellectual qualities ; and no better evidence can be required in support of this view of the case than the fact that officers of the Staff corps promoted from time to time under the present system from one grade to another, are not necessarily disturbed in the appointments they hold, or disqualified by such promotion for the duties they have to perform. In fact, the men are the same in age and qualification, though it may be in a different and higher grade from that which they would have held under the former system. Thus, many officers who would have been subalterns, and perhaps brevet captains, under the old rules, are now substantive captains ; but not, therefore, the less qualified for the performance of similar duties.

13. Admitting, however, the propriety of conforming to usage and tradition in regard to regimental service, and of providing officers of the subaltern grade for the subordinate positions with native regiments, as well as a certain proportion of young officers for departmental employment, there is no reason to doubt but that the several Staff corps, in their normal condition, will at all times provide sufficient numbers for this purpose.

14. The number of native regiments, even were it considered necessary that the regimental staff should be of the subaltern grade, which is certainly not the case, would, at four subalterns per regiment, require about 700 subalterns, whereas a very simple calculation will show that in the normal state of the Staff corps the number of subalterns, assuming Colonel Norman's estimate of their aggregate strength to be correct, will be generally between 1,000 and 1,100.

15. At the present time, it appears from the statement of the Controller of Military Finance, in paragraph 31, that there are in the service, including officers on the local list, not less than 1,069 officers of the subaltern grade ; and yet frequent allusion is made to the want of subalterns, many of them moreover being placed in departmental employment in positions not unsuited to officers



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of higher grade, while others are unemployed from not having passed.

16. The introduction of the Staff corps, with new and more favourable rules of promotion, and the transfer of nearly the whole of the remaining officers of the Indian army to those corps with the immediate benefit of those rules, has of course tended to swell temporarily the numbers in the higher grades; while the contemplated future reduction in the aggregate number of officers required for employment in India, and the actual reduction of the number serving with regiments, places a certain number of officers out of employment until absorbed.

17. As an administrative question, the necessity of maintaining for any time a considerable number of officers out of employment is to be regretted; but considered under its financial aspect, as contrasted with the former state of things, the evil is more apparent than real, inasmuch as the officers who would formerly have been all posted to and employed with regiments are now classed as unemployed in consequence of the introduction of a new regimental organization, involving a great reduction in the number of regimental officers. Indeed, they are only now unemployed in the sense of holding no staff appointment, and are doing duty either in garrisons or with regiments.

18. Upon this subject I shall only further observe that the present lists show very few officers of such length of service as to lead to the supposition that they have become inefficient from that cause. In fact, by far the greater number of the older officers are employed, and many in positions of great responsibility, requiring more than usual experience, energy, and capacity.

19. I cannot, therefore, admit that there are, in this increase in the number of officers of the higher ranks, sufficient grounds for introducing this exceptional measure for inducing some of them to give up the service.

20. I have now to notice your proposal with reference to the present number of unemployed officers.

21. I find, from the latest reports, that the number of officers of the several grades unemployed in India, below the rank of colonel with colonel's allowance, was nearly as follows, viz:—

	Lieut.- Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Total.
Bengal—Staff Corps .	28	27	18	9	82
„ Local Service .	27	5	14	26	72
Madras—Staff Corps .	23	20	25	19	87
„ Local Service .	17	2	14	17	50
Bombay—Staff Corps .	1	5	7	2	15
„ Local Service .	4	—	3	7	14
Total	100	59	81	80	320

And it appears from an analysis of the reports noted in the margin,¹ that the reasons for the non-employment of these officers, as far as they are given, though the reports are incomplete in this respect, are as follow :—

	Lieut.- Colonels.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieuts.	Total.
Not passed, or otherwise unfit	58	28	48	60	194
Removed for incapacity or misconduct	1	2	—	3	6
Resigned appointment at their own request	7	8	2	2	19
Various causes	32	17	22	5	76
No cause assigned	2	4	9	10	25
Total	100	59	81	80	320

22. It appears, therefore, that a large number of these officers are considered ineligible for employment in consequence of their not having qualified in the languages; not a few have been

¹ Statements have been prepared from Enclosures to—

Military Letter from India, No. 487, dated December 22, 1868.

Ditto ditto No. 374, dated September 26, 1868.

Ditto from Madras, No. 427, dated November 26, 1868.

Ditto from Bombay, No. 136, dated November 25, 1868,
par. 15.

The statement of the unemployed local officers in Madras has been prepared from the Army List of October 1, 1868.



allowed to resign employment, and thus by their own act to swell the unemployed list; others have been thrown temporarily out of employment from causes that must always operate to some extent in such a service as that of India, whether in the civil or military departments, since—with a varying number of absentees occasionally vacating appointments during absence—there must inevitably remain at all times a margin of unemployed officers.

23. I understand from your Despatch that you look to the present scheme to reduce this list of unemployed officers.

24. With some misgivings as to the voluntary acceptance of your offers on the part of any very large number of the senior officers, misgivings shared in and expressed by Sir R. Temple in his minute of October 20 last, you say that if the inducement in the shape of either increased pension or bonus were coupled with a notification that this special offer was final, and that after a given date all field-officers continuously unemployed would, like general officers in the Staff corps, be placed on English pay after three years; and that all those who might be considered clearly unfit for military or civil employment suitable to their rank would be removed to the retired list, you are of opinion that a very extensive reduction in the senior grades might be effected.

25. Upon this I must observe, that there are no grounds whatever for anticipating that the officers now unemployed would be more ready to accept the terms offered than other and more efficient men; that, in many cases, to purchase the retirement of officers of the latter class would be to inflict an injury on the State, and to cause considerable embarrassment to the public service; while, with regard to the former, it would be simply, in many instances, to offer a premium upon indolence or incapacity; and I must remind your Excellency, with reference to the coercive measures proposed in this paragraph of the despatch, that your Government would, strictly speaking, be in no better position to enforce these measures after the promulgation of this notice than at present.

26. The officers of the late Indian service who joined the Staff corps, under Lord Cranborne's despatch of August 8, 1866, have been informed that they have not rendered themselves, by so doing, liable to be placed on half-pay, under G.O., No. 826, of September 17, 1861, upon any grounds other than such as would



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have justified their removal from the effective strength of the army, had they not joined the Staff corps.

27. Under the spirit of this notification, the removal of an officer who entered the service before 1858, on the ground of his having failed to pass in the native languages, will not be justifiable. Other measures, to which I shall presently allude, must be resorted to, with a view to the speedy reduction of the unemployed list.

28. In the meantime, your General Order No. 1,168, dated December 10, 1868, passed in accordance with the instructions of her Majesty's Government, communicated in Sir Stafford Northcote's Despatch, No. 259, of July 23 last, will, it is hoped, effectually put a stop to the practice of allowing officers on the effective list either to decline or to resign employment, and remain unemployed to suit their own convenience; and it is not without some surprise that I am led to conclude, from the remarks contained in the 37th paragraph of your despatch, that the power of an officer thus to make a convenience of the public service is still practically admitted. So long, however, as this is the case, there can be no limit to the list of unemployed officers, and no want of excuse for expecting some special measures, with a view to getting rid of the burden. Under the present constitution of the Indian military service, it is imperatively necessary that the service at large should understand that no officer can escape active employment but by resigning the service.

29. I have now to consider your proposals in their probable bearing upon the finances of the State.

30. The statements and calculations submitted by the Controller-General of Military Expenditure in his memorandum dated May 23, 1868, lead to such startling results, that I considered it desirable to subject them to the test of investigation by some person thoroughly conversant with questions of this nature; and with this view I caused the whole of the papers to be placed in the hands of Major-General Hannington, formerly Military Auditor-General in Bengal, an officer whose ability and experience in the conduct of inquiries of this nature must be well known to your Government.

31. I now forward for your information a copy of his Report, by which you will perceive that the results obtained by the



Controller-General, and upon which the apprehensions of your Government have been raised, are greatly exaggerated; that, instead of the Government saving expense by the adoption of your proposals, it would, if the full number of 200 officers retired, involve an absolute loss to the State of upwards of 467,000*l.*, including an immediate payment of 200,000*l.* (assuming that none of the unemployed officers are absorbed), to say nothing of the inconvenience that might be caused by the simultaneous retirement of many of the most valuable members of the public service.

32. It may, however, be reasonably expected that some of the unemployed officers would accept the offer, and, to the extent of their unemployed pay, the above capital sum would require reduction, but no assurance can be felt that many of this class would do so, not to speak of the impolicy of purchasing the retirement of such as are unemployed by reason of incapacity; while no reliance can be placed on their fitness to succeed to the offices vacated by others, a fact illustrated by the circumstance pointed out in Sir Stafford Northcote's despatch of July 23 last, No. 259, that, while the unemployed list in Bengal had been reduced during the year 1867 by five only, there had been, during the same period, 28 fresh admissions to the Staff corps.

33. It seems, also, from General Hannington's Report, that, instead of the number of officers of the several Staff corps receiving the colonel's allowance being likely to amount in 1892 to 981, they will not exceed 487, according to the Controller-General's tables, or 629 according to tables more favourable to life; and that, instead of the total number of such officers both in the Staff corps and local service being 1,154, and the aggregate annual cost on that account 1,227,835*l.*, the entire number will not exceed 573 in the one case, or 740 in the other, and the total cost 644,551*l.* or 832,405*l.*, according to the tables used; and this calculation is made irrespectively of any intermediate retirements on ordinary pension.

34. I must further observe, that, while referring to the inducements now held out to officers to remain in the service, with the view of attaining the colonel's allowance, and calculating the ultimate charge on that account, no allusion seems to be made to the consequent reduced charge for pensions, the fact being



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that, in the extreme case supposed, of all surviving officers remaining for the colonel's allowances, those allowances would, with the pay proper of the officers, represent very nearly the whole of the cost on account of retired officers, showing an amount of 832,405*l.* in 1892, against 687,957*l.* as it stood (shortly after the formation of the Staff corps) in 1863. Meanwhile, a considerable saving is taking place. During the last five years the charge (excluding that for the medical and clerical services) has decreased by 13,100*l.* a year.¹ This reduction will go on for some years to come, and may be fairly regarded as a not unimportant set-off to a future temporary increase brought on by the Staff corps, before those corps reach their normal condition.

35. It would appear, therefore, not only that the alarm which your Government expressed at the prospect of future expenditure on this account is unfounded, but that the remedy proposed on financial considerations would probably result in an absolute and considerable loss to the State.

36. The above observations relate to a proposal made with a view to the removal of a temporary embarrassment by the adoption of a special measure. I have now to consider your further proposals respecting a modification in the present pension rules, with a view to keeping down in future the number of field-officers of the several Staff corps.

37. I cannot concur with your Government in the necessity or expediency of thus holding out special inducements to officers of the Staff corps to retire before the Government have had the full benefit of their services. It appears scarcely consistent with sound policy to create a body of officers, and to hold out inducements to them to enter and qualify for a special service, and then to frame subsidiary regulations, with the avowed object of inducing them to retire at a time when their services are most valuable.

38. There appears to be, in the minds of many, an entire misapprehension of the object with which a scale of pensions is laid down for any department of the public service; and this or that rate of pension is not unfrequently alluded to as insufficient to meet the requirements of an officer, and the support of his family.

¹ See General Hannington's Second Report, dated February 15, 1869.



39. The fact is, that pensions are intended, not as inducements to officers to retire while still capable of work, but as a recognition of former services, in the event of their retiring to suit their own convenience, or from failure of health before they have reached a disqualifying age.

40. To tempt men to retire at ages between forty and fifty, by the offer of enhanced pensions, framed with a view of rendering them independent of further employment, would be extremely impolitic; men are then usually in the vigour of life, and have reaped something of that experience which is of special value in India: knowledge of the languages, right understanding of native character, softened prejudices, all the fruits of matured intellect and experience, have then been attained. To encourage early retirement is not only to sacrifice wantonly the interests of the service by depriving it of the best men, but tends also to bring up a class of officers whose thoughts are bent from the first upon early retirement, an object incompatible with an earnest and contented public spirit. The pension is intended generally for the worn-out servant, not offered for the purpose of inducing an efficient public servant to retire.

41. The pensions now granted to the officers retiring from Indian service are framed on a scale more liberal than in any other military service in the world; while the remuneration to those officers, when actually employed, is amply sufficient to enable them in most cases to provide for the present and prospective necessities of their families.

42. The one retiring allowance which is given at the close, or assumed close, of an officer's career, is the colonel's allowance; and no question has been raised as to the sufficiency and liberality of that allowance.

43. It may be necessary to notice, with regard to this allowance, and to the remark made by your Government as to the inducement held out to officers to remain in the service by the certainty of attaining thereto, that the present rule, which gives the allowance after twelve years' service in the grade of lieutenant-colonel, was introduced, as a purely temporary expedient, to meet the difficulties which arose from the conflicting claims of the officers of the Staff corps prior and subsequent to Lord Cranborne's Despatch of August 8, 1866, and applies only to officers

who joined the Staff corps before or under that despatch ; and that, even allowing the aggregate length of service required to qualify for the position under present regulations to be less than the average period within which it was attained under the former system—and, according to the conclusions of the Royal Commission of 1865, it is not much less—the increased inducement to remain must be measured by the difference between those two periods, and cannot be considered independent, under the present system, of those contingencies which, from various causes, induced or compelled officers formerly to retire from the service before the attainment of that position. When the time shall have arrived for carrying out the instructions contained in Sir S. Northcote's Despatch of July 9, 1867, No. 184, and placing a limit to the establishment of colonels with colonel's allowance, all apprehension of an undue charge on this account will of necessity come to an end.

It would appear, indeed, from a calculation made by General Hannington, that, when the Staff corps shall have attained to its normal condition, the whole of the retiring allowance, including 100 colonels' allowances, will probably not exceed 300,000*l.* annually.

44. Your proposals have yet to be considered from another point of view, and that is, as affecting the efficiency and contentment of the officers at large.

45. There can be no doubt that the effect of measures of this nature, disturbing the faith of a body of officers in the stability of the ordinary rules of the service, is to excite a general feeling of restlessness and discontent, which even a declaration like that proposed in the 21st paragraph of your despatch would be insufficient to allay for many years.

46. Your Government will remember that a similar declaration was made on the occasion of special annuities being offered to a number of officers in 1861, in the 25th paragraph of Sir C. Wood's Despatch, No. 320, of August 10 of that year, in which the Government of India were instructed to intimate that it was a final arrangement, and that no further proposals connected with schemes for the retirement of Indian officers would be entertained. Notwithstanding this notification, the precedent then established has been made use of to keep alive the expectation



of a similar proceeding in the minds of officers of the army in India, an expectation that has received continual stimulus from the public press, has doubtless tended to arrest the course of ordinary retirements, and has now been, in some measure, justified by the action taken by your Government.

47. The explicit declaration above quoted from Sir C. Wood's despatch may have escaped the attention of your Government ; and, at all events, it will not be irrelevant to notice in this place the claim that officers who have since retired might put forward to participate in any scheme such as that now proposed.

48. The determination of her Majesty's Government not to offer any further inducement to retire will, no doubt, create a feeling of disappointment in the minds of all who were looking forward to the promulgation of some such scheme as that now proposed by your Government ; but, on the other hand, its adoption, especially after the above-quoted announcement by her Majesty's Government in 1861, could hardly fail to create in the service at large a chronic state of dissatisfaction with the retiring rules, and an expectation that each officer in his turn might reasonably expect to derive benefit from some similarly special measure.

49. Another objection to the introduction of measures of this nature, if not absolutely inevitable, deserves notice, while the extensive changes made in the late Indian service are still recent ; and that is, their effect on the minds of that large body of officers who have been transferred from the local to the British army. It is not unreasonable to expect that the contemplation of measures of this nature, from the benefits of which they are excluded by their recent transfer to the British service, would give rise to feelings of irritation and disappointment, greatly to the prejudice of those branches of the service to which these officers belong, and in which they now form a very valuable and important element.

50. It is upon the above considerations that her Majesty's Government have arrived at the conclusion that the adoption of the several proposals contained in your letter under acknowledgment is neither necessary nor expedient.

51. I desire, in conclusion, to communicate to your Excellency the wishes of her Majesty's Government regarding the disposal of



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the unemployed officers. These may be divided into two classes:—1. Those qualified in all respects for employment.
2. Those from various causes not qualified.

52. With regard to the former, I need only observe that admission to the Staff corps from the line should be restricted to some extent until this class of unemployed officers has been provided for.

53. With regard to the latter, it must be assumed that their disqualification is due to causes that may be divided into two classes:—1st. Such as would, under the system in force before the amalgamation, have led to their removal from the effective list; such as moral delinquency or intellectual incapacity. 2d. Not having passed the language test, a disqualification for active employment under present, but not under former rules, according to which an officer of this class might have served with his regiment.

54. Among the latter class it is generally understood that there are many officers otherwise well qualified for active employment, and who in many cases possess a colloquial knowledge of the language. Her Majesty's Government consider it advisable, under present circumstances, that all of this class of officers, whose names were borne on any regimental cadre prior to the re-organization of the army, should be employed on the staff, whether passed or not, in such departments and positions as your Government may consider them individually best fitted for. Such a course of procedure will doubtless involve a departure from an established and very important rule, but can form no embarrassing precedent, inasmuch as all officers, before entering the Staff corps hereafter, must qualify in the native language.

55. In the case of the young officers who entered the service since 1858, and under special conditions, your Government will cause all of them who may not have passed to be addressed individually, and informed that, in the event of their not passing the higher standard within a given period, which it will be for your Government to determine, they will be removed from the service, as her Majesty's Government cannot permit an officer voluntarily to disqualify himself for useful employment, and at the same time to enjoy the benefit of pay and promotion in the public service.

56. With regard to those officers whom it may be considered not desirable to continue in active employment, by reason either of questionable conduct or intellectual incapacity, you will cause



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a special report to be made in each case, with a view to their removal from the effective list, upon such conditions as their several cases may render just and expedient.

57. By the adoption of these several measures, it may be confidently expected that the ordinary casualties of the service, and the effect of the new furlough rules upon the number of absentees, will lead to the absorption of the present unemployed officers at no very distant date.

58. I cannot close this despatch without pointing out to your Excellency the evils resulting from the discussion of projects of this nature in India before the views of her Majesty's Government have been sought and ascertained. In the present case, it would appear, from the frequent notices in the public papers, to have been well known for many months past that a scheme of this nature was under consideration; and that, while the date of the Memorandum by the Controller-General of Military Expenditure is May 23, showing that the information therein given must have been for some time under preparation, the Secretary of State, in utter ignorance of what was taking place, replied, on April 3, 1868, to a question put to him in the House of Commons, that no such scheme was contemplated.

59. Not only has the fact of its being under consideration been generally known, but in one case, in the *Calcutta Review* for August 1868, a paper has been published relating to the subject, bearing the clearest marks of having been written by one who had access to at least a portion of the papers now for the first time submitted to her Majesty's Government. Still later, an abstract of your proposed scheme has been published in several Indian newspapers of a recent date.

60. Her Majesty's Government consider it very desirable that, in the consideration of questions of this nature, affecting the interests of a large body of public servants, publicity should be avoided as much as possible, so long as the intentions of the Government are undetermined; and, moreover, that in all possible cases, the views of her Majesty's Government should be ascertained before a proposal of this nature is made the subject of formal and departmental investigation.

I have, &c.,

(Signed)

ARGYLL.

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